The transition in Australian science policy, 1965-1990 by Homeshaw, Judith Elizabeth
The Transition in Australian Science Policy
1965-1990
by
Judith Elizabeth Homeshaw BA(Hons)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Tasmania
June 1994
I affirm that this thesis contains no material which has
been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma in
any tertiary institution and that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material
previously published or written by another person
except where due reference is made in the text of the
thesis.
mAbstract
The thesis is an explanation of the transformation of science policy in Australia
between 1965 and 1990 using analytical constructs from policy analysis and political
sociology to examine the way in which cultural, political, social and economic factors
have influenced the course of decision-making about the production and application of
scientific knowledge.
During these years science policy in Australia changed from being driven
principally by notions of the creation and transmission of knowledge to being
concerned with questions of economic production. Until the 1980s change was
incremental rather than radical due to the conservatism of interest groups, the political
ideology of significant actors in the policy community, and the political passivity of
scientists.
In 1965 the production of scientificknowledge took place in the universities and
a few large public research organisations and was extemally non-accountable in terms
of the utility of the knowledge produced. By 1990 the production of scientific
knowledge has become the keystone of the government's hopes for turning Australia
into a 'clever country' with the production of economic wealth based on knowledge
and 'know-how' rather than raw materials. The rationale for the change is basically
economic: scientific knowledge is considered necessary to supply the innovations
upon which a broader system of economic production is to be based.
This change has brought into focus the relationship between the political system
and the scientific system which forms the core of the science policy process.
Politicisation of the science system occurs as the scientific community is drawn into
the policy-making process and interaction between the two systems is formalised in
new techno-political agencies. The organisation of the production of scientific
knowledge, once the province of autonomous scientists, is increasingly under the
control of central, corporatised political agencies.
A policy community approach, supplemented by concepts of power is the main
analytical tool. This approach explains policy formulation and outcomes in terms of
the interactions of interest groups. A policy community is seen as that part of a
political system that - by virtue of its functional responsibilities, vested interests and
specialised knowledge - acquires a dominant voice in determining government
decisions in a specific field of government activity, and is generally permitted by
society at large, and the public authorities in particular, to do so. Power is exercised
in the policy community by organised interests with the capacity to control the
resources, rules and ideas which underlie action in the policy arena. The dynamic
which underlies action in the science policy community is that of the exchange of
knowledge, resources and legitimacy.
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Introduction
This thesis is about science policy in Australia. Science policy can be defined as a set
of decisions taken by a group of actors with authority concerning the selection of
scientific research goals in the public arena and the means of achieving them. The
science policy arena is a set of political relationships in which governments and
scientists interact to provide the rules, resources, and ideas for the production of
scientific knowledge, and its application and dissemination.
In Australia the principal arena of action in science policy is at the federal level.
Since federation, the Commonwealth government has gradually assumed the major
responsibility for the provision of public resources to the production of scientific
knowledge, and by far the major proportion of such production in Australia is now
funded at this level. In 1988-89 the Commonwealth government provided $1888m
(0.61% of GDP) for research and development compared with $399m (0.12% of
GDP) provided by the States.^ Through suchmechanisms as the establishment of the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1926; the National Health and
Medical Research Council (NH&RMC) in 1937; the creation of subsidised trust funds
for rural research in the 1950s; the takeover of university funding in 1958 and the
setting up of the industrial research grants scheme in 1967; the focus of control has
passed from State governments to the Commonwealth government. In 1968 the State
governments' share of research expenditure was 13 per cent. By 1988 this had
decreased to 11 per cent.^ This thesis therefore focuses on the interaction between the
science system and the political system at the federal level. Discussion of the
involvement of State govemments in the production, dissemination and application of
scientific knowledge is confined to the role of State govemments as producers and
users of such knowledge. The formulation and implementation of science policies by
individual State govemments is not under consideration here.
In Australia too, most research and development is both funded by, and
undertaken within, the public sector. In 1988-89 only 40 per cent of expenditure, and
30 per cent of researchers and support staff, were from the private and private non
profit sector.3 The USA tradition of private, independent laboratories undertaking
research work for public and private sponsors did not develop in Australia. Apart
Australia, Science and Technology Budget Statement 1991-92, Budget Related Paper no. 6,
AGFS, 1991, p. 101
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, Australian Science and Innovation Resources
Brief, AGFS, Canberra 1992, p. 3.
The years 1968 and 1988 are used because, in the twenty-five year period 1965-1990, these are the
earliest and latest years for which comparable data are available.
Department of Science, Project Score, Report 5, Summary of all expenditure by Australia on
research and development during 1968-69, AGFS, 1973, Table 2, p. 10;
ABS, Research and Experimental Development All Sector Summary 1988-89, Cat no. 8112.0,
1990, Canberra, Table 4, p. 4.
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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from a few privately funded research laboratories in the rural and mining industries,
and equally few (and highly prestigious) private medical research institutes, the vast
majority of public funds spent on research and development in Australia are for work
undertaken in public sector research organisations or private firms. Even these private
facilities are, to a greater or lesser degree, subsidised by governments. The thesis
therefore concentrates on decisions made in the public arena but includes publicly
funded research and development undertaken in the private sector.
Four main areas of science are examined: higher education; research undertaken
in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Organisation (CSIRO); rural research;
and research for manufacturing industry. These areas have been chosen because each
has developed a distinct type of relationship betweenpolitical actors and researchers.
Researchers in the higher educationsystem regard themselves as being at the frontiers
of knowledge which may not have any practical value but is of intrinsic value. CSIRO
has for many years been the Commonwealth Govemment's 'principal instrument for
civilian research' and therefore requires close scrutiny in an analysis of sciencepolicy
in Australia.4
Research for manufacturing industry has long been the problem area of
Australian science policy because it confronts governments with the issue of
intervention into market relationships. In contrast, research for rural industry has
traditionally been collectivised, legitimated and subsidised by governments in
Australia. These two areas of research invite comparison because of the discrepancy
between the traditional reluctance of governments to intervene in the private sector
management of research in manufacturing industry and the willingness to subsidise
rural research and to prioritise between rural industries through differential rates of
subsidisation.^ Rural industries were always seen as the traditional source of wealth
creation in Australia: manufacturing industries were not.
The thesis does not cover the relationship between government and other areas
of science in Australia. Decisions about health and defence research have, in
Australia, traditionally been made in isolation from other areas of research, and have
been considered as part of health and defence policy respectively. Defence research
has been isolated from other areas of research since the Menzies 'Red Scientists'
scandal caused such work to be split off from CSIRO in 1949. Not until 1993 was
the decision been made to subject health research to the same economically-based
evaluation criteria as other civilian research.^ Both areas have remained opaque to
Guy Gresford, The Organisation of Science Policy in Australia, Public Policy Paper no. 7,
Department of Political Science, University of Tasmania, 1976,p. 6.
For example, in 1963-64 the Commonwealth Government contribution to wool research (4s per
bale) was twice the growers' contribution (2s per bale); whereas the Govemment's contribution to
wheat research simply matched that of the growers.
Committee of Economic Enquiry. Report 1965, vols. 1 & 2, (Sir James Vernon, Chairman),
Parl. Papers 371 & 372, Canberra, 1965 p. 676.
Dr Michael Pitman (Chief Scientist), Address, Australasian Association for the History,
Philosophy and Social Studies of Science Conference, La TrobeUniversity, July 10, 1993.
3government scrutiny. Reference to these areas of scientific production will be made
only when policy changes in these areas impact on the areas under consideration.
There are other areas and institutions of science which, because of constraints of
space, are considered only in passing. These include Antarctic, marine, energy and
mining research; and the associated institutions and programs.
Temporal Points of Reference
Policy arenas are historically dynamic systems of action. The choice of a period for
analysis must recognise that prior events are important in defining interaction in a
policy arena; and that change continues beyond the specified time boundaries of an
analysis. Nevertheless, analysis of change in a policy arena needs temporal
containment in order to restrict the scope of substantive issues under consideration to a
level which is manageable and meaningful in terms of the analytical approach which is
used.
The years 1965 and 1990 have been selected as temporal boundaries of the
thesis because they can be considered as watersheds in the history of science policy in
Australia in terms of control over the public resources allocated to the production of
scientific knowledge. In each year there were significantpolicy events which were the
culmination of both incremental and radical changes in the relationship between the
Commonwealth government and scientists. Each year was the penultimate one in the
tenure of a Prime Minister who had developed an interest in science policy. Menzies'
interest dated from the formation of ANU in 1945-46 whereas Hawke's interest
developed late in his prime ministership. Each man chose to locate ministerial
responsibility for science policy within his own portfolio, and to bring scientists into
the core of executive government.
In 1965 science policy was emerging as a coherent set of issues which had to be
explicitly addressed by politicians. Menzies made a speech in Parliament which
acknowledged for the first time that political actors should make decisions about the
directions in which scientific research should proceed.'^ The Martin Report on Higher
Education (1965) and the Vemon Report on economic policy (1965) had both made
explicit recommendations for restructuring the production of scientific knowledge in
Australia.^ 1965 was the last year of State govemments' responsibility for research in
universities and the last year of government non-intervention in manufacturing
industry research. The era in which the relationship between government and
individuals in the scientific community was conducted through informal, ad hoc
interaction was ending because of pressures on political leaders from political
opponents and some prominent scientists, and because of new ideas about the
^ Australia, House of Representatives 1965, Debates, vol. HR46, pp. 267-274.
^ Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, Report, 3 Volumes, (Sir Leslie
Martin, Chairman), Government Printer, Canberra, 1965.
Committee of Economic Enquiry. Report 1965.
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relationships between governments and science which were being formulated
throughout the western world.9 The Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Gough
Whitlam, had observed the way in which Harold Wilson had used the issue of
technological development as a stepping stone to political power in the UK^o He
used similar issues to harangue the Liberal-Country Party Government over its lack of
coherent policy for science and technology. The scientific community in Australia was
split over the issue of whether to institutionalise scientific advice to government with
its attendant risk of loss of scientific autonomy.
By 1990 science policy was confirmed as a significant policy arena by being
selected by the ALP to open its election campaign. The concept of 'the clever
country', underpinned by scientific research and increased education, was front page
news throughout Australia. For ten years, seven of them in government as Minister
for Science, Barry Jones had been proselytising the need to redress the technological
balance of payments between the Australian economy and the rest of the world by
developing science-based industries. The absorption of the Department of Science
into the Departmentof Industry, Technology and Commerce in 1987 emphasised the
Hawke Government's commitment to realign the production and application of
scientific knowledge with non-ruraleconomicproduction
The restructuring of the production of scientificknowledge necessary to achieve
this objective threatened existing networks of the control of resources and institutions
and caused scientists to become involved in political activity. For example, as the first
Hawke Govemment enlargedthe membership of the Australian Industry Research and
Development Incentives Scheme (AIRDIS) Board, and the Australian Research Grants
Committee (ARGC), to include industry representatives with marketing expertise,
particularly in the new biotechnology and computer industries, the influence of
researchers in traditional disciplines, and of their academies, was diluted. Their
response was the establishment of the Federation of Australian Scientific and
Technological Societies (FASTS) in 1985 as an overtly political lobbying
organisation, and of the National Science andTechnology Advisory Group (NSTAG)
as a scientist's 'think tank' on science policy.
Similar restructuring involved the redefinition of the industrial role of CSIRO in
an 1986 legislation amendment; the cutback in direct appropriation funds to force the
Organisation to seek more external sources of funding; and the encouragement of a
market-oriented ethos within the CSIRO Executive. These changes threatened the
much-prized autonomy of CSIRO researchers. They formed their own lobbying
9 For example, the establishment ofthe OECD in 1961 included a science and technology section
which advised member countries on their science policies. The USA and the UK governments
had appointed scientific advisers. The journal Minerva was launched as an academic forum for
discussion on sciencepolicy. Chapter3 discusses in detail the awakening of such ideas and their
reception in Australia.
^® TheHonourable William Morrison, Interview, 8 November 1989.
11 'PM $776m to build "a clever country", Australian, 9March 1990, p. 1.
5organisation - Australian Science Action - and used such pressure group techniques as
mass rallies, saturation correspondence to print media, the co-option of journalists and
direct lobbying of significant political actors, to embarrass the Government electorally.
The Hawke Government counter-responded by issuing a major policy statement
on science and technology in 1989, by introducing an annual science and technology
Budget Paper, by appointing a Chief Scientistin the Department of Prime Ministerand
Cabinet, and by establishing a Prime Minister's Science Council and a permanent
interdepartmentalco-ordinationcommittee. These measures created a new stratum of
relationships in science policy-making.
Analysis of policy changes between these two distinct years, separated by
twenty-five years of continuing action, must take into account policy changes
throughout the intervening period and the reasons for such changes. In the thesis
chronological analysis of policy changes is organised according to sectoral divisions in
science policy becauseeach sector demonstrates varying patterns of change. Although
the pressures for change were experienced by all sectors, change was manifest
differently in each sector. In order to explain the changes and to account for the
differences the thesis also examines the way in which mles (structures), the allocation
of resources, and the ideas underlying policy action, change in each of the four
selected areas of the science system.
The Main Empirical Argument of the Thesis
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the extent to which science policy changed
between 1965 and 1990. The main empirical argument is that there has been a radical
shift in the objectives of science policy and the way in which governments have
sought to realise these objectives. Therefore a major task will be to discern the
direction of change; to analyse the factors which have brought about such change; and
to identify changing science policy outputs. It is not the purpose of this thesis to
evaluate the efficacy of such outcomes.
In 1965 the principal objectives of producingscientific knowledge were cultural,
and educational, and these were achieved by allocating resources to largely
autonomous research organisations and institutions. Until 1964 there was only a
Minister-in-Charge, CSIRO. Portfolio responsibility for research was then given to a
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister in Education and Research. There was no
formal policy mechanism for interaction between the scientific community and
significant political actors. Advice and negotiation about the allocation of resources
occurred on an ad hoc basis between the principal scientists of each sector and political
actors. There was no coherent linking of the publicly-funded production of scientific
knowledge and national socio-economic policy objectives.
Within the higher education sector the objectives were the training of new
scientists and the production of basic scientific knowledge to maintain Australia's
position in the international scientific community. Resources were allocated to
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individual universities through recurrent grants, and to individual researchers through
competitive grants based on the excellence of the research project rather than the
country's need for the results of such research. The amount and type of applied
science of direct relevance to industry produced in universities depended on the
entrepreneurship of individual scientists vis a vis local industries. In 1968, 76 per
cent of all research conducted in higher education institutes was basic science. Only
20 per cent was applied and 4 per cent was developmental.
In 1965 theobjectives of CSIRO were explicit in thename of the Organisation -
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation. The Organisation
was empowered to 'initiate and carry out' scientific research for the promotion of
'primary or secondary industries'. However, the 1949 amendment to the 1926
Science and Industry Act had diluted theOrganisation's statutory obligations actively
to disseminate the results of its researchto industry. It seems to have been assumed
that CSIRO scientists would automatically align their research with the needs of
industry and that such accountability mechanisms as statutory requirements were
unnecessary. Annual appropriations for the Organisation were reported outside any
portfolio in the same way as the Attomey General's Department.
Within the manufacturing industry research sector the interaction between the
Commonwealth government and producers was virtuallynon-existent. There was as
yet no direct subsidy to industry for manufacturing research. Such organisations as
theAustralian Industry Research Group (AIRG) and the Institution of Engineers had
been unsuccessfully lobbying the Menzies Govemment for several years to adopt the
Canadian policy of allowing tax concessions of 150-200 per cent on research
activities. The Committee of Economic Enquiry, in its comprehensive and detailed
analysis of economic policy in Australia, in 1965 made a strong case for the active
promotion, by govemment, of innovation through research anddevelopment.
The situation for ruralindustry wasverydifferent. Thejoint funding of research
and development by industry associations and governments had become
institutionalised by 1965. Research for the wool, wheat, dairy and meat industries
was subsidised through a system of trust funds comprising compulsory levies
imposed on producers through the taxation powers of the Commonwealth
govemment, and matched to varying degrees with public funds. The research results
thus obtained had the status of a public good distributed at public expense through a
system of extension services to mral producers.
In general therefore, governmental objectives for science in 1965, apart from
raral research, were broadly focused on nationalistic and cultural issues. Research
organisations were created and maintained as much to provide evidence of national
12 Department ofScience, Projects Score, Report 3, Summary of all expenditure by Australia on
research and development during 1969, AGPS, 1974, Table7, p. 31.
13 Science and Industry Research Act, no. 13 of 1949, Part II, section 9, subsections (a) and (g).
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esteem or colonial loyalty as to assist in economic production.14 Management of the
role that scientific knowledge played in national economic production was considered
by government to be the responsibility of scientists and producers. Governments
maintaineda flow of funds, legitimated scientists' activity through state sponsorship,
and left the organisation of research and development to the scientists. In contrast,
governmental objectives for science in 1990were finely focused on the application of
scientific knowledge to national economic production. Technical and political
rationality had replaced scientific rationality in the organisation of research and
development. Decision-making in the allocation of public resources to science was
based on techno-economistic criteria rather than the criteria of scientific status.
Thus, by 1990 the main focus of science policy objectives had become the
restructuring of economic production towards research-based industries. Interaction
between the Commonwealth government, researchers and producers towards
achieving this outcome is co-ordinated through a variety of formal mechanisms
including advisory committees, inter- and intra-departmental committees, research
funding agencies, and departmental science advisers. Researchers and research
organisations are increasingly being held accountable for the public funds they use.
Since 1989 a separate Science and Technology Budget Paper has been published
giving details of financial resources allocated to research and development in all
Commonwealth govemment portfolios. Parliamentary scrutiny of the allocation of
resources to research agencies has been undertaken through the Australian National
Audit Office and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts. The autonomy of public
sector scientists to select research projects, and to disseminate to the international
scientific community the results of their work, is being constrained by selection and
evaluation criteria which align publicly-funded research with potential economic gains,
and by new approaches to the issue of intellectual property.
Within the four areas of science covered in detail in this study the change in
science policy can be observed in four distinct dimensions of the organisation of the
production of science: the allocation of public financial resources; the restructuring of
research organisations; the selection andevaluation of research projects; and the type
of knowledge produced and its application. In the higher education sector the
abolition of the binary system widened the research base of higher education and
increased the competition for researchresources which are increasingly allocated on a
team rather than an individual scientist basis. Research in basic science is channelled
into areas of potential economic benefit by the transfer of recurrent research funds to
the competitive grants system; the widening of the membership of selection
committees; and the inclusion of criteria of selection which include market skills and
^4 Between 1950 and 1965 the most significant developments in the science system in Australia
were the establishment of the Australian Academy of Science, the expansion of hasic research
facilities at the Australian National University, and increased expenditure on the Weapons
Research Institute which wasdirectly associated with theBritish nuclear weapons program.
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values. In 1988 basic research accounted for 63 per cent of all scientific work in
universities; applied research for 31 per cent and developmental research for 7 per
cent.
Restructuring in CSIRO has resulted in a corporate executive structure with
individual divisions grouped in industry-aligned institutes. In 1990 the first-ever
appointment of a Chief Executive from the private sector emphasised the
Commonwealth government's commitment to orient the Organisation's work more
closely to market needs. The govemment held constant the proportion of funds
allocated to the Organisation by direct appropriation and forced scientists to seek
externalfunding. A universal systemof research prioritisation was developed within
CSIRO to be used by researchers who were encouraged to think of their work more in
terms of its commercial application in Australia than its importance within the
intemational scientific community.
In the sector of manufacturing industry, successive Commonwealth
governments have gradually accepted the need to intervene in the process whereby
scientific knowledge is produced in order to assist the innovation process. The shift
has been froma situation in whichgovernments subsidised a narrow range of activity
labelled 'research and development' to one in which the range of eligible activities has
broadened. This has involved the differentiation of subsidies from the Govemment to
enable firms of different sizes, stages of growth and type of technology to undertake
or fund a range of research from basic-type, generic science to research into the
commercialisation of new products or processes. So, for example, generic grants
generate scientific knowledge which can be used by a range of firms at a pre-
competitive stage, and discretionary grants encourage small firms with no previous
research experience to perceive research activity as an essential route to innovation.
The 150 per cent tax concession on research and development, introduced in 1986, is
a recognition by govemmentthat firms needflexibility, autonomy and the capacity to
act quickly in order to capture new markets: characteristics often constrained by the
necessary bureaucracy of grants schemes.
In rural industry, where the collective funding of research has been well-
established, the techno-economic imperative has meant a shift from the prioritisation
by scientists and producers of research projects generating universally available
knowledge, to one in which research corporations undertake studies of potential
marketniches and only then designresearch projects whichwill result in newproducts
or processes to fit that niche. Within such public sector research organisations as
CSIRO, in which a great deal of mral researchprojects were not funded collectively,
the cutback in appropriation funds and the need to raise funds externally has led to a
reduction in the amount of research formerly considered to be a public good. These
15 ABS,Research and Experimental Development AllSectorSummary 1988-89, Table6, p. 5.
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organisational constraints, together with the changing nature of intellectual property in
biotechnology, have led to increasing privatisation of rural research.
One consequence of these changes in science policy is that actors who
previously benefited from the traditional approach to the production of scientific
knowledge find that their interests are now threatened. Scientists who enjoyed
considerable organisational autonomy over the conduct and direction of research, and
over the dissemination of the results of their work, find their resources diminishing
unless they accept political and economicnorms of accountabilitynot formerly applied
to them. Independent rural producers find that extension and laboratory services
formerly provided free of charge by the State are now only available through the
marketing of agribusiness firms' products and processes. CSIRO researchers who
pursued intemational recognition now find that divisional resources are allocated to
them according to criteria based on the commercial potential of their work within
Australia. These actors have become politically involved in recent years in order to
protect their interests. They have done this by forming new representative
organisations, such as FASTS and Australian Science Action, which are concerned
with lobbying governments about scientists' interests rather than with promoting
academic stams.
These changes have occurred largely out of the spotlight of electoral and
parliamentary scrutiny. Examination of political action within the formal instimtions
of government would yield only partial understanding of the transition in science
policy. Therefore, in order to examine in detail the changes in sciencepolicy, and the
policy outcomes in terms of the policy actors and their behaviour, it is necessary to use
an analytical approach which allows the identification of significant individual and
organisational actors across political and sectoral boundaries; how they perceive and
defend their interests; and an explanation of the way in which their actions shape
policies.
The Analytical Approach
The analytical approach used in the thesis is that of the policy community. The policy
community approach is based on pluralistic concepts of interest groups attempting to
influence the allocation of societal resources by interacting with governments. Such
insights have been used in policy analysis since 1939,but it is only in recent years that
policy community theory has become a distinct tool of analysis, The approach is
still in the process of development with such writers as Jordan, Rhodes, and Wright in
the UK, and Atkinson, Coleman, Pross and Skogstad in Canada, refining the concept
and testing its utility through the analysis of policy in a variety of arenas. This thesis
adds to that increasing body of knowledge in two ways: by refining further the
^^ Grant Jordan, 'Subgovernments, Policy Communities and Networks: Refilling Old Bottles?',
Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 2, no. 3, 1990. pp. 319-338.
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analytical categories of actors to clarify their location and significance in the policy
community; and by introducing concepts of power from political sociology to inform
the analysis of interaction among policy actors.
The thesis is organised on the basis that policy communities consist of actors,
with control over mles (the action structures of institutions), resources and ideas, in
specified arenas of action, making decisions about achieving outcomes. Science
policy is decided principally in two arenas of action: the science system and the
political system. Action in the science system centres on the production of scientific
knowledge; and political action centres on the authoritative allocation of values to
achieve social objectives. The key concepts underlying these assumptions are
discussed in chapter one. The analysis of science policy is essentially an analysis of
interaction between these two social systems within an Australian economic and
institutional context and a global economic context.
The production of scientific knowledge in the science system, and the
authoritative allocation of values in the political system are society specific in that the
institutional context of action will vary from country to country according to the way
in which the relevant institutions have developed through time. So, for example, the
science system in Australia, whichhas been influenced greatlyin its developmentby
the science system in the UK, has had to adapt to a federally administered political
system in a large, sparsely populated country geographically isolated from the rest of
the English-speaking world. Both systems of action exist in a global economic
environment in which goods and services are produced and exchanged with varying
degrees of openness. These social, political and economic contexts and the ideologies
informing them are described in chapter two.
A policy community approach developed from the ideas of Richardson and
Jordan in the early 1980s is used to identify the key actors and groups of actors who
make science policy decisions. To Lowi's notionof the universality of homogeneous,
easily defined interest groups in a society are added concepts of corporatism as
representative monopoly, and the understanding that 'the public interest' is therefore
the sum of pressure groups active on a particular issue. Government then becomes
'the management of a complex environment through the co-operation of mediating
institutions'. This approach allows an analysis in the science policy context which
cuts across the boundaries of individual organisationsin both subsystems of action. It
also allows an analysis which recognises that certain policy arenas are influenced by
individuals, groups and organisations beyond national boundaries.
Such writers as Pross, and Coleman and Skogstad, refined the approach by
saying that a policy community is composed of a subgovernment of actors authorised
by governments to make decisions or provide advice, and an attentive public which
J. Richardson & G. Jordan, Governing under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post-
Parliamentary Democracy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979,p. 158.
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attempts to influence those decisions. Such actors interact through policy networks
which are defined as the stmctural arrangements which develop over particular issues
among a set of actors sharing a common policy focus. These networks can be
categorised according to the degree to which actors are organised, the capacity of non
government actors to co-ordinate their activity, and the relative autonomy of both
public and private actors. Policy networks develop and change as particular issues
wax and wane in importance within a policy community.
Policy networks can also exist across national boundaries. Most policy
community writers discuss the influence of intemational interaction on policy-making
in certain arenas. Science policy is one of these arenas because the norms of the
science system emphasise that the production of scientific knowledge should be
considered an international rather than a national phenomenon. The ideas of
international influence on policy communities mentioned by Pross, Coleman and
Skogstad, and Atkinson and Coleman are especially relevant here. This thesis
therefore introduces the concept of an intemational attentive public which is influential
in Australian science policy-making. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, and the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex
are two organisations which would be included in the intemational attentive public for
science policy in Australia.
The thesis also questions the use, in policy community literature, of the notion
of 'a subgovernment' in the absence of a defined category 'government'. If policy
community writers use the prefix 'sub' to mean 'a subset of govemment rather than
'subordinate to' govemment, there must logically be a category of actors extemal to
the policy conununity but internal to such institutions as Cabinet and central agencies.
This thesis therefore specifically includes a category designated as the executive core
to include those actors who are part of the central agencies of govemment, who do not
act within a specific pohcy community but who have the capacity to veto action within
a policy community. The concepts of the policy community approach are discussed in
chapter one and are used throughout the thesis, but particularly in chapters three and
four to analyse the organisation of science policy and the ideas informing it.
Another aspect of the policy community approach which is deficient is the
explanation of power in the policy process. Atkinson and Coleman state that the two
key questions of policy analysis have become: 'who participates and who wields
power.'i^ Nevertheless they do not consider the exercise of power per se as one of
A. P. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Toronto,
1992.
William D. Coleman & Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A
Structural Approach, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, Toronto, 1990.
^^ The variables are:
• the issue of boundary shifts between and within policy communities;
• recognition of the importance of political ideas;
• shifts in the political and socio-economic environment.
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the three critical variables which must be explored in the development of the policy
community approach. Rhodes considers policy communities as part of power-
dependence relationships in societies but sees power as a medium of exchange for
resources and not part of the process of controlling both the structures of exchange
and the media exchanged.^o This thesis directly addresses the question of how actors
in policy communities exercise power. The exercise of power is seen as a crucial
dynamic in policy community interaction.
The concepts of power which explain most fully notions of resource dependency
and the domination of decision-making within a policy community are those developed
separately by the political sociologists Giddens and Clegg.^i The concepts are
discussed in chapter one. The notion that power is both emergent from, and
generative of the rules, resources and ideas of interaction in a policy community is
used to organise the substantive analysis of change in Australian science policy which
forms the core of the thesis. The actors, groups of actors and organisations which
comprise the science policy community will use their control over the resources, rules
and ideas of political action and the science system in order to achieve outcomes
favourable to their interests.
Control over the rules of the production of scientific knowledge is discussed in
chapter three in terms of the organisation of science policy. Access to crucial decision-
making forums enables actors to shape policy to fit their interests. The decision-
making structures which are established, and which develop and change, reflect the
interests and ideologies of key actors in the different subgovemments of the policy
community. The actors who control and influence the decision-making structures of
the science policy community use ideas from a variety of sources to justify their
actions. In the science policy community scientists draw upon norms and values
described in the writings of such sociologists as Merton and Storer, and such political
scientists as Polanyi and Peres, to defend the autonomy of research organisations.^^
Ideas in the political system may derive from political ideology, and from economic
Atkinson & Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance'
pp. 58 & 172-176.
R.A.W. Rhodes, Power Dependency, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks,
Essex Papers on Politics and Government, no. 30, Department of Government, University of
Essex, September 1985, p. 3.
21 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in
Social Analysis, Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 69-70.
Stewart R. Clegg, Frameworks ofPower, Sage Publications, London 1989.
Robert K. Merton, 'Studies in the Sociology of Science', in Social Theory and Social Structure,
The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 585-681, p. 611.
Leon Peres, 'The Science of Being Important', The Australian Quarterly, vol. XXXIX, no. 1,
March 1967, pp. 28-37.
Michael Polanyi, 'The Foundations of Academic Freedom', Australian Journal of Science, vol.
XI, no. 4, February 1949, pp. 107-115.
—'The Republic of Science', in Criteria for Scientific Development, ed. Edward Shils, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968, pp. 1-20.
Norman Storer, The Social System ofScience, Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, USA, 1966.
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theories of innovation and market failure to justify government actions. These ideas
are discussed in chapter four. The discussion is organised along two dimensions:
ideas about government objectives for scientific research; and ideas about who should
exercise control over the organisation of research.
Decisions are made by and for the science policy community in the expectation
that certain outcomes will eventuate within the subsystem of science. Control over the
public resources allocatedto the production of scientific knowledge is both part of the
formulation of science policy and one of its outcomes. The expenditure of public
funds reflects political ideologies about the way society should be, and the influence
that certain actors have over the decisions about the allocation of public resources.
Analysis of the changing patterns of resources allocated to and within the science
system allows the analyst to measure the fit between science policy rhetoric and
science policy reality. Chapter five compares patterns of expenditure on the
production of scientific knowledge in 1965 and 1990andhighlights significant events
which affected the patterns of allocation.
Chapter six, seven and eight discuss three aspects of the way in which scientific
knowledge is produced, in order to measure the impact of changing policy upon the
production and applicationof scientific knowledge. These aspects are: the structure of
research organisations and programs; the selection and evaluation of research
programs; and the type of knowledge produced and its application. The norms and
values of science advocate the autonomy of the individual research worker to
undertake a programof research. The traditional belief among scientists is that good
science emerges from rigorous application of the scientific method to areas of interest
and concern to scientists and others. Scientists believe that the progress and results of
such scientific work cannot be predicted. Hence researchers should be allocated
resources and allowed to produce results which may often be serendipitous. The
norms of political and economic accountability should apply only loosely to the
production and application of scientific knowledge, and to the institutions in which
research is undertaken.
Political actors have different andchanging expectations of the science system
which are in conflict with the norms and values of science. The notion that scientists
should be accountable to the public for the funds they consume, the knowledge they
produce and the use to which that knowledge is put, may result in very different
modes of organisation for research. Still further removed from the norms of science is
the proposition that non-scientists should decide, or even participate in decision-
making aboutwhichresearch is to be undertaken. The idea that the knowledge which
results can be owned, bought and sold in the same way as any other commodity is
anathema to the traditions of science. Science policy therefore is an arena of potential
conflict between two systems of action based on different values. The outcomes of
science policy are to a large extent the result of the way in which the two systems of
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action interact and negotiate control of the rules, resources and ideas of the science
policy community.
This proposition is fundamental to the entire thesis but is discussed in detail in
chapters six seven and eight. Chapter six analyses the way in which changing ideas
about research have been realised through the restructuring of research organisations
and funding programs. Chapter seven discusses how new techniques for the
prioritisation, selection and evaluation of research projects have been introduced in the
four sectors of the science system, and examines the extent to which their introduction
was resisted by the scientific community. Chapter eight focuses on the principle
product of the science system - new scientific knowledge - and examines the changing
role of govemment in the application of research results.
The thesis contributes to policy analysis in Australia at two distinct levels: by
continuing to develop the policy community approach to analysis; and by introducing
into the empirical analysis of science policy variables not previously considered.
Firstly, it adds to the policy community literature by expanding the concepts of
attentive public and subgovemment to include international actors, actors within the
executive core of national governments, and the new stratum of superstructural
subgovemments. Secondly, it continues the work of Coleman and Skogstad in testing
the capacity of the policy community approach to explain policy change through time
by examining the causes and dynamics of change in policy communities. Thirdly, it
adds to the approach an explanation of how certain actors dominate policy formulation
and implementation through the exercise of power in the form of control over ideas,
rules and resources. Fourthly, it uses these concepts of power to examine variables
not previously considered in the analysis of science policy in Australia. By explicitly
examining the relationship between political ideology and science policy outcomes, the
thesis shows that it is possible to predict the way in which science policy will develop
as political values (expressed as objectives for the science system) change.
This relationship is demonstrated empirically through analysing changing
patterns of control over the way in which rules, resources and ideas are established,
allocated and introduced into the science policy community. All three variables are
interdependent. Control over structures and the rules of interaction allows control
over membership of key decision-making bodies, the resources they allocate and the
ideas by which policy initiatives are translated into outcomes. Control over resources
allows control over the capacity to introduce new forms of interaction and the way in
which new ideas are operationalised. Control over ideas allows key actors entry into
significant decision-making agencies and therefore influence over the way in which
new structures of interaction and resource allocation replace old ones.
Over the twenty-five year period under consideration considerable empirical
change is observable within the science policy community. Examination of these three
variables through time allows the analyst to identify definite patterns of change and to
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identify their probable causes. This analysis can then be used to predict future patterns
of action as policy actors attempt to impose particular ideologies on the science policy
community in order to protect their particular interests.
Sources of Evidence
The thesis uses information from a wide range of sources. Interviews were conducted
with fifteen key actors in the science policy conimunity.23 These include: the Chief
Scientist; the Chairman of the Science Policy Committee of the Australian Academy of
Science(AAS); a CSIRO divisional Chief; the Chairman of the Board of the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO); a former Minister for
Science; two key decision-makers in the Department of Industry, Science and
Technology; a member of the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC);
and several scientists with experience both in manufacturing and higher education.
During a long visit to the UK I had access to the libraries of Cambridge
University and the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex where I
also attended seminars on science policy and discussed relevant issues with the
researchers there, some of whom had been part of the Australian science policy
community. Empirical data in the public domain and information about the way in
which it is compiled were obtained from such govemment agencies as the Australian
Bureau of Statistics; the Patents Office and Commonwealth govemment departments;
and from CSIRO. Parliamentary Papers were used as a source of Annual Reports;
Budget Papers; Reports of Government Enquiries, and Auditor-General's Reports.
Hansard is used to link policy decisions and action with political rhetoric, and to trace
the actions of political actors. Joumals of science and science policy; and magazines
of the science system such as CoResearch and Scitech were scmtinised for insights
into the workings of the system. Social directories such as Who's Who provided
knowledge about memberships which was useful in tracing membership of the science
policy community. Such private organisations as the Australian Industry Research
Group; Attica; and FASTS supplied information about their organisations.
Biographies and autobiographies of key actors yielded information about action,
careers and personalities. Finally, informal and unplanned contacts with scientists in
such places as aeroplanes and university cafeterias often provided valuable
background perspectives on science policy issues.
Unfortunately this did not include Barry Jones, Minister for Science 1983-1990, whose busy
schedule did not coincide with interstate field research trips. Fortunately Jones has written widely
on science policy before, during and since his term of office.
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Chapter 1
Key Concepts in the Analysis of Science Policy
This chapter discusses the concepts from policy studies and political sociology which
will be used in this analysis of science policy in Australia. The chapter begins with a
definition of science policy which stresses the importance of individual and
organisational actors and the decisions they make in particular arenas of action. The
primary analytical approach used is that of the policy community, a relatively new
concept, the development of which is traced and amplified with new insights into the
categorisation of actors and the way in which they exercise power.
The thesis argues that the actions of key actors and groups are informed by
ideologies which must also be identified in order to understand action in the policy
community. Particular attention is paid in this chapter to concepts which can clarify
and explain ideologies informing the actions of scientists Political ideology is
discussed in chapter two The chapter concludes with a reiteration of the key concepts
in a frame of reference for the thesis.
1. SCIENCE Policy Defined
The definition of science policy to be used here is an adaptation of one used by
Jenkins to define public policy in general. Jenkins uses a definition created by G. K
Roberts' because it:'.. .captures the detail and density of the activities embraced by the
political arena'.1 The definitionreads:
A set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors
concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a
specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the
power of these actors to achieve.^
The definition is used because it offers the analyst an understanding of the
elements and variables which must be examined in order to explain public policy. The
idea of 'interrelated decisions' leads to the examination of relevant decisions through
time and institutional space. The identification of individual actors or groups of actors
is essential in understanding the environment in which decisions are made, and
identifying the interests of those who make and influence the decisions. The concept
of power, often lacking in definitions of public policy, allows the analyst to examine
the social stratification of policy arenas in terms of the capacity to achieve action and
outcomes favourable to certain interests.
Using Roberts' definition of public policy as a base, science pohcy is defined as:
1 W.l. Jenkins, Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective, Martin Robertson,
London, 1978, p. 13.
Quoted in ibid., p. 15.
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A set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors with
authority concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them
withina policyarenain which governments and scientists interact to providethe
rules, resources and ideas for the production and application of scientific
knowledge. These decisions should, in principle,be within the power of these
actors to achieve.
2. The Concept of Policy Community
The notion that governments enact policies which are as much the reflection of the
individuals and organisations which produce themas they arethe reflection of public
choice, societal needs or political parties' platforms, has been in currency in policy
studies since 1939when Griffiths exhorted students of the policy process to examine
the 'whirlpools of special social interest and problems' which surround the formal
institutions of political systems.^ Griffiths perceived that policy-making structures are
based on specialisedknowledge and the desire to influence policy decisions in order to
protect or prosper certain interests rather than the constitutional status of the policy
participant. Also in 1939, in Britain, Sir Ivor Jennings wrote of the parliamentary
process that:
.. .much legislation is derived from organized interests... most of it is amended
on the representation of such interests, and... often parliamentary opposition is
in truth the opposition of interests."^
As the density of government activity burgeoned after the Second World War,
political scientists began to see that the concept of groups of individuals or
organisations withcommon interests, acting together to influence government policy,
could be a useful analytical tool to explain the increasingly complex relationships
between government and society in liberal democracies.5 The concepts of policy
network and policy community arose out of two broad streams of ideas about the
policy process. These were theidea of pluralist pressure groups which developed in
Britain and the USA, and the post-plurahst reaction which followed.
2.1 Pressure groups
The development of pluralism is documented by Richardson and Jordan (1979) and
Jordan (1990). They attribute the articulation of the dynamic which gives rise to the
political activity of organised interests to E. Pendleton Herring in theUSAwho argued
that such groups arise because:
...the more the government becomes involved in controlling industrial and
commercialinterests, the morethose interests mustbe allowedto participate in
and indeed to consent to policy changes.^
E.S. Griffith, The ImpasseofDemocracy, Harrison-Hilton, New York, 1939, p. 182.
Quoted in J. J. Richardson & A. G. Jordan, Governing underPressure, p. 158.
Ibid., p. 159.
Ihid..
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Within this idea are elements not only of government intervention and group
opposition, but also of the legitimacy of group participation in the policy process and
of the non-viability of policies which are not acceptable to organised non
governmental interest groups. Beer, in his study of British pressure groups, refined
these ideas into his concept of 'new group politics' in which policy emerged out of a
process of bargaining between governments, producer and consumer groups.'^
In the USA Freeman combined the concepts of interest groups and systems
theory to produce his notion that policy is made within subsystems of the political
process. Subsystems are:
...the pattern of interactions of participants, or actors, involved in making
decisions in a special area of publicpolicy.. .although there are obviously other
types of subsystems, the type which concerns us here is found in an immediate
setting formed by the executive bureau and congressional committees with
special interest groups intimatelyattached.^
Freeman here places his notion of the interaction of executive, parliamentary and
interest group interaction in a political process which allows the actors relatively free
access to the decision-making processes of government.
Lowi sees the process as one of homogeneous groups of organised interests,
representing every facet of social life, bargaining with each other over competing
claims to public resources. The role of governmentin this situation is one of ensuring
fair access to the bargainingprocess.^ Lowi developed this notion of the invasion of
the public domain by private interests and their expropriation of decision-making
structures and hypothesized that the process is one of coalescence into a triangular
situation of dependency between central agencies, congressional sub-committees and
producers in which each side of the triangle could not function without the support of
the other two.^O
2.2 From iron triangles to policy networks
In the 1970s the triad of influences on the policy process in the USA was dubbed 'the
iron triangle'. Lowi's concept of loose triangular dependencies had hardened into one
of inflexible structural policy processes. Peters describes the interaction thus:
The pressure group needs the agency to deliver services to its members and to
provide a friendly point of access to government, while the agency needs the
pressure group to mobilize political support for its programs among the affected
clientele...
Ibid.
^ J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process, 2nd. edn.. Random House, New York, 1965, p. 11.
^ Richardson &Jordan, Governing under Pressure, pp.160-161.
1H Jordan, 'Sub-governments, policy communities and networks', p. 325.
11 G. Peters, American Public Policy, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1982, p. 24.
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Peters claimed that much of the domestic policy of the USA was formulated within
these functionally specific subsystems. Their exclusivity was compounded by the lack
of central co-ordination of the processes of formulation and of the ensuing
implementation and outcomes. Heclo on the other hand thought that the iron triangles
concept was too rigid and static to explain fully the nature of the policy process.
Instead he saw policy-making as accompanied by 'clouds of issue networks' and the
process as 'conflictual, permeable and predictable'.
Heclo's imagery is of stable interest elements constantly reforming as the policy
situation demanded. His impression of the relationships between interest groups,
officials and governments as somewhat ephemeral and 'loose-jointed' is echoed by
Rokkan and Kvarvik in Norway who found, in separate studies, that interest group
participants in the process preferred semi-formal forms of interaction to be
incorporated into binding structures. So Rokkan states:
.. .the crucial decisions on economic policy are rarely taken in the parties or in
Parliament: the central area is the bargaining table where the government
authorities meet directly with trade union leaders, the representatives of the
farmers, the smallholders and the fishermen, and the delegates of the
Employer's Associations. These yearly rounds of negotiations have in fact
come to mean more in the lives of rank and file citizens than formal elections.
...the corporatism of the two-tier system of decision-making is implicit and
latent, not formal and institutionalized'.^3
Rokkan's observations have a grass-roots feel about them that reminds the
analyst that interest group participation in policy-making is not confined to remote,
macro-level activities of peak organisations and senior public officials. Kvarvik adds
to this understanding of micro-level policy-making his finding that many policy
participants move in and out of organisations in all sectors on the basis of their
expertise either in the process or in the specialised activity which is the subject of the
negotiations. Policy making is conducted through a 'network of administrative
committees' in a process of 'the secularisation of administration'.14 This notion of
secularisation emphasises the fact that the concept of policy networks is much looser
than that of neo-corporatism with its implicit connotations of big business and big
unions. The dogma of monopohstic representation gives way to include concepts of a
broader-based community involvement.
2.3 Richardson and Jordan's original concept
In the late 1970s Richardson and Jordan perceived that the disjunction between the
continuing academic debate about the issue of pluralism in the policy-making process,
and the conventional paradigm of the pre-eminence of the electorate, political parties.
1^ H. Heclo, 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in The New American Political
system, ed. A. King, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1978, pp. 87-124, p. 105.
13 Quoted inRichardson &Jordan, Governing under Pressure, p. 164.
14 Ibid., p. 165.
20
Parliament and Cabinet, was detrimental to comprehensive policy-analysis because
many important socio-economic decisions are not even discussed in such fora. They
posited the hypothesis that policy-making is fragmented into subsystems which are
grouped around substantive issues and ongoing relationships rather than such
traditional political structures and processes as party platforms, government
departments or plenary sessions of Cabinet. They call these subsystems of political
activity 'policy communities'.xhey describe them thus:
It is the relationship involved in committees, the policy community of
departments and groups, the practices of co-option and the consensual style,
that perhaps better account for policy outcomes than do examinations of party
stances, of manifestoes or of parliamentary influence.
Richardson and Jordan argue that this 'contemporary style of policy-making'
has emerged because of the fact that increasing government intervention in a wide
range of societal issues requires further intervention to manage the interdependence of
problems which results. Government becomes the management of a complex
environment through the co-operation of mediating institutions. Policy is therefore the
outcome of a process of adjustment based on mutual need to achieve objectives and
formulated in a proliferation of institutions and processes designed to negotiate the
accommodation of interests.They saw the process, however, as relatively closed:
The policy-making map is in reality a series of vertical compartments or
segments - each segment inhabited by a different set of organised groups and
generally impenetrable by 'unrecognised groups' or by the general public.
Such a system of policy-making has both costs and benefits for society-at-large.
These are summarised in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: The costs and benefits of policy communities
Costs Benefits
• the unorganised are undervalued and excluded • multiple channels exist for influencing policy-
making
• group interests dominate therefore policies may • conflict avoidance is possible through group
not work in wider environment participation
• goal displacement and diminished autonomy for • specialised knowledge is available for the
groups solution of poliey problems
• there is increased likelihood of implementation
due to participation in policy formulation
Source: Richardson & Jordan, Governing under Pressure, pp. 172-180
1^ Richardson &Jordan, Governing under Pressure, p.43-44.
Ibid., p. 74.
17 Ibid., p. 171-174.
18 Ibid., p. 174.
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Richardson and Jordan see the policy community concept as a more adequate
explanation for policy formulation, implementation and outcomes than notions of party
or parliamentary discourse. They also imply that this is a situation which evolved in
the 1970s in Britain and Europe. However, Richardson and Jordan did not fully
articulate the characteristics or dynamics of pohcy communities. Other policy theorists
have developed the concept into a more detailed approach to policy analysis.
2.4 Press's attentive public and policy community
Pross is a Canadian policy analyst who found Heclo's concept of cloudy networks too
open, and Peters' concept of iron triangles too closed to explain fully the policy
process in a federal system such as Canada's which has no equivalent to the
Congressional subcommittee of the USA. However, Pross believed that the concept
of policy community could be adapted to fit the political system in Canada. Pross
bases his idea of a policy community on the fact that the complexity and time
constraints of political society result in 'special publics' which dominate decision-
making in fields where they have competence. 'Special publics' are the narrow end of
a funnel bringing issues from the general public to the decision-making apparatus of
the state. According to Pross the policy community is:
.. .that part of a political system that - by virtue of its functional responsibilities,
its vested interests, and its specialized Imowledge - acquires a dominant voice in
determining government decisions in a specific field of public activity, and is
generally permitted by society at large and the public authorities in particular to
determine publicpolicy in that field.20
Pross sees the policy community consisting of two parts: the subgovemment and the
attentive public. The structure and function of the policy community is given in table
1.2.
Policy communities have mobile populations which vary from policy field to
policy field and according to the jurisdictional framework, for example according to
which level of government has constitutional responsibility for the policy area. Pross
considers that the most significant members are not primarily policy initiators. They
see the policy community as a defensive bailiwick against wider public input, or
against unwelcome interference from other government agencies.2i Total
restructuring of the policy community may occur if the disjunction between policy and
public needs becomes too wide to bridge.
^9 Pross, Group Politics andPublic Policy, p. 119.
20 Ibid., p. 98.
21 Ibid., p. 107.
Table 1.2: Press's specification of the policy community
STJBGOVERNMENTS
institutionalised groups or agencies with
substantial resources and the incentive to commit
them to subgovemment work
goal
to keep policy-making at the routine or
technical level thereby minimising
interference
functions
• communication between officials and group
representatives
• automatic group inclusion on advisory
committees
• continual formal and informal access to senior
agency officials
• participation on long-range enquiries into policy
• invitations to comment on draft policy
core members
ministers (F & S)
senior officials (F & S)
representatives of vital interest groups
industry associations
other members
parliamentarians with special interests
officers of Privy Council office
foreign governments
OECD
ILO
international pressure groups
ATTENTIVE PTJBLTC
introduces into the policy community an
element of diversity inhibited at the sub-
government level by the need to maintain
consensus
goal
to evaluate polices and point out deficiencies
functions
• holds conferences and study sessions
• write in newspapers, trade magazines and
journals
• continuous informal policy review
articulating policies & programs with
changing public needs
core members
issue-peripheral government agencies
journalists
private institutions
specific interests
pressure groups
academics
think tanks
Source; A. Paul. Pross,Group Politics and Public Policy, pp.119-126.
Members of the attentive public range from institutionalised groups, government
agencies, issue-oriented groups through to interested individuals. They evaluate
policies and point out their inadequacies. Geographical and organisational distance
from the policy-making centres, and the fact that communication between members
usually occurs via the print media and seminars, keeps the greatest influence of this
section on long-term policy. Members of the attentive public may once have been
members of the subgovemment or they may be individuals or groups who are
opposed to currentpolicy and are therefore excludedfromthe subgovemment.22
Subgovemments are usually very small groups of people intimately connected
with the core processes of policy formulation and implementation. Such people
usually occupy the top positions in their agencies or organisations. In the public
sphere this will include federal and state ministers of the portfolios with the greatest
responsibility in the field; the senior public servants from these portfolios;
22 Ibid., p. 105.
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chairpersons of advisory committees or executive boards of statutory agencies; and
from outside government the key spokespersons for interest groups and private
organisations in the field.23
A useful observation about subgovemments is made by Ripley and Franklin.
They see that subgovemments emerge in part from the complexity of 'the national
policy agenda' and thereby become a factor in increasing the level of complexity.
They also argue that subgovemments tend to be of greatest significance in the least
visible areas of policy.24 The observation is useful in areas where policy concems
professional expertise not easily accessible to politicians. The cognitive and
organisational complexity comprising these areas of policy give rise to groups of
policy actors who act as 'translators' between significant professional and non-
professional actors. They become skilled in the technical language and professional
ideology of the policy arena and can use the scarcity of these skills to exclude other
actors from decision-making. This understanding is therefore particularly useful in the
science policy arena
Pross sees pressure groups as the main vehicles for policy innovation. Pressure
groups move in and out of the core groups of both parts of the policy community.
This movement is particularly pronounced in the attentive public where individuals and
groups move in and out of prominence as their resources, interests and the public
agenda change. Issue-oriented groups are least welcome in subgovemment because
they disturb the consensus which grows up around issues.25 Whereas the
subgovemment deplores change which will threaten the status-quo of policy-making,
and the attentive public is too remote or lacks the influence to effect short-term radical
change, pressure groups can accelerate the pace of change and inject new ideas into the
policy process.
In distinguishing these three types of actors or groups of actors Pross has
refined the notion of policy community by categorising different sets of behaviour and
influence and by analysing the dynamics of the processes involved. The question of
how policy changes through time and institutional variation is addressed but not fully
developed.
2.5 Coleman and Skogstad: policy community and change
Coleman and Skogstad take Press's notions of the subgovemment and attentive public
and build the concept into an approach which is concerned with policy structure,
policy behaviour and the way that these processes and policy output and content
23 Ibid., p. 98.
24 Randall B Ripley & Grace A Franklin, 'The Nature of Policymaking in the United States', in
Current Issues in Public Administration, ed. Frederick S Lane, St. Martin's Press, New York,
1986, pp. 48-54, p. 53.
25 Ibid., p. 107.
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change through time. They also use the idea of policy networks as specialised
interaction occurring around specific policy issues.
Coleman and Skogstad say that policy-making occurs within policy communities
in which state actors and representatives of organised interests interact to shape public
policy in a given sector over time. In their view policy is not the result of the
preferences and influences of social forces or pressure groups implemented by state
officials with little autonomy, but of a process in which state institutions can critically
shape the manner and degree of influence of organised interests. They therefore place
much more emphasis than Richardson and Jordan on the degree to which state
autonomy influences policy outcomes which can be explained most satisfactorily by
close examination of the interaction between state and societal actors.^6
According to Coleman and Skogstad, in studies of public policy the
organisational capacities of both state and societal actors must be assessed because the
structural linkages between the actors are cmcial to the kind of outcome that emerges.
The structural characteristics of sectoral-level organisations, whether these be state
agencies or societal actors, constrain the options available to the policy-makers and
reinforce particular values and beliefs in the policy process. '^^ Past policy decisions
also constrain the available options.
They claim that the normative-ideological order which pervades the political
system conditions the norms and values of sectoral actors in the policy community.
This strengthens the position of actors with 'compatible' values and weakens those
with 'incongment' values. Central agencies may invade agencies with predominantly
incongruent values and impose different policies. Macro-structural factors such as
federalism also affect the balance of influence. Strong regional organised interests
may develop to counter central state domination, whereas strong state capacity at the
regional level may fragment national development of organised interests. Global
economic and political concerns and situations also affect both state and sectoral
capacityor incentive to controlpolicy-making.^s
Coleman and Skogstad differentiate between policy communities and policy
networks. They say that a policy community consists of
.. .all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or
function who share a common "policy focus" and who, with varying degrees of
influence shape policy outcomes over the long mn.29
Whereas policy network is a concept describing:'.. .the properties that characterise the
relationships among the particular set of actors that forms around an issue of
importance to the policy community.'30 Policy networks are therefore the structural
Coleman & Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada, pp. 312-314.
27 Ibid., p. 326.
28 Ibid., p. 315. "
29 Ibid., p. 25.
30 Ibid., p. 26.
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patterns of interaction between state and society for resolving issues of concern to a
given policy community. Different types of policy networks may exist within the
same policy community. These emerge because different issues will affect the
interests of members of the community to varying degrees shaping, in turn, the
particular constellationof actors involvedin resolving the issue.^i Table 1.3 gives the
characteristics of different types of policy networks.
One of the refinements introduced into the policy community approach by
Coleman and Skogstad is the notion of change in the policy process. They
acknowledge that the issuehas not yet received muchattention frompolicycommunity
theorists. Theybeginwith the sameunderstanding as Pross that the majorobjective of
actors in subgovemments is to maintain stable relationships and avoid abrupt change.
They say that the policy process in the postwar period has become more complex,
more formalised and less episodic. In this context change always involves an
expansionrather than a contraction in the size of the policy community. The attentive
public, the subgovemment and organised interests in any policy community change
according to:
• changing social conditions;
• changing economic conditions;
• changing pohtical systems;
• changing intemational pohtical events;
• changing values.^^
Some types of policy networks are more susceptible to changeover time, for example,
concertation networks change less and pressure pluralist networks change the most.
In the case studiesdiscussedby Coleman and Skogstad study three patternsof change
have become apparent:
1. pressure pluralism > state direction > pressure pluralism
In response to sudden unexpected changes governments will impose
policies on a sector. The changes are short-lived as politicians and officials
foster new groups or repair the old relationships.
2. concertation > pressure pluralism
Former single government/sectoral relationships fragment in the face of
ideological shifts widening and strengthening associational systems
increase the ability to influence votes.
3. pressure pluralism > corporatism
Conflict among interests prompts governments and the stronger interests to
negotiate to change the policy network structure.
Ibid, pp. 15-23.
32 Ibid, pp. 321-326.
Table 1.3: Coleman and Skogstad's classification of policy networks
1. PLURALIST
• arise in sectors where state authority is
fragmented;
(dispersed state authority)
• organised interests are at low level of
development
(weak associational system).
change more likely
2. CLOSED
• state decision-making capacity concentrated &
co-ordinated
• usually long-established, often single agency
• organisational interests prominent
• strong associational system
• virtual monopoly relationship between
organised interests and public agency
change less likely
a. pressure pluralism b. corporatism
• groups approach the state independently &
compete;
• state remains autonomous;
• groups assume policy advocacy role.
• multilateral consumer/producer groups combine
in a highly integrated associational system to
negotiate better conditions in the face of
economic or social threat and are co-opted by
government into policy participation.
c. clientele pluralism d. concertation
• as above but develops so that:
• state officials identify with organised interests;
and
• become dependent on skills, data, and
compliance;
• organised interests participate in policy
process.
• state decision-making capacity concentrated &
co-ordinated in single agency for the sector;
• organisational interests in the entire sector
represented by a single association.
change slow and incremental
parentela pluralism
• organised interests dominate;
• members occupy positions in governing party;
• state authority diffused to regional levels;
• likely to arise if there is one political party &
only a few major industries.
3. STATE-DTRECTED
' highly autonomous co-ordinated state agencies;
' sectoral interests with very weak associational system;
' interests play neither an advocacyor participation role
' usually temporary situation until sectoral interests organise;
' or the precipitating crisis disappears;
' or the state eeases to impose poliey on weak, wide-ranging sector;
change and innovation considerable
Data Source: William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in
Canada: A Structural Approach, CoppClarkPitmanLtd,Toronto, 1990, pp. 27-29
Coleman and Skogstad admit that their discussion of change in policy
communities is not yet fully developed but is intended to stimulate further studies on
the subject of the causes and dynamics of change in policy communities. Their
discussion of the formation of different types of policy networks is especially useful
when analysing interaction between actors with distinctly different interests, ideologies
and degrees of control and dependence in policy communities. In this thesis their
typology of policy networks has been used to analyse changes in the sectors of the
science policy community in Australiaand to explain change through time in the way
in which policy community relationships and interactions are structured.
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2.6 Wright's understanding of ideology
Wright explicitlyaddresses the role of ideology in policy communities and his insights
are useful in explaining how conflicts arise and are expressed through the actions of
policy actors. In the course of analysingindustrialpohey in various countries Wright
discovered variations among policy formulation and implementation that could not be
explained by orthodox theories. He found that in France, with a supposedly strong,
dirigiste government, policy outcomes could not be determined whereas in West
Germany, with a supportivepro-marketideology, outcomes were more predictable.33
Wrightelaims that analysis at the sectoral andsub-sectoral level reveals a variety
of policy subsystems. Actors will behavedifferently in the policy process faced with
the particularity of the circumstances in which specific issues and problems arise and
have to be handled: that is, there is a differencebetween prescriptive values and actual
behaviour, the norms for whieh need to be identified. This is manifested as a gap
between rhetoric and reality. Wright maintains that rhetoric indicates that general
norms such as non-political bureaucracy, sovereignty of parliament or racial equality
have been abandoned in favour of particularisticnorms. He says:
Rhetoric is often used to proclaim or reaffirm systemic and subsystemic policy
and behavioural norms, or to indicate ways in which the settings of those norms
and the behaviour of governmental and non-govemmental actors at sectoral and
sub-sectoral levels may conflict or contradict with what was expected or
intended.
.. .Faced with theparticularity of an actualpolicy issue or problem, government
(or a part of it) may prefer to act prudently or expediently and inconsistently
with its general policy stance.34
Wright's sectoral model of the policy process is useful because he attempts to
account for the gap between politieal rhetoric, policy behaviour and outcomes. The
existence of these gaps draws the policy analyst's attention to the fact that policy
sectors are not monolithic and that behaviour in the different sectors will vary
according to the norms of the dominant ideology of that sector.
Wright's understanding of norms and values however, leads to some confusion.
'Racialequality', whichWright sees as a normis, in sociological terminology, a value
towards which norms such as the appointment of pubhc servants on the basis of merit
and not raee, guide behaviour. However, the basic premise, that governments or
subgovemments, when faced with different norms and value systems, cannot always
enforce policy behaviour in accord with stated ideological norms and values, applies
particularly well to the science policy community in which the norms and values of
science often conflict with pohtical ideology.35
33 Maurice Wright, Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies,
Policy Studies, vol. XXXVI, 1988, pp. 593-612, p. 596.
34 Ibid., pp. 601-603.
33 See, for example, Talcott Parsons, 'An Outline of the Social System', in Talcott Parsons et at.,
Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, The Free Press, New York,
1951, pp. 30-79, pp. 43-45; and
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY COMMUNITY APPROACH
The policycommunity approachsees an analytical division between an attentivepublic
which attempts to exert influence on policy-makers, and a subgovernment which
advises and decides. There is, however, an as yet unresolved problem with the
comprehensiveness of the explanation of political action it affords. The problem is
that of the notion of subgovernment in the absence of a category of action labelled
'government'.
Richardson and Jordan speak about the blurring of the boundary between
government and pressure groups by the membership of interconnecting organisations
which seem to include government departments and 'the Ministry'.^6 Ripley and
Franklin, describing the complexity and indivisibility of government/non-govemment
action policy process in the USA, acknowledge that subgovernments: 'do not
dominate all policymaking' but do not further explore the characteristics of
government action.^? Wright speaksabout theneedfor cautionin using such terms as
'government' or 'the state', saying that there is often conflict between general policy
behaviour (rhetoric) and particularistic policy behaviour (actual behaviour), but does
not consider the core of government actors who define general policy behaviour. 8^
Pross lists federal and state ministers of the portfolios with the greatest responsibility
in the field as members of the subgovernment, but does not define the role of the other
members of the government, especially those in the executive government.^ 9
Coleman and Skogstad speak about the actions of central agencies who 'invade
agencies with predominantly incongruent values and impose different policies' but
theydo notspecify who decides which normative-ideological order willprevail.^o In
developing an approach which offers a better explanation of policy-making than the
traditional institutional approach these authors have neglected to create a category for
actors within the central core of governmentwho are connected only at times of crucial
resource decision-making to a particular pohcy community.
3.1 The executive core
In analysing a particular policy using the policy community approach it becomes
apparent that the notion of subgovernment does not cover the entire field of action
involved. The approach is particularly problematic when discussing the role of such
central agency actors as the rest of the Cabinet when certain portfoho policy issues are
being discussed; the senior officials of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
Malcolm Waters & Rodney Crook, Sociology One, 2nd edn., Longman Cheshire, Melbourne,
1990, pp. 29-30.
2^ Richardson &Jordan, Governing UnderPressure, p. 74.
Ripley & Franklin, The Nature of Policymaking in the United States, pp. 51-54.
38 Wright, 'Policy Communities, Policy Network and Comparative Industrial Policies', p. 603.
Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, p. 121.
Coleman & Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada, p.315.
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who have no input into certain policy issues; or the Treasurer or Minister of Finance.
Consequently it has been necessary to develop the approach to include a 'government'
category of officials and politicians who do not make routine or important decisions
about particular policies; whose advice is not automatically sought in such issues; but
without whose tacit approval action on an issue could not occur.
In this thesis the category of executive core is used to denote those actors in
the central agencies of govemments who do not make regular or routine decisions in a
particular policy arena but without whose agreement crucial decisions about that policy
arena could not be made.
3.2 The international attentive public
The idea of intemational influence on policy areas is mentioned by several authors in
the policy community debate. Pross talks about the influence of foreign govemments,
international advisory organisations and multinational corporations on policy."^i
Coleman and Skogstad cite changing intemational political events as one of the major
factors affecting policy-making.'^ ^ Atkinson and Coleman stress the need for a multi
level analysis which incorporates the influence of extra-national organisations in
policy-making.43 These authors consider such international actors as part of the
attentive public.
For example, national environmental policies are influenced by the activities of
such intemational environmental pressure groups as Greenpeace or Friends of the
Earth, and by international agreements on policy. Policies on managing the social
problems created by the HIV virus are influenced by information exchanged at
international conferences on AIDS. The OECD gathers, analyses and publishes
information which is used to develop national economic policies. Individuals
representing international organisations, or influential single-nation organisations,
often have great influence However, despite the organised nature of their members'
activities, and the fact that they participate in science policy-making at the core of
national governments, such actors cannot be classified as a subgovernment because
their organisations have no sovereign powers or rights.
Therefore the approach used here has been augmented with the category of
international attentive public which can be defined as a network of organisations
and individuals which interacts across national boundaries to influence the policy
process of individual nations in areas of special interest to its members.
41 Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, pp. 124-125.
42 Coleman & Skogstad, Policy Communities andPublic Policy in Canadap. 323.
43 Atkinson & Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and theProblems of Governance',
Governance, p. 172.
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3.3 The superstructural subgovernment
A fifth category of actors has also been added: that of the superstructural
subgovernment. These actors oversee policy in complex policy communities
divided into sectors of distinctly different forms of relationship, interaction or
function. Increasingly in modem government a set of ageneies may develop through
time to co-ordinate policy formulation, evaluation and implementation across two or
more sectors of the policy community.
The amended policy community approach has five categories into which actors
in the policy community can be placed. These are summarised in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Categories of actors in an amended policy community
approach
Executive core Actors who occupy central positions in key political institutions who are
not members of the policy community hut without whose implicit or
explicit agreement key decisions about policy could not be made,
eg., non-portfolio Cabinet ministers, Cabinet officials, ministers and
officials of central agencies, Prime Minister.
Superstructural subeovernment Actors who participate in decision-making in agencies designed
to co-ordinate policy across two or more of the sectors of a policy
community. Such actors are likely to be members of the sectoral
subgovernments of a policy community
eg., interdepartmental committees, allocatory agencies, minister's
councils.
Subeovernment The most influential actors in the policy community who are authorised
to make both important and routine decisions in the policy arena,
eg., ministers at all levels of government; key public officials, members
of advisory committees, industry associations, corporate leaders.
Attentive public Actors who have a special interest in a policy arena, who can influence decision-
making in the subgovernment, but who do not participate in the central
decision-making processes.
eg., academics, members of think tanks. State Premiers, opposition party
spokespersons, specialist journalists, pressure groups.
International attentive public
Actors in international or single-nation organisations with interests and
information in a policy arena who may be consulted by subgovernments
on policy issues or who may be opposed to the policies formulated by
the subgovemment.
eg., foreign governments, OECD, International Labour Organisation,
Greenpeace, UNESCO.
3.4 Policy community and power
Most writers using the policy community approach have not linked their observations
directly to explanations of the exercise of power when they describe the ways in which
policy actors influence the policy process to produce outcomes which favour the
organised interests they represent. Underlying most of the literature are pluralistic
notions of voluntarism, consensus and exchange. Richardson and Jordan base the
original concept on the notion of competition between groups of organised interests of
which government is the most powerful because of its possession of a monopoly of
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force, greater legitimacy, and the fact that it can:. .manipulate a broader spectrum of
interests' than other groups.44 For Pross power resides in groups with 'functional
responsibilities, vested interests and specialised knowledge'.^s Power for Pross is
therefore a function of political authority, resource control and expertise. The dynamic
of action is protection of interests and values. Coleman and Skogstad see resource
autonomy and the capacity to co-ordinate as vital characteristics of both government
and non-government organised interests.^6 The dynamic of policy communities is
consensus: '...a shared set of values, norms and beliefs which shape the policy
networks that emerge'.47 Rhodes does address the issue of the exercise of power
when he considers policy communities as part of power-dependence relationships in
societies. He talks about powerbeing exercised when influence, as a commodity, is
exchanged according to 'rules of the game', for resources.48 The problem here is that
rules of the game are accepted as a given. The interaction which decides the rules of
the game is not analysed. Atkinson and Coleman state that the two key questions of
policy analysis have become: 'whoparticipates and who wields power.' They add:
We are told that networks consist of exchange relationships, but what is the
structural context in which these exchanges take place? Are there relationships
of power and dependency that transcend and color individual transactions.?49
They conclude that it is necessary not only to consider questions of integration and
consensus, but also to examine the structural effects of dominant ideologies on the
way in which policy communities develop. Accordingly, this study goes beyond
previous studies by explicitly examining the way in which power is exercised in the
policy community through control over the rules patterning interaction, the resources
allocated to the production of scientific knowledge, and the ideas about the way in
which such knowledge is created and applied. In this thesis the policy community
approach is complementedby the use of concepts developed by political sociologists
to explain the exercise of power in societies.
3.5 Power
Power is an essential dimension of social interaction. For over a century political
philosophers and sociologists have engaged in ongoing debate about the nature of
power. The result is a smorgasbord of concepts from which the policy analyst can
choose ideas which explain the way in which organisations and individuals maximise
their interests in society.50 To complement the policy community approach it is
Richardson & Jordan, Governing under Pressure, p. 14.
^5 Pross, Group Politics andPublic Policy, pp. 119 & 125.
Coleman & Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada, pp. 15-23.
47 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
48 Rhodes, Power Dependency, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks, p. 3.
49 Atkinson, &Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems ofGovernance',
p.161.
50 Malcolm Waters, Modem Sociological Theory, Sage Publications, London, 1994, forthcoming.
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necessary to use a concept of power which explains the strategic actions of individuals
or organisations which seek to dominate action in a particular policy arena in order to
further their interests.
3.5.a Structure and agency
Since the 1970s the most fruitful debate on power has been that between agency and
structure: between behaviourist explanations involving concepts of the individual
exercise of will; and structuralist explanations that power is a function of the
organisation of social action. The behaviourist argument is encapsulated in Weber's
classic definition of power:
The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the
probability rests.^^
From this statement about interaction Weber constructed his model of social behaviour
built on the premise that actors (individuals or organisations), through the exercise of
coercion or domination through different types of authority, can force other actors to
act against their own interests.
This description of the exercise of power in the simplest form of social
interaction is elaborated by Dahl in his study of the exercise of influencein key issues
of public policy-making in New Haven, Connecticut.52 Dahl's observations lead him
to develop a pluralistic approach to the exercise of power in which power is divided
between different actors or groups. His definition that: 'A has power over B to the
extent that he can get B to do somethingB wouldnot otherwise do.' is a paraphrase of
Weber and is based on the belief that B's behaviour is caused by A's behaviour. It
does not take into account the fact thatB maybehave in theway that A preferswithout
A having to act at all. That is, it does not take into account the structural conditions in
which action occurs.
This point is taken up by Bachrach and Baratz who argue that there are two
facets to the exercise of power: behaviour which causes others to respond by behaving
against their own interests; and behaviour that operates both to limit the other's access
to decision-making which would go against the actor's interests, and to reduce the
probability that discussion of those interests would arise in the first place.53 This
explanationfocuses for the first time on 'non-decision-making' as an aspect of power
which is particularly relevant to public policy-making. The capacity to ignore or 'hide'
issues is as important as the capacity to win debates over decision-making.
51 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. &transls. H.H. Gerth &C. Wright
Mills, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1948, p. 53.
52 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961.
53 p. Bachrach &M. Baratz, 'Two Faces ofPower', American Political Science Review, vol. 56,
1962, pp. 947-1052.
'Decision and Nondecisions', American PoliticalScience Review, vol. 57, 1963, pp. 941-1051.
33
Richardson and Jordan refer to Bachrach and Baratz' studies when they discuss the
issue of agenda-settingin policycommunities.^^ However, the approach still assumes
that actors behave in relation to subjectively-defined wants and needs rather than to
structurally defined interests.
The 'structuralist' approach to power originates with Marx who explained social
power as a function of the way in which society is structured to maintain the
distribution of economic resources in favour of those who control the means of
production.55 Writers on powerwho adoptedMarx's approach see power as inherent
in the way in which social, political and economic institutions are developed. They
explain behaviour in terms, not of individual or group will, but as being in conformity
with such institutions as factory production, social class, and access to education.
Lukes is such a writer who criticises the behaviourist approach to power, as articulated
by Dahl, and Bachrach and Baratz, on the grounds that their explanation fails to see
that the exercise of power in society has a third dimension which is invisible to those
who assume that all behaviour is subjectively defined.
Lukes claims that power can be exercised in such a way as to deny actor B
awareness of the fact that his/her interests can be achieved by acting in a different way
to the action proposed by actor A. This is achieved through the manipulation of social
structures in such as way as to 'distort' the awareness of actor B that their interests are
different, and that there are ways of behaving which will change their capacity to
achieve those interests.This explanation of power alerts the policy analyst to the
way in which ideology can affect actors' perceptions of public policy issues. It is
important too because it highlights the agency/structure dichotomy which underlies
many political ideologies which are used to justify the distribution of societal resources
in particular ways. Theories of individual choice use behaviourist explanations of
individual will and capacity to decide courses of action. Theories of social justice
argue that certain individuals and groups are structurally disadvantaged and need
publicly-provided assistance to overcome these disadvantages.
However, Lukes' three-dimensional approach is of limited use in explaining
social change. If individuals are prevented from recognising their own interests the
question arises of how these are to be defined since another agency must always be
involved in correcting structural distortions of perceived interests. Behavioural
explanations diminish the impact of social structure whilst structural explanations deny
the possibility of change through individual action. The political sociologist Giddens
tries to resolve the dichotomy and he provides a useful explanation of power in his
concept of structuration.
Richardson and Jordan, Governing under Pressure, p. 80.
Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State, New York University Press, New York, 1982, pp. 9-20.
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan, London, 1974,pp. 24-25.
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3.5.b Rules, resources and ideas
Giddens analyses the way in which individual actions accrue over space and time to
form social structures which are recognisable because they are reproduced. Interests
and power relationships are inherent in such actions. For Giddens every individual
social action both emerges from, and is generative of the pattern of human existence
which can be thought of as a social system:
... the structural properties of social systems are both the media and the
outcome of the practices that constitute those systems.... every process of
action is a production of something new, a fresh act; but at the same time all
action exists in continuity with the past, which supplies the meaning of its
initiation.^?
The conditions of autonomy and dependence experienced by actors in the social
system are also reproduced in interaction:
Power is an integral element of all social life as are meaning and norms; this is
the significance of the claim that stmcture can be analysed as rules and
resources, resources being drawn upon in the constitution of power relations.
All social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary implication of
the logical connection between human action and transformative capacity.
Power within social systems can be analysed as relations of autonomy and
dependence between actors in which these actors draw upon and reproduce
structural properties of domination.
'Transformative capacity', which can be thought of as the capacity to change objects,
symbols, ideas and the structural conditions of action, is expressed in interaction
through the control and use of resources. According to Giddens the exercise of power
in society is therefore inherent in the capacity of actors to influence the outcomes of
action in such a way as to satisfy their wants; and for Giddens only people have
wants: social systemsdo not.^^
The concepts of wants, interests, ideology and power are linked for Giddens
through the significance of action. The fundamental basis of interests are 'wants'.
These are achieved through a given course of action, the outcome of which can be
influenced by the use of resources. Interest groups are therefore collectivities of
people with common wants and ideas about their realisation. Those groups or
individuals who control a majority of resources have the power to influence courses of
action in ways that will result in favourable outcomes for the individuals in that group.
Giddens perceives ideology emerging when groups with sectional interests seek
to conceal the fact that most action in society serves their interests, since such a
realisation would cause social disintegration at the level of individual action.
Concealment is achieved through the manipulation of resources in three ways. Firstly,
Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 69-70.
Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Macmillan, London,
1981, pp. 28-29.
59 Ibid., p. 189.
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to represent sectional interests as universal ones: secondly, the denial of contradictions
which arise out of the fact that dominant interests are being served (for example, to
label conflict which arises out of economic production as 'non-political'), and thirdly,
by portraying as 'natural' conditions and actions which preserve the status quo.^o
Clegg also sees power defined in terms of agencies and events occurring in a
framework of systematic relationships, but he criticises Giddens for underestimating
the effect of structuralconstraintsupon the capacity of actors to structure relationships
according to their wants.In Clegg's explanation of power he employs the notion of
'power circuits' which are sets of structured relationships through which different
types of power flow. There is no simple definition of power for Clegg. He maintains
that power is multi-faceted and that any explanation of the exercise of power in social
action needs to be as complex as the phenomenon it is attempting to explain.^^ There
is power which is manifest in the rules and dominationwhich cause action in agencies
leading to certain outcomes. He says:
Power, viewed episodically, may move through circuits in which rules,
relations and resources that are constitutive of power are translated, fixed and
reproduced/transformed.63
In Clegg's explanation this episodic power is 'power over' the agency of others
which allows the dominant agency to achieve outcomes favourable to its interests.
There is an interdependence of rules, resources and ideas and the capacity to use any
of these to control outcomes. In Clegg's words:
Existing social relations constitute the identities of agencies, whether individuals
or some collective loci of decision-making and action. Agencies' causal powers
will be realized through the organization of standing conditions. These require
that agencies involved in what Hindess terms 'arenas of struggle' are capable of
utilizing means in order to control resources which have consequential
outcomes for the scope of action of these agents. Each agency is operative in a
highly complex environment of standing conditions. Each is among many
others with strategic interests in each other and in the relations that constitute
them as actors in the same system. Agencies possess varying control of
resources which they have various means of effectively utilizing in order to
produce consequential outcomes for their own and others' agency.64
For Clegg, control over rules is the capacity to authorise or veto action.
Change occurs through conflict over the issues of the rules of action, the membership
of agencies and the techniques of production and discipline. These techniques are
both the means of innovation in action and production and the 'bearers of domination'.
New techniques challenge existing power relationships and set up resistant action by
60 Ibid., pp. 188-195.
61 Clegg, Frameworks ofPower, p.
62 Ibid., pp. 211-218.
63 Ibid., p. 211.
^/1 ^ - -
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64 Ibid., p. 215.
65 Ibid., p. 209.
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those whose interests are threatened. Dominant interests will therefore try to control
not only resources, but also the ideas which inform the social relations which
legitimate the rules of action which structure the relations of production and meaning.
Clegg's explanation of power is useful in alerting the policy analyst to the
inherent complexity of power relationships in any social system of action. Individuals
act in agencies and environments which are complex sets of interdependent
relationships of resource exchange, rule-making and structures of meaning.
Mechanisms of accountability, co-ordination and control reinforce dominant interests.
Agencies requiring resources therefore have to abide by rules set by what Clegg terms
'nodally positioned agencies in the environment'.
Through Clegg's extension of the structural understanding of power, the policy
process and its. outcomes can therefore be understood by tracing the control of
resources, rules and ideas between agencies through time. The concept of power as
inherent in the control of the rules of action, the ideas which underlie the structures
and relationships which both emerge from and generate the rules; and the resources
necessary for interaction and production, can be integrated into the policy community
approach so that, in any particular policy arena, it is possible to explain change
through time by analysing the way in which significant actors in the subgovemment,
influenced by ideas and interest groups in the attentive public and the international
attentive public, will both make decisions about the allocation of resources; influence
members of the executive core to endorse those decisions; and seek to control ideas
and rules in order to maintain their interests and their status as 'nodally placed' actors.
Action in policy communities can be therefore be interpreted as being oriented
around the control of rules, resources and ideas to protect or promote interests. But,
as Wright, Pross, and Coleman and Skogstad point out, not all action is informed or
guided by the same set of values, norms and ideologies. Giddens argues that the use
of ideology as a justification for action enables actors to disguise the fact that they are
influencing the control of resources in order to further their own interests. Action in
the science policy community is distinctive because it involves both political ideology
(diseussed in chapter 2) and a unique set of values and norms which serve to protect
the interests of scientists. These scientific norms and values are conceived by many
writers to be a distinct social system of action.
4. THE SYSTEM OF SCIENCE
The production of scientific knowledge in a society can be seen analytieally as a
separate subsystem of society because action in the scientific community is patterned
by unique norms and values. These norms and values affect the way in which
scientists interact with governments and some understanding of them is therefore
necessary in order to explain interaction in the science policy community.
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4.1 Merton on the norms of science
Merton was one of the first modern sociologists to analyse the relationship between
science and society. He saw the relationship as one of 'dynamic interdependence'
between science as an ongoing social activity and the 'environing social structure'.^6
Merton's fundamental observation is that it is the method of producing scientific
knowledge which distinguishes scientific activity from other social activity:
The ethos of science involves thefunctionally necessary demand that theories or
generalizations be evaluated in terms of their logical consistency and
consonance with facts.^^
According to Merton the production of scientific knowledge has to remain
separate from other social activity because the rigorous observations upon which the
scientific method isbased has tobefree from possible political orreligious bias. If the
knowledge produced by scientists as a result of testing hypotheses through
observations, or using observations to develop testable hypotheses, was in conflict
with dominant political or religious ideologies about the way theworld should be, then
the scientific method would be at risk.
Merton distinguished four norms which he saw as constituting the 'ethos of
science' and which guided the actions of its practitioners in such a way as to avoid
distortions of the scientific method by values dysfunctional to the use of the scientific
method. The norms are:
1) Universalism
All natural phenomena are open toinvestigation. Scientific principles are not
rented to national boundaries. Knowledge that has been established by
scientific methods inone country isequally as valid in any other country, and
its validity does notchange with nationality, race or religion.
2) Communalism
Scientific knowledge is not considered to be the private property of the
scientist who produced itbut part ofthe body ofscientific knowledge open to
all scientists, '...recognition and esteem are the sole property right of the
scientist in his discoveries.' Since the status of scientists within the science
system is dependent upon evaluation of their contribution to knowledge this
norm encourages the sharing of knowledge.
3) Disinterestedness
This norm states that scientists ideally should not profit inany way other than
scientific status from the discoveries they make. Scientific work should be
carried out in order to add tothe body ofknowledge and not to gain power,
social status or money. The norm functions to preserve the 'reputability' of
scientific knowledge that isnot defiled bythe possibility ofpersonal gain.
4) Organised scepticism
Each scientist is responsible for the vahdity of the methods used to verify the
work of other scientists. Knowledge is not accepted as truthuntil it has been
proven to be not false by 'detached scrutiny'. The norm needs to be followed
Merton, 'Scienceand the Social Order', p. 585.
67 Ibid., p. 595.
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most rigorously when the scientific method is apphed to areas of knowledge
formally considered sacred orwhich would affect thedistribution of power in
society.68
These idealised norms of science are used by the scientific community to counter
threats to the autonomy of their systemfrom the widercommunity. In 1937 Merton
observed the threat to scientific communities in Germany and Russia from totalitarian
governments. This led him to analyse the special requirements of the scientific
community. Merton writes:
The exaltation of pure scienceis thus seento be a defence against the invasion
of norms which limit directions of potential advance and threaten the stability
and continuance of scientific research as a social activity.
Conflict becomes accentuated whenever science extends its research to new
areas towards which there are institutionalized attitudes or whenever other
institutions extend their area of control.^^
Merton's analysis of science as social activity is important to the analysis of
science policy because of the insight helends tothe interaction between the scientific
community and governments. Conflict is implicit in the relationship because the ethos
of science separates the scientist from other social norms and values, particularly from
political interests.
4.3 Storer on science as a social system
Storer further developed Merton's concepts by adding the notions of patterned
scientific interaction oriented to the exchangeof a particularcommodity. He sees the
science system as:
...a stable set of patterns of interaction, organized about the exchange of a
qualitatively unique commodity and guided by a shared set of norms that
facilitate the continuingcirculation of that commodity
4.3.a Patterns of interaction
Storer sees science as a 'non-service' profession which, although it differs from
professions such as medicine orlaw inthat scientists do not provide a direct service to
the public, nevertheless exhibits characteristics typical of professions in general.
These are the production, maintenance and transmission of a specialised body of
knowledge, the autonomous recruitment training and control of itsmembers, a reward
system which both motivates members and isa means ofcontrol, and the regulation of
the relations between members and non-members."^!
Merton, 'Science and Democratic Social Structure', p. 606-615.
Merton, 'Science and the Social Order', p. 597; &
'Science and Democratic Social Structure', p. 615.
Storer, The Social System of Science, p. 91.
"7! Ibid., p. 75.
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The central core of scientists engaged in basic research, teaching and the
evaluation of the work of other scientists, forms the reference group for the larger
body of scientists whose work is the application of scientific knowledge to the
solution of practical problems. Storer maintains that the norms and values of this
central core provide the ideal standard for the patterns of interaction of the total
community of scientists in a society, and the uniqueness of this normative structure is
the basis of his claim that science is a distinct social system.^^
4.3.b The exchange commodity of competent response
This competent response of scientists towards the work of other scientists is seen by
Storer as the commodity (comparable to goods and services) which serves as a reward
within the science system.73 Storer maintains that the norms and value of science are
directed to the goal of creating knowledge:
The desire to extend our understanding of the workings of the universe ... is the
baseline against which other motives must be compared....
So long as the interaction among scientists places a premium upon creativity,
we may assume that they tend - while in the role of scientist - to accept this as
their major professional goal. The importance of creativity is, in effect, built
into their universe of discourse; in order even to converse as a scientist, one
must implicitly accept this goal.'^ ^
The norms of science, therefore, impel the scientist not only to create through
the discovery of new concepts aboutthe universe, but alsoto share that knowledge so
that it may be evaluatedagainst previously acceptedknowledge and legitimisedin the
science system. This evaluation cannot be carried out by 'lay' personsbecause they
do not have the knowledge or awareness of the systematic processes of scientific
evaluation to judge what is competent scientific work. The process of evaluation is
only valid for scientists whenit is performed by persons sufficiently socialised in the
methodology, norms and values of science to providea response which has meaning
in the sciencesystem. The idealised norms of scienceare not imposedfrom the wider
society upon the science system, but emerge from the desire of scientists to obtain
competent response fromtheir colleagues. Scientists' behaviour can be explainedby
the degree to which these ideal norms fit the world in which the scientist actually
works. Lack of fit results in behaviour which protects the normsJS
Storer argues that the social structure of science (that is the working out of the
system in the 'real' world) emerges as a compromise between the norms of science
and environmental constraints. He does so by examining the way in which the norms
become distorted in the everyday world of the scientist. Thus the norm of
disinterestedness is distorted when some scientists deliberately choose research topics
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
Ibid., pp. 69-74.
74 Ibid., p. 58.
73 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
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that will further their career, social status or incomeJ^ The norm of organised
scepticism which serves to discourage fraud and incompetence is compromised by the
expense of replicating experiments, the need for applied scientists to produce
commercially applicable results in a short time and the sheer volume of new
knowledge in any one field that peers must evaluate in order to assess the validity of
new work7'7
Perhaps the norm which has been the most difficult to uphold is the norm of
communality. Merton states in his original paper on the norms of science:
Property rights in science are whittled down to a bare minimum by the rationale
of the scientific ethic... .The institution of science as part of the public domain is
linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is the
antithesis of this norm; full and opencommunication its enactment.'^ ^
Violation of the norm rests on the understanding that 'knowledge is power'.
Sponsors of the production of scientific knowledge who wish to maintain their
superiority vis a vis rivals will expect researchers in their employ to forgo their rights
as scientists to share their results with the rest of the scientific community.'^ ^ terms
of science policy, secrecy in science becomes a problem for governments when
publicly-funded science is appropriated by scientists working in the private sector; or
obversely, when governments wish to eommercialise publicly-funded science and
scientists argue that all science should be considered as a public good.
The coneepts outlined above will be used in the thesis to explain interaction
between pohtieal and scientific actors in the science policy community. Political action
is centred around the allocation of public resources. Scientific action is centred around
the creation of new scientific knowledge. Both sets of actors use control over rules,
resources and ideas to shape policy outcomes which further their particular interests.
Scientists and political actors justify their actions in terms of differing ideologies.
Chapter two will discuss the way in which the ideology of science and politieal
ideologies interact within changing social, political and institutional contexts.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with examining concepts from different social science
disciplines which can inform the analysis of science policy, particularly those factors
which effect and affect change, both in the policy process and in policy outcomes.
The following statements about science poliey underlie this analysis of changing
science policy in Australia from 1965 to 1990.
Storer, p. 110.
77 Ibid, p. 118-121.
78 Merton, 'Science and Democratic Social Structure', p. 611.
79 Storer, The Social System ofScience, p. 126.
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6.1 Definition: decisions, actors and power
Science policy is defined as a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political
actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of
achieving them within the science policy arena in which governments and
scientists internet to provide the mles, resources and ideas for the production of
scientificknowledge. These decisions should, in principle, be within the power
of these actors to achieve.
6.2 Decision-making: expertise and authority
The science policy communityis that part of a political system that - by virtue of
its functional responsibilities, its vested interests, and its speeialised knowledge
- acquires a dominant voice in determining govemment decisions in the field of
government activity related to the allocation of societal resources to the
production of scientific knowledge and regulation of the uses to which that
knowledge is put; and is generally permitted by soeiety at large, and the public
authorities in particular to determinepublic policy in that field.
6.3 Power: control over rules, resources and ideas
Power in the science policy community is exercised by significant actors who
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and authority in policy-making. Power in
the networks which structure the policy community is a function of the
resources, rules and ideas that actors can mobilise to influence the course and
outcomes of interaction. These rules, resources and ideas, and the capacity to
mobilise them, are the products of thestmcture of organised interests whichmay
be dominatedby one or more agencies. The policyprocess and its outcomescan
therefore be fully understood only by tracing the interaction of resources, rules
and ideas between agencies through time.
6.4 Interaction: norms and values
Scienee policy is formulated, implemented and evaluated by actors in
organisations both governmental and non-governmental, scientific and non-
scientific, acting according to the norms and values of the most powerful
organised interests within the science policy community, withinpolicynetworks
of stmcturedor informal relationships forming assoeiational systems of varying
degrees of cohesion.
6.5 Dynamic of action: the exchange process
The dynamic underlying the relationship between governments and the scientific
community is that of the exchange of resources. Governments need scientific
knowledge to organise and manage the complexities of modem society and to
stimulate economic, socialandcultural development. The scientific community
needseconomic and ethical support fromgovemments to finance and legitimate
the production of scientific knowledge.
6.6 Pressure groups: the agents of change
Pressure groups are atomistic, self-organised groups, whose members share
common interests in science policy and ideas about how those interests should
be realised. Groups evolve in response to changes which threaten their interests.
They often interact in one-to-one relationships with government, or
governmental agencies. Those groups which control the resources which are at
any given time salient in a particular area of sciencepolicy have the power to
influence negotiating processes and courses of action in such a way as to result
in outcomes favourable to their interests. Pressure groups are therefore likely to
be aetive in the policy community on an ad hoc basis as their resources and the
threats to their interests fluctuate.
6.7 Conflict: different values and threatened interests
Conflict arises in the policy community when the interests of the scientific
community, based on its particular norms and values, do not aceord with the
interests of the dominant political ideology based on a different set of norms and
values, or when the dominant organised interests are threatened by innovative
techniques or ideas.
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Chapter 2
The Ideological, Institutional and Economic Context
Action in the science policy community in Australia takes place in a complex set of
public, private and semi-autonomous organisations. An analysis of science policy
therefore needs an understanding of the rules, ideas and resources underlying the
establishment and operation of, and interaction among, scientific and political
institutions. These rules, resources and ideas are the basis for action and for the
emergence of significant actors with interests. This chapter will describe the
institutional context of science policy in Australia using the concepts elucidated in
chapter one. Australian political ideology in general is discussed briefly, with a
fuller exposition of changing patterns of political ideology for science in Australia.
The institutions and patterns of action of the science system are described in order to
appreciate their unique development in Australia. The resources available for the
production of scientific knowledge come from the economy: both directly in the
form of financial resources, and indirectly in the form of skilled human resources.
The chapter ends with a discussion of the composition and global context of the
Australian economy in terms of the implications for science policy of particular
patterns and indicators of activity.
1. Australian Political Ideology
In chapter one the ideology underlying action in the science system was discussed
using Merton's concept of the ethos of science and Storer's concept of competent
response. The following brief discussion of political ideology in Australia is
included to provide a basic understanding of the relationship between political
ideology and action in the political system in Australia. The most significant
ideologies in the relationship between the political system and the science system in
Australia are utilitarianism, populism and socialism. However, these three
ideologies cannot explain all aspects of the relationship at the end of the twentieth
century and three further terms have been coined by the author to explain how
governments perceive the relationship between the state and science.
1.1 Political ideology and science policy
Ideological labels are often a poor guide to political behaviour in Australia. During
periods of political change in the twentieth century political parties have shuffled
ideologies to find the one which seems most likely to appeal to the critical interest
groups of the time. Loveday claims that in Australia: 'Governmental actions can
almost always be explained with no more than incidental reference to political
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ideas'4 The terms 'socialist', 'liberal' and 'conservative' could be applied to rural
farming interests, mining magnates and environmentalists respectively.^ Menzies
himself said in the 1960s:
Where government action or control has seemed to us to be the best answer to
a practical problem, we have adopted that answer at the risk of being called
Socialists.3
In the case of the allocation of resources to the production of scientific
knowledge this may mean that the Hawke governmentof the 1980s pursues a policy
of the privatisation of Australian science, whereas the Bruce government of the late
1920s, which took a conservative stance on the provision of public goods, presided
over the expansion of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
which set the pattern of government-funded science in Australia for the next fifty
years. The way in which political ideology affects the production of scientific
knowledge cannot be categorised according to 'right' or 'left' labels of declared
political intent.
In Australia there have been four basic ideologies about the relationship
between governments and the production and application of scientific knowledge:
colonialism; nationalism; conservatism and techno-economism. In the second half
of the twentieth century conservatism and techno-economism predominate but
elements of colonialism and nationalism persist. A fifth ideology,
environmentalism, has become electorally salient in the 1980s.
l.l.a Colonialism
For the first 180 years of white settlement in Australia the power of British
institutions and British capital was significant in the development of the Australian
political system, Australian culture and the Australian economy. Opposition to that
power began in the 1840s with the move towards self-governed colonies but it was
not until the 1890s that left-wing populism mobilised politically against rural and
mercantile interests. The elimination of British colonial exploitation was the
primary objective of the labourmovement in Australia at the end of the nineteenth
century.4 Brugger and Jaensch argue that understanding 'the British economic
connection' is crucial to understanding the political ideologies of Australia in the first
1 Peter Loveday, 'Australian Politieal Thought', in The Pieces of Politics, 2nd edn., ed. R. Lucy,
Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 2-28, p. 4.
2 In 1961 Encel, writingfor the American journal Science, explained how the Australian tradition
of intervention in the name of 'national development', even by conservative governments, would
be considered 'sociaUstie' in the USA.
Sol Encel, 'FinancingScientificResearchin Australia', Science, vol. 134, no. 3474, 28 July 1961,
pp. 260-266, p. 265.
3 Loveday, 'Australian Political Thought', p. 2.
4 Bill Brugger & Dean Jaensch, Australian Politics: Theory and Practice, Allen & Uniwin,
Sydney, 1985, pp. 12-13.
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three decades of the twentieth century.^ The fact that there was no rebellious cutting
of the colonial ties with Britain ensured that colonialism was an important in the
politics and economics of Australia until the retirement of Menzies in 1966.6
Colonialism decided the shape of Australian scientific institutions. In the early
nineteenth century Australian science was moulded in the British tradition. The
early scientists were British scientists, the early institutions were modelled on British
institutions and the knowledge they created was dispatched to Britain for peer
evaluation and legitimation. This is to be expected in a colony which was huge,
sparsely populated, culturally remote from the indigenous and regional populations,
and economically dependent on its mother country. The effect upon the institutions
of science in Australia was to engender a sense of intellectual dependence on the
British model of the production of scientific knowledge which did not begin to
diminish until the 1930s.^
Examples of the colonial bias in the establishment and organisation of
scientific institutions abound. CSIR was established in 1926 partly in order to attract
funds from the Empire Marketing Board set up in Britain to foster scientific research
in the colonies which would be of economic benefit to Britain.^ Sir David Rivett,
the Chief Executive of CSIR for its first twenty-fouryears, was an ardent supporter
of Britain, even to the extent of compromising his belief that the production of
scientific knowledge in Australia should be autonomous of any political influence.
In keeping with his desire to further economic interdependence in the Empire, he
agreed that wool research in Australia should be subordinate to that conducted in
Britain.^ Until 1938 there was no sciencejournal in Australia. The editorial of its
first issue includes a qualification of its existence:
There is much to be said for reducing rather than increasing the number of
scientific journals in the Empire-, to add one more to the list can be justified
only if there is a place to be filled, and the capacity to fill it.^O [emphasis
added]
The use of the word 'Empire' rather than 'world' emphasises the colonial parameters
of thinking in scientific institutions in Australia immediately prior to the Second
World War. The overemphasis on rural research in CSIR can be attributed to the
5 Ibid., p. 30.
6 Graham Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne,
1991, pp. 147 & 301.
^ Moyal estimates that Australian science did not reach the stage ofindependence and self-reliance
that characterises Basalla's final stage of the diffusion of western science until 'the third decade of
the twentieth century'.
Ann Moyal 'The Effect of InstitutionalEvolution on SciencePolicy', in Science and Technology
for What Purpose?: An Australian Perspective, ed. A.T.A. Healy, Australian Academy of
Science, 1979, pp. 67-83, p. 68.
^ C.B. Schedvin, 'The Culture ofCSIRO', Australian Cultural History, no. 2, 1982-83, pp. 76-89,
p. 78.
9 Ibid., p. 81.
Anon. 'A New Venture', The AustralianJournal of Science, vol. 1, no. 1, 1938,p. 1.
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British desire to protect British secondary industry markets. It was not until the
chief of BHP, Essington Lewis, visited Japan in 1936 and realised the implications
of that country's arms build-up that the development of secondary industry was
encouraged by the establishment of the National Standards Laboratory.^ i It is
perhaps ironic that the next phase of colonialism may be Japanese-funded. The
proposed multi-function polis is based on the same interaction of economic
exploitation and the production of scientific knowledge that underlay CSIR.12
1.1.b Nationalism
Nationalism has also been influential in the relationship between the Australian
scientific community and governments. Nationalism is an ideology which glorifies
the perceived shared characteristics of individual states, territories, citizens and
cultures. Nationalistic sentiments often arise in the face of a challenge to national
sovereignty and economicindependence, or as a protest against colonial domination.
In Australia nationalism developed after 1901 as a unifying counterpoint to the
conflict inherent in a federation. Nationalistic ideas were used by Hughes to retain
political power until the end of the First World War.^^ Nationalism was similarly
invoked as a mechanism of unification by both the Whitlam government and the
Country Party in 1973.15
Nationalism has both positive and negative effects on scientific activity. In
1964 Sir Frederick White, Chairman of CSIRO, said: 'Military objectives and
national prestige are the predominating motives of the Western world'.
Nationalistic sentiment can give rise to the estabhshment of researeh institutions and
facilities which are symbols of a nation's cultural and economic maturity. The
possession of sueh faeilities renews the citizen's commitment to the nation by
stimulating pride in belonging to a nation powerful enough to provide them. The
negative effects arise from the sense of exelusion which nationalism can engender.
The ideas of 'natural' racial inequality are extended to knowledge and the produeers
of knowledge, so that 'foreign' scientific knowledge and scientists are considered as
inferior. In the twentieth century scientific knowledge has sometimes been
generated to feed ideologieal beliefs centred on nationalism. The Nazi experiments
on racial superiority and the belief in the genetic ideas of Lysenko in the USSR are
11 E.A. Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia, 2nd edn., Longman
Cheshire, Melhourne, 1979, p. 66.
12 Mandeville sees the multi-function polis idea as created by the Japanese Ministry for
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and traces its genesis to the need for Japan's economy to
use high technology information produced hy Pacific Rim nations with sophisticated knowledge-
producing systems. T.D. Mandeville, 'A 'Multi-Function Polis' for Australia', Prometheus, vol. 6,
no. 1, June 1988, pp. 94-106, p. 102.
15 Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice, p. 158.
1^ Brugger &Jaensch, Australian Politics: Theory andPractice, p. 29.
15 Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice, pp.279& 293.
1^ Sir Frederick White, 'The Strategy of Australian Science', Australian Journal ofScience, vol.. 26,
no. 7, January 1964, pp. 191-195, p. 191.
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two instances of the way in which nationalism can override the universalistic norms
of science.
Examples of nationalism influencing the production of scientific knowledge in
Australia include Hughes' decision after Gallipoli to establish a national science
organisation; Menzies' sponsorship of the Australian National University and the
Australian Academy of Science; and Whitlam's attack on the effects of multinational
ownership of Australian firms on research and development investment. The
negative effects of nationalism have been felt when politicians have invoked
xenophobic sentiments about foreign science to gain electoral support. The most
notorious incident was the 'Red Scientists' scare fuelled by the Menzies government
in 1947. A milder form of nationalism was recently invoked by a Liberal Party
politician. In an address to the 'Science and Society' conference in June 1989,
Warwick Smith, the former Opposition spokesperson on science, said:
One can argue that science has frequently sailed away from society's needs. It
has been carried out for world society needs, not necessarily Australia's needs.
There is sometimes a lack of commitment to Australia's development on the
part of scientists - and others - in the community.
1.1.c Conservatism
If nationalism attempts to insulate scientific knowledge within national boundaries,
or at least direct its effects to benefit the nation, conservatism seeks to restrict
decision-making between the scientific community and government to the
significant actors in each system, and to restrict the establishment of new political
agencies to negotiate the formulation implementation and evaluation of science
policy. One of the principle tenets of conservatism is the Burkean belief that
leadership arises in societies as a process of societal evolution. These elites are
naturally better endowed than the masses to plan and administer society, and once
recognised, should be given autonomy to pursue their ideals. Governments should
be strong, to maintain law and order, but non-interventionist since all social change
should be spontaneous rather than planned. Modern conservatism advocates that
social change should occur in response to market forces which should be seen as the
natural wellspring of social development. By contrast, radical, government-induced
change is inherently misguided because it threatens the social cohesion maintained
by traditional values.!^ It is this facet of conservatism which has been so influential
in Australian politics and which has, according to Altman, led to the situation in
Warwick Smith, 'Science should be subsumed to society's needs'. Address given to the Public
Affairs Conference, 'Science and Society', Australian National University, June 7-9 1989.
Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice, pp. 325-328.
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which : '...Australia is cursed with extremely conservative ideological
establishments'.
The effect of conservatism on the institutions of science in Australia can be
seen in the attitudes of particular prime ministers. The institutions and practices
introduced by them illustrate their conservative ideology. Bruce expressed the
ideology perfectly when he spoke of the establishment of CSIR, stressing the
desirability of maintaining the institutional status quo:
The purpose of the government is, not to create a great new centralized
institute of research, but, for the benefit of both the primary and secondary
industries, to bring about co-operation between existing agencies and to enlist
the aid of the pure scientist, the universities and every other institute handling
scientific questions.
Similarly, Menzies' 'behind closed doors' method of science policy-making^i is
typical of the elitism inherent in conservative notions of aristocracy and the 'natural'
evolution of individuals who lead. Eraser continued the conservative tradition by
steadfastly opposing the setting up of new formal decision-making science policy
bodies, and favouring an ad hoc, non-institutionalised form of policy making.^^ jje
was gradually persuaded to temper this conservatism as the demands of a more
technologically oriented system of production began to require more complex
management. When political conservatism meets the organisational conservatism of
the scientific community the result can be institutional stagnation which lags behind
the changing needs of society.
l.l.d Techno-economism
Techno-economism is the belief, in modern industrialised societies, that the
paramount purpose of scientific activity is to furnish knowledge that can be used in
the development of innovative technologies useful to achieve national economic
objectives. According to this ideology the pursuit of scientific knowledge must
always be justified in terms of economic achievement. Pure scientific research is
countenanced on the understanding that knowledge of what may in the future be
economically useful is presently imperfect. The concept of techno-economism was
implicit in Bernal's seminal analysis of the relationship between modem societies
19 Dennis Altman, 'Social and political barriers', in The Socialist Objective; Labor and Socialism,
ed. Bruce Meagher, Hale & Ironmonger, Sydney, 1983, pp. 135-157, p. 147.
29 c.B. Schedvin, Shaping Science andIndustry: AHistory ofAustralia's Councilfor Scientific and
Industrial Research, I926-I949, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p. 24.
21 James Davenport, 'The Impulse of Science in Public Affairs, 1945-1986', in The Commonwealth
of Science: ANZAAS and the Scientific Enterprise in Australia, 1888-1988, ed. Roy McLeod,
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1988, pp. 73-96, p. 78.
22 Malcolm Fraser, 'Government Approaches toScience, The Australian Journal ofScience, vol. 31,
no. 12, 1969, pp. 410-415, p. 413.
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give new guidelines for the directions the organisation is to take in allocating
priorities for researchwork.32
It is unlikely that techno-economism will decline as the major political
ideology informing the relationship between governments and scientific activity
under an ALP government. Although radical techno-economism has dominated
science policy-making by the Hawke government, it is by no means party-specific.
The science policy statement of the Liberal and National Parties (issued in
November 1988) is equally certain (though perhaps more timid in its re-structuring)
of the relationship between the production of scientific knowledge and national
economic growth:
Science and technology are indispensable in achieving a more outward-
looking and innovative society. They offer Australian industry a unique
opportunity to revitalise and expand its domestic and export markets in an
increasingly competitive world.33
l.l.fThe challenge ofenvironmentalism
Environmentalism may provide a challenge the ideology of techno-economism. The
ideology is based on the science of ecology defined as: 'a branch of biology dealing
with organisms' relations to one another and to their surroundings'.34 Groups who
use ecological knowledge politically have come to be known as 'environmentalists'.
They judge all political issues in light of their impact on the global or local ecology,
believing that the values informing human behaviour should be based not on an
anthropocentric view of the natural world but on an ecocentric view which denies the
moral pre-eminence of the human species.35 Thus the naturalworld has moral rights
of existence which are separate from humans' perception of the use-value of the non-
human world.36 This view places environmentalists in constant potential opposition
to development based on the exploitation of natural resources. Scientific knowledge
is used by both sides in the conservation/exploitation debate to influence
governments in the allocation of resources to their respective interests, whether they
be profits or the objectives of deep ecology.
In the 1980s there have been many indicators of the way in which
environmentalism is increasingly significant in science policy. Among them are
firstly, the fact that the total membership of the five major environmental
organisations in Australia grew by 1200 per cent between 1980 and 1990, thereby
32 CSIRO, Annual Report 1987-88, CSIRO Public Affairs, Canberra, 1988, p. 10.
33 Liberal& National Country Party, Science Policy: Preparing Today for Tomorrow, LiberalParty
of Australia, & National Party of Australia, Barton, ACT, 1981, p.l.
34 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7thedn., 1982, s.v. 'ecology'.
35 The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary ofAustralian Politics, 1988 edn., s.v. 'ecological movement'.
36 p.R. Hay, 'The Environmental Movement: Romanticism Reborn?', Island Magazine, no. 29,
Summer 1986-87, pp. 10-17, p. 11.
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increasing the electoral significance of environmentalism.^^ Secondly, concern for
the environment has now been formalised in the CSIRO Act. In June 1988, section
13 of the Science and Industry Research Act 1949 was amended to provide new
Ministerial Guidelines for the objectives of CSIRO. The first of these is: 'CSIRO's
main task will be the conduct of strategic and applied research in support of national
economic, social and environmental objectives (emphasis added).'38 Thirdly, there is
some indication that funding for environmental research is increasing.39 The May
1989 Statement was followed by a major Environmental Statement by the Prime
Minister in July 1989.^0 xhe National Greenhouse Advisory Committee was formed
in August 1989 to advise the government on developments in global warming and on
priorities in this areas of research.
As environmentalism is recognised by governments as a legitimate political
lobby, the line between scientific and political activity, between fact and value, is
blurred. At present environmentalism's formal political constituency is restricted but
its influence has to be seen in terms of its potential for disrupting both the balance of
political power and the process of economic production. The political appeal of
environmentalism depends upon the global physical climate and the global economic
climate. It will wax in the face of substantial evidence of global warming and wane
in the face of continuing global and Australian economic recession.
The above political ideologies express the way in which the relationship
between the political system and the science system in Australia has been perceived
by successive governments. The way in which they developed demonstrates
Giddens' notion that groups with sectional interests seek to conceal the fact that most
action in society serves their interests. Sectional interests are represented as
universal interests. Thus British manufacturing interests were represented as
interests of Empire in providing funds for the establishment of CSIR. Rural interests
have dominated the allocation of resources to research throughout much of the
twentieth century. Manufacturing interests have used government concern over the
lack of innovation in industry to bring about tax subsidies for private production.
37 Brian Woodley, 'How a tiny seed grew into a treewith strong branches', Weekend Australian,
June 9-101990, p. 21.
38 CSIRO, Annual Report 1987-88, CSIRO Public Affairs, Canberra, 1988, p. 10.
39 In 1990 ASTEC published a review of environmental research in Australia which included a
comparison of environmental research funding in 1984-85 and 1986-87, the only truly
comparable years data then available from the ABS. The Council estimated that research funding
from all sources during that period had increased by 4.2% in real terms. The Commonwealth
Government share of that funding increased by 6%. ASTEC noted that:
Attempts to assess the status of Australian environmental research are plagued by the
subjectivity of practitioners and the shortcomings of more objective means of measurement.
ASTEC, Environmental Research in Australia: A Review, AGPS, Canberra, 1990, pp. 16-19 &
83.
The Science and Technology Budget Statements do not separate environmental research from
other program research such as energy.
Australia, Science and Technology Budget Statement, 1991-92, Table 2, p. 92.
Australia, Our Country, Our Future: Statement on the Environment, The Hon. R.J.L. Hawke,
Prime Minister of Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.
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The ideologies both arise from, and are generative of the way in which the science
policy community is structured. These constituent elements of the science policy
community are described and analysed in chapter four. The interests and objectives
of scientific actors in the science policy community are derived in large part from
their socialisation in the Australian scientific community. Concepts for an analysis
of the production of scientific knowledge were outlined in chapter one. The
following section describes thedevelopment of the institutions of Australian science
in the light of these concepts.
2. The Australian Science System
This thesis is concerned with science policy in four main sectors of activity: the
higher education system, government research institutions, rural research
organisations and the manufacturing sector. The most significant actors in the
science system, and science-based members of the policy community, emerge from
institutions in these sectors each of which has its own distinctive pattern of
organisation and production. The four sectors will be examined throughout
subsequent chapters which explore the formation of rules for, the development of
ideas about, and the allocation of resources to, scientific researchin Australia.
2.1 Higher education research
The higher education sector in Australia has two direct basic functions within the
science system: the training of scientists and the production of scientific knowledge.
A third function, integral to these two, is the perpetuation of the science system
itself. The development of individual institutions, and the establishment of
associated peripheral organisations have centred around these functions.
2.1.a Theproduction of scientists and scientific knowledge
Higher education research in Australia has been conducted in universities,
agricultural, technical and mining institutes and, increasingly in the late 1980s, in
colleges of advanced education. The first universities in Australia were not
established until the decade of colonial independence in the 1850s-60s. Sydney
University was first in 1852 followed closely by Melbourne in 1855. They were
modelled on London University, founded in 1826 with seventeen chairs of science,
rather than the Oxbridge system which emphasised classics.^i For a hundred years
they were funded mainly by State governments.
The traditional British separation of commerce and academe was adopted in
Australia. Agricultural and technical education began outside the universities as
agricultural colleges and technical institutes were established in the 1880s. The
University of Sydney did not get a Chair of Agriculture until 1910 despite the
Ann Mozley Moyal, Scientists inNineteenth Century Australia, Cassell Australia, Sydney, 1976,
p. 221.
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economic dependence on rural industry xhe influx of scientists from Britain in
the 1880s reinforced the British model of autonomous university research although
individual scientists such as Masson in Melbourne did see his chemistry teaching
and research as part of a wider industrial scientific effort. There was no attempt at
this stage, or later after the First World War when the success of the German
university/industry research model became apparent, to develop a uniquely
Austrahan model of university research. Australian scientists continued to be trained
in the British mode and to base their careers on success in Britain rather than
Australia.43
At the end of the Second World War there was an attempt to move universities
away from the British model. The establishment of the Australian National
University in Canberra as a tertiary institution devoted to research offered Australian
scientists a place of excellence for research in Australia. The original idea was
formulated by Oliphant and Chifley using Princeton University as a model. The
founding of the New South Wales University of Technology (later the University of
New South Wales) in 1949 on the model of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology was also intended to herald a new era in which the scientific knowledge
produced in universities was to be focussed on local economic production as well as
on recognition in the international scientific community. However, both universities
were later re-oriented to the British model by the anglophile Menzies."^
By 1965 the Commonwealth govemment had assumed financial responsibility
for tertiary education in Australia and research in universities was funded partly
through general university funding and partly on a competitive basis through the
Australian Research Grants Scheme (ARGS). ARGS was intended to allocate
resources to 'the most outstanding and promising research being carried out in
universities and non-government research institutions'.^5 The Scheme thereby
maintained the lack of co-ordination between university research and that undertaken
in govemment laboratories. Thus, in 1977, the first ASTEC Report concluded that:
'...steps need to be taken to improve the interaction between universities and
colleges, industry and govemment laboratories'.^^ Several universities have since
42 Ibid., p. 237.
43 R. w. Home, 'Introduction', in Australian Science in the Making, ed. R. W. Home, Cambridge
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. vii-xxvii, pp. xiv-xv.
44 Davenport, 'Science in Public Affairs', p. 82.
43 D.M. Lamberton, Science, Technology and theAustralian Economy, TudorPress, Sydney 1970,
p. 36.
46 TheReport quoted thework ofSirIanMcLennan who showed thatfrom 1970-75, of 66patented
innovations in Australia, only three had originated in university laboratories. Ten years later
ASTEC was still advocating the closer liaison of industry and university research on the grounds
that the social and economic returns on the investment made by the allocation of public resources
to the production of scientific knowledge in universities were inadequate.
ASTEC, Science and Technology in 1977-78, AGPS, Canberra, 1978, pp. 5 & 87.
ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance of Australia's Universities and Other Higher
Education Institutions, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, p. 3.
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tried to bridge the gap between their scientists and industry by establishing
entrepreneurial companies to manage theexchange of ideas andfunds between firms
and universitylaboratories.47
In the late 1980s the higher education research system has undergone radical
changes as political expectations of the science system based on conservative and
colonial ideologies have been challenged by techno-economistic ideas of the
relevance of research to national economic production. The unification of the higher
education system has meant the incorporation of the former institutes of advanced
education into the university research system. This has increased competition for
research funds and diluted the ethos of international competent response by
encouraging researchers to derive theirstatus from otherarenas of action.
l.l.b The perpetuation ofthe norms ofscience
Societies which foster the norms of science and which reward scientists and
recognise scientists' work through the mechanism of competent response have
traditionally been an essential part of national science systems and of the global
system of science. In Australia such societies are closely associated with
universities. Not until the 1980s did a different type of scientists' agency emerge in
the form of representative bodies rather than agencies concerned with the
reinforcement of scientific norms.
The earliest scientific societies and associations in Australia were established
as foci for the practice of Bernal's 'Gentlemen's science'.48 Theearly colony had no
resources or inclination to pursue scientific enquiry, or as Moyal, expresses it, '...no
money or men'.49 By the 1880s the scientific community in Australia had been
institutionalised into one of government and university scientists but as yet had not
developed an Australian focus. The establishment of ANZAAS in 1888, as a federal
body which pre-dated the political federation of Australia by thirteen years was in
fact the expression of the scientific community's desire that Australia should be
represented by one association in the halls of imperial science in Britain.^o This
colonial tendency of the Australian scientific community to regard itself as part of
the British scientific community, rather than existing in the global scientific
community in its own right, continued unchallenged until the end of the Second
World War.
The cost of anglo-centrism was that no integrated scientific community
developed in Australia. In the 1950s the ideological link with the British system of
47 The 1978 ASTEC Report said that the initiatives were 'laudable' but too smalland fragmented.
ASTEC, Science and Technology in 1977-78, vol. lA, p. 87.
48 Bemal, Sciencein History. Volume 3: The Natural Sciences in Our Time, p. 719.
49 Moyal, Scientists inNineteenth Century Australia, p. 107.
Roy McLeod, 'Organizing Scienceunderthe Southern Cross', in The Commonwealth of Science:
ANZAAS and the Scientific Enterprise in Australia 1888-1988, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 1988, pp. 19-39, pp. 30-39.
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science was formalised with the establishment of the Australian Academy of Science
(AAS). Although the Academy did not use the prefix 'Royal' it was modelled on the
British society and duplicated its ethos and organisational stmcture.si The Academy
perpetuates the norms of science by conferring high status upon Australian scientists
who conduct their research appropriately and achieve international recognition of
their competence. During the Menzies' era the Academy was immensely influential
in the allocation of resources to the Australian science system in general and the
higher education research system in particular. Situated in the precincts of the
Australian National University in Canberra, the AAS maintained a monopoly over
the status system of science and was authorised by the Commonwealth govemment
to interact with the international science system on behalf of Australia.
In 1976 the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering
(AATSE) was established by scientists employed in industry who felt that the AAS
was not acknowledging the contribution of scientists working in applied disciplines.
The AAS came under pressure from Fellows who were working in applied fields to
change its policy but successive Presidents decided that the ethos of the AAS was to
foster good basic science and that applications would automatically follow. This
was not a satisfactory response to those Fellows who wished to have more influence
on technology policy in Australia and the new Academy was formed. 52 This
widening of the status system of science heralded the formation of other
representative bodies in the 1980s.53
2.2 Government research
In the Australian science system government research agencies have been pre
eminent in the production of scientific knowledge. Scientists from this sector
dominated the science policy community until the advent of techno-economism
began to formalise science policy-making in the late 1960s.
2.2.a Research in the Commonwealth public sector
The major stimulus for research and development in Australia comes from the
Commonwealth government. Forty per cent of Commonwealth expenditure on
research and development is spent on scientific activity in Commonwealth research
In 1951 a closed seminar in celebration of the Jubilee of federation was held at the newly-
established Australian National University in Canberra. In February 1954 the Queen personally
handed to Oliphant the Charter of the Australian Aeademy of Scienee.
In 1990 the Academy has 260 Fellows and receives 25 per eent of its funding from the
Commonwealth Government.
The Australian Academy of Science, Thefirst twenty-five years, Australian Academy of Science,
Canberra, 1980, pp. 11-14.
Professor Ian Ross, Secretary, Science Policy Committee, Australian Academy of Seienee,
Interview, 5.4.90.
^2 Professor H. Worner, Director, Microwave Research Unit, University ofWollongong, Personal
Communication, 3.11.89.
52 This issue isdiscussed atgreater length in chapter three.
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agencies.54 Since 1974 the largest agency in terms of financial and human resources
has been CSIRO.^^
The establishment of a Commonwealth govemment-funded research capacity
arose because of increasing concern that certain problems facing economic
production were not be satisfactorily managed by State departmental research
laboratories. Between 1908 and 1926 there was a protracted debate over the
constitutionality, rationale, functions and structure of a federal research institution
which would produce such knowledge. The other major factors in the decision to
proceed with establishing such an institution were the isolation imposed by the First
World War, Hughes' nationalistic desire for an Australian research organisation and
Britain's desire to exploitthe research capacity of her colonies.^^
The Council for Scientific and Industrial research (CSIR) became the umbrella
organisation for a diverse range of research activity but there was a definite bias in
favour of rural research. By 1935 the focus was still on primary industry despite the
Council's charter to undertake research for manufacturing industry as well.57 It was
the threat of war and disrupted imports of manufactured goods which galvanised the
Commonwealth government into expanding its researeh activity into the areas of
manufacturing industry and defence.
After the Second World War governments began to realise that modem social
life depended to an increasing extent on a level of scientific knowledge produetion
which needed some degree of diversification and co-ordination. The Labor
government set up a Commonwealth Department of Post-war Reconstmction, led by
the Minister-in-Charge of CSIR, to begin the process of reviewing Australia's post
war scientific needs. The establishment of the Bureau of Geology, Geophysics and
Mineral Resources, the Defence Research and Development Policy Committee and
the re-organisation of CSIRinto CSIRO were all part of this process.^s
In contrast, during the Menzies governments, scientific activity in the federal
sphere was constrained by Menzies' conservative notions of the role and functions of
the state. The rate of increase of scientific staff in Commonwealth government
departments levelled off considerably from 1955-60 and, of the eleven govemment
Australia, Science and Technology Budget Statement 1991-92, p.lOl
In 1965 CSIRO accounted for 28% of financial resources allocated to major research agencies in
1990 dollar values. By 1990 this had increased to 45%. The major loser has been the Defence
Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) which accounted for 47% in 1965 (as the
Weapons Research Institute) but only 25% in 1990. A more detailed account of the allocation of
resources to research and development is given in chapter 5.
See Sir George Currie & John Graham. The Origins of CSIRO: Science and the Commonwealth
Government 1901-1926, CSIRO, Melbourne, 1966, chapter 1; and Schedvin, Shaping Science
and Industry, chapter 1.
In that year only 4.3 per cent of the budget was spent on non-rural research and of that tiny
amount 65 per cent was spent on mining and metallurgy research and the remainder on radio
research.
Australia, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Ninth Annual Report, Parliamentary
Papers, Commonwealth Govemment Printer, Canberra, 1935, pp. 92-95.
Davenport, 'Science in Public Affairs', pp. 75-78.
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laboratories outside CSIRO, only two, the Ionospheric Prediction Service and the
Biological Standards Laboratory, were established after 1948.^9 Until 1963 portfolio
responsibility for scientific activity lay with the Minister-in-Charge for CSIRO. This
reflects the narrowness of the organisational research base in Australia and the fact
that research in universities was not considered to be part of national economic
production. Even more (68 per cent) of CSIRO's budget was devoted to rural
research than in 1935 and a large proportion of the remaining funds were for
research in mining and metallurgy.
From 1965 to 1990 there has been an intensification of techno-economism in
the conduct of research in the federal public sector characterised by diversification of
the means of scientific knowledge production funded by the Commonwealth
government, by vastly increased research subsidies for secondary industry and by
governmentinsistence that an increasingportion of public sector scientific agencies'
budgets should be eamed from external sources. In 1985 CSIRO funds accounted
for nearly 50 per cent of direct appropriations to research agencies. By 1990 that
had decreased to 45 per cent.^i Other research agencies have been established
(Australian Institute of Marine Science, Co-operative Research Centres) or enlarged
(Antarctic Division) breaking the monopoly of CSIRO on the production of non-
medical, civilian, scientific knowledge, but none have yet come close to challenging
the Organisation's supremacy.
2.2.b Public sector research in the States
For the first 120 years of European settlement all scientific activity was funded
privately or by State governments. The production of scientific knowledge by
government departments in the States has traditionally been concerned with solving
problems of primary industry, developing infrastructure and services, providing
expertise for running the States' public enterprises and fulfilling the States'
responsibilities in such areas as health, education andwelfare.^^
59 R.w. Boswell, 'The Interaction and Development of Science in Government and Science in
Industry', Public Administration, vol. XXVn, June 1968,pp. 141-165, pp. 149-151.
50 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Organisation (CSIRO), Eighteenth Annual Report,
Parliamentary Papers 1964-65-66, Commonwealth GovernmentPrinter, Canberra, 1935, pp. 92-
95.
51 A moredetailed account is given in chapter 5.
52 Federation required stipulation of the specific responsibilities of the new Commonwealth
government. 'These responsibilities are given in the Constitution in several sections, but the
majority of the exclusivepowers of the Commonwealth are included in the forty subsections of
Section 51. There is no specific reference to science or research activities in Section 51 but many
of the subsections concern government responsibilities which use scientific knowledge. For
example:
(v) postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like sevices;
(vi) defence and law enforcement;
0 astronomical and meteorological observations;
(ix) quarantine;
(xv) weights and measures;
(xviii) copyrights, patents of inventions and designs;
(xxiiiA) provision of health services.
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Government laboratories concerned with production problems in the rural
industries were established in the second half of the nineteenth century. These
research activities grew as industrialisation, pastoral development, fisheries, forestry
and mining exploration gathered pace in the twentieth century. Departments and
statutory bodies such as the Hydro-Electric Commission in Tasmania, the Geological
Survey of New South Wales and the Victorian Brown Coal Research and
Development Committee built up large bases of expertise and service delivery with
substantial research and development input.63
In the 1980s many State governments have developed outreach services to
assist State-based companies relying on high technology or scientific expertise to
establish their enterprises. State enterprises have also been encouraged to market
their services and products. Initiatives in high technology led to the development of
science and technology parks in all States and many States have set up agencies to
act as intermediaries in the transfer of scientific knowledge from public sector
research organisations to private producers. An example is Daratech in Victoria
which the government established in 1987 to assist local industry in the use of the
knowledge produced by the Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. State
govemments are also providing venture capital so that public sector research can be
developed by private companies.64
2.3 Manufacturing research
In contrast to the rural sector, the manufacturing sector of economic production in
Australia has traditionally had a low utilisation rate for scientific knowledge. The
use of imported technology has heen a characteristic of non-rural manufacturing in
Australia. Hill has termed this aspect of Australian culture 'technophilic'. He
describes it thus:
A characteristic symbol of the history of technological change in Australia is
that we adorn our civilisation with technology trinkets. They are not things
that we work up and with. They are not emergent from the culture. We stick
them round our cultural neck and play with them ...so that when new
technology such as colour T.V.s comes in the market is saturated in a very
short time. We wait and absorb the technological culture that comes to us.
In addition to the above areas covered in Section 51, subsection xxxvii allows the Commonwealth
government to assume any responsibility referred to it by State Parliaments. Thus, for example,
although education is a residual power of the States since it is not referred to in the Constitution,
the States agreed in the late 1950s to allow the Commonwealth government financial
responsibility for the universities. This action has transferred to the Commonwealth government
control over an important sector of research in Australia because the basic training of scientists is
conducted almost exclusively in universities.
63 ASTEC, Science and Technology in 1977-78, vol. IB, p. 122.
64 Bureau of Industrial Economics, Commercial Opportunitiesfrom Public Sector Research,
Research Report 32, AGPS, Canberra 1990, pp 22-23.
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Businesses do it as well. They don't unpack the social and cultural dynamics
behind the black boxes they import.65
Professor Howard Worner claims that there are only five Australian
manufacture and mining companies which have made substantial contributions to
Australian science. They are BHP, ICI Australia, Western Mining Company,
Conzinc Riotinto of Australia and Repco (before being taken over). Other companies
have maintained laboratories, but these have usually been to solve problems of
production rather than to innovate.^^
The impression obtained is that decision-makers in Australian industry are
chronically reluctant to use scientific knowledge to innovate and develop products.
Many of the scientists interviewed during research for this thesis have an enormous
range of experience in Australian and overseas industry. Such scientists as Dr.
Alexandra Pucci, Professor Arthur Birch and Professor Richard Collins confirm this
view that, in general, the relationship between private sector manufacturing
production and the production of scientific knowledge in Australia has been
fragmented and sporadic.
In the 1980s the scientific inertia of the manufacturing sector began to change.
In new areas of technology, industry associations have developed not only to foster
research and knowledge transfer in the manner of the older research associations but
also to oversee the way in which the industry develops in Australia by campaigning
on its behalf with State and Commonwealth governments to simplify and expedite
such interactions as new regulations and uniform standards. The Medical Industry
Association of Australia Inc., the Australian Robot Association and the Australian
Biotechnology Association are three examples of such agencies.^7 More recently
interdisciplinary sciences such as biotechnology and computer science have set up
associations to foster and co-ordinate the commercialisation of the products of their
work. The boards of such agencies often act in a representative capacity for research
activities in a particular industry.
2.4 Rural research
Research for raral industry is the longest-established applied science in Australia.
Although not strictly part of the scientific community, rural research associations
and councils are an integral and influential part of scientific activity in Australia.
They are basically groups of individual firms and producers who combine resources
to sponsor common interest research and development, usually on an industry-wide
basis. The research is undertaken by State government research agencies, CSIRO
Professor Stephen Hill, Centre for Technology and Social Change, University of Wollongong,
Interview, 3.11.89.
Worner,Personal Communication, 3.11.89.
^7 Scitech Technology Directory 1992 Edition, Jane Ford (compiler), Scitech Publications,
Canberra, 1992, pp. 226-232.
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and the universities, but some industries, such as the Australian Wine Research
Institute or the Sugar Research Association have traditionally run their own
laboratories.
The first attempt to raise funds for specific rural research was in 1927 when
members of the Australian Wool Growers Council and the National Council of Wool
Selling Brokers launched an appeal to establish a pastoral trust fund to finance
research to improve the quality of wool fleeces.68 Three years later the fifth CSIR
annual report hsted the New South Wales and Victorian Meat Exporters Association,
the Australian Pastoralist Research Trust and the Australian Dairy Council as
contributors to the cost of specific research programs.^^ By 1955 there were 21 such
associations or councils listed as contributing funds to CSIRO research.'^ o The even
greater significance of the wool industry was apparent in 1965 when the Wool Trust
Fund contribution to investigations was $5 million or twenty per cent of total
Treasury funding for research at CSIRO in that year.'^ ^
The growing number, importance and success of the rural research associations
was recognised by consecutive governments in the 1960s and 1970s. Associations
were transformed into Rural Industry Research Funds for a wide range of smaller
rural producers in such industries as oilseeds and cotton. Each dollar raised for
research by producers was matched, or partly matched, by the Commonwealth
government. In the 1980s the concept has been refined by the Hawke governments
so that small rural enterprises can receive funds for research and development from
the Special Rural Research Fund which became, in 1990, the Rural Industries
Research and Development Corporation.'^ ^
This brief account has described the basic institutional context for activity in
the science system in Australia. The general picture is of a set of institutions closely
modelled on similar British institutions and therefore predisposing scientific activity
towards similar patterns of interaction with the rest of society. Probably the most
significant change in science policy in the last twenty five years has been the
decreasing autonomy of scientists within publicly funded research agencies both in
terms of the selection and organisation of research, and in the uses to which that
research is put. Later chapters will analyse the causes and describe the outcomes of
such changes. Fundamental to the techno-economistic ideology of political actors in
the science policy community is the need to reverse Australia's deteriorating trading
Shedvin, Shaping Science and Industry, p. 85.
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Fifth Annual Report, Parl. Paper 25 Canberra,
1931, p. 45.
The largest contribution was from the Wool Research Board which spent £560,000 on research in
that year. This represented fourteen per cent of CSIRO's total expenditure on research in 1955.
CSIRO, Seventh Annual Report, Parl. Paper 110, Canberra, 1955, p. 180-181.
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report, p. 8.
Australia, Science and Technology Budget Statement 1989-90, Budget Related Paper no. 10,
AGPS, Canberra, 1989, p. 49.
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position. The final section of this chapter gives a brief description of this situation as
it impinges on science policy. Before such issues are discussed, however, it is
necessary to understand the way in which political actors and scientists interact. We
need to appreciate the currency of their mutual interests: knowledge and power.
3. Political Interests and Scientific Interests
Action in the science policy cormnunity is oriented around two distinct types of
interests: political interests and scientific interests. Action in the science system is
informed by a unique set of norms, elucidated in chapter one, which function to
protect the validity of knowledge produced by the scientific method of the
formulation of testable hypotheses. Action in the political system is informed by the
particular ideologies of the dominant coalition of political actors. Conflict between
the two systems arises when the actions of one system are evaluated using the
ideologies of the other system. Political objectives for scientific knowledge may be
seen by scientists to violate the norms of science. Scientific norms may be seen by
political actors as obstructing social and economic objectives. Consequently,
science policy also consists of negotiations over the control of rules, resources and
ideas not only concerning the production of scientific knowledge but also the uses to
which that knowledge is put. The media of negotiation are knowledge and power.
3.1 Government and science
Governments need scientific knowledge to inform the process of governing; to solve
societal problems such as natural disasters, environmental problems, health crises
and defence requirements; and as a source of innovative productive capability.
Scientists need governments to supply financial, human and ethical resources for the
process of creating new scientific knowledge. The relationship is therefore an
exchange relationship between resource interdependent systems of action. The basic
exchange nature of the relationship exists in all industrialised nations. What differs
between countries is the degree and nature of the dependencies which emerge from
the interaction of the universally-accepted scientific method of the creation of new
knowledge and the various forms and practices of different political systems.
3.2 Political interests
Governments need scientific knowledge in two main forms. Firstly, scientific
knowledge and systematic methods of organising and analysing information are
needed by governments to manage the complexity of modem life. For example,
mass health care, transportation, education and defence are functional areas of the
provision of goods and services by governments which require scientific expertise.
Secondly, governments need to stimulate the production of scientific knowledge for
economic, social and cultural development in societies. Brooks used the terms
'science in policy' and 'policy for science' to categorise these two different ways in
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which the scientific community and governments interact. He emphasised that the
two aspects are often closely linked, and gives the example of the way in which
scientific advice on the nuclear test ban treaty (science in policy) led to government
funding for seismological research (policy for science)."^3
Scientific knowledge may be received by govemments either directly from the
scientific community acting within government laboratories, from quasi-government
research institutes or from private laboratories undertaking government contracted
research. Scientific knowledge funded by governments may also be privately
produced for private use with the owners of production acting as govemment agents
to achieve national objectives. Governments employ scientists, who may or may not
also be involved directly in scientific research, in order to advise them about the use
of knowledge which may be very specialised. When scientists act in such a capacity
they are acting as political agents and are therefore subject to the demands and
interests of the political system and the values and ideologies which inform it.
3.3 Types of scientific knowledge
The attention which scientists give to classifying the types of knowledge they
produce is a function of the importance of knowledge in the science system.
Knowledge is their commodity of exchange and scientists are located in the system
by the type of knowledge they produce. Consequently, policy analysts and actors in
the political system must be aware of the nuances of research-defining terminology
and the social status of science which underlies it. The most widely-recognised
differentiation outside the scientific community is that between 'pure' research which
has no immediate practical application; and 'applied' research which is undertaken
with definite practical objectives in mind."^"^ xhe low status of applied science in
Australia has been responsible for much resistance within the scientific community
to changing sciencepolicy objectives.^^
^3 Harvey Brooks, The Govemment ofScience, TheMIT Press, Massachusetts, 1968, p. 85.
In the science system applied scientists (producing tactical problem-oriented science according to
the ASTEC categorisation) were generally regarded as being of lower scientific standing.
Consider this report of a remark made by one of Australia's best-known basic scientists at the
Commonwealth Jubilee Seminar in 1951:
Professor Huxley said that he did not believe that applied science was more difficult than
pure science. It was unpopularwith scientists because it was dull. Top physicists, etc., who
were working in applied fields during the war, got out of these fields as soon as possible after
the war ended.
Australian National University, Science in Australia, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1952, p. 176.
^3 The research dichotomy pure/applied has overtones of the religious sacred/profane dichotomy
implying that-which-is-to-be-worshipped being distinguished from that-which-is-mundane. The
separation of the Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering from the
Australian Academy of Science in 1976 can be seen as the beginning of the end for the elite
status of basic science in Australia. In 1990 the corporatisation of the production of science, with
the concomitant status rewards for applied scientists means that pronouncements such as Huxley's
are now few and far between.
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3.3.a The Dainton typology
In 1971 Sir Frederick Dainton further differentiated the types of knowledge that
scientists produce by distinguishing between the various types of stimulus which
caused the knowledge to be sought in the first place. He sees the range of scientific
activity as a spectrum of research.
3.3.a.i Basic science
At one end of the spectrum is basic science which is undertaken, often by individual
scientists, to specifically to extend knowledge by answering a problem of theory,
ideas or research results which don't fit any known paradigm. The time frame to
produce this sort of knowledge is typically long and its application to practical
problems may not occur for many years.
3.3.a.ii Tactical science
For research at the other end of the spectrum Dainton coined the term tactical
science to denote that science which has an immediate practical application in the
short term either as providing an answer to an immediate problem or by providing
the knowledge for goods and services to be produced. This type of research is
predictable and requires only relatively minor changes to current knowledge.
3.3.a.iii Strategic research
In between these two types is strategic research. This is carried out because a
collective body of opinion decides that research in a certain direction will be useful
in the middle term but at the time of the decision being made has no practical
problem to answer or no known scientific gap to fill. The boundaries between these
types of knowledge are not rigid. Knowledge created during tactical research may
help to fill holes in knowledge and knowledge created during basic research may
have immediate commercial application.'^ ^
3.3.b The ASTEC typology
In 1978, the newly-constituted Australian Science and Technology Council
(ASTEC) felt the need to explain other terms which had been used to define different
types of research. The Independent Inquiry into CSIRO had used three categories of
research and ASTEC wished to amplify this schema.As in the Dainton definitions
the distinguishing charaeteristic is the primary objective for which research is
undertaken. The ASTEC definitions are:
Frederick Dainton, 'Are Some Science Policy Issues Inevitable, Irresolvable and Permanent?', in
The Management of Science, ed. Douglas Hague, Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 47-68, pp. 49-
51.
The types are:
fundamental: to contribute to the discipline;
strategic mission-oriented: to contribute to a definable problem area, maybe long-term;
tactical problem-oriented: to give answers to definable, short-term problems.
Australia, Independent Inquiry into CSIRO, AGPS, Canberra, 1977, p. 9.
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• basic research (fundamental) to acquire new knowledge of the
underlying foundations of phenomena
and observable facts without any
particular application or use in view;
• tactical problem-oriented research (as Dainton above)
Basic research may further be divided into:
• curiosity-motivated research pure basic research; and
• strategic mission-oriented research (as Dainton above)
ASTEC explains the difference between these sub-categories (which they see as
largely 'an attitude of mind'- presumably on the part of the scientists) with a quaintly
Australian example:
Studies on the physiology of the koalas would be described as curiosity-
motivated research; but similar studies on sheep could be strategic mission-
oriented research, as the expectation of practical benefit is ever-present.
Nevertheless a study of the physiology of koalas could produce results of
great scientific importance which could, in time, be of great practical value
also. After all, koalas are extraordinary. They eat only certain types of
eucalyptus leaf and therefore ingest large quantities of essential oils: and they
do not drink water.'^^
3.4 Scientific interests
The interests of scientists fall into two broad categories: the need for financial
resources to pay for costly training, skills, and technology; and ethical needs to
ensure the legitimacy of their actions in the wider society.
3.4.a Financial resource needs
The production of scientific knowledge in the second half of the twentieth century
needs considerable financial resources. Bernal gives some idea of the scale of the
increasing cost to governments of the production of scientific knowledge. He
estimates that, between 1937 and 1962, the cost to the US Government of civil
science increased by a factor of forty eight. In the same period the cost of US
military science rose by a factor of 560.'^ ^ por Bemal such a scale of expenditure is
an indicator of the changing relationship between science and society. He sees the
transformation as occurring in three phases:
...in the nineties we are still in the era of private science, that of the small
laboratory of the professor or the backroom of the inventor. The next stage,
first evident in the twenties and thirties of the new century, is the era of
industrial science, that of the research laboratory spending a few tens of
thousands of pounds, and of the correspondingly expanded university
department and the now subsidized research institute. The third stage,
appearing first in the Soviet Union but becoming universal in the Second
ASTEC, The Direct Funding ofBasic Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1978, p. 8.
Bemal, Science in History. Volume 3: The Natural Sciences in Our Time, p. 847.
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World War, is that of governmental science, where the expenses of research
and development run into hundreds of millions of pounds and establishments
as large as towns are needed to house the men and equipment needed for it.
For this only the State can find the money, though it may call upon the
assistanee of monopoly firms, themselves almost States in their own right, to
spend it for them in the form of development contracts.®®
Such vast commitments of public money in democratic societies inevitably requires
justification to the taxpayer. Governments increasingly need to legitimate their
deeisions by publieising and documenting the criteria by which choices are made.
The size of the funds scientists demand always exceeds the resources that
governments are prepared to allocate to the produetion of scientific knowledge.®1
One of the changes occurring in the Australian seience poliey eommunity has been
the increasing scrutiny to which Parliament is subjecting public funds allocated to
researeh and development. The 1989 Auditor-General's Report on Extemal Funding
for CSIRO, and the 1991 Joint Committee of Public Accounts Inquiry into Public
Sector Researchare prominentexamples of this trend.®^
3.4.b Legitimation needs
Power, in the form of enforcing the rules inherent in scientific norms, is exercised in
the scientific community as control over the institutions in which such knowledge is
produeed. Because the norms of science described above are in many ways
antithetieal to other societal norms (for example, the norm of universalism, which
encourages the investigation of all natural phenomena, may be in conflict with
religious norms) it is desirable for scientists that scientific research is isolated from
other societal institutions. One of the funetions of government legitimation of
researeh activity is the delegation to the scientist of politieal responsibility for the
outcomes of such activity.
The ethical dilemma posed for governments by the scientists' norm of
universality was recognised by Max Weber in 1918. Weber is concerned with the
question of whether those who pursue science as a vocation have the right to
determine the value of the knowledge they produce for the rest of soeiety. He
concludes:
Science ... presupposes that what is yielded by scientifie work is important in
the sense that it is 'worth being known'. In this obviously are contained all our
problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It
can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, whieh we must
aeeept or rejeet according to our ultimate position towards life....Natural
seienee gives an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish to
®0 Ibid, p. 719.
®1 OECD, Science, Growth and Society -ANew Perspective, (the 'Brooks Report'), 1971, pp. 16-17.
®^ Australian National Audit Office, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation - Extemal Funds Generation, Park Paper 202, Canberra, 1991.
Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Public Sector Research and Development, Report
318, AGPS, Canberra, 1991.
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master life technically. It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its own purposes,
whether we should and do wish to master life technically and whether it
ultimately makes sense to do so.^3
It is this aspect of the interpretation of the value to the rest of society of the products
of activity in the scientific community which forms the basis of the dependence of
scientists on governments for the ethical opportunity to pursue the creation of new
scientific knowledge.
In any society the balance between the autonomy and social control of the
science system is the result of a continuously negotiated exchange. As scientists'
capacity to manipulate the 'natural world' comes closer to sacred notions of spiritual
significance such as 'creation' then such negotiations are no longer abrogated to
scientists but become open to political input in the form of ethics committees. The
establishment of the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee is an example of
this trend. Although such fora are not included in this analysis they will
undoubtedly form an increasingly important part of science policy as genetic
manipulation becomes the norm in many scientific disciplines.
The extent to which science policy is negotiated rather than imposed depends
upon the extent to which the science system is dependent on government funding
and legitimacy, and to which it can muster support from the wider community for its
autonomy. Scientists are then likely to invoke concepts such as Merton's and
Storer's, and other beliefs about the way in which scientific knowledge is produced
in order to defend their organisational autonomy and to guarantee the future support
of their system by governments.
The financial support and organisational autonomy of the science system are
under increasing scrutiny as Australia's deteriorating trade position in the global
economy causes questions to be asked about the benefits to the Australian
community of public expenditure on research and development. The orientation of
scientists towards pure science disseminated to the international scientific
community, rather than applied research which can be used to add value to
Australian exports then becomes an obstacle to the government's objectives of
restructuring the economy. The need for such restructuring is discussed in the final
section of this chapter.
4. Australia's Changing Economy
One of the most significant changes in science policy between 1965 and 1990 has
been the extent to whieh the production of scientific knowledge in Australia has
become linked to national economic production and to Australia's position in the
global economy. Therefore an understanding of the economic context in which
Max Weber, 'Science as a Vocation', in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology eds. & trans.
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1967, pp. 129-156, pp.
143-144.
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policy-making occurs is necessary for an analysis of science policy for two reasons.
Firstly, as mentioned in the Introduction, in 1965 the production of scientific
knowledge was detached from issues of national economic well being, apart from
research conducted for a few rural industries. The structural, ideational and
ideological reasons for this detachment form a major theme of the thesis and are
discussed at length in chapters three and four. By 1990 science policy has become
an important element in the process of the restructuring of national economic
production. The transition has occurred through restructuring informed by techno-
economism as the motivating political ideology in science policy. Secondly, the
production of scientific knowledge depends to a large extent on the capacity of
national economic production to provide the resources to support the science system.
A diminishing rate of wealth generation forces, at best, a steady state of resources
with which to fund research. Prioritisation processes reduce the autonomy of
scientists in their selection of research projects. The benefits of the public funding of
research, and the use to which research results are put, become issues of economic as
well as science policy. This section of the chapter examines the economic indicators
which are used in justifying the continuing allocation of public resources to the
production of scientific knowledge.
4.1 The structure of Australia's economy 1965 and 1990
Economic production in Australia has undergone significant changes between 1965
and 1990. In terms of science policy the most significant indicators are the
proportion of GDP producedby eachsectorof the economy; the level of imports and
exports; and the level of foreign ownership of industries.
4.1.a Gross Domestic Product and Industry
GDP is the most widely used single indicator of economic well being and growth in
an economy. It is a measure of the final consumption or investment value of all
goods and services produced in an economy over a given period of time (not
including income from overseas investment). By measuring the GDP per capita over
time it is possible to gain a crude measurement of productivity in an economy. Thus
from 1965 to 1990 the GDP per capita in Australia grew from $9,500 to $15,600 in
real terms which indicates that overall productivity increased by 64 per cent in 25
years. This compares with a 97 per cent increase for Canada, and a 63 per cent
increase for Sweden over the same period.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the contribution to GDP of different sectors of economic
production in Australia in 1965 and 1989. The greatest increases have been in the
services sector, particularly in finance, community services and ownership of
dwellings. The proportion of GDP contributed by manufacturing industry has fallen
84 Ibid., pp. 276-277.
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from 26 to 17 per cent - a fall of 65 per cent. The only other sector to register a fall
in contribution was the agricultural sector which decreased by 38 per cent from 11 to
4 per cent of GDP.^^
Figure 2.1: Australia, GDP by industry sector, 1965 and 1989
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Data source: R.A. Foster and S.E. Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1989-90,
Ambassador Press, Canberra, 1991, p. 214.
4.Lb Exports and imports
Another indicator of a nation's economic well being is the balance of payments. The
flow of capital, the balance between imports and exports and the nature of the goods
and services exchanged indicates the way in which a country trades with the rest of
the global economy.Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the most significant categories
of exports and imports in terms of a percentage of the total for 1965 and 1989.
85 Ibid., p. 214.
86 The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 3rd edn.. Penguin Books, UK, 1984, s.v. 'balance of
payments'.
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Figure 2.2: Australia, the most significant exports by commodity group,
percentage of total value, 1965 and 1989
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Data source: Foster & Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1989-90, p. 9.
The most dramatic change has been the decreasing value to national exports of
textile fibres. The largest single commodity in this group is wool and the
comparison illustrates the importance of wool exports to the nation's economy in
1965. Other rural commodities have also fallen in level of contribution. The largest
single category increases have been in the mining industry. In 1965 Australian
economic prosperity was primarily based on rural industries which provided 11 per
cent of GDP, 9 per cent of employment and 65 per cent of the value of exports. By
1990 this proportion had fallen to 6 per cent of the population involved in the
production of 4 per cent of GDP and 27 per cent of exports. The picture is
compounded by the falling price of mral commodities. Between 1965 and 1989 the
price of oil rose 14 times and theprice of gold rose 11 times, but that of meat and
wool rose by only 3 times the 1965 price. The value of 1965 wool exports in 1990
dollars would be $6,485 million. The value of wool actually exported in 1990 was
$2,861 million.87 The volume of wool exported in 1965 was also higher at 756
million kilograms compared with 640 million kilograms in 1990.^^
In 1990 the wool price was depressed, but in 1988, when the wool price was at its highest level
ever at US$11. 65 per kilo, the total valueof exports was still only $6261 million.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book, no. 53, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and
Statistics, 1967, p. 965.
Australian Wool Corporation, AnnMa/ Report1990-91, AGPS, Canberra, 1991,p. 23.
Figure 2.3: Australia, the most significant imports by commodity group,
percentage of total value, 1965 and 1989
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Data source: Foster & Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1989-90, p. 13.
There are four categories of goods in which the proportion of imports has fallen
since 1965. The decrease in fuel imports is due to the development of an indigenous
oil extraction industry. The decreases in manufactured materials, crude, inedible
materials and food, beverages and tobacco indicate that some basic manufacturing
processes may now be occurring in Australia. The most telling contrast between the
nature of imports and exports is that the highest-level categories of imports have a
significant value-added component. Australia exports unprocessed or relatively
unprocessed commodities and imports from other countries the manufactured goods
for necessary for production and lifestyle. Such imports are forming an increasing
proportion of Australian exports.
4.Lc Overseas investment in Australia 1965 and 1990
Australia is traditionally dependent on external sources of development capital
because of her geographical isolation from the industrially developed countries of
the world, the presence of vast mineral resources and large tracts of arable land, and
a low level of population to generate capital to exploit these resources have made.
At first the foreign capital gained from the export of primary produce was used to
buy goods manufactured overseas. Later revenue gained from primary producers
provided tariff protection to allow the development of secondary industry in
Australia. There has always been a need in Australia for overseas capital to develop
resources, and this has benefited the economy by introducing new industries, new
technology and access to overseas markets.
Concern about levels of overseas investment in Australia grew in the mid
1960s and became a bipartisan political issue when McEwen, Leader of the Country
Party, and Calwell, ALP leader, advocated regulation of foreign control of
Australian industry. The Menzies government commissioned an inquiry on overseas
investment by the Committee for Economic Enquiry which found that Australian
industry was not overly controlled by foreign companies.Despite this finding
consecutive governments have enacted legislation, albeit weak, to maintain
minimumlevels of Australian ownership in certain industries.^O
Figure 2.4: Australia: major foreign investors, 1965-88
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Data source: Foster & Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1989-90, p. 35.
Figure 2.4 compares the major investors in the Australian economy between 1965
and 1988. The figure shows that foreign investment in Australia in 1988 is of more
diverse origin than the situation in 1965 when the UK and the USA dominated
Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report 1965, p. 719.
The Whitlam Government instituted formal scrutiny of foreign investment by inter-departmental
committees, and the Eraser Government continued the regulation (though not the rhetoric)
through the Foreign Investment Review Board which is still extant in 1990. The Hawke
Government has relaxed the controls on such industries as oil, gas and banking and exempted
from scrutiny the takeover of Australian companies of less than $5 million capitalisation, but has
tightened restrictions on the level of foreign ownership in real estate. Between 1986-87 and
1987-88 the number of real estate proposals examined by the Board increased ten-fold. The
proposals were worth $9.7 billion of which nearly a third came from Japan.
Foreign Investment Review Board, Report 1987-88, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,
1989, pp. 13, 14,31 &40.
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investment. In 1988 nearly 50 per cent of total foreign investment came from
multiple sources. Foreign ownership of Australian industry varies according to
industrial sector.^!
The high levels of foreign ownership in manufacturing coincide with the low
levels of privately-fiinded research and development in this sector. In 1985-86 only
31 per cent of research and development in Australia was funded by private
enterprise. Half this research takes place in multinational companies which are
foreign owned or controlled. Nevile states:
About 40 per cent of foreign controlled firms undertaking R&D in Australia
have controls from overseas on R&D expenditure, and other foreign firms
may be discouraged or prevented from undertaking any R&D at all. Local
subsidiaries of foreign firms may have access to R&D done overseas, but they
may be restricted in the types of products they can produce in Australia and
what they can export.92
The implications for scientific activity in Australia of the degree of foreign
ownership in critical sections of Australian industry are not clear. The Department
of Industry, Technology and Commerce, in the 1992 Australian Science and
Innovation Resources Brief, reports that a low level of research and development
expenditure by private enterprise in Australia has traditionally been linked to the
high level of foreign ownership in large companies, particularly in the manufacturing
industries. The link is sustained by the fact that the increasing levels of research and
development by private enterprise in the late 1980s is mainly associated with small,
Australian-owned firms.93
4.2 The need for restructuring
As traditional commodity-based markets disappear through greater eompetition and
protectionism the structure of Australian economic production will need to widen to
fit changing markets. The Australian attitude to teehnology and its impact on
exports can partly be explained by the fact that discoveries of new sources of
commodities have in the past allowed policy-makers the luxury of being able to
avoid politically unpopular industrial re-structuring decisions. In the late 1960s the
mineral boom financed the infrastructure necessary for a growing population, and
the oil and gas discoveries of the late 1970s balanced falling manufacturing exports.
Nearly all agricultural industry is Australian-owned with only 2 per cent of activity and 6 per cent
of agricultural land under foreign ownership. Similarly, the transport industry is 95 per cent
Australia-owned. The highest levels of foreign ownership are found in the mining industry where
only 55 per cent is Australian-owned. In the service sector foreign interests own 40 per cent of
the life insurance, 34 per cent of general insurance, 35 per cent of registered financial
corporations but only 21 per cent of banks. The manufacturing industry is 33 per cent foreign-
owned.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Investment Australia 1989-90, Catalogue no. 5305.0,
AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p. 21.
92 Nevile, The Disaster ofPrivate Sector Research andDevelopment inAustralia, p. 6.
93 Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, Australian Science and Innovation
Resources Brief1992, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p. 14.
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In 1987-88 primary commodity prices rose by 45 per cent and eliminated the current
account deficit. In 1985 the OECD Examiners wrote in a report:
We were struck by what seemed to be a widespread Australian view of
technology as in some sense extemal to national life. This is in part, no doubt,
a consequence of Australia's historical idiosyncrasies. A high proportion of the
techniques used in Australian industry (although not in agriculture) are indeed
imported from overseas, mostly by foreign owned companies. Australia has a
tradition of importing technical and professional workers, rather than (or as
well as) educating them from childhood. ...The process of technological
development is seen as discontinuous: the transition from research to design of
a product or service, or from design to sales, seems sometimes to involve the
collision of mutually uncomprehending cultures.
...The somewhat remote Australian attitude to technology seemed to us to
lead to a consistent undervaluation (and to some extent also a
misinterpretation) of national technological achievements andpossibilities.^^
In the 1980s Australia has increasingly been experiencing the economic effects
of a technological balance-of-payments deficit. In 1990 the OECD commented:
Countries like Australia, where exports are concentrated in primary
commodities and imports are mainly manufactured goods, exhibit greater
terms-of-trade volatility than industrial countries where the composition of
their exports and imports is similar.95
The cause of this volatility lies in the changing composition of world markets.
Figure 2.5 compares the situation between 1964 and 1987.
In 1964 the type of export produced by Australia (food and raw materials)
accounted for 36 per cent of total global imports. In 1987 this proportion had fallen
to 16 per cent. At the same time the proportion of world imports filled by
manufactured goods increased from 54 per cent to 73 per cent. In 1987 only 34 per
cent of Australian exports were manufactured goods. The situation is worse for
advanced manufactured goods, or goods with a considerable component of high
technology. In 1974-75 the net balance of the value of exports in this area was
minus $6 billion (in 1984-85 constant prices). In 1988-89 the net balance was minus
$19.5 billion. In the two years between 1986 and 1988 the deficit increased by a
massive 72 per cent. The need for restructuring can therefore be expressed in the
following way.95
94 OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy: Australia, OECD, Paris, 1986, p.
13.
95 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Australia, OECD, 1990, p.44.
95 Peter Sheehan, 'Science and Economic Development: A National Challenge', Canberra Bulletin
ofPublic Administration, no. 68, March 1992, pp. 132-137, pp. 132-134.
Figure 2.5 The structure of world imports, 1964 and 1987
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Data source: Peter Sheehan, 'Science and Economic Development: A National Challenge', Canberra
Bulletin of Public Administration, No. 68, March 1992,pp. 132-137, p. 132.
Australia exports raw materials or basic manufactured goods which compete in a
shrinking market of falling prices. Global wealth is increasingly gained through
advanced manufactures which are imported into Australia causing an ever-increasing
deficit in terms of trade balance. The problem is compounded by the fact that global
markets in advanced manufactures are becoming monopolised by inter-country
agreements between transnational corporations and host governments. In such
countries as Japan, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and the USA, industry and
science and technology policies are being influenced by firms agreeing to offset the
costs of high technology products by using indigenously-produced components.
This cartelisation of the advanced manufactures global market is very hard to
penetrate for countries like Australia, who have lagged behind in high technology
production. The evidence is that the most knowledge-intensive part of
manufacturing is undertaken in the home-base country of transnational
corporations.97 In order to decrease the economic impact of the falling value of
exports it is considered necessary to develop 'home-base', high technology industries
in Australia. Such industries are dependent on scientific knowledge. The need for
industrial re-structuring has made science and technology policy increasingly central
to Australia's economic well being. This centrality challenges the autonomy of the
science system by replacing scientific objectives with government-imposed socio
economic objectives.
Jenny Stewart, 'Science, Technology and Industry Policy: Are We in the Race?', in Federalism
and Public Policy: the Management of Science and Technology, Federalism Research Centre,
Canberra, 1992, pp. 87-98, p. 90.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has described the institutional, ideological and economic context of the
sciencepolicy community in Australia. The picture which has emergedis one of the
replacement of conservatism and nationalism by techno-economism in the way in
which governments perceive the production of scientific knowledge. The change
has occurred as traditional markets for Australian commodities have disappeared and
as technological change has transformed the composition of world trade. In the face
of declining resources for research the objectives for science policy have become
economic rather than cultural. This has resulted in a demand by the executive core
and Parliament for increased accountability in the science system. Changing
objectives for science have resultedin a reorganisation of the way in which scientific
knowledge is produced in Australia. This has been achieved through changing the
ideas, rules, and resources about science and allocated to science. The following
chapters document and analyse these changes.
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Chapter 3
Changes in the orientation of science policy
The key concepts outlined in chapter one contain two references to the importance of
ideas in policy action. One is Clegg's notion that control over ideas, often expressed
as 'techniquesof production and discipline' is an integral part of the exercise of power
in social contexts.1 The other is Atkinson and Coleman's suggestion that one of the
key areas to be developed in the policycommunity approach is analysis of the way in
which ideas inform action in policy communities.^ This chapter seeks to bring
together these two notions by examining the changing ideas through which the
ideologies described in chapters one and two achieve action and outcomes. It also
addresses the question of how suchideas can be obstructed by members of the policy
community whose interests are threatenedby the proposed changes.
The chapterbegins by specifying two sets of ideas: ideas developed by political
actors and ideas developed by scientists. Each of these idea sets focuses on two
issues: the aims or objectives to which research and development should be directed;
and the way in which scientific work should be organised in order to achieve them.
The chapterindicatesthat the origins of these ideas lie in debates about sciencepolicy
within international contexts. It shows that the political debate about the objectives of
science was a confrontation between three positions: the mainstream economic view
that state investment in science can lead to growth; the neoclassical economic view that
scientific discovery should be governed only by market forces; and the political-
economic view that scientific discovery is not related to general well-being but to the
interests of particulargroups. In eachcase it shows the waysin which these positions
were introduced to the Australian context by key interlocutors. It also argues that a
significant formal charmel for the introduction of new ideas was the OECD.
The chapter then moves on to examine ideas aboutthe organisation of scientific
activity. It shows that there was a general shift in such ideas from a stress on
scientific autonomy in the direction of calls for accountability and direct linkage to
political objectives. Again it shows the ways in which models of scientific activity
developed internationally were introduced into the Australian context by key actors.
The chapter concludes by showing how these two sets of changing ideas were adopted
or adapted in the four main sectors of science policy under consideration here: higher
education research, CSIRO, research in manufacturing and rural industry research.
The capacity to influence policy can be exercised through the development of
ideas about the way in which policy is formulated, evaluated and implemented.
^ Clegg, Frameworks ofPower, p. 209.
2 Atkinson & Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance',
p. 167.
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Scientific and political ideologies were discussed in chapters one and two. Scientific
ideology consists of the norms and values which guide the action of scientists in the
production of scientific knowledge. Such values and norms can give little guidance as
to the way in which such knowledge should be used socially. Political ideology •
affords broad views about the way the world should be but does not always offer
detailed plans for policy-making. Change in policy arenas is effected both
ideologically and ideationally. Change needs the dynamic of political will which
comes from ideology, that is to say, certain beliefs about the way the world should be.
Change also needs ideas about how broad values and interests can be realised in
action.
Members of a policy community derive ideas about policy formulation,
evaluation and implementation from a variety of sources. In many policy arenas clear-
cut alternatives about the way in which public resources should or should not be used
emerge and are debated in public. Only recently has this occurred in the science policy
community. The use of scientific knowledge becomes a political issue only rarely and
therefore alternative ideas about its use have not been widely debated outside the
science policy community. Until recently such discourse was cursory but as the
availability of public resources stabilises or diminishes, and as scientific knowledge is
perceived as being of critical importance economically, the debate becomes more
openly and intensely argued. This chapter discusses the ideas used by opposing
interests in the science policy community to justify their control over the organisations
and resources of scientific production.
The general thrust of the argument is that the debates emerged internationally,
were carried into the Australian context both through the formal action of the OECD
and by internal contacts, and were here resolved in terms that moved the orientation of
science policy away from a concentration on preserving scientific elitism and
autonomy towards techno-economistic goals of the application of research to economic
production.
1. Two Sets of Ideas
Ideas informing science policy can be broadly categorised into two sets which
correspond analytically with, on one hand, action in the political system and, on the
other, action in the science system. Action in the political system centres around the
authoritative allocation of values. The predominant ideas underlying the allocation of
values in science policy have come from economics and political economy. They
involve questions about the way in which public financial resources are allocated to the
production of scientific knowledge, and about who controls the allocation of such
resources. Some ideas argue that market forces should be allowed to direct the flow
of financial and other resources to the production of scientific knowledge. Others
maintain that government intervention is necessary to fund areas of research which are
perceived to be vital to society but in which markets show little interest.
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Action in the science system centres on the production of scientific knowledge.
Ideas about the way in which production is organised can be grouped into those
advocating autonomy for scientists in the way they undertake their research; and those
which argue that some measure of pohtical control is necessary when public resources
are being used to fund the production of knowledge, and when the application of such
knowledge has social and economic consequences beyond the control of scientists.
Figure 4.1 summarises the categorisations which are used in this chapter to identify
the origin of the ideas and the way in which they have been articulated in Australia.
Figure 4.1: The origins of ideas informing science policy
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2. Objectives for Science
Political awareness of the link between science, technology and economic production
emerged when the demand for an increasing rate of innovation in industry exceeded
the capacity of the non-academic engineer to devise new processes. It occurred first at
the turn of the century in Germany which did not have Britain's large 'captive'
colonial market and needed more advanced and rapid production in order to compete.^
The link was reinforced after the Second World War when, in 1945, Vannevar Bush
and other scientists reported to the Eisenhower Government in the USA that the
allocation of public resources to science, which had proved a successful policy in
achieving military superiority, could equally well be successful in maintaining
economic superiority.
Rose & Rose, Science and Society, p. 25.
The US government accepted the findings and conditions of Bush's report and his
success in convincing the US Government to continue national science funding
inspired natural and political scientists in other advanced western economies to
proselytise similar ideas to their govemments Analysts specialising in science policy
came mainly from two academic disciplines: economics and political economy. The
following section discusses the development of such ideas about science policy. The
adoption and adaptation of these ideas by the Australian science policy community is
then examined.
2.1. Ideas from economics
There are two main schools of economic thought that have influenced science policy:
mainstream economics which argues that govemments should invest in research and
development in order to stimulate economic growth; and neo-classical economics
which argues that such stimulation should come directly from market forces.
2.1.a Mainstream economics
In the 1950s and 1960s economic theorists 'discovered' science and technology.
Having previously consigned the effects of technology to a residual category of non-
economic factors in national growth, theorists began to need to explain the lack of fit
between theory and experience. Freeman, the first Director of the Science Policy
Research Unit at Sussex University, asserts:
... a plausible case can be made for the view that one of the important reasons
for the world-wide economic growth rate in the 1950s and 1960s being higher
than in any previous quarter century was the high rate of technical change
sustained by the massive expansion of R&D, especially in manufacturing
industry.^
According to Freeman the mechanism for innovation in industry is now the science
laboratory rather than the technically developed machine. Modern science needs
resources beyond the level of small firms and most innovation now occurs in large-
scale organisations. This means that govemments must often underwrite high risk
research and developmentin which even largefirms are not prepared to invest.^
Quantitiative studies of the effects of technological change on economic growth
were performed to validate the theories. These studies used such indicators as patent
statistics, product aggregate functions and case studies of innovations. Solow, for
instance, claimed that technological change accounted for 87 per cent of economic
4 Vannevar Bush, Science - The Endless Frontier, US Government Printing Office, Washington,
1945.
^ Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1982, p. 196.
^ Christopher Freeman, 'Economics of Research and Development, in Science, Technology and
Society, eds. Ina Spiegel-Rosing & Derek de Solla Price, Sage London, 1977, pp. 223-275,
pp.254-255.
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growth in the USA between 1904 and 19497 Most studies assumed a linear
sequential model of the translation of scientific knowledge into goods and services,
that is, that there is a sequence of cause and effect events through time, the first events
leading to subsequent events. Layton categorises these models as being either
'discovery - push' in which new or existing scientific knowledge leads to innovation;
or 'demand - pull' in which factors of production external to the scientific community
solicit new scientific knowledge in the process of developing new goods and
services.^
In 1957 the launch of Sputnik by the USSR provoked a debate in the USA about
the adequacy of resource allocation to basic science. As part of the discussion Nelson,
an economist with the Rand Corporation, wrote what was to become a seminal paper
for mainstream economic theory entitled The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research.'^ In the paper Nelson considers the question of what the optimal resource
allocation to basic science should be in a national economy based on free enterprise.
According to Nelson private firms will normally undertake or sponsor applied
research which will reduce production costs or improve the finished product or
process and thereby increase market share. Investment in research and development
will proceed only to the point at which research costs outweigh expected private
gains. Few advanced breakthroughs will occur in applied science because the costs
of conducting such research over the time necessary to achieve sufficient knowledge in
a particular research area will not be appropriable through the market. Also, not all
knowledge created by basic research is patentable and its dissemination will cause
extemal economies which cannot be captured in market prices.n Firms undertaking
basic research which yields results which they cannot exploit commercially, but which
could be used by other firms, will prevent the dissemination of that knowledge on the
grounds of inappropriability. However, advances in basic research are often of great
social value, defined by Nelson as:'... a given flow, over time, of benefits that would
not have been created had none of our resources been directed to basic research'.
Social value must be weighed against the social cost of forgoing the benefits of
allocating the resources elswhere than to basic science.
' R. M. Solow, 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of Economics
and Statistics, August 1957, pp. 312-320.
^ Layton claims that this oversimplification of the relationship between the production of scientific
knowledge and economic production has resulted in many fallacies in science policy which are
hard to eradicate. It is more useful to think of the relationship as a 'branching network of
interacting events' in which there is no attempt to identify temporal antecedence.
E. Layton, 'Conditions of Technological Development', in Science, Technology and Society, eds.
Ina Spiegel-Rosing & Derek de Solla Price, Sage London, 1977, pp. 197-222, pp. 203-5.
^ Richard R. Nelson, 'The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research', Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 67, no. 3, 1959, pp. 297-306.
10 Ibid., p. 301.
11 Ibid., p. 302.
12 Ibid., p. 297-298.
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Nelson argues that the most efficient way of doing this is to ensure that basic
research is undertaken in institutions organised around the principle of the rapid
dissemination of research results to the greatest number of firms capable of exploiting
the findings. In this way a society obtains the maximum benefit. Such institutions
may be universities or industry associations sharing the costs of research which will
yield benefits to all members. He concludes that universities are the most efficient
form of organisation for the production of basic science because researchers have a
deep knowledge of their particular research areas, and are therefore more aware of
where breakthroughs can best be commercially exploited. 3^ It would be socially
inefficient for such researchers to be tied to the conditions of secrecy needed to realise
profits in the market.
2.1.b Neoclassical economics
Other writers began to reiterate the theories of classical market economists and
advocate minimal govemment intervention in the relationship between research and
development and market needs for innovation. Williams challenged the notion that,
despite the enormous impact of research and development on agriculture and industry,
increasing expenditure on research and development would automatically increase
national economic growth. Factors which intervened in the relationship were:
• some research is undertaken for purely scientific reasons and therefore
should be considered as economic consumption rather than production;
• not aUresearch results are commercially developed;
• there is little interaction between scientists and the world of commerce:
businessmen do not always know what to do with research results and
scientists do not always produce research which can be exploited
commercially;
• research results and technological know-how move easily and cheaply
between countries and are therefore difficult to evaluate in national cost
benefit terms.
Williams said that there was a greater opportunity for countries at a low level of
technology to grow by using technology developed elsewhere. In mission-oriented
research and development, governments (or firms) could easily calculate the benefits
of investing in new science production by:
• calculating the present costs of inventing and installing the new process;
• calculating the present value of money benefits expected to accrue;
• establishing where the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
13 Ibid., p. 306.
1^ Professor Williams had previously been at theManchester School of Social andEconomic Studies
where there was a developing interest in science policy in the early 1960s. He co-authored with
C.F. Carter a seminal paper entitled 'Government Scientific Policy and the growth of the British
Economy'.
B.R. Williams, 'Economic Appraisal of National Research and Development Problems',
Australian Journal ofScience, vol. 31, no. 6, 1969-70, pp. 203-205, p. 204.
13 Ibid., p. 205.
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He asserted that, where segregation of research and development is not efficient (as in
manufacturing), there needs to be a drastic re-structuring of industry.
Kealey adopts a similar neo-classical approach to the use of government funds
for science but argues against the production of basic research in universities. The
justification for such funding is post hoc and opportunistic. He claims that the
establishment of university research follows rather than precedes national economic
growth. Defending his argument he cites the examples of the establishment of the
British civic universtites in the mid- to late-nineteenth century when economic power
had already begun to shift to Germany; and the more recent case of Japan where
economic growth was effected using 'borrowed' technology and where basic research
has increased in universities only in the late 1980s.Kealey advocates that medium-
sized industrial countries should concentrate on creating applied scientific knowledge.
University science should be funded only to the extent of retaining scientists of
sufficient calibre to train new researchers for industry. If no outside sponsor can be
found to fund a researcher's work then governments must step in to prevent the
researcher from leaving the higher education system. This reasoning has certainly not
been applied in Austraha where the higher education science subsystem is increasingly
seen as the cradle of future economic development.
Kealey also advocates a market-centred approach to such areas as environmental
research which, in Australia, has always been considered as a public good. He claims
that if groups were able to allocate individually the distribution of their taxes currently
spent on the science system in general they could sponsor the research most suited to
their interests. This close association between the providers and users of research
funds would ensure a much more efficient use of resources. Kealey's views have not
been widely adopted in the UK. He reports that for a short time, in 1989, his ideas
were 'adopted' by the Conservative Party and published by a right wing political
'think tank', but that since then his ideas have been abandoned as too radical in the
face of opposition from fellow-scientists.
2.1.C Mainstream and neo-classical economics in Australia
In Australia economists were slow to pick up the concept of science-based innovation
as being of relevance to the Australian economy. In 1965 four top economists gave
keynote lectures on Australia's economic future at the 1965-66 ANZAAS Congress.
None of them mentioned the contribution of research and development to national
economic production. In the same year the Vemon Committee devoted a whole
1^ Terence Kealey, Science Fiction - and the trueway to save British science, Policy Study no. 5,
Centre for Policy Studies, London, 1989, p. 30.
17 Ibid., p. 24.
' ® Terence Kealey, Department of Clinical Biochemistry, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.
Interview, 9.7.93.
Kealey is himself a research scientist whose work is sponsored both through the national research
system and through private industry funds.
19 They were: W.B. Reddaway, Director, Department ofApplied Economics, Cambridge University;
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chapter to consideration of the economic impact of research and development and the
model used in the report is definitely the mainstream economic model that
governments should stimulate economic growth by subsidising industrial investment
in reseach and development.20 The authors considered the costs and benefits of
importing technological know-how and found firmly in favour of increasing
govemment subsidies to research and development.
In general economic models of research and development in Australia have tried
to combine elements of both schools of thought. In 1968 Williams, who had by then
moved from Manchester to Sydney University, was invited to address The Australian
Academy of Science (AAS) at its first Symposium on Science, Technology and
Society (the foremnner of the influential Science and Technology Foram).
Williams repeated his ideas at intervals over the next twenty years. In 1972 he
addressed a foram entitled 'Science Policy for Australia' organised by the Australian
Industry Research Group (AIRG). He reiterated his hypothesis that such science as
basic, medical and environmental research is consumption-oriented and should
therefore be funded according to broadly-defined social objectives. He contrasted this
with industrial research and development which is funded in order to make profits.
The role of government, and therefore of science policy, is to identify where
incongruities exist between innovative opportunity and industrial structure and to
develop programs which will realign scientific output and industry needs.^i
In 1982 Williams assessed the effects of research and development on recession
economics and concluded that the forecasts of the 1960s had been too optimistic in the
face of such other factors as: oil price rises; high wage growth rates and consequent
cost inflation; declining profits, devaluation of the US dollar; and the changing
management of demand. The consequence for governments in formulating science
policy is to fund only those projects for research and development for which there are
known benefits in terms of production and marketing requirements. This process of
picking winners requires a more sophisticated approach than simply increasing
research and development expenditure.22
Sir Leslie Melville, Australian National University, member of the Vernon Committee;
Professor H. W. Arndt, Australian National University;
Professor F.W. Holmes, University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Australian Journal of Science, vol. 28, 1965 & vol. 29, 1966.
20 Although theissueof research anddevelopment was notincluded in the terms of reference of the
Enquiry, the Committee considered that consideration of its economic impact was essential
because of the relevance of research and development to productivity.
Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report, May 1965, p. 418.
21 Bruce Williams, 'Science policy for Australia', Search, vol. 3, no. 6, June 1972, pp. 205-209, p.
206.
22 Bruce Williams, 'Economic Impact ofScience and Technology in Historical Perspective', Minerva,
vol. XX, nos. 3-4, Autumn-Winter 1982, pp. 301-313, p. 308.
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2.1.d Johnston and ambiguous ideas about market failure
One economist who advocated continuing government intervention was Johnston who
had also worked in the Manchester Centre for Social and Technology Policy. In 1979
Johnston, then at the Centre for Technological and Social Change at WoUongong, was
co-opted by the Fraser Government to write the first Science and Technology
Statement, and his influence has persisted throughout the ALP Governments of the
1980s and 1990s. Johnston argued in 1982 that the Australian science system should
merit special consideration because of four special characteristics:
• the system was too oriented to rural interests;
• manufacturing industry had a poor tradition of innovation;
• the sectors of the science system were too rigidly separated to allow ideas
and human resources to cross boundaries;
• the federal political system had resulted in a decentralised form of decision-
making for science policy and this, combined with an anti-intellectual bias
in the political system meant that expertise was at best fragmented and
distrusted.
It would therefore be disastrous for science policy in Australia if, at a time when a set
of machinery for science policy had finally been established, government economic,
industrial and social policy was to be dictated purely on market principles with
minimal government intervention.23
Normally, Johnston says, the concept of market failure is used to argue for
government intervention in science and technology policy. It is argued that private
investment in research and development declines because the benefits (and costs)
which accrue to private investors does not accord with social benefits. The sources of
market failure for scientific research are said to be indivisability (where individual
firms do not have the resources or skills to set up facilities); inappropriability (when
the firm originating research cannot appropriate all the benefits which eventuate);
uncertainty (the threat to profitability of high risk activity); lack of property rights in
potential inventions (because no-one owns undiscovered knowledge it has no known
market value to guide firms in their investment in research); lack of management
expertise in judging the marketability of scientific products; external health and safety
costs; lack of economic incentives, and reluctance to invest in long-term projects.
Although the premises of market failure have been challenged, it remains one of the
most frequently used economic rationales for increased government investment in
science. According to the theory, governments are supposed to support science up to
thepoint at which social costs are outweighed by private benefits.24
23 Ron Johnston, 'Australian Science Policy: Now we can steer, where do we want to go?'. Current
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 59, no. 3, August 1982, pp. 20-30, p. 22.
24 RA. Joseph & R. Johnston, 'Market failure and government support for science and technology:
economic theory versus political practice', Prometheus, vol. 3, no. 1, June 1985, pp. 138-155,
pp. 139-142.
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In Australia however, Johnston claims that the concept of market failure is often
used by economic rationalists against governments intervening. He cites the instance
in 1981 when the Industries Assistance Commission, the Department of Finance and
the Treasury argued against government support for science on the grounds that it was
impossible to measure the point at which social costs costs and private costs diverge.
At the same time the Department of Science and Technology used the concept to argue
for government intervention.25 Johnston interprets this contradiction as being due to
the fact that political choices requiredifficultvaluejudgements about why one pohcy is
preferred to another. If an argument against a policy choice can be couched in
economic terms it can be rejected on the grounds of inefficient use of public funds,
thereby avoiding electorally damaging value judgements.
The implication for science policy, says Johnston, is that issues cast in market
failure terms tend to be grossly oversimplified which leads governments to look for
easy economic solutions to science policy problems, when in fact complex
interorganisationalsolutions involving the exerciseof politicaljudgement are required:
Consequently, policy is not considered in terms of what might improve an
already complex regime, but tends to revert to comparing admittedly imperfect
intervention to stylisedperfect markets.26
It is interesting that few actors in the science policy community in Austraha have
developeda more explicitlymarket-centred science pohcy such as the one advocatedin
the UK by Kealey.27 There are few suggestions that, for example, CSIRO should be
totally privatised, or that universities should concentrate solely on basic research and
leave applied research to market demand. A nationalistic ideology towards science,
which sees a science system as a symbol of national maturity not necessarily
connected with economic production, combined with a conservative ideology which
allows the science system autonomy in deciding objectives, and the lack of innovative
culture in manufacturing industries has led to a traditional dependence on govemments
and scientists rather than markets to manage the science policy community.
2.2 Ideas from political economy
Some writers on science policy adopt an approach which explicitly examines the
relationship between the production of scientific knowledge, economic production and
the distribution and exercise of power in society. One of the first to do so was Bemal
who argued that the domination of economic production is an important factor in
deciding the direction and beneficiaries of the production of scientific knowledge. In
1939 he outlined a method of organising research which would benefit society as a
whole rather than entrepreneurs alone. A collective fund, formed by the contributions
25 Ibid., pp. 144-147.
26 Ibid., p. 152.
22 Theexception to this is Roach of the Sydney Business and Technology Centre whose ideas are
discussed in section 4.3 below.
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of civil, military and private institutions, and administered by a science and industry
council, would be used to finance a mobile army of scientists organised on the basis of
voluntary association to work on projects decided by representatives of the national
economy.28
Bemal's ideas were idealistic and strongly influenced by the conduct of research
in the USSR. However, his basic thesis was used by Hilary and Steven Rose, though
their analysis of political ideology is less tinged with soeialist idealism than Bemal's.
They reject the writings on science policy which came out of the USA in the early
1960s as:'.. .liberal responses lacking a clear theoretical understanding of the relations
of science to capitalist production'.29 Theyclaimthat the politicalideologyof techno-
economism has captured the productionof scientificknowledge in both capitalist and
socialist countries. The 'interpenetration of science and society', whereby scientific
knowledge permeates every facet of social existence, has meant that the interaction
beween governments and scientific communities has also changed. Concepts of
competition, elitisim and a 'natural' form of society in accord with the laws of nature
can be used to legitimate political actions. Consequently governments and their
'industrial counterparts' cannot allow the scientific community to remain autonomous.
The production of scientific knowledge has a deliberate social purpose which cannot
be defined by scientists. Pohcy decisions must therefore be made outside the scientific
community.30
In the early 1960s, in the UK, Sir Solly Zuckermanwas one of Harold Wilson's
principal scientific advisers. He was also the Scientific Adviser to Lord Mountbatten
and the Department of Defence. In 1961 he produced a report entitled The
Management and Control ofResearch and Developmentwhich provided the definitive
thinking on the categorisationof scientific knowledge production until the pubhcation
of the Rothschild Report in 1971.31 Zuckerman was unambiguous in his objectives
for research. His philosophy for the production of scientificknowledge was that it is
the essential base for industrial growth and economic welfare. He states:
The primary purpose of the research and development which is carried out by,
or for, manufacturing industry is not to increase the body of scientific
knowledge, but to secure and maintain a high rate of productivity through
technical innovation, to develop new products, and eventually to make greater
profits. 32
In discussing the criteria for science policy, Zuckerman emphasises that the allocation
of funds for scientific research should be judged not only according to technical
feasibility but also after an appraisal of the costs of a project, its expected financial
28 J.D. Bernal, The Social Function ofScience, George Routledge, London 1939, pp. 266-319.
29 Rose & Rose, The Political Economy of Science and Technology, p. 17.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
31 Sir Solly Zuckerman, The Management and Control of Research and Development, HMSO,
London, 1961.
32 Sir Solly Zuckerman, Beyond theIvory Tower, Weidenfeld &Nicholson, London 1970, p. 119.
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benefits and its impact on the national balance of payments. However, it is not high
quality research alone which seeds economic growth. There must also be competent
industrial processes of innovation. These include prototype development, tooling,
market research and preparatory produetion.33
2.2.a Political economy in Australia
The science policy analyst in Australia who most closely approximates the Roses'
approach to the relationship between economic power and science policy is Encel who
has used the term 'teehno-economism' in relation to the Hawke Government's
approach to the direction of research activities.34 Encelwas the first writer to analyse
systematically the relationship between govemments and the production of scientific
knowledge in Australia. He was aware of the intemational interest in science policy in
the 1960s, examined the Australian situation and conducted research into science
policy systems in the USA, the USSR, Canada and Britain in an attempt to stimulate
serious and formal discussion about the need for a planned science policy in Australia.
He saw the relationship between governments and the production of scientific
knowledge in Australia in the global economic context of a small country with a
dependent economy. The government was therefore faced with the need to make
priority choices. Encel was critical of a system of pohcy advice and decision-making
about science which listened only to the views of an elite minority of scientists. What
was needed in Australia was an 'appropriate organisation of advice' which would
assist governments to keep a balance between funding for universities, government
research organisationand incentives for industry.35
Encel said that there were ten reasons 'extrinsic' to the practice of science why
governments perceived the need to intervene in the production and use of scientific
knowledge:
1. science is a major contributor to economic growth;
2. science is a source of national prestige;
3. science is a source of military strength;
4. science is the source of innovation for intemational competitiveness;
5. science as a means of protection for key industries;
6. science as a means of using natural resources and managing natural problems;
7. science as a source of education and technical human resources;
8. science as the means to better health;
9. science as the solution to teehnogenic problems such as pollution;
10 science as an integralpart of cultural expression.36
33 Ibid., pp. 120 & 153.
34 Sol Encel, 'Is theDevelopment of a Scientific Culture Possible or Appropriate?', Address given
to the Public Affairs Conference 'Science and Society', Australian National University, 7-9 June,
1989.
33 Encel, S.,'Science and Government Policy', Public Administration, (Sydney), vol. XXIV, no. 2,
June 1965, pp. 104-116, p. 106.
36 Encel, S.,'Science and Government Policy: IV - Australia', Public Administration, (Sydney), vol.
XXVn, no. 2, June 1968, pp. 166-193, pp. 169-174.
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Encel's discussion of these ten reasons in the context of Australia's economic
position in 1968 reveals how the policy orientation has changed in the intervening 25
years. He dismisses the first four reasons as inapplicable to Australia since they apply
only to countries with advanced industrial economies with a large military component
(this was, however, at a time when 36 per cent of the appropriation budget was
devoted to the Weapons Research Establishment). Encel claimed that there was no
approbrium attached to importing technology developed overseas. What Australian
governments needed to do was to encourage seientists to develop technology unique to
the solution and development of Australia's economic and social needs. This required:
• a body of information about research expenditure and activity;
• a science policy agency within the Department of Education and Science;
• a science policy advisory council on the model of the NH&MRC.^^
Encel was scathing in his attack on the apathy of the Australian conservative
governments in dealing with the problem of science policy. He labelled as 'simple-
minded' the advice to the govemment given by the AAS which failed to recognise the
complex reciprocity of science and society and the consequent need for the systematic
planning of scientific production in Australia.^s The reaction to these techno-
economic proposals by Encel indicates the degree to which government ideas about
policy for science in the 1960s in Australia were framed in a very narrow
understanding, not only of science, but also of policy. A senior representative of the
Department of National Development questioned whether science policy was anything
more than the principles upon which research was organised and therefore a matter for
each individual scientific organisation.39
Zuckerman's ideas were introduced to Australia through the ALP Party Platform
in the mid 1960s and later as Gough Whitlam used the lack of a Liberal-Country Party
policy on science to further his portrayal of the govemment as tired and unfitted to the
new technological
2.3 The influence of the OECD
The OECD has been an important disseminator of these ideas of techno-economism in
science policy. There has been a section of the Organisation devoted to the
development of science policy issues since its establishment in the early 1960s. The
Organisation influences ideas about science policy through its practice of studying
37 Ibid.,pp. 178 & 181.
38 Sol Encel, 'Science, Technology and the Australian Community', Search, vol. 1, July 1970, pp.
12-17, p. 14.
39 Ihid., p. 182. Similar advice was obviously given toGorton by the Department ofEducation and
Science before making his famous 'wheelbarrow pushers' statement.
Morrison, Interview, 1.11.89.
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national science policy communities and advising member governments on their
development.^!
2.3.a Early OECD ideas on innovation
In 1960 a report was published by the Organisation for European Economic Co
operation (GEEC), the forerunner of the OECD, which emphasised the need for
Europe to accelerate the rate of the application of scientific knowledge to production in
order to be able to compete on equal economic terms with Russia, the USA and China.
The author states:
The experience of the OEEC over the last ten years has demonstrated the
interdependence of the European economies and the growing relative importance
of intra-European trade. No country of Western Europe will be able to isolate
itself from the effects of a decline in the relative importance of Europe in the
world economy....The answer to this threat clearly lies in the more energetic
application of scienceto economic growth.42
In the expansionary economic climate of the 1960s such advice was heeded and
Europe followed the USA and Russia along the path of spending up to three per cent
of GNP on research and development. The OECD advised member governments
hoping to emulate the example of the two superpowers. Fears of a 'brain drain' from
Europe and political acceptance of the relationship between economic growth and
increased scientific output allowed scientists to demand funds from governments at a
time of rapid economic growth.43
In 1963 the OECD published a report for the first ministerial meeting on science
citing studies of capital investment which showed that most of the effect of increased
productivity attributed to increased capital investment was in fact due to the technology
component of that capital. The new technology, which accounts for rising
productivity and the resultant economic growth, emerges from research, invention and
development which are themselves in tum the product of education. All research may
in time lead to new knowledge which can be used to promote national economic
growth. Governments therefore should aim to spend a certain proportion of GNP on
research and development.''^
2.3.b Legitimate intervention
Later the message was broadened to manage the uncertainties about the social uses of
scientific knowledge which arose in the 1960s. Industrial pollution, the use of the
^! Dr Les Rymer, Director, Science and Technology Strategy Section, Department of Industry
Technology and Commerce, Canberra, Personal communication, 30.4.90.
Dana Wilgress, Co-operation in Scientific and Technical Research, Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation, n.pp.
Jean-Jacques Salomon, 'Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy', in
Science, Technology and Society eds. Ina Spiegel-Rosing & Derek de Solla Price, Sage London,
1977, pp. 43-70, pp. 53-55.
OECD, Science and Economic Growth, OECD, Paris, 1963, pp. 17-20.
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scientific knowledge generated by the military-industrial complex of the USA in the
Vietnam war, the increasing power of multi-national companies vis-a-vis national
governments, and the increasing economic and social gap between developed and
developing countries raised questions about the validity and morality of policies for
science. In 1971 the OECD issued the Brooks Report which argued that science
policy is of use to governments in this dilemma because the allocation of resources for
the production of scientific knowledge not only means a 'policy for science' but also
'science for policy':
It includes government encouragement of science and technology as the roots of
strategy for industrial development and economic growth; but it also includes
the use of science in connection withtheproblems of the public sector.'^ ^
Governments should therefore use such knowledge, firstly to influence markets by
taxes and subsidies which will produce action towards desirable ends; secondly to
regulate economic productionin the interests of safety andnon-pollution; and thirdly,
and perhaps most significantly:
.. .to direct economic activities of governments deemed to be sufficiently in the
general public interest to warrant supplementing private activities beyond the
level that market forces alone would generate. These interventions will affect
the allocation of investments and the direction of innovation.'^^
Although science and technology are still seen as fundamental to economic
growth, simply allocating funds to research and development is not enough. In
addition, scientific knowledge must be used as both the engine and regulator of
economic growth. Sectoral approaches such as that used in the USA, where the
allocation of funds for research and development funds is the responsibility of the
significant decision-makers of the sectors of for example, health, welfare or
agriculture, need to be balanced by centralised decision-making which directly
allocates research anddevelopment funds to specific activities within sectors.47
2.3.C The role of research in industry restructuring
The 'social needs' approach to science policy did not survive the economic and
political rigours of the 1970s. The oil crisis and subsequent recessions in
industrialised economies forced governments back to the narrower perceptions of
innovation directed at economic survival. Advances in computer, biomedical and
materials science opened up new avenues of economic production. These changes
together critically strengthened the position of political actors advocating greater
45 The Report was compiled by an Ad Hoc Group on New Concepts of Science Policy, chaired hy
Harvey Brooks of Harvard University and including Alexander King, the Director-General for
Scientific Affairs, OECD, who, in 1974, was one of the Examiners for the first OECD Report on
Science and Technology in Australia.
OECD, Science, Growth and Society, OECD, Paris 1971, p. 31.
46 Ibid., p. 89.
47 Ibid., p. 92.
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government intervention in deciding the direction of scientific research. In 1985 the
OECD reported:
Government priorities for science and technology have changed markedly in
recent years. Support has shifted toward industrial innovation, usually at the
expense of areas such as the environment, energy and health and social
services. Long-term research is being steered to areas that may contribute most
to advancing the new technologies, and university/industry co-operation is
being fostered for the samepurpose.48
The OECD perceives a problem arisingfrom the fact that most member countries
are concentrating on the same priority areas of research and development. This could
lead to overproduction. Governments therefore have to be aware, not only of the
strengths and weaknesses of their own research systems and productive forces but
also of their position in the global economic and research systems in order to allocate
resources to those areas of research most likely to be exploitable and profitable in their
own productive context. Not all members have the ability to pursue all the new
developments. Governments therefore need to pinpoint certain sectors of industry in
whichrestructuring willbe supported by govemment aid.49
The focus of the OECD message has therefore changed considerably over thirty
years. In the 1960s broad brush funding was advocated with sectoral interests
deciding their own areas of research to be followed. All research and development
would eventually lead to innovation and economic growth. This advice was changed
in the 1970s to one of expanding the role of scientific knowledge in policy-making.
Governments were to engage experts to monitor and regulate economic growth and
innovation in the name of social as well as economic needs. In the 1980s science
policy entered a climate of expanding scientific knowledge and static or contracting
resources. The call for greater intervention in science and technology production now
includes restructuring entire industries and the negotiation of science policy issues
with multinational corporations.^^
2.3.d The OECD and Australia
Australiajoined the OECDin 1971.^1 One of the services offeredby the Organisation
to its member countries is a systematic review of scientific activity. The first of these
OECD, Science and Technology Policy Outlook 1985, OECD, Paris, 1985, p. 8.
49 Ibid.,p. 12.
50 Ibid.,p. 10.
Curiously, this event of some significance was not acknowledged publicly by the Gorton
Government. It required a Parliamentary question upon notice in December 1971 from the
Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Lance Barnard, to the then Minister for Education and Science,
Malcolm Eraser, who answered that Australia had in fact joined the OECD in June 1971. The
reason for the lack of publicity was hinted at in April 1972 when A1 Grassby asked Prime
Minister McMahon whether the OECD was about to undertake a survey of the Australian
economy. McMahon replied that the Australian people, and not the OECD should be the judges
of the Australian economy.
Australia: House of Representatives 1971, Debates, vol. HR 72, pp.2330-31;
House of Representatives 1971, Debates, vol. HR 75, p.4582;
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was requested by Morrison, Minister for Science and Consumer Affairs in the first
Whitlam government, and undertaken in 1974. The resulting Examiners' Report
found that the production of scientific knowledge in Australia required: '...more
coherent statements of policy, closer articulation with national economic and social
policy considerations and closer working with universities and industry'.^^ Eleven
years later the message was the same. In 1985 the OECD Examiners reported that, in
Australia, the process of research and development was discontinuous with the design
and production of new goods and services.53
Policy networking with the OECD occurs through the exchange of personnel
and through attendance at OECD Science and Technology Secretariat meetings which
perpetuate and redefine the OECD ideology. For example John Bell, (now Secretary
of the Department of Industry, Technology and Regional Development), was at one
time head of the OECD Science and Technology Secretariatin Paris.^"^
Summary: Ideas about Objectives for Science in Australia
In the mid 1960s techno-economistic ideas about govemment objectives for science
were developing in the USA and in Europe. Economic thought in Australia was slow
to incorporate these ideas about the relationship between wealth generation and
research and technology into their plans for Australia's economic future. The ideas
were first propagated in Australia by Encel (a political economist) and Williams who
had undertaken science policy research in one of the foremost centres in the UK.
Encel's ideas were repudiated by senior public servants in non-science portfolios who
maintained the conservative position of the autonomy of scientists in deciding
objectives for science.
The ideas gained some currency when they were adopted by Whitlam as part of
his long campaign for government culminating in the 1972 electoral victory.
However, the political will of the Whitlam govemment to institutionalise the proposed
changes proved ephemeral (these changes will be discussed in chapter four). The
ideas were restated more forcefully as global economic factors and Australia's
deteriorating position in the global economy forced the Eraser govemment to call for
new ideas about how to harness publicly-funded research and development more
closely to economic production. The ideas were finally fully adopted when the
political will of the Hawke government was applied to the techno-economistic ideas
about the organisation of science as articulated by the OECD and by economists in
House of Representatives 1972, Debates, vol. HR 77, pp. 1778-79;
House of Representatives 1972, Debates, vol. HR 78, pp. 3416-17;
House of Representatives 1972, Debates, vol. HR 80, pp.1819-20.
OECD, Examiner's Report on Science and Technology in Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 1974.
OECD, Reviews ofNational Science and Technology Policy: Australia, p. 13.
John Bell & Allan Aird, Science Policy in Practice, Paper presented to the Science and Society
Conference, Australian National University, 7-9 June 1989.
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Australia who had by then developed systematic ideas about the relationship of
research and technology and economic growth.
3. The Organisation of Science
Ideas about the way in which the production of scientific knowledge is organised are
central to government objectives for the research system. The relationship between the
interests of governments and those of science were discussed in chapter two.
However, the exchange relationship is not unproblematic and both sides have
expectations which may be mutually antagonistic. When governments' expectations
of the scientific community are directed towards cultural or nationalistic objectives then
scientists are usually allowed to decide the course and content of research. Scientists,
particularly those working in the public sector, traditionally demand autonomy in the
way in which they select and organise their work. The acceptance by Eisenhower of
Vannevar Bush's 1945 recommendations included the condition of scientists'
autonomy. This further legitimated the ideology of science but led to a debate about
the extent to which this autonomy is a function of society's capacity to support it.^^
The following discussion of the ideas underlying the organisation of science centres
around this debate because the opposing ideas are continually used in science policy
discourse. Three ideas are especially influential: the prioritisation and choice of
research areas; models of the effect of research on innovation; and the concept of
critical mass in the organisation and funding of research. The section also considers
the way in which these ideas have been received in Austraha.
3.1 Prioritisation and choice
In the early 1960s, as part of the awakening interest in science policy, there was a
debate in the joumal Minerva about the criteria by which choices are made as to which
areas of science are investigated in order to create new knowledge. The debate was
very influential because it gave intellectual justification to the two main streams of
ideas on the process of prioritisation in scientific work. One stream was based on the
notion of Polanyi, a political scientist, that science should be considered as a sovereign
area of social activity into which non-scientists should not be allowed. The other,
based on the ideas of Weinberg, an atomic physicist, argued that scientific activity
should be regulated by criteria external to science as well as those arising from the
intemal dynamics of scientific creativity.
3.1.a Polanyi and scientific autonomy
Polanyi, following Merton's ideas about the ethos of science, argues that the
production of scientific knowledge should be thought of as a republic in which
political thought is unfettered and autonomous. The production of scientific
knowledge obeys the principle of 'spontaneous co-ordination' of 'independent
Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, p. 265.
initiatives' guided by an 'invisible hand' of the publication of results. This publication
of results acts like a system of prices on the free market. Certain criteria must be
satisfied for work to be published and therefore to be of value. The criteria are:
plausibility; or the notion that new knowledge must be verifiable with reference to a
given body of unfalsified knowledge; scientific value in terms of accuracy, systematic
importance and the intrinsic interest of the subject matter; and originality of the work
undertaken. Through the self-determined co-operation of scientists the 'joint
discovery of a hidden system of things' proceeds more efficiently than through
individual scientists working alone, or through 'any authority which would undertake
to direct the work of the scientists centrally'. Such intervention would 'bring the
progress of science virtually to a standstiir.56
3.1.b Weinberg and the need for choice
In contrast to these ideas, which of course were very acceptable to scientists arguing
for control over the rules and resources for the production of scientific knowledge,
those of Weinberg advocate greater accountability of scientists to society for the work
they undertake. Weinberg argues that the problem of choice among scientific projects
cannot be avoided or left to scientists because the proportion of societal resources
allocated to science are now simply too great to allow scientists complete autonomy.
Such choices have to be made by individual scientists, by research managers and by
government administrators. He says:
My purpose is to suggest criteria for making scientific choices - to formulate a
scale of values which might help establish priorities among scientific fields
whose only common characteristic is that they all derive support from
government.^'^
Weinberg postulates that there are two sets of criteria by which such choices can
be made: criteria internal to science and criteria external to science. The internal
criteria can be expressed in two questions:
1. is the field of science ready for exploitation?
2. are the scientists in that field competent to undertake the work involved?
Such choices are made by specialist scientists on granting committees. In the case of
'small' science demanding a low allocation of institutional resources these choices can
often be left to scientists. However, most projects now require justification on a wider
frame of reference using external criteria. Weinberg lists three such criteria:
Polanyi, 'The Republic of Science', pp. 2-5.
These ideas were given prominence in the 1975 Report of the Science Task Force in the form of
the inclusion in the Report of a letter from Professor Harry Gelber of the University of Tasmania
(Political Science) deploring the erosion of scientific autonomy.
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Science Task Force, Towards
Diversity and Adaptability AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 31.
Alvin M. Weinberg, 'Criteria for Scientific Choice', in Criteria for Scientific Development, ed.
Edward Shils, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968, pp. 21-33, p. 21.
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• technological merit once society decides that a certain technological
end is desirable then the production of scientific
knowledge to achieve that end should be
supported;
• scientific merit research should be preferred because it has the
potential to contribute to a wide range of scientific
disciplines; this should be decided by a panel of
scientists from all such disciplines;
• social merit research which has relevance to the values of a
particular society.
Weinberg says that the criterion of social merit is the most difficult to apply in
practice because of the problems of the definition of societal values. Decisions have to
be made about whose values are pre-eminent and which of several pieces of scientific
work, which may be of proven technological or scientific merit, contributes most to
such values. Weinberg uses the example of 'national prestige' as a social value. Does
putting a man on the moon or building a dam in a third world country contribute more
to national prestige. Despite such difficulties Weinberg believes that it is essential that
scientific projects should be decided according to such criteria.
3.1.C The need for change
Despite the publicity given to the debate on priorities, and the fact that the economic
stringencies of the 1970s meant that the alloeation of resources to science became more
problematic, there was no great advance in the 1970s in the techniques of research
prioritisation.58 In 1972 the OECD reviewed the use of analytical techniques in
decision-making for research and development and concluded that such analytical
techniques as Delphi, performance evaluation review techniques, program
performance budgeting systems, relevance (decision) trees and demand models can
only supplement normal policy-making structures by aiding the rationality of choice.
They cannot alter the fact that policy-making is determined by the structures in which
decisions are made.^^
By the 1980s it was clear that the golden age of funding for research and
development was over. Ziman used the term 'steady -state' to describe the situation in
which policy-makers were allocated a constant supply of resources with which to fund
an ever-increasing set of potential researeh projects.^o This situation meant that
science policy-makers would need models of choice based on more than scientific
judgement.
58 Weinberg himself writes of only one method, developed by Bromley in the USA to allocate
resources to sub-field of pbysics, which was developed from his approach.
Ibid., pp. 7-9.
59 OECD, Analytical Methods in Government Science Policy, OECD, Paris, 1972, p. 72.
50 J. Ziman, Science in a "steady state": The research system in transition. Science Policy Support
Group, Concept Paper no. 1, 1987.
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In 1984 Martin and Irvine, of the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex
University, were arguing that the peer evaluation system advocated in pure form by
Polanyi, and in moderated form for basic science by Weinberg, was inadequate to the
demands of science policy in the 1980s. They take Weinberg's analysis as a starting
point, saying that his external criteria have, to a large extent, remained implicit in
decision-making for science policy with the result that the resulting allocations have
reflected the values and commitments of powerful interest groups rather than of
society. Peer evaluation depends on scientific 'gatekeepers' who regulate the flows of
information and financial resources through the scientific community. As budgets
level out or fall, and the demands of the scientific community increase, governments
attempt to make decision-making at increasingly low levels open to more explicit
external criteria, including economic criteria.®i
According to Martin and Irvine, the consequence is a circle of influence in which
the agencies of decision-making become ossified towards particular disciplines;
research becomes concentrated into a smaller number of large institutions; the number
of influential actors concentrates in a similar fashion and truly disinterested peer
evaluation becomes impossible as all researchers in a subfield of science are in the
same network of influence and resource allocation. There is a bias against funding
new disciplines and a built-in resistance to closing down facilities which are no longer
productive or relevant to national objectives.^^
In these circumstances considerable changes need to be made to the agencies of
decision-making for science policy in order to 'open up' the processes of peer
evaluation and to substitue explicit external criteria for deciding priorities. This can be
done by:
1. improving the data on inputs such as spending patterns to and within the
disciplines and institutions of science;
2. overhauling the mechanisms of resource allocation so that peer evaluation
is supplemented by the use of 'foreign peers' and 'iterative processes'
such as the Delphi technique of group decision-making which avoids the
pitfallsof expert committees;^^
John Irvine & Ben Martin, 'What direction for Basic Scientific Research?', in Science and
Technology Policy in the 1980s and Beyond, eds. M. Gibbons, P. Gummett and B.M. Udgankar,
Longman, Harlow, pp. 67-98, p. 70.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-78.
63 TheDelphi technique consists of the canvassing of expert opinion by questionnaire about their
expectations for a series of hypothetical future events, in this case the likely success of certain
research projects. The results are synthesised and presented to the experts again with a request that
they might like to change their views, giving reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with other stated
opinions. The process reiterates until convergance and narrowing of estimates is achieved. The
method is supposed to eliminate the intimidation of experts who have valid opinions but who are
weak actors in committee situations. It is used in the Organisation for the Advancement of Pure
Research in The Netherlands.
OECD, Analytical Methods in Government Science Policy, p. 43.
3. examining the way in which scientific research is organised in terms of the
effects of leadership, managerial style, the size and organisation of
research groups and instrumentational obsolescence on scientific
performance;
4. integrating research more closely to future economic and social needs by
establishing methods for identifying the economic and social costs and
benefits of each project;
5. widening the membership base of committees to ensure that a plurality of
opinions, interests and values are explicit in the external criteria of
prioritisation.
3.1.d Martin and Irvine and 'research foresight' in the 1990s
By 1989 sufficient interest had been shown by policy-makers in the ideas expressed
by Martin and Irvine that they had developed the technique of researchforesight which
they describe as: '...a systematic mechanism for coping with [the] complexity and
independence of long-term decisions on research'.Martin and Irvine say that the
need for research foresight is even greater at the end of the 1980s than it was earlier in
the decade. The internal and external conditions of research have changed
dramatically. Internally, basic science is now of great strategic importance
economically because of the fact that the four fields of research yielding the most
revolutionary results in industrial terms (electronics, information, communications,
advanced materials and biotechnology) are all based on molecular or atomic-level
analysis. This has led to greater emphasis on university research.
Research in these areas needs costly instrumentation and facilities at a time
when, externally, Ziman's steady state of resources looks likely to continue into the
1990s. The peer evaluation system of resource allocation based on disciplinary
reputation is unfitted for the task of deciding which areas of science have the greatest
technological potential. Most advanced nations now trade within in a global economic
system of increasing diversity, complexity and consequent interdependence. This
makes accurate prediction essential since mistakes in foresight are costly and have
wide ramifications. Martin and Irvine say that the forecasting techniques of the 1960s
and 1970s failed to anticipate events such as the oil crisis because they do not take into
account socio-political changes.
Foresight was developed by Coates in the USA to factor these changes in to public and private
policy-making. They use Coates' definition of foresight as:
A process by which one comes to a fuller understanding of the forces shaping the long-term
future which should he taken into account in policy formulation, planning and decision-
making. Foresight includes quantitiative and qualitative means for monitoring clues and
indicators of evolving trends and developments and is best and most useful when directly
linked to the analysis of policy implications. Foresight prepares us to meet the needs and
opportunities of the future. Foresight in government cannot define policy, but it can help
conditions to be more appropriate, more flexible and more robust in their implementation, as
times and cireumstances change. Foresight is, therefore, closely tied to planning. It is not
planning - merely a step in planning.
Ben R. Martin & John Irvine, Research ForesighcPriority-Setting in Science, Pinter Publishers,
London, 1989, p. 1.
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Foresight in science policy differs from forecasting in that it is a process which,
among other characteristics:
1. involves consultation and feedback with actors in the policy community;
2. aims to understand causal relationships in possible future developments by
continuous monitoring of trends and opportunities;
3. takes as a given that there will be not one but several possible outcomes
most of which result from confrontation among actors;
4. recognises the complexity and interdependence of the phenomena and
activities in research and therefore adopts a systemic approach to assessing
the cross-impacts among the constiment processes and conflicts;
5. recognises that power expressed in social, political and motivational action
is a crucial factor in information about future developments, and that
openness to external scrutiny in decision-making is essential to prevent
stagnation;
6. recognises that information is always incomplete and that often the most
that can be achieved is greater coherence and stimulation in policy-
making.65
The process can be applied to decision-making at all levels (macro/research field;
meso/research area; micro/research project) and consists of three stages: the pre-
foresight stage during which the decision is made to commit organisational resources
to the foresight process and the administrative machinery is established; the foresight
stage of design, analysis, negotiation and dissemination of priorities; and the post-
foresight stage of either implementation or closer, micro-level foresight analysis of
problem areas.
The pre-foresight stage is likely to be generated by dissatisfaction with the
existing processes of resource allocation, either on the part of the organisation itself or
of agencies with authority over the research activities of the organisation.66 The
foresight stage consists of four core activities: design of the foresight process; strategic
analysis; agreeing on the most promising options; and disseminating the results to the
science policy-makers.67 Post-foresight activities are important in ensuring that
preferred options become realities. Because priorities are decided by a process which
has non-rational elements of political and bureaucratic influence, and therefore involve
compromise, it is necessary to incorporate into post-foresight processes of consensus-
building and what Martin and Irvine call 'anticipatory intelligence' activities to
minimise the conflict of disappointed interest groups. Post-foresight includes the sub-
processes of implementation, research program design and management, and the
dissemination of research results.
65 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
66 Ibid., p. 31.
67 Ibid., pp. 32-37.
Their work resembles that of Dror who developed his model of optimal policy-
making in response to Lindblom's notions of muddling through. Research foresight is
both as comprehensive in its scope and as complex in its processes as Dror's optimal
model. Policy analysts wil recognise in the three stages of foresight Dror's phases of
meta-policymaking, policymaking and post-policymaking.
All of these sub-processes depend on the way in which research activities are to
be divided between or within institutions and the way in which the results are to be
used. Martin and Irvine work from the premise that, even if it is not possible to
predict accurately the directions in which scientific research will develop (the catchcry
of the more traditional elements of the scientific community), it is at least possible to
make the process of the allocation of resources to research open to more than scientific
opinionand optimallyrationalin its examination of likely developments.^^
The most significant change illustrated by the work of Martin and Irvine is that
that these analysts, who have considerable experience in working with scientists in
various countries, have adopted methods of policy-making developed in public
administration to change the way in which choices about research are made in the
science system. This method systematically introduces non-scientific criteria into such
decision-making.
3.I.e. Prioritisation and choice in Australia
The ideas discussed above gradually filtered through into the science policy
community in Australia through interaction between significant actors in the the
attentive public and subgovemment and their counterparts in the intemational attentive
public. Some of these actors moved into the Australian science policy community in
the 1970s. Others like Martin and Irvine came to Australia to advise governments in
the 1980s. Australian academics studied abroad and brought some ideas back with
them.
3.1.c.i Scientific autonomy
In 1949, soon after the restructuring of CSIRO following Menzies' 'Red scientists'
allegations, the Australian Journal of Science published a paper by Polanyi. In the
paper he stresses the need for the individual autonomy of scientists; the counter
productive effects on creativity of hierarchically-imposed co-ordination and the
68 Ibid., pp. 37-39.
69 Similarly, Martin and Irvine's model has sixteen separate sub-processes which are remarkable
similar to Dror's eighteen sub-phases of optimal decision-making. One can therefore assume that
the model will form an ideal type against which less-developed models are judged, but may in the
long-term prove too costly in time and organisational resources to become an established science
policy mechanism. In their discussion of research foresight in Australia Martin and Irvine admit
that the process is time-consuming, highlights tensions between traditional processes and
foresight processes, and to be successful requires effective institutions of management and a
conducive political culture.
Ibid., p. 220.
Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, Chandler Publishing Company, USA, 1968.
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dysfunctional effects in general of centralised political control over the science system.
In Polanyi's opinion the 'internal coherence of science' provides a superior form of
'spontaneous co-ordination' because scientists see their research as part of the 'spritual
reality of science' which transcends centralised political control over research
activity.'^ o The acceptance and publishing of the paper, at a time when the Journal
published very few papers outside the natural sciences, suggests that Australian
scientists endorsed these views, or at least thought them worth debating.
Peres, a science policy writer of the 1960s, former CSIRO administrator and
then political scientist at Monash University, studied at Harvard where he was
influenced by the ideas of Polanyi, Merton and Storer. He supported the laissez-faire
attitude of the Menzies/Gorton/Fraser school of conservative thinking about science
policy, particularly the reluctance to establish new agencies of decision-making. In
attempting to combine this ideology with that of scientific autonomy in face of the need
for change he produced some contradictory proposals for the administration of science
policy.'^i
Peres claimed that it was impossible to separate science policy from government
policy in general, since scientific information is an integral part of some areas of
govemment activity. This he saw as 'science as a means'. He said:
Even if one could render "Science Policy" meaningful there remain fairly
fundamental policy questions of what actions and arrangements governments
should take to facilitate the use of the science means in achieving non-scientific
ends."72
Peres then goes on to argue for separate administrative machinery for developing
'science as a means'. He does this in the framework of the centralist/decentralist
debate current in public administration studies in the 1960s. His reasoning follows the
following course:
• the production of scientific knowledge is now dependent on government
support;
• policy for scientific activity is not separable from other govemment policies
and therefore responsibility for it should not be isolated in a separate
portfolio;
• however, if governments are to use the production of scientific knowledge
as a means to achieving general national policies then this requires a
different set of administrative arrangements than the production of scientific
knowledge as an end in itself (ie., CSIRO);
• neither govemment nor scientists should have overall control of decision-
making in this area;
Polanyi, 'The Foundations of Academic Freedom', pp. 107-115.
^^ Leon Peres, 'Organizing Science asa Means', Public Administration, (Sydney), vol. XXIV, no. 4,
December, 1965, pp. 287-297.
72 Ibid., p. 289.
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• such decision-making should be de-centralised rather than centralised,
preferably with the agencies who have responsibilities for using seience in
their activities;
• however, this would lead to an over-emphasis on applied science and too
mueh govemment control;
• therefore perhaps responsibility for such decisions should be given to
industry;
• but industry in Australia has a proven record of unsophistication in
innovation;
• so perhaps we should set up a system of industry research councils and
hope that there is greater strength in fragmentation than in unity.
Peres raises, then avoids answering, the question of who should make the
decisions about the forms and extent of funding for research, considering that it is a
'matter of judgement rather than logic' and therefore not suitable for costly 'additional
pieces of administrative machinery'."^3
3.1.c.ii Science policy and choice
Two writers in the 1960s who did taekle the thorny question of the selection of
research priorities were O'Dea and Falk. O'Dea, and her co-author and boss, John
Falk, Chief of the Division of Plant Industry, CSIRO, advocated the development of a
new social science discipline to be called 'seienomics' - the systematic study of the
impaet of seience and technology on society.'^ '^ They saw the need in Australia for a
body of knowledge which would inform decisions about the ehoice of priorities in the
allocation of resources to science. O'Dea considered that scientists and govemment
administrators had shown themselves to be ineapable of facing up to or
comprehending the complexity of the interaction between science and society and
regarded the issue in a situation of 'bemused fog'.'^ ^ x^e discipline of seienomics
would need data, informed opinion and expertise in operational theory. Falk and
"73 Ibid., p. 295.
These points were made when Peres was still an administrator with CSIRO. A year later he was
an aeademic political scientist and arguing with scientists over the advantages and disadvantages of
advisory councils, concluding that: 'Whether or not an Advisory Committee were appointed, the
government would almost certainly want to use a specially appointed cadre of seience advisers as
weir.
'The Science of Being Important', The Australian Quarterly, vol. XXXIX, no. 1, March 1967, pp.
28-37, p. 31.
In 1978 Peres was appointed by Eraser as a member of the first permanent ASTEC. Bncel, a
long-term supporter of such a Council, was not.
John Falk & Marjory O'Dea, 'Science, Technology and Society: An Outline of the Development
of Seienomics', The Australian Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 4, December 1967, pp. 50-65.
^3 Marjory O'Dea, 'Problems in the Administration ofScience', The Australian Quarterly, vol. 40,
no. 4, December 1968, pp. 76-88, p. 77.
O'Dea here is referring to the 1967 Royal Institute of Public Administration Conference on
'Government and the Scientist' at which Encel gave his controversial paper. It is interesting that
Falk, as a CSIRO Chief, did not co-author this paper which was critical of government policy and
scientific administration.
O'Dea used the Minerva debate as their frame of reference. They conclude that such
decisions are ultimately political rather than scientific and that, given the proven lack of
expertise in such matters in the political or science systems, academia would have to
take the lead in disseminating and refining ideas already current overseas.''^
3.1.c.iii Prioritisation in the 1980s and 1990s
The debate in Australia, as overseas, produced little development in the 1970s and it
was not until the economic strictures of the early 1980s that further progress was
made.
Johnston uses Ziman and Blume's insights to emphasise how ideas about
prioritisation have changed over the past thirty years. The 1960s was the age of
science as the 'motor of progress'; the 1970s was the age of science as the 'solver of
problems', and the 1980s has seen science as the 'source of strategic opportunity'.
However, resource allocation must now take place in a steady state situation of a finite
envelope of resources.These changes mean that effective processes of resource
allocation are more critical than ever in selecting which scientific projects will provide
the most economically productive types of knowledge.
Johnston also uses Martin and Irvine's concept of research foresight to propose
that science policy should be concerned with nurturing winners rather than picking
winners. He argues the need for new methods of research management. These are
summarised in table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 Johnson's investment model of management research
knowledge production
' a priori goal and milestone setting;
• monitoring of progress;
• reviewing appropriateness of goals;
securine all benefits
' increased intellectual secrecy;
' restrictions on publication;
' extensive intellectual property protection.
product development
• effective linkage and rapid transfer of new
knowledge within and between organisations and
sectors;
opportunity scanning
• knowledge of public sector research;
' systematic scanning of literature;
• knowledge of competitors' research
Source: Johnston, 'Strategic policy for science', p. 4.
What is important for the science policy analyst, says Johnston, is the implications of
the new 'investment model of research' for the relationship between political systems
and science systems. Governments need to create cultures of consensus about the
nature and importance of research and to provide the authority, credibility and
legitimacy that Martin and Irvine say are fundamental to the process of research
^® Falk & O'Dea, 'Science, Technology and Society', p. 60.
Ron Johnston, 'Strategic policy for science', Australian Universities' Review, vol. 33, nos. 1 &
2, 1990 p. 2.
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foresight^S These words are at the core of ASTEC's proposed method of producing
a science policy through the mechanism of a White Paper
The influence of Ziman, and Martin and Irvine can be gauged by the way in
which their language has permeated the superstructural subgovemment in Australia.
Both the steady state and research foresight models for science policy are explained
and quoted at some length in a report commissioned by the Prime Minister from
ASTEC in 1989.Irvine has also spoken directly to the Prime Minister's Science
Council on the development of the medical and scientific instrument industry in
Australia using a combination of the higher education and manufacturing industry
research granting schemes, and foresight workshops of users and producers, to plan
future needs and policy.^i
Similarly, Bell, then Deputy Secretary of the Department of Industry,
Technology and Commerce, and onetime head of the OECD Science and Technology
Secretariat in Paris, used both concepts in a paper on science policy given in 1989:
In the past the expansion of funding for the research system took care of these
problems. However, economic and political factors are limiting the possibilities
for continued expansion. Publicly funded science is moving to a situation
where there are great demands for change, but where resources will have to take
place within a steady envelope of resources which is unlikely to have great
scope for expansion. This steady state situation argues strongly for institutional
selectivity and specialisation. Rigourous evaluation of competing research
programs and justification of equipment purchases are essential. Today's
problems are not purely a matter of fonding levels, they require new resources
and institutional change.®^
Martin and Irvine themselves use their research foresight model to analyse
Australian science policy as an example of resource allocation in a small to medium-
sized economy.®^ xhey find that in 1989that some research foresight processes have
been used in Australia but that their impact on science policy decision-making has been
limited because:
• there is a political culture which relies upon negotiated compromise and
prefers rule-of-thumb judgements to objective analyses;
• research support is pluralistic with no real mechanism for establishing
national priorities;
• there is no tradition of long-term planning in science policy;
Ibid., p. 6.
ASTEC, Setting Directionsfor Australian Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1990, pp. 7-11.
80 Ibid..
8t John Irvine, 'Promoting innovation in scientific instruments; some lessons for government
policy'. Science and Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 3, June 1991, pp. 181-195.
82 Bell& Aird, Science Policy inPractice.
83 One of the conclusions that Martin and Irvine arrived at in their assessment of the research
foresight process in Australia is that the CSIRO model of priority-setting (which was in the
process of development when they were in Australia in 1989) could become a useful model for
other agencies because it addresses the problem of resentment among scientists at top-down
decision-making. The model was publicly presented for the first time to the 1990 NSTAG
Forum by the CSIRO Chief Executive, John Stocker. The model is discussed in detail in chapter
6.
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• there is a prevailing free market ideology which relies on the market to 'pick
winners';
• strongly autonomous research institutions have defended the peer evaluation
system.84
They point out that, in Australia, failure to take into account cultural, political and
institutional factors has frustrated policy attempts to use scientific knowledge to
achieve national economic goals. They claim that certain (unnamed) 'entrenched
interests' were able to act politically to safeguard their position in the scientific
community.Their observations of the Australian science policy community as
pluralistic, fragmented and unco-ordinated in its objectives is a strong indicator of the
way in which the science system has resisted government attempts to centralise
decision-making about the way in which scientific knowledge is produced and applied
in Austraha. This resistance will be examined further in the next chapter.
3.2 Models of science and innovation
Ideas about the way in which research and development affect economic production
through the process of innovationare important in sciencepolicy-making because they
indicate the points at which the process may need support from governments and
private producers for the production of new products and processes. At its simplest
the process is seen as one of linear cause and effect: results from curiosity-based
research in a laboratory are developed into products and processes which are then
produced and sold on the market. More sophisticated models of the process
developed since the 1960s stress the interactive complexity of the process and the
resultant complexity of organisation needed to manage it.
3.2.a Linear-sequential models
The linear-sequential model of the contribution of research and development to
innovation and economic growth has been discussed above in relation to the
development of economic ideas on the relationship between research and innovation.
There are basically two versions of the concept: that of 'science-push' from the
laboratory to the firm, and that of 'demand-pull' out of the laboratory by the
marketplace. Layton says that the linear model, the result of attempts to simplify the
process of innovation for mathematical analysis, has defined the 'structure and
functioning of the technological social system' because of the power of its
simplicity.86 The simplicity was always an artificial analytical construct but it was a
84 Ibid., p. 199.
Among others Martin and Irvine cite the 1981 ASTEC exercise to establish national research
priorities using UNESCO methodology; the 1983 National Technology Strategy of the
Department of Science; the 1986 Department of Science Research Capability Assessment Task
Force; DITAC's 1986 and 1987 exercise in Selecting Technologies for the Future; and the
methods used by CSIRO's Planning and Evaluation Advisory Unit (PEAU).
85 Ibid., pp. 225-227.
86 Layton, 'Conditions of Technological Development', p. 205.
powerful medium for scientists to argue for increased funding for basic research and
as such it has persisted despite the fact that empirical studies refuting the linear-
sequential modelhave beenpublished ever sincethe 1960s.^^
One of these, undertaken by Jevons, describes how the model, developed by
economists has been used by scientists to justify more investment in basic science:
The implied model of that relationship is that technology is science applied:
science discovers something, technology applies it. Moreover a temporal as
well as a cognitive relationship is implied. The scientific discovery determines
not only what innovation takes place but also when it takes place. The timing of
the innovation is determined by the timing of the discovery. D is the trigger
which sets off the events which leads to industrial innovation and economic
surplus.
Jevons illustrates how the model can be used to defend the funding of basic science by
the example of how the study Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science
(TRACES), funded by the National Science Foundation in the USA (the main funding
agency for basic science), examined the relationship between five innovations and
basic research. The study found that seventy per cent of the information could be
traced back to basic scientific events. The study was later discredited as being over-
simplistic in its choiceof projects for examination.®^
Science policy theorists are constantly trying to provide more realistic models
upon which to base support mechanisms for the production of scientific knowledge.
Pavitt says that the development of new models has occurred along four dimensions:
1. the intensity of the relationship between the direct transfer of knowledge
from basic science to application varies with the field of science and the
sector of economic activity;
2. the impact of basic science on technology requires inputs of knowledge
from other sources;
3. basic science has an impact on technology not only through direct
knowledge transfer but also through access to skills, methods and
instruments;
4. knowledge transfers are 'person-embodied', involving personal contacts,
movements and participation in national andinternational networks.^^
The most influential of these is Bruce Williams whose ideas on the contrihution of research and
development to economic production have heen discussed above. Ron Johnston (with Gibbons)
undertook a study in Britain in 1970 on the information inputs into successful technological
developments.
Discussed in Fred Jevons, Knowledge and Power, Southwood Press, Sydney, 1976, pp. 15-18.
®® Ibid.,p. 12.
Jevons gave this illustration in a lecture given in Canberra in 1975. Among the audience was
Professor Arthur Birch who had achieved some of the basic research results which led to the
development of the contraceptive pill, one of the innovations in the TRACES study. He
confirmed that TRACES had 'got it all wrong' in tracing the relationship between the research and
the commercial development for the pill.
Ibid., p. 21.
Keith Pavitt, 'What do we know about science? The case for diversity', in The Management of
Science, ed.. Douglas Hague, Macmillan, UK, 1991, pp. 21-46, pp. 30-31.
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3.2.b The Ziman model
Ziman's 'neural net' model incorporates these propositions in a 'spatial network, a
multidimensional lattice' consisting of three cognitive dimensions: commodities,
techniques and ideas. Basic science, applied research, technology and marketing are
activities located in institutional spaces on these three dimensions. The whole network
is a complex set of linkages existing between the natural world being investigated and
the world market on which new goods and services are eventually traded. The
linkages consist of interactions motivated by 'powerful economic, social, political and
fiscal forces'. Any development in either ideas, commodities or techniques emerges
from a particular indirect pathway of linkages moving between all three dimensions in
any one institution or set of institutions organised around the production of
commodities, ideas and techniques.^i
According to Ziman the utility of the model lies in the way in which the
flexibility of the institutions in the neural net to respond to stimuli along all three
dimensions. He uses the example of the Interdisciplinary Research Centres in the UK
(similar to the Co-operative Research Centres in Australia) which he sees as
institutions established to facilitate interaction between the dimensions. Any attempt
by governments to pre-program the activities of such centres would be counter
productive to the flexibility they are intended to enhance.92
Two aspects of Ziman's model demonstrate the contiguous nature of ideas about
innovation since the 1960s. Firstly, the rationale of the utility of scientific knowledge
in maintaining economic competitiveness remains as important as ever. Secondly, the
desirability of safeguarding the"flexibility" of science institutions can be interpreted as
serving the interests of scientists by recognising the autonomy of decision-makers
within the scientific community.
3.2.C Models of science and innovation in Australia
3.2.c.i The linear-sequential model
The validity of the linear-sequential model was very prominent in Australia in the
1960s. It was advanced most frequently by those who stood to prosper by the
science-push ideology being adopted by funding decision-makers. A typical example
is White's claim, when speaking of strategies for Australian science:
That discovery at the frontiers of knowledge should be a primary objective is
justified by the history of modern industrial development. All of the most
revolutionary changes in industry have had their origins in this sort of research.
If we proceed only by trying to decide what we should manufacture, and then
tum to science, our progress will be slow and uninteresting.93
John Ziman, 'A neural net model of innovation', Science and Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 1,
February 1991, pp. 65-75, p. 73.
92 Ibid., p. 74.
93 White, 'The Strategy of Australian Science', p. 194.
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In 1990 the language of the linear sequential model still permeates the highest levels of
policy-making. This statement is made by the Director of the Science and Technology
Strategy sector of the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce:
.. .if you're talking about the application of research results then you don't want
links between scientists - they tend to develop anyway - the invisible college,
even though it's not fashionable, certainly does exist. What you want to
develop is interaction between different parts of the chain, between scientists,
people involved in engineering, marketeers etc. so that people are doing
research in an environment that is outward looking and not just science-led.
[emphasis added]94
The May 1989 Statement on Science and Technology includes an analysis of the
'complex' relationship between science and technology which has undertones of the
linear sequential model:
Science provides the foundation of knowledge and skill formation which makes
technology possible - it provides a context of continuity with past experience
and future capability. Investment in science helps to provide the core capacity
which is an essential precondition to the next stage of development in
technology.... 95
The concept is, not unexpectedly, often used by scientists to criticise the re-allocation
of funds towards applied science. At the Profile of Science Forum, for example, a
physics professor proclaimed:
We must first convince government that technology without basic science is
doomed to stagnation and, eventually, failure....Can we ask Simon Crean to
convince them that basic physics is the cradle in which new technology is
nurtured and that physicists are the nursemaids who make it grow into
technology?96
The idea is enduring, partly because interests are served by its preservation and
partly because basic science is indeed the source of some innovation. The problem for
govemments of medium-sized economies is that not all basic science is commercially
applicable or culturally enriching, and that decisions have to be made about which
basic science to fund. In Australia the problem has been exacerbated by the isolation
of university research from commercial development and the autonomy of the higher
education research funding subgovemment.
3.2.c.ii The Ziman neural net model
In Australia Ziman's ideas have not yet been formally used in the science policy
literature, but his basic idea of the need to maintain linkages between different
94 Rymer, Interview, 30.4.90.
95 Australia, Science andTechnologyfor Australia, p.7.
96 Professor A.G. Klein, 'We're in a bad way', in Profile ofAustralian Science: Forum Proceedings
May 1990, ASTEC, Canberra, 1990, pp. 33-36, p. 34.
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institutions of production is inherent in the views of McCracken, the Direetor of the
CSIRO Office of Space Seience and Applieations:
Thus, it is now recognised that the most effective management of science within
a national framework occurs when R&D occurs that concurrently involves basic
science, strategic science, applied seience, development, production
engineering, and operations. These several professional and teehnieal
communities, with their often irreconcilable characteristics, are thus forced to
work together, and this greatly accelerates technology transfer from the
laboratory to the market place. It also stimulates the reciprocal process
stimulation wherein industry learns the advantages to be gained from actively
eommissioning researeh in the laboratories of the nation. The large mix of
skills, and the involvement of the most competent people, neeessitates that the
projeets will be large.97
The notion of networks of innovation also underlies Johnston's slogan for
science policy in the 1990s: concentration (of research structures and projects), co
operation ( between institutions and sectors) and co-ordination (of policies across
government portfolios).The concept is currently being institutionalised in the form
of Co-operative Research Centres Program developed in 1990 by the Chief Scientist
Ralph Slatyer. These Centres are joint financial ventures between researeh groups in
universities. State and Commonwealth research organisations, private industry (in all
sectors) designed to facihtate the flow of ideas, eommodities and techniques.
The coneept that the link between research and development is a complex
network of interaction has serious implieations for the autonomy of seientists. Where
they formerly had managerial as well as profesional seientifie autonomy they are now
expected to relinquish some control in both areas. The design of new teehniques of
research organisation needs new attitudes from scientists socialised in the traditional
modes of organisation.^^ The outeomes of this concept areexaminedin ehapter six on
the restructuring of research in Australia.
97 Ibid.,p. 148.
9^ Ron Johnston, 'The Three Cs of science policy: concentration, co-operation, co-ordination', in
Science and Technology Creating Wealth for Australia, NSTAG 1990 Forum Report, The
Institution of Engineers, Canberra, 1990, pp. 41-44, pp. 42-43.
99 Ron Johnston, 'Strategic Policy for Science', in The Research System in Transition, eds. Susan
E. Cozzens, Peter Healey, Arie Rip & John Ziman, NATO ASI Series, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, The Netherlands, pp. 213-226, p. 225.
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3.3 The notion of critical mass
The final concept in the organisationof research to be discussedhere is that of 'critical
mass'. The concept is used increasingly to justify the allocation of resources in
science policy. The notion is borrowed from atomic physics where it emerged from
the process of making an explosive nuclear device. Criticalmass is defined as: 'The
minimum mass of fissile material required in a nuclear reactor or a nuclear weapon to
maintain a chain reaction'. 10° The essence of the concept is that a certain amount of
energy/activity is necessary before a nuclear explosion can be triggered and
maintained. In science policy the concept is used to argue for and justify the
establishment of centres of scientific research consisting of a sufficient number of
highly qualified scientists, adequately equipped and funded in order to produce new
scientific knowledge across the entire continuum of basic to applied science.
Ziman and Healey use the concept in their discussion of the need to organise
certain types of research on a national and supra-national basis. They argue that, as
research becomes more costly, govemments need to become increasingly selective
about the projects they fund. Selectivity in this regard means the fostering of
excellence, the closure of ineffective research units and the elimination of duplication
of effort. One of the criteria which govemments can use to decide if a research unit is
worth continuing, expanding or eliminating is that of whether or not the research
undertaken by the unit is up to international standards since: '...a "critical mass" of
activity is needed to achieve suchstandards in any one field'.lOi
Ziman and Healey maintain, however, that size is an unreliable measure of
critical mass since the effort and interaction needed to produce knowledge of the
required standard variesbetween fields of science. In the field of pure mathematics,
for example, the requiredstandardof results can be achieved with individual workers.
Experience in Germany in the 1970s indicated that research centres with over a
hundred workers were not successful. More recently groups: '...present themselves
as compact, coherent research groups that jointly tackle a programme of work, not as
quasi-departments covering a whole field'.Ziman and Healey introduce the notion
of 'domains of specialisation' which they constme as areas smaller than disciplines
such as oceanography but larger than individual research projects within disciplines.
As a rough guide they suggest that, on an international scale, a domain would be an
area of scientific research in which 'several hundred workers' produce a 'thousand or
so' papers a year. At the national level in a country the size of Britain with 5% of the
world's scientific output this would translate into about twelve scientists producing
fifty papers a year. 103
100 The Penguin Dictionary ofScience, 6thedn., Penguin Books, 1986, q.v. 'critical mass'.
101 John Ziman & Peter Healey, InternationalSelectivity in Science, SciencePolicy Support Group,
London, p. 4. (no date)
102 Ibid., p. 9.
103 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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Despite its widespreaduse the concept has not beenfully explored academically
by science policy analysts. Freeman says that, to the extent of his knowledge, there
are no theoretical or empirical studies which justify the use of the concept in science
policy.104 Pavitt alsoquestions the indiscriminate application of the concept across all
disciplines before more studies have been done of scientific productivity in different
types of organisations and fields of science.105
3.3.a Critical mass in research organisation in Australia
The use of the concept has become widespread in Australia. At the 1988 Forum of the
National Science and Technology Advisory Group (NSTAG) an entire section of the
proceedings was devoted to the 'Concentration of Resources and Critical Mass'.
Green, Director of the CSIRO Institute of Natural Resources and Environment, and
member of the Boards of the Centre for Technological and Social Change,
Wollongong, and the National Science and Technology Centre in Canberra, explained
how CSIRO Institutes are looking to the universities and industry to 'acquire the
critical mass of scarce specialists' needed to 'sustain innovation in a competitive
world'. 106 Green argues that the fragmentation of research effort, low level of
industrial investment in research and development and lack of collaboration between
the sectors of research in Australia have meant that research in the past has failed to
achieve a critical mass sufficient to provide the national economy with material for
innovation.
McCracken also believes that Australia's intemational economic competitiveness
will be increasingly at a disadvantage because of the lack of large basic and strategic
science projects. Suchprojectsgenerate the effectthatMcCracken believes to be at the
heart of critical mass or the concentration of research community resources. This is
that large-scale, parallel research projects in Europe, the USA and Japan demonstrate
that the time scale for the commercialisation of innovation resulting from the research
is very much reduced. The relationship betweenresearch and economic productionis
enhanced because the long time focus (five to ten years) develops a skills base which
is transferable within both public and private sectors; because advanced technologies
are developed for the conduct of research, and because managements become
competent at handling the transfer of technologybetweensectors. He says that such
projects as the VeryFast Train or the Cape YorkSpace Port shouldinclude criteriaof
critical mass used on a national scale.107
104 Christopher Freeman, Emeritus Professor, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex,
Interview, 1.11.91.
105 Pavitt, 'Whatdo we know aboutscience?, p. 41.
106 RoyGreen, Concentration of Resources and Critical Mass', (discussion on) in National Science
and Technology Advisory Group, TheNature and Role of Innovation in the Economy, 1988, The
Institution of Engineers, Canberra, 1988, pp.151-155, p. 154.
107 Ken McCracken, Concentration of Resources and Critical Mass, in Ibid.,ppl47-150, p. 150.
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The concept of critical mass also lies behind the establishment of the Co
operative Research Centres. Partly through co-location of research facilities and partly
through creating better linkages between institutions conducting related research, a
sufficient amount of new knowledge is produced which will an impact in a certain area
of interest to be developed commercially. The concept is also written into the May
Statement in the form of exhortations to private sector industry to increase their level
of investment in research:
...there are still problems with the overall amount of research funding which
will require a concerted effort by both industry and government if we are to
produce a critical mass of activity which will make Australia a significant
contributor to, and beneficiary of, world science and technology in the 21st
Century. 108
However, the concept is not without its critics in Australia. Lowe sees the use
of the concept as a political device of both governments and scientists:
The political responses to the funding deficits of the 1980s was to concentrate
the limited resources. Based partly on the widespread superstition that the
achievement of a "critical mass" is a necessary precursor of high quality
research and on the obvious political value of malang expenditure more visible
by concentrating it in large units. This approach has given us "centres of
excellence", special research centres, key centres and now more special research
centres. 1119
Lowe argues that concentration can have negative as well as positive effects on the
productivity of researchers. Firstly, turning departments or research projects into
research centres means that the best researchers have to become managers which is
counter-productive to the production of scientific knowledge, particularly if they tum
out to be mediocre managers. Secondly, the opportunity costs of investing in one
centre the equivalent of eighteen average ARC grants has not yet been justified in
terms of relative productivity. Thirdly, such centres of co-ordinated research tend to
be self-perpetuating which is counter-productive to the system as a whole in terms of
flexibility of response to changing priorities.
These comments alert the poliey analyst that, until more studies of the critical
mass concept have been undertaken, the use of the concept in science policy to justify
a definite type of organisation of research may mask other interests than that of
efficacy in the creation of new scientific knowledge and its application to economic
objectives.
Summary
The preceeding sections have discussed the predominant ideas which have informed
the development of science policies in westem industrial societies in the second half of
108 Australia, Science and Technologyfor Australia, p. 5.
109 Ian Lowe, 'The dying of the light',Australian Universities' Review, vol. 33, nos. 1 & 2, 1990,
pp. 13-18, p. 15.
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the twentieth century. Two broad foci are identified: government objectives for
scientific knowledge in modern societies; and the way in which the production of
scientific knowledge should be organised and used. Most of the ideas originated in
the period between 1945 and 1965. Since then they have been further developed as
political and scientific actors in science policy communities recognise that the ideas can
be used to operationalise and justify their particular ideologies. Thus, for example,
political actors have used ideas from economics and political sociology to justify
intervention into the way in which science is organised in the name of national interest;
and actors in the science system have used concepts of extra-rational creativity to
defend the autonomy they see as essential in the face of the increasingly market-
oriented govemment objectives for researeh.
There is considerable evidence that ideas are transferred throught the
international science policy attentive public and adopted by actors in the Australian
science policy community. The final section of this chapter examines the way in
which these ideas have been adopted by science poliey subgovemments in Australia.
4. Ideas in the Subgovernments
Ideas derive from actors located in different sectors of the science policy community.
They are articulated within the intemational attentive public, the attentive public, the
subgovemment, or the exeeutive core. Tracing the path of ideas through the science
policy community can indicate the way in which networks of co-operation or
opposition arise, achieve prominence and decline in influence.
4.1 Higher education
It would be expected that ideas about the autonomy of science would be expressed
most forcefully in the higher education system where it is assumed that the most
creative seience is practised. The notion of 'one best man for the job' and 'his'
autonomy is a conservative principle which 'fits' the traditional image of the scientist,
and has influenced the way science has been funded in Australia, particularly in higher
education. It is an idea about the way in which research should be organised which
continued to be used by some higher education researchers in 1990. For example, at
the 1990 Forum on the Profile of Australian Science at the Australian Academy of
Scienee in Canberra, Dr Bob Ward, a former research director of BHP described the
traditional way of organising research in higher education:
A thousand years ago when I was a student we had a God Professor. He
issued government money for the use of teachers; he ran the research
philosophy; he ran the department; was a lecturer and so on. I objected strongly
to this, but I learned a lot about research management and I now realise that it
was a very effective way of doing research. One of the advantages from the
government end is that they can see who's mnning the research. They don't
have to worry about Charlie Bloggs who's a first year lecturer and they don't
know anything about him. Much better to give a decent sum of money to the
successful heads of departments and let them get on with the job. That has the
advantage of Darwinism coming in. Successful departments attract good
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teaching staff; they attract good students; they attract good graduate students,
and grow and prosper. In the fullness of time the poor departments disappear
from the face of the earth. It seems to me that if we re-instituted the God-
Professor we would have a basic research climate in Australia that the
government could respond to.iio
In the 1960s this view was being challenged from within the science system by
the view that a wider range of socio-economic values needed to be incorporated into
objectives for science. Two anonymous chemists from 'an Australian University',
wrote in the Current Ajfairs Bulletin in 1962 that there should also be an advisory
council of 'scientific economic' representation which would supervise national science
policy; and that a comprehensive survey of existing research resources and facilities
should be undertaken in Australia so that future requirements eould be systematically
planned. They point out that, unless there is the technological culture to develop such
products and processes in Australia, basic research is no more than '...a charitable
donation to the rest of the world.'^ Implicitin this criticismis the idea of systematic
techno-economistic planning for research.
The advent of ASTEC in 1978 gave academie seientists an influential forum for
the discussion of ideas about seience policy. Half the membership of the original
Council were university scientists and until 1992 the Chairman has always been an
academic scientist. ASTEC acts both as a conduit, distiller and modifier of views
from scientists about that relationship between the political and science systems. Since
the early 1960s the Eederation of Australian University Staff Associations (EAUSA)
had maintained the traditional view of the university scientist.when the higher
education research system was being restructured in the mid 1980s EAUSA submitted
its ideas about objectives for university science and the way in which it should be
organised. A comparison of these ideas with the subsequent recommendations made
by ASTEC to the Prime Minister (Table 4.3) shows that the dichotomy between
autonomy and centralisation was as pronounced as ever.
The EAUSA perspective is the traditional stance of the university researcher re-
emphasising that researeh in universities is for fundamentally educational purposes
and that the narrower role of industrial problem-solver and innovator is secondary and
incidental. The ASTEC Report sees the role of the universities as complementary to
that of other government-funded research establishments in ensuring that publicly
funded researeh is relevant to present and future socio-economic needs. The ideas
expressed by ASTEC reflect Ziman's notion of an expanding science system in a
'steady state' of available resources. These ideas were to change the rules for the
Dr Bob Ward, Forum on the Profile of Australian Science, Australian Academy of Science, May
1 1990.
111 Anon. 'Science in Australia: Research Today - andTomorow', CurrentAjfairs Bulletin, vol. 30,
no. 7, August 1962, pp. 99-112, p.lOO.
112 Thecriteria of allocation forsectoral agencies such asCSIRO, ARC andIR&DB arediscussed in
chapter 5.
Table 4.3: A comparison of science policy ideas, FAUSA and ASTEC
issue
objective
which
type of
research
the
criteria
the
process
FA USA
' the primary role of universities is to
educate creative and skilled people;
' research strategies should be designed
to fulfill this broad socio-economic
role;
' universities should not be expected to
fill the mission-oriented research role
neglected by industrial interests;
' research should primarily be curiosity-
led to complement the university
teaching role and not made to fit the
narrow interests of industry;
' if the government wishes universities
to participate in competitive funding
for mission-oriented research then
extra resources should be made
available for the teaching and research
roles;
' resources should therefore be allocated
only to the universities where
infrastmcture is already developed;
• research should not be concentrated in
a few centres of perceived excellence
in research which have a reduced
teaching load;
' rather a balanced development of
exposure to good research should be
available for all students in
universities;
the existing competitive scheme of
research grants should be retained on
its traditional basis of excellence by
peer evaluation;
' all current funding schemes should be
co-ordinated under a National
Research Scheme responsible only to
a senior Minister with no specialist
portfolio responsibilities;
ASTEC
the role of the higher education sector
is to help solve current economic
problems through the production of a
skilled workforce and of basic and
applied research knowledge;
researchers in universities should be
accountable to the public for the
selection of topics and the conduct of
research undertaken;
both research undertaken for
intellectual reasons and research
undertaken for economic and social
research can add to the knowledge
base and also be useful in educating
the next generation of researchers;
high quality basic research can be
undertaken by focussing on areas of
greatest potential for Australia an
broadening the criteria for priority
selection;
• institutes of technology and colleges
of advanced education should be
encouraged to participate in basic and
applied research suported by end-
users;
• the efficient use of recurrent funds for
research should be improved by
recognising that not all staff are
uniformly research competent;
• the specialisation and concentration of
research effort should be encouraged
in individual research institutes;
' funds for the competitive research
schemes supplement recurrent funds
and produce high-level, relevant
research results and should therefore
be increased;
• criteria should include:
• the quality of the researcher
• the research record
•the ripeness of the field for
commercial exploitation
•potential technological and
social benefit;
' an Australian Research Council should
be established as a statutory body
responsible to the Minister for
Science.
Source:ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance ofAustralia's Universities and Other Higher
Education Institutions, AGPS, Canberra, 1987.
Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, Submission to the ASTEC Review of
Higher Education Research Funding, April 1986.
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allocation of resources to research in higher education for the first time in twenty
years. 113
4.2 CSIRO
By 1965 the ideology of autonomy had, for nearly forty years, underlain research
undertaken by CSIRO. The principle had been established by Rivett in CSIR and was
upheld by Sir Frederick White, Chairman of CSIRO from 1961-1970. He also
considered that all the 'great opportunities' come out of 'frontier science', which one
assumes to be basic science. Applied science should be produced in order to 'guide
the political and economic decisions' to be made. Scientists should make the deeisions
about the research to be undertaken since neither politicians nor business leaders were
capable of predicting which research would lead to economie suceess.H'i
White was expressing the traditional scientist's view of the relationship between
the politieal and science systems. Scientists need resourees to provide facilities for
research but in retum they demand autonomy in order to maintain control over the
commitment-inducing system of peer response. They also expect governments to
manage the relationship between production and science as long as intervention stays
within the development and commercialisation activities of production. To these ends
it is in the national interest that basic science, from which applied science emerges in
part, should be supportedby governments. These ideas about autonomy and the pre
eminence of basic science seem disconsonant with the statutory objective of CSIRO as
instrumental to the needs of industry.
By 1990 new ideas about organisation and purpose had been introduced into
CSIRO through re-emphasis of its industrial role, through dilution of the ideology of
science in the organisation, and by introducing key personnel with radically different
ideas. In 1986 Minister Jones rewrote the Science and Industry Act 1949 to re-
emphasise its industrial role in the science system.in the following year the
Hawke Government appointed a former NSW premier, Neville Wran, to be the first
Chairman of CSIRO under the new legislation. Wran saw his role as introducing an
'entrepreneurial ethos' in the Organisation.One of Wran's first changes in this
respect was to introduce a system of cash incentives for scientists whose results are
eommercialised. Such rewards go directly against Merton's scientific norm of
disinterestedness and indieate the extent to which the government was determined to
impose its techno-economic political ideology on CSIRO.
113 Aitkin, who became the first Chairman of the Australian Research Council was also a memberof
ASTEC and an enthusiatic endorser of the Ziman ideology which states that under such conditions
concentration of and selectivity among research areas are inevitable.
Don Aitkin, 'How research came to dominate higher education and what ought to he done about
it', Australian Universities' Review, nos. 1 & 2, 1990, pp. 8-13.
11^ White, 'The Strategy of Australian Science', p. 194.
113 This aspect of change in CSIRO is discussed more fully in chapter 6.
11^ Ben Bremner, 'Cash incentives for scientists'. Weekend Australian, Jan 25-26, 1988, p. 5.
115
116
Wran was succeeded by Professor Adrienne Clark, the first woman ever to
achieve such a significant role in CSIRO, and a scientist with positive ideas about the
capaeity of the science system to combine excellent research with
commercialisation. In 1991 John Stocker was appointed to the position of Chief
Scientist in CSIRO from a background of industrial research - the first Chief with such
extensive experience of commercial science. These personnel changes have
introduced into CSIRO new ideas about the way research is organised and the ends to
which research is produced. The changes have led to a new awareness among CSIRO
staff of the complexity of the scientists' role in modern society and of the need to
collaborate both with each other and with all sectors of society. These outcomes of
changing ideas in sciencepolicy are diseussedfurther in later ehapters.^^®
4.3 Manufacturing industry
The business community traditionally have four main concerns about science policy
and the views and ideas theyexpress areusually centred around theseconcems. They
are: the role of govemment in industrial research and development; the nature of
research to be undertaken in private laboratories; the responsibility of training
scientists to work in industry, and the question of ownership of the intellectual
property of scientific knowledge.
In the mid 1960s the industrial scientific community in Australia became aware
of the fact that the relationship between economic production and the production of
scientific knowledge in Australia was underdeveloped. The sort of government
intervention that was becoming the norm in rural economic production had not
extended to manufacturing industry.119 Several industrial research managers were
stimulated to speak out on the issue by the findings of the Vernon Committee of
Economic Enquiry which pointed to the low level of industrial innovation in Australia;
by the burgeoning interest of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in science policy;
and by the realisation that industrial research and development was a valid concern of
govemment.
Their ideas were based on the premise that the relationship between the
processes of industrial innovation and the production of scientific knowledge is a two-
way relationship. Sir Ian MeLennan, the Chief General Manager of BHP explained
the premise in the following way. Industry has problems which need to be solved and
basie seience may be able to provide the solution immediately. However, the basic
scientific knowledge for such a solution may not yet have been created and industrial
problems can therefore generate the production of new scientific knowledge.
Adrienne Clark, 'New plants for old', The Uncertainty Principle, ed. Robyn Williams, ABC
Enterprises, Sydney, 1989, pp. 205-217.
Merilyn Sleigh, Science and Government - HI', Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, no..
68, March 1992, pp. 91-94, p. 92.
119 The term 'industrial research and development' has not normally, in Australia, included rural
research.
McLennan was very scathing about the attitude of university researchers in the 1960s
who embued their students with the idea of applied research as second-class
science. 120
This cultural separation was also deplored by Lusby, writing on behalf of the
AIRG.121 He noted that that there was a need for universities to accept applied
research work for higher degrees which was directed more to Australian industry's
needs than to the objective of attaining status in the international science arena. The
concentration on basic research had a two-fold effect. Firstly, it did not produce new
products and processes which could be commercialised in Australia; and secondly, the
university system produced postgraduate researchers with skills attuned to basic
research who were leaving Australia because there were not enough positions in the
basic research areas for which they had been trained. He said that the same ideas
about research predominated in some divisions of CSIRO;
CSIRO through its Division of Radiophysics has, as a matter of policy, sought
in recent times to work in special fields that are of world wide prestige but
which have had little direct bearing so far on public usefulness; for example,
radio astronomy and cloud seeding. While large sums have been expended on
radio telescopes, most of the contractwork has been placed overseas.122
The solution would be to concentrate more government spending locally; to ahgn
higher degree research work in universities closer to industry; and to change the anti-
industrial philosophy in universities by using part-time lecturers from industry who
would not only teach industry-related skills but also act as role models for young
scientists. University staff should be encouraged to spend their sabbatical leave
working in industry and this should be accorded as much prestige as working in
overseas universities.
It is interesting that in the period 1965-1972 there was very little discussion by
researchers in the private sector (or in CSIRO) about the issue of intellectual property.
It is probably an indication of the lack of interaction between CSIRO, the universities
and industry that the issue was not considered significant in science policy.
In 1990 the manufacturing industry science policy community interacts within a
more centralised model of the relationship between governments and private industry
over the issue of research and development. Extensive government intervention in the
allocation of resources by CSIRO and the universities to the type of scientific research
^20 Sir Ian McLennan, 'Scientists and Industry', Australian Journal of Science, vol. 30, no. 1, 1966-
67, pp. 20-23.
^21 In 1964 the Australian Industrial Research Group was formed by managers in private industry
concerned to improve the quality of research management in Australia, and: '... to stimulate and
develop an understanding of research as a force in economic, industrial and social activities'.
K.T.H. Farrer, AIRG: The First Twenty Years, Australian Industry Research Group, Melbourne,
1986, p. 2.
M.M. Lusby, 'Seience Policy towards the Electronics Industry', Search, vol. 1, no. 4, October
1970, pp. 142-144.
122 Ibid., p. 143.
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which the government pereeives as being of benefit to national economie well-being
has become a familiar political rhetoric, if not always an implemented reality. Ideas on
science policy have been formally articulated to governments through industry
representation on ASTEC for over twelve years. The private research community is
represented not only by the AIRG but on an individual researeher basis by the
AATSE, by the Institution of Engineers and by FASTS. These groups co-operate to
produce each year the NSTAG Forum which evaluates science policy. They are an
example of the way in which stmctured interaction can be designed by aetors with
resourees to influence policy formulation with their ideas. The way in whieh these
groups interact within the policy community is the subject of the next chapter.
In 1989-90 the AIRG submission to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts
Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development: '...strongly supports the
initiatives of the Department of Industry, Teehnology and Commerce to stimulate an
increase in the level of industrial R & D in Australia.1^3 xhe AIRG in particular
praises the universities for developing 'skills to manage the interface with
industry'. 124 xhe AIRG feel that if research is contracted out to be performed by
CSIRO the arrangements for property rights, exclusive licence, royalties or lieenee fee
and publication rights should be different to those pertaining when the research is
performed jointly by private laboratories and CSIRO.
The AIRG represents large research investors in well-established industries and
companies. Sueh high technology companies as Paeific Biotechnology, Nucleus Ltd
and Crocker Research have benefited from IR&D initiatives and have positive views
about government intervention. Less enthusiatie submissions were received from
companies who felt that too mueh emphasis was placed on the researeh side of the
innovation equation and not enough on the development and commereialisation side.
So, for example, the Australian Pharmaeeutieal Manufacturers' Assoeiation
commented that while their members were receiving government grants for research,
there were limited government funds for commercialisation, and the prieing
regulations on prescription drugs favoured pharmaceutical products developed
overseas. 125 Xhe most stringent eritieism and innovative (and controversial) ideas
came from businesses involved in the commercialisation process.126
123 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development,
AIRG Submission, vol. 2, pp. S1024-S1026.
124 An indication of the utility of these skills to industry is the fact that the universities' share of
private research contracts has risen from 26 per cent to 57 percent. In contrast, CSIRO's share
has fallen from 57 per cent to 26 per cent. The reason lies mainly in CSIRO's unrealistic
expectations of the value of its intellectual property input to joint ventures.
Ibid., pp. S250-S253.
125 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development,
Australian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, Submission no. 17, vol. 1, p. S123.
126 Out of 102 submissions surveyed for this thesis, 16 were from private firms in manufacturing
industry or their representatives. 8 were strongly supportive of government intervention, 3 were
moderately supportive and 5 strongly against it.
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For example, Roach of the Sydney Business and Technology Centre claims that
the continuing lack of successful commercialisation of research results in Australia is
due to the fact that the process is largely managed by public servants and academics
through such devices as co-operative research centres, technology parks, management
investment companies, and government or university innovation agencies. The
solution is total privatisation of the development and commercialisation phase of
innovation using the following process:
1. 80-90 per cent of all public sector IR&D funding should be directed to
private industry research associations on the advice of a 2 or 3 person
committee experienced in the commercialistion of research and
development;
2. the cost-effectiveness of these centres should be continually monitored;
3. governments should encourage the development of private centres of
research including the privatisation of existing public sector research
agencies whose primary role is that of producing research for industrial
production;
4. potential products and processes should be assessed by experts in
marketing, accounting, and product protection, as well as scientists and
technologists from a range of disciplines, before the development phase.
5. the whole system should exist in multi-function polises providing a context
of commercial universities for the training of scientists, engineers and
business managers, and the production of basic research; private research
and development centres specialising in the production of applied research;
andproduction and marketing facilities. ^27
Similarly, I. W. Shedden, of Shedden Technology Management Limited, has
experience in managing research and development, evaluating new technology and
commercialising new products and processes for the world market. Shedden suggests
that if governments are serious about comercialising research and development they
should:
1. redefine "R&D" to include preliminary market surveys and market
development work;
2. continue the 150 per cent tax concession and streamline the Taxation Office
approvalprocesseswhich currently delay the process of commercialisation
by six months;
3. allow investment in R&D syndicates by individuals as well as corporate
entities;
4. allow at least partial franked dividend reUef for such investment;
5. tap into superannuation funds for R&D investment;
Ibid., Sydney Business and Technology Centre, Submission no. 63, vol. 8, pp. S1008-S1022.
Roach claims that 400 of these private research centres exist in Japan and 250 in the United
States. He also gives a history of being ignored by State and Commonwealth agencies such as
DITAC.
6. allow capital gains tax relief for new businesses specifically established to
commercialise R&D results.1^8
A continuing suggestion for the provision of funds for the development of
products and procresses for commercialisation is that of a levy on manufacturing
industry similar to that which has proved successful for mral research. This idea was
rejuvenated in a suggestion from the Institution of Engineers that such a levy could be
based on the principle of the training level recently introduced by the Commonwealth
Government, i.e., imposed on firms which do not already spend a certain required
amount on research and development. This would eliminate the 'free rider' problem
of firms later exploiting the benefits of new products and processes for which they
bore no costs. 1^9
There is considerable mistmst of govemment management of venture capital and
investment funds, and general agreement that the role of govemment is to provide the
right investment climate and a long-term, stable, straightforward scheme of incentives
for companies to undertake research and development. These sentiments are
expressed in a survey of sixteen senior managers of firms undertaking research and
development that had achieved significant advances in innovation in the last few
years.130 The survey finds that most leaders think that, since private research and
development was conducted in a context of obligation to investors, it was to be
expected that there would be a tendency to low-risk strategies. Australian companies
should therefore concentrate on developing overseas innovations to local conditions
and leave research and development to areas such as natural resources and primary
production in which Australia had natural advantages.
The ideas held by the manufacturing science policy community thus cover a
wide spectmm of opinion about the role of government in the production of new
scientific knowledge for economic application. However, the notion of some form of
governmental support of private research and development is now almost universal.
The differences lie in the degree of control retained by governments over the direction
over research. Those companies who have benefited from government subsidies
directed at certain areas of research support the implicit prioritisation of government
funds involved. Others with more radical ideas (such as those of Roach quoted
above) would prefer a neo-classical economic model of market-directed pressure
groups controlling the flow of public resources used to compensate for market failure
in the research, development and commercialisation of new products and services.
These ideas more closely fit those of Kealey and are almost unique in the Australian
Ibid., Shedden Technology Management Limited, Submission no. 55, pp. S0982-S0986.
129 Ibid., The Institution of Engineers, Submission no. 49, vol. 7, pp. S927-S938.
130 Anon, 'Science and Technology: Attitudes of Australian business leaders'. Ascent Technoogy
Magazine, no. 3, August-October 1991, pp. 8-9.
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science policy conununity. In no other sector are there such radical ideas about the
privatisation of public research organisations.
4.4 Rural industry
The importance to national economic well being of rural production, and the political
domination of the Liberal-Country Party from 1949 to 1972 meant that the role of
governments in the subsidisation of rural research was unquestioned. Government
support for rural industry in Australia has traditionally included subsidising the cost of
rural research. State departments of agriculture and Commonwealth research
organisations have undertaken, at public expense, the creation of scientific knowledge
to be used in rural economic production. However, ehanging political ideology and
changing global commodity markets forced subgovemment examination of the ideas
justifying govemment intervention. A series of reports expresses the way in which
different ideas influenced rural research policy.
4.4.a The Vernon Report
In 1965 the Committee of Economic Enquiry based its discussion of the economic
impact of research and development on the premise that:
The relationship between research and development and the growth of
productivity is self-evident. Research and development contribute to
technological change and innovation and to rising standards of technieal eontrol
and management which are important elements in increasingproductivity.^^!
The Committee found that productivity in rural industries had increased because
uncertainties in global markets had been offset by increased productivity. This was
due to the decreasing costs attributable to innovations in production methods brought
about by the application of research results to production. 132 xhe system of
govemment support for raral industry research funds should therefore be continued.
If there was a weakness in the mral research system it was in the sometimes inefficient
application of research results to produetion. This could be improved by further
developmentof agricultural extension services.133
The way in which raral research was discussed in the Report underlines the
taken-for-granted nature of government subsidies. The Report contained an entire
chapter devoted to the role of research and development in economic production.
Rural research was barely mentioned in this chapter which gave a detailed rationale for
government subsidisation of research for manufacturing industry. Instead, rural
research was discussed in the same chapter as rural industry and included no such
justifications.
131 Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report 1965,p. 418.
132 Ibid., p. 182.
133 Ibid., p. 424.
4.4.b Whitlam challenges the assumptions of subgovernment
When the Whitlam Government took office in 1972 the political ideology for science
changed to one in which manufacturing industry became the target of techno-
economism. Whitlam commissioned an enquiry into raral policy which included an
examination of the issue of govemment subsidies to rural research. 134 xhe enquiry
endorsed the importance of research in rural policy on the grounds that increased
input costs and market uncertainties required the continued expansion of exports,
which in turn depended on rural research to maintain productivity. Unlike the Vemon
Report, the authors of this Report justified their findings in terms of economic theory,
in this case, market failure:
Private costs and benefits could, in principle, still be sufficient to stimulate an
adequate level of research even though social returns might be considerably
higher. Because of the atomistic nature of farm enterprises and the difficulty for
any individual or group of individuals to retain for themselves the benefits of the
research results, the government needs to play a role in institutionalising the
provision of research funds.... 135
The Report concluded that governments would always need to provide a
'considerable proportion' of rural research funding' because of the indivisibility of the
benefits of research. The exact level of subsidy could not be calculated because:
'Research is a field in which it is generally accepted that the market mechanism
provides a very poor guide to the efficient allocation of resources'.136 However,
governments should play a role in directing the nature, quality, co-ordination and
application of research and its results.137
4.4.C The Industries Assistance Commission Report
The Fraser Government followed up the findings of the Rural Policy Enquiry by
commissioning a report from the Industries Assistance Commission on financing rural
research. The Commission noted that the Rural Industry Research Funds (RIRFs)
method of raising funds from industry levy meant that rural producers contributed
only fifteen per cent of the costs of rural research. However, the social benefits to the
general public of the retums from public sector investment in rural research were high
enough to justify maintaining the systemin its traditional form.i38 The Commission
was influenced in its decision by the findings of the Science Task Force (Philips
134 Australia. Working Group, The Principles of Rural Policy in Australia: Report to the Prime
Minister by a Working Group, Park Paper 32, 1974, Canberra, paragraphs 5.125-5.170.
135 Ibid., paragraph 5.135, p. 109
136 Ibid., paragraph 5.167, pp. 114-115.
137 Ibid., paragraph 5.132, p. 109.
138 -pbe Commission examined the recommendations of the Rothschild Report in the UK which
recommended a 'customer/contractor' basis for funding research projects. The customer decides on
the objective to be achieved and how much can be spent on the research. The principle involves
the dtermination of priorities by the customer.
Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, Parl. Paper 155, Canberra, 1977,
pp. 1 & 46.
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Committee) against the centralisation of funding, opting instead for the 'flexibility and
diversity' of the RIRFs. However, the Commission went against the Task Force's
finding that scientific autonomy does not lead to a lack of accountability in research,
arguing that:
...society is unlikely to be satisfied with the assurance that autonomy does not
inevitably lead to isolation and irrelevance and that only a minority of good
research scientists will concem themselves with trivial problems.^39
Similarly the Commission found that the failure of the Standing Committee on
Agriculture to fufil its role of monitoring rural research meant that there was a need for
'a central research unit to monitor such problems'.
These somwhat contradictory findings resulted in the Commission
recommending against centralised restructuring of the RIRFs but in favour both of
centralised control of the organisation of rural research, and of decision-making on the
objectives for rural research. The Commission justified its ambivalence by using
Polanyi-type statements about 'good' systems of research organisation' which are
'...capable of reaching fair and reasonable judgements on the needs of producers and
consumers'.
The implication of their findings is considerable intervention, by an overarching
research committee, in deciding which research projects should be funded by the
RIRFs. Such a policy was unacceptable to the cost-cutting, decentralist conservative
ideology of the third Fraser Government despite the economically rational models used
by Edwards and Fairbairn. The opportunity for restructuring was not used because
the ideas for action did not fit scientific values of autonomy, political ideologies of
non-intervention in sensitive rural electorates, and the reluctance of the Standing
Committee on Agriculture to relinquish its control of rural research.
139 Ibid., p. 45.
140 Ibid., p. 51.
141 Ibid., pp. 45 & 47.
See also the diseussion on researcher/rural producer preferences in chapter 4, especially footnote
111.
142 Lazenby & Williams claim that it was the influence of the SCA which continued the fragmented
and inefficient use of rural research funds. They write:
The Standing Committee on Agriculture, which was established in 1927 to co-ordinate rural
research in Australia, in fact very rapidly became the major mechanism to define the
boundaries and maintain the separateness of the research institutions... .The outcome of this
situation is that neither the overall program of rural R&D nor the infrastructure required for
such activities has been developed in response to national opportunities or needs. For
example, a survey in 1990 showed that there are more than 500 sites in Australia in which
research for the rural industries is carried out, many of them small and with largely local
objectives.
Alec Lazenby & Richard Williams, 'Rural Research: Realities and Opportunities', in The
Management of Science and Technology, ed. Jenny Stewart, Federalism Research Centre,
Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, pp. 25-32, p. 26.
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4.4.d Rural research and neo-classical economic rationalism
In 1981 the Eraser Government connnissioned two agricultural economists to estimate
the benefits to the nation of rural researchers ensuing analysis entailed the first
methodically rigourous examination in Australia of the macro-level economic costs and
benefits of rural research. The authors were the first explicitly to raise the issue of
why rural research should not be undertaken in AustraUa. They specifically addressed
the question of whether it was not more efficient to buy overseas knowledge and apply
it to Australian conditions. In doing so they used the argument that the creation of
scientific knowledge only has social and economic benefits if it is applied to society's
needs expressed in market terms. They claim:
The economic rationale of research is that, by easing the constraints on to
production and consumption imposed by a society's limited resources of labour,
capital, natural resources and knowledge, it increases the range of society's
options.
Edwards and Fairbairn calculated that rural research was only justifiable in
Australia if the benefits could be appropriated by Australian producers but not by the
rest of the world. For example, if research resulted in cost reductions of ten per cent
for Australian producers, and no cost reduction for the rest of the world, then
Australian producers could, in some rural industries, appropriate up to 94 per cent of
total world gains from the innovation. They concluded that the only research to be
undertaken in Australia should be:
1) to investigate promising areas of research undertaken overseas;
2) toundert^e research which could beofbenefit toAustralia which had not
been undertaken overseas.1^5
Edwards and Fairbairn made no attempt to translate their findings into
recommendations about restructuring either the research system in general, or the rural
research sector in particular to improve the efficiency of the RIRFs.
4.4.e Radical rural techno-economism
With the change of government in 1983 came a change of political ideology and a
series of incremental changes to the rural research system. The establishment of an
inventory of rural research by the Department of Primary Industry in 1983, and the
restructuring of the Australian Agricultural Council heralded the Commonwealth
Government's intention to base decisions about rural research on a more economically
rational footing. 1^6 xhe new ideas for rural research were based on the 'user pays'
G.W. Edwards & J.W. Fairbairn, Measuring a Country's Gains from Research: Theory and
Application to Rural Research in Australia, AGPS, Canberra 1981.
144 Ibid.,p. 1.
145 Ibid., p. 78.
146 R. Williams & G. Evans, 'Commonwealth Policy for Rural Research Past and Present: A
Review', in Workshop on the Organisation and Funding of Rural Research,'Bwtesxi of Rural
Research, 12-13 May 1988, AGPS, Part TT, p. 107.
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principle and operationalised within the rural policy community through the
corporatisation of the RIRFs, increases in Commonwealthcontributions to matching
levies, and deereasing appropriations to Government researeh organisations
undertaking rural research.1^7
Some analysts consider that the restructuring and re-allocation of resources bring
the ideal opportunity finally to implement the co-ordination and concentration
principles of economic rationalisation. Lazenby and Williams advocate the
implementation of several recurring suggestions for rural research policy. Among
these are:
1) open fora in which actors from Commonwealth and State Governments,
the research corporation and research agencies can contribute to policy-
making;
2) the replacement of ad hoc decision-making with strategic plans
incorporating the objective of all the major interest groups;
3) the concentration of research and development projects with optimal use of
human and financial resources;
4) the involvement of researeh eorporations in maintaining the infrastructure
of research agencies.1^8
Rural producers are also in favour of changes to the system, including greater
participation in the control of such research agencies as CSIRO by independent
boards. The National Farmers' Federation has declared itself very much in favour of
the changes to research corporations and CSIRO already implemented. A
representative of the Federation said, in a Workshop run by the SCA:
Responsiveness, we have found, depends on who holds the cheque book.
Hard experience has shown us that research is not particularly responsive to end
user needs when scientists or bureaucrats are given all the say in setting
priorities. Our feedbaek indicates that those research councils are working
extremely well.1^9
The development and use of ideas in the rural seience policy community has
been influenced to a remarkable extent by conservative actors in the subgovemment
and executive core using their position in policy networks to stifle the dissemination of
ideas which threaten their control over the existing structures of scientific and
economic production, and the allocation of resources to activity within those
structures. Power has been exercised to perpetuate action beneficial to those interests
and prohibit or delay ideas which would redistribute control over rules, resources and
ideas through membership of influential coimnittees and boards.
This analysis has revealed that ideas and their dissemination and adoption by
significant actors have been of paramount importancein rural research. Rural research
^"^7 Lazenby & Williams, 'Rural Research: Realities and Opportunities', p. 28.
These ideas are discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.
Ibid., pp. 30-31.
John Mackenzie, 'The Views of the Rural Sector', in Workshop on the Organisation and Funding
ofRural Research, pp. 70-78, p. 72.
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science policy networks were corporatist (according to Coleman and Skogstad's
typology) in 1965 and have changed only in that the degree of corporatisation has
increased with the formation of the rural research corporations. The Fraser
Government's laissez-faire nationahst/conservative ideology did not provide sufficient
dynamic for change. Nor did the market ideas of Edwards and Fairbairn prevail
against this inertia. It was the fit between neo-classical economic ideas and the ALP
science policy ideology of radical techno-economism which effected change.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the ideas which underly science policy in Australia in
relation to two basie orientations: control over decisions about the objectives for
science; and control over the organisation of research and development. In general
these ideas come from the intemational attentive public and are taken up by significant
actors in the science policy community in Australia to justify the way in which they
influence the establishment of structures and the distribution of resources for the
production and application of scientific knowledgein Australia.
The analysis shows that there has been a definite shift towards orienting science
policy as part of national economic production in all sectors. The ideas have, not
surprisingly, been most strongly resisted in the higher education science policy
community; to a lesser but significant extent within CSIRO and adapted most readily
in the manufaeturing and rural science policy communities.
Ideas about government intervention in the organisation of science have been
resisted in all sectors except the manufacturing sector. Here, a combination of weak
scientific ideology and lack of a traditional innovation culture has been gradually
transformed by governments into a more corporatist ethos in which governments and
private firms participate in research and development oriented to restructuring
manufacturing production in Australia. Table 4.4 summarises the way in which the
ideas become orientations to science policy as they are taken up by members of a
scienee policy community.
Ideas about government objectives for the production and application of
scientific knowledge can be grouped into two categories: nationalistic-cultural and
techno-economistic. Nationalistic-cultural ideas are those which see research
principally in terms of international status and cultural development; and techno-
economistic ideas are those which advocate that public resources should be used to
fund the production of scientific knowledge which will be of economic benefit. Ideas
about the organisation of the science system can be categorised into those which
demand autonomy for scientists in the name of creative freedom; and those which
argue that the production of scientific knowledge is too eostly; too central to modem
society; and too unpredictable in its effects to be left under the control of scientists.
Figure 4.2: A typology of science policy orientations
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The notion of the production of scientific knowledge as a service to the state implies
that the state controls both the objectives for science and the way in which research is
organised. Public resources are allocated to science in order to increase national
prestige. The production of scientific knowledge occurs in institutions structured
according to nationalistic rather than scientific ideology. Ideas of this type underly
defence science, space research, and the way in which science is seen in totalitarian
societies.
Those who advocate the notion of science as science argue that research is
primarily a cultural activity which enhances national prestige but that scientists should
have autonomy over the organisation of science. Such an orientation to science policy
sees elite scientists or their organisations controlling the direction of research which is
publicly funded according to criteria intemal to the science system. In Australia such
policies prevailed in Liberal Coalition govemments prior to 1972.
Orientations to science policy which advocate that the principal objective of
allocating public funds to research is to produce knowledge which will be of national
economic benefit argue that such allocation should occur not according to the criteria
of scientific ideology but through co-operation among a range of science policy actors
including private business organisations, unions, economists, politicians and
scientists. These actors are co-opted into the subgovemment in order to formulate,
implement, and evalute policies. Govemments need their skills and commitment to
ensure the co-operation of the science policy community in general in the successful
implementation of policy.
In Australia between 1965 and 1990 there has been a shift from an orientation to
science policy based on the ideas of science as science, to one based on the the ideas
of science as part of national economic production. The shift has not be uniform in
time or science pohcy sector. Higher education science policy still retains elements of
elitism centred on the production of science qua science, in autonomous research
organisations, according to scientists' priorities. Science policy for CSIRO is now
oriented markedly towards economic production. Networks are corporatist with
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significant actors from all sectors involved in decision-making for the organisation
through the mechanism of a Chairman and Board.
Manufacturing and rural science policy are per se oriented to economic
production rather than culture and so have always been techno-economist. Significant
actors in these subgovemments have not yet adopted ideas oriented to market notions
of science as a business activity because government contributions to industry research
at least match industry contributions. Even in 1965 manufacturing science policy has
to be interpreted as oriented around ideas of national economic production rather than
as business activity. Although there were no grants for manufacturing research,
government intervention in the form of tariffs protected the sector from the need to
innovate. However, in 1990 the selection of research priorities is increasingly decided
acording to market-centred criteria.
Within the superstructural subgovernment the shift has been markedly towards
science as part of national economic production with a movement away from science
policy allocation decisions made by small elite groups of scientists, organised on an ad
hoc basis, dictated by shifting subjective interests; to one in which a wide range of
actors from the subgovemments make decisions in agencies operating according to
mles specifically oriented to national economic production.
The fourth type of science policy orientation - that which sees science purely in
terms of business activity - had been expressed in the attentive public by actors
concemed with the commercialistion of research results but had not been more widely
adopted. Ideas underlying such a policy derive from neo-classical economics and
advocate minimal government intervention in the production of scientific knowledge.
Such policy advocates say that nations with medium level economies should
concentrate on using public funds to subsidise areas of research which are subject to
market failure. The criteria for selecting these areas should be decided by market
specialists and scientists, and the research should be undertaken under government
contract within privately managed research organisations.
The failure of significant actors in Australia to adopt such ideas before 1990 is
counterfactual to the thesis of this dissertation; namely, that ideas will be adopted by
significant actors only if their interests are served by so doing. The dependence of the
science system in Australia on the pohtical system has been such that the ideas of neo
classical economics have not been welcome in the science system. Significant actors
in the science system have chosen to be co-opted into techno-economistic agencies
rather than risk wiiming autonomy at the risk of unemployment.
Since 1990 significant actors in the political system have taken up these ideas.
The Liberal-National Party Coalition in Australia has absorbed some elements of a
market-centred orientation into their science policy proposals. This has been more
noticeable as election defeats and ALP Government science policy techno-economism
have marginalised the range of alternative policies. By 1993 the Coalition was
offering such policy innovations as:
• cutting general business taxation to boost investment in research and
development;
• allowing increased levels of plant and equipment depreciation to enable
technological upgrading;
• allowing capital gains relief to high technology companies undergoing
restructuring and/or reinvestment;
• contracting out public sector high technology and research and development
activities to the private sector;
• devolving more research responsibility to the States through CSIRO/
university 'research clusters';
• co-ordinating industrial and research priorities through the Prime Minister's
Science Council and allowing the process to be driven exclusively by the
research and business community.1^0
This policy would reduce the role of government in both the selection of
objectives for publicly-funded research, and the organisation of the way in which the
research is managed. The policy relies on spontaneousinvestment in innovation from
the business sector as a result of tax cuts. The dynamic to undertake research activity
comes not from governments but from the need to compete in deregulated markets.
The role of government would be to maintain research infrastructure and encourage
university/industry participation in research and training. There would be a strong
tendency for market centred science policy to revert to notions of science qua science
as scientists in public sector research organisations lobbied government to maintain
science as a nationalistic-cultural activity.i^^
This chapter has shown how ideas from the intemational and national attentive
publics have been adopted and adaptedby the Australian science policy community.
The ideas have been operationalised as sciencepolicy when they have fitted the need
of significant actors within the science policy community to control the rules and
resources of the production and application of scientific knowledge. The outcomes of
science policy are the allocation of public resources to the production of scientific
150 Guy Notch, 'Coalition unveils S&T Policy', Search, vol. 24, no. 2 March 1993, p. 41.
151 Between 1988 and 1993 only two sciencepolicy documents have been available on request from
tbe Liberal Party. One is a 4 page pamphlet entitled 'Science Policy: Preparing Today for
Tomorrow,' dating from 1989 when Warwick Smith was Shadow Spokesperson on Science and
Technology. The other is a copy of Peter McGauran's 1992 speech to the Committee for
Economic Development of Australia. It is therefore difficult to assess the internal contradictions
of the policy. Some are immediately apparent. For example, CSIRO 'core funding' would be
maintained at current levels at tbe same time that government research programs would be
contracted out to private sector research organisations.
Liberal & National Country Party, Science Policy: Preparing Todayfor Tomorrow, Liberal Party
of Australia, & National Party of Australia, Barton, ACT, 1989, p.l.
Peter McGauran, 'Commercialising Research and Development: Public and Private Sector
Interaction', Address to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, June 9 1992.
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knowledge; the restructuring of the science system as ideas about the organisation of
research change; the evaluation and selection of research projects; and the application
to economic production of the knowledge produced. These issues are discussed in the
next chapters.
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Chapter 4
The Organisation of the Science Policy Community
Science policy has been defined in ternis of actors with authority in specified situations
making decisions about policy outputs.^ This chapter uses the policy community
approach to identify and locate the key actors in the science policy community, to
examine the derivation of their authority, and the way in which they exercise power to
organise and re-organise the structures of science policy-making. Through such
control these actors can influence the membership of subgovernments and the ideas
underlying the allocation of resources and the organisation of the production of
scientific knowledge. The chapter uses Coleman and Skogstad's categories of policy
network, outlined in table 1.3 in chapter one, to trace the patterns of change in the
types of relationship occurring in the subscctors of the policy community through
time. Two dynamic principles underlie the changes. The first is fluctuations in the
economic context described in chapter two. The second is the exercise of influence
and power emanating from the ideological differences between the political system and
the science system; and from the ideas and resource dependencies which scientific and
political actors use to further their respective interests. The principles are concretised
in the structures and relationships of the policy networks and policy community, and
in the policy outcomes to be discussed in chapters five to eight.
1. The Science Policy Community
The science policy community exists within an arena of specialised knowledge,
responsibilities and functions. Actors within the policy community share a common
policy focus and, to a lesser extent and with varying degrees of influence, routinely
shapepolicy outputs and outcomes. They rangefrom individuals acting independently
to persons occupying positions in large public and private organisations. The same
individuals may also act in other policy communities. For example, the majority of
members of the Industrial Research and Development Board (IR&DB) are research
managers or executives of private firms and would therefore also act within the
industry policy community. The policy networks of science policy are the
relationships and patterns of interaction between particular sets of actors which form
around particular issues of concem to the policy community.
In many respects there are at least seven separate science policy communities in
Australia: defence; health; CSIRO; energy; higher education; primary industry; and
manufacturing industry; each with its own distinctive subgovemment, attentive public,
policy networks, and ways of controlling rules, ideas resources. There is a
considerable degree of multiple membership, mobility within and between the
Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, p, 119.
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subcommunities; and variation through time in the type of policy networks through
which they interact. This fragmentation makes the analysis of science policy an
exercise in identifying the degree of co-ordination among these sectors through time.
Therefore it is also necessary to examine what is here called th&supersectoral
subgovemment of decision-making, allocatory and advisory bodies and organisations
common to all sectors except health and defence research. The development of this set
of agencies is a significant structural change in all sectors of the policy community
except health and defence.
The following discussion of the science policy community in 1965 and 1990
will first examine actors and organisations in the attentive publics, both international
and domestic, who are often responsible for the introduction of ideas into the science
policy community. Figure 4.1 is a version of Pross's 'bubble diagram' adapted to
illustrate the organisational and individual actors in the science policy community in
1965.2 The diagram is limited by the incapacity to illustrate social space in a two
dimensional medium, but it does provide a guide to the discussions which follow.
2. THE International Attentive Public
In any technologically advanced society the scientific community identifies as much, if
not more with the international scientific community than it does with other sectors of
its own society. It is recognition by the international scientific community which
brings the rewards for scientific competence.^ Through such international science
publications as Science and Nature; by giving papers at intemational conferences; and,
increasingly, by announcing the creation of new knowledge through the general
international media, scientists seek the rewards of the global science system.
Intemational scientific interaction involves networks of organisational and individual
action which transcend national and sectoral boundaries and which define and
perpetuate the values and norms of the science system.
A network of science policy interaction has developed in parallel with the
intemational science system. The individuals and organisations participating in this
science policy network are prominent members of national science policy communities
and members of intemational organisations with special interests in science policy
such as the OECD or UNESCO. The network developed in the early decades of the
twentieth century among scientists concerned about the relationship between
governments and the production and use of scientific knowledge, but it was not until
the early 1960s that it began to develop as an organised activity.^ Since then the
network has grown in complexity and influence.
2 Ibid., p. 123.
2 Seethediscussion onMerton and Storer inchapter one.
4 Rose & Rose, 'The Incorporation ofScience', p. 21.
Figure 4.1: the science policy community in 1965
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2.1 The international attentive public in 1965
The 1960s have been described by Salomon as 'the golden age', and by Jevons as 'the
dreamtime', of science policy.^ The funding of science was relatively unproblematic
because of the significant contribution of scientific knowledge to the result of the
Second World War; the unquestioned ethos of economic and industrial expansion; the
continuing security threat of the Cold War; and the nationalistic fervour to gain
5 Fred Jevons, A Science Policyfor the 90s: Globalisation and Localisation, Institutute for Science
and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, 1989 [no page number].
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ascendency in space exploration.^ In the academic sector a growing body of
knowledge was developing in centres for the study of seience policy. For example,
the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) was set up at the University of Sussex in
the UK in 1966: '...in response to a growing awareness of the contributions which
science and technology could make to economic progress and improving the quality of
life'."^ The journal Minerva was launched to provide a medium for the dissemination
of papers concerned with science and soeiety.^ As discussed in chapter three, within
this international attentive public for science policy certain ideas were becoming
influential among politically active scientists and those who advised governments on
the allocation of public resources to the produetion of seientifie knowledge in the early
1960s.
2.2 The international attentive public and Australia in 1965
In 1965 the Australian scientific community was still very much a colonial offshoot of
the British seientifie eommunity. Many of the top scientists in Australia had been
trained by British scientists at Oxford and Cambridge who had been involved in the
debate about how science eould best serve society.^ In Australia in the 1930s there
had been a surge of interest in the relationship between science and society which
paralleled that in Britain but no science poliey specialists such as Blackett, Bemal or
Zuckerman had appeared. aNZAAS had loose associational conneetions with its
British and American counterparts. The AAS had a more explicit international role,
given in one of of nine objeetives in the Academy's Royal Charter:
To establish and maintain assoeiations and relations between Australian
scientists and the Intemational Scientific Unions and other international groups,
meetings and unions of seientists; and between Australian scientific activities
and the activities of scientists in other countries.
In 1965 the Commonwealth government funded this role of the AAS which was
(and still is) Australia's 'adhering organisation' to the International Council of
Scientific Unions, Since the late 1950s it had also been traditional for a Fellow of
^ Salomon, 'Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy', p. 56.
^ Geoffrey Oldham, 'Director's Introduction: SPRU at 25', in Science Policy Research Unit Annual
Report 1990-91, University of Sussex, 1990, p. 7.
® The Editor, Minerva, vol. 1, no. 1, Autumn 1962, pp. 5-17, p.5.
9 Ron Johnston, 'Social Responsibility of Science: The Social Mirror of Science', in The
Commonwealth ofScience: ANZAAS and the Scientific Enterprise in Australasia 1888-1988, ed.
Roy McLeod, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 308-325, p. 310.
In January 1939 at a meeting of ANZAAS in Canberra entitled Science and Society, the Chief
Executive of CSIR, Sir David Rivett, advocated that scientists in Australia could best serve the
interests of society by becoming involved in ' legislative and administrative areas'. Reported in
'Science and Society: Summary of the Contributions to the Discussion held by the ANZAAS
during its meeting at Canberra', The Australian Journal of Science, vol. 1, no. 4, 1939, pp. 116-
119, p. 117.
11 The Australian Academy of Science, The First Twenty-Five Years, The Australian Academy of
Science, Canberra, 1980, p. 212.
^2 The amount in 1965 was $88,000 (approx. $750,000 in 1990 values).
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the Academy to chair the Committee for Natural Sciences of the Australian
Commission for UNESCO. In 1972 the Natural Sciences Committee was restructured
so that:
Jointly with the Executive of CSIRO, the Academy was invited to forward a
panel of names to the Minister, who appointed the Committee. The result was a
greater number of Fellows on the Committee and a stronger voice for natural
science in the Commission. Since 1972, when these reforms were
implemented, the Academy's policies have been more influential in determining
the Government's briefs to its delegations to the UNESCO General
Conferences.
However, the predominant form of interaction in science policy issues was
through strong personal networks. Oliphant (see section 6.1 below) had been a
colleague of Zuckerman's at Birmingham University before the war and had
communicated with Blackett and Bernal.i^ He brought to the Australian science
policy community many relationships developed in the 23 years he had spent overseas
in such institutions as the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory at Berkeley, and the
Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge. Other prominent scientists had similar
connections, though none perhaps as influential in the post-war global science policy
arena as those of Oliphant. Oliphant was particularly influenced by the science policy
achievements of Sir Henry Tizard in Britain in setting up the Advisory Council for
Scientific Policy. 15 As mentioned in chpater 3, Zuckerman's influence was also
introduced through the ALP which at the time was preparing the first electoral platform
in Australia to address science policy issues. Morrison, Minister for Science in the
first Whitlam government, describes the process of writing the ALP Science Policy:
When we came to power in 1972 we had a very detailed set of science policy
recommendations in the federal platform. Science policy was very much the
flavour of the decade in the 1960s and a lot of it was derivative of Harold
Wilson's efforts in England.15
International connections in science policy in Australia in 1965 were therefore
confined to a narrow spectmm of opinion and advocacy emerging from the scientific
communities of Britain and, to a lesser extent, the USA. Australia was not yet a
member of the OECD and techno-economistic ideas were being introduced through
scientists' influence on both Liberal Party and ALP politicians. Contact was through
personal interaction with some formal representation of organised interests. There
was virtual autonomy from the state - indeed the state was dependent on the personal
Australia, Advance to Treasurer - Statement ofExpenditure, Parl. Paper 314, 1964-66, vol. V. p.
581.
13 TheAustralian Academy of Science, The First Twenty-Five Years, p. 133.
1^ Stewart Cockburn & David Ellyard, Oliphant, Axiom Books, Adelaide, 1981, pp. 131 & 134.
^5 M.L.E. Oliphant, 'Science and the Survival of Civilization', The Australian Journal ofScience,
vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 8-16,.pp. 10-11.
^5 Morrison, Interview, 1.11.89.
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connections of the scientific community for international input into science policy in
Australia. The policy networks of the intemational attentive public therefore fit
Coleman and Skogstad's category of clientele pluralism in which the state identifies
with, and is dependent on, the skills and information of organised interests. At this
stage in Australia's science policy those interests were professional (scientists) and
political (Whitlam) rather than industrial.
2.3 The international attentive public in Australia in 1990
In 1990 the number of organisations through which the state interacts with the
intemational scientific community is larger, covers a wider range of associational types
and is included as part of Australian intemational commercial activity. The interaction
is still fragmented, but the techno-economistic objectives of the state have imposed a
more formal stracture on relationships which are directed to socio-economic rather
than professional scientific ends. In 1990 the AAS is still representing Australia in
international science, as is AATSE which represents Australia on the Intemational
Council of Academies of Engineering and Technological Societies.
The Commonwealth govemment now represents Australian researchers directly
by promoting Australian science on a commercial as well as on a cultural and
educational basis. DlTAC's International Program is designed to make Australian
science, technology, industry and services more visible to potential overseas
customers and investors. The Australian Industry, Science and Technology
Counsellor Network, based in London, Washington, Tokyo, Bonn, Bmssels and
Paris is part of DlTAC's outreach activity designed to promote and maintain a two-
way flow of information between the host country and Australia on science and
technology policies and investments.DITAC is also responsible for overseeing
negotiations concerning the science and technology-based intemational multi-function
polis which is to be established near Adelaide. ^9
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade manages Australia's relations with
UNESCO and the OECD, and administers bilateral research agreeements. In 1991 the
former Minister for Science, Barry Jones was elected to the Executive Board of
UNESCO as part of the attempt to reform UNESCO programs. The Australian
International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) now not only organises
development assistance but has an entrepreneurial role in linking Australian innovation
with commercial interests in developing countries.
DEET has an International Division which works closely with the Higher
Education Division to promote international awareness of Australia's scientific
Ross, Interview, 3.5.1990.
1^ Scitech Technology Directory, pp. 30-31.
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, Annual Report 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra,
1991, pp. 79-93.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra, 1991, pp.
146-150.
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knowledge and research capabilities and thereby contribute to international
competitiveness and economic development.CSIRO's International Relations
program is similarly designed to advise the Chief Executive and Directors of such
matters and to provide information for a corporatepohcy which will facilitate CSIRO's
contribution to world science.^^
One area in which interaction is science-led rather than government-pushed is the
access for Australian scientists to multi-national consortia science facilities. In the
absence of govemment commitment to participationin such activities as the European
Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) or the Tsukuba synchrotron light source,
research organisations such as ANSTO, CSIRO, the ARC, the Australian National
University and the University of New South Wales have formed a consortium which
provides resources to ensure suchaccess.23
The way in which Australia participates in the international science policy
community has undergone a shift from an orientation to culturaland educational issues
to one focused prineipally on economic activity. Such techno-economistic interaction
is undertaken by scientists overseen by the political system rather than by the science
system. The dynamic underlying the interaction is of economic well being rather than
scientific recognition.
The policy networks which have developed do not exactly fit any of Coleman
and Skogstad's categories. They are not state-led because scientists still play an
integral role in policy formulation. They are not concertative because state and non-
state activity is fragmented and plurahstic. They are not clientelepluralistic or pressure
pluralistic because the state has assumed leadership in the direction of policy. The
closest fit is with the corporatist eategory in which consumer/producer groups
combine with govemment to negotiate better conditions: in this case for the globalised
commercialisation of Australian research. The prominent leadership role taken by the
state is balanced by the state's dependence on interest groups for commitment to policy
implementation. However, the corporatist networks are to a large extent sector-
specific without overarching co-ordination.
3. The Attentive Public
The attentive public is the most volatile part of the policy community with actors
moving in and out, to and from both the generalpublic and the subgovemment in line
with changes in their interests; their capacity to organise to promote and protect those
interests; the fit between their norms and values and the norms and values of the
dominant actors in the subgovemment; and the salience of those interests to the policy
objectives of dominantactors in govemment and non-government organisations. The
21 Department of Education, Employment and Training, Annual Report 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra,
1991, pp. 52-57.
CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia's Future, p. 139.
ASTEC, Major National Research Priorities: A National Program, AGPS, 1992, p. 6.
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attentive public is also the least cohesive part of the policy community. Members'
interests do not lie in maintaining consensus and keeping a relatively narrow policy
focus, but in broadening issues and action arenas to encompass policy areas in which
they have specific expertise or resources which cannot be ignored by the
subgovernment.24 The following section identifies the attentive public of Australian
science policy in 1965 and 1990.
3.1 The attentive public in 1965
The attentive public consisted of individuals in public and private agencies with an
interest in the relationship between governments and the scientific community.^5
Some elements of the attentive public were more closely integrated to the international
attentive public or the general public than they were to the science policy
subgovernment. With the exception of ANZAAS there were no organised interest
groups specifially oriented to the scrutiny of science policy and even ANZAAS'
interest waxed and waned. In 1962 the ANZAAS Sydney Jubilee Congress had
included a discussion on science policy centred around an article in th&Current Affairs
Bulletin which advocated a national science foundation and an advisory council on
science policy.^6 However, until 1970, when ANZAAS was re-organised and the
Australian Journal of Science became the more outward-looking5earc/i, ANZAAS'
contributions to science policy were limited to its Congress activities.^"^
A key concept of the policy community approach as outlined in chapter one is
that traditional political institutions are not the primary unit of analysis. Therefore
Parliament, which in some models of policy analysis would be a key agency stressing
responsible government, is, in the policy community approach, of interest only to the
extent that its decisions and advice significantly influence the policy process. In 1965
Parliament was not a forum for science policy formulation. There were no Standing
Committees on Science and Technology to oversee the reports of public research
organisations or scrutinise their activities. This was left to Ministers and individual
members. One CSIRO Division Chief reported: 'It is the despair of an increasing
number of scientists that there is little intelligent or informed discussion on science
from either side in Parliament'.^s The most significant debates on science policy
issues in 1965 centred on Menzies' presentation of the Martin Report, on
appropriations to CSIRO as part of the Budget debate and on the Second Reading of
the Meat Research Bill.29 On each occasion the Deputy Leader of the Opposition,
Pross, 'Group Politics and Public Policy, p. 122.
25 Davenport, 'The Impulse of Science in Public Affairs, 1945-1986', p. 86.
26 'Science in Australia', Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 7, August 13, 1962, pp. 99-112.
22 Davenport, 'The Impulse of Science inPublic Affairs, pp. 88-89.
2® Walter Boas (Chief, Division of Tribophysics, CSIRO), 'On being scientific'. The Australian
Quarterly, vol. XXXVIII, no. 2, June 1966, pp. 41-53, p. 52.
2^ Australia, House ofRepresentatives 1965, Debates, vol. HofR46, pp. 267-274; and
Debates, vol. H of R48, pp. 1859-2087;
Debates, vol. H of R 48, pp. 2597-2731.
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Gough Whitlam, used the opportunity to engage in rhetoric about the Government's
lack of plannedscience policy.^O
State governments straddled the boundary between the attentive public and
subgovernment. They financed research laboratories in State departments, made an
indirect contribution to research through university funding, and a direct contribution
for the first two years of the Australian Research Grants Scheme. They received
monies from the Commonwealth govemment in the form of special purpose payments
for such programs as agricultural extension services and the National Sirex Fund, but
it was the scientists at Commonwealth and State levels and not the State govemments
who controlled the direction and use of the research.^i
The Australian Viee-Chancellors Committee (AVCC) played a subdued role in
science policy formulation in the mid 1960s. The AVCC members were the most
powerful actors in the university system, and, as almost two-thirds of all university
departments in the 1960s were science-based, they wielded considerable influence
over rules, resources and ideas within the system. However, the AVCC was
perceived as a remote subgroup unwilling to tackle larger issues of higher education
policy reform and does not appear to have played a significant role as a body of
organisedinterests in science policy.32
University scientists were represented in 1965 by the Federation of University
Staff Associations (FAUSA) formed in 1960 after the Commonwealth govemment
assumed the major responsibility for funding universities. FAUSA was active in
presenting to the Minister the perspective of theuniversity researcher on sciencepolicy
issues. For example, in 1968 FAUSA submitted a Report on Research in
Universities.33 In 1974 the Association was asked by the Whitlam govemment to
respond to the OECD Examiners' Report at a meeting with the examiners in Canberra.
In 1975 FAUSA established a Science Policy Committee.
30 Whitlam was entirely expedient with regard to science policy. Heused every possible occasion in
opposition to regale the Government with the unimplemented recommendations of committees of
inquiry, in order to highlight the fact that the ALP had such a policy. When he became Prime
Minister in 1972 he appointed as Minister for Science and External Affairs, Morrison who had no
interest or experience in the science policy area and who, as an ex-Department of Foreign Affairs
bureaucrat, had far more interest in negotiating and administering the independence of Papua New
Guinea.
Similarly, his second science minister, Clyde Cameron, was bitterly disappointed at being forced
to resign the Labour and Immigration portfolio. At Yarralumla he told Sir John Kerr that he
could throw the science portfolio appointment document into the wastepaper basket.
Science policy is not mentioned in Whitlam's account of his governments.
Morrison, Interview, 8th November 1989.
Clyde Cameron, The Confessions of Clyde Cameron 1913-1990, ABC Books, 1990, pp. 219-
223.
The Whitlam Years 1972-1975, Viking, Sydney, 1986.
31 A more complete account of intergovernmental funding forscience is given in chapter 5.
32 A.E.Alexander, 'University Organization and Government: A Century Out-of-Date?', Australian
Journal of Science, vol. 27, no. 12, 1965, pp. 337-342, p. 341.
33 Anon, 'Report onResearch in Universities', Vestes, vol. XIII, 1970, pp. 295-297.
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At the periphery of the attentive public in science in 1965 were the non-
proximal, 'coal-face' scientists who sometimes treated politics with disdain. The
concerns that moved them to concerted action were threats to the universal image of
science rather than local concerns. In the mid 1960s the Vietnam war, pollution, and
the consequent disenchantment with science among the general public in Europe and
America, galvanised the normally passive scientific community into action.34 The
emergence of the Society for Social Responsibility in Science was not provoked by
local issues and failed to attract the commitment of many scientists once its immediate
cause - the war in Vietnam - was over. Johnston comments:
The history of this particular phase of the social responsibility of science reveals
a pattern commonly experienced in Australia, in both cultural and political
movements. Their origin is elsewhere, in Europe or the United States. The
ideas are transported, frequently by visiting academics, but if they find a fertile
environment in Australia, their flourishing will produce rapid mutation to
correspond with the special needs, interests and opportunities of the local
climate, but its foreign origin can also mean that it never effectively takes root,
and quickly withers and dies.35
3.2 The attentive public in 1990
In 1990 the attentive public has developed into an organised network of agencies
representative of the producers and users of scientific knowledge. There are some
agencies which have persisted since 1965 but the majority have been established in
response to the techno-economic ideology which developed in the 1970s and which
was intensified and legitimated by the Hawke govemment in 1983.
The AAS, which enjoyed significant informal input into science policy in 1965,
has lost its pre-eminence in the subgovemment and now must be considered simply as
a representative pressure group in the core section of the attentive public. Other
groups have emerged from the AAS because new techniques and ideas have
challenged the capacity of the AAS to encompass them in an organisation which
maintains its scientific integrity. For example, it was only in 1989 that the AAS
considered it necessary to establish a committee specifically to deal with science policy
issues. This Committee functions on the basis of weak associational interaction. It
does not usually meet. Its members follow science policy issues and communicate
their concems and proposals for action by fax.36
The informal, elite policy network which the AAS dominated is now secondary
to other networks. Figure 4.2 illustrates the emergence of key organisations.
24 They inserted full-page advertisements in theSydney Morning Heraldand theAustralian Journal
ofScience which denounced Australia's participation in a war which used science-based weapons
of destruction and offered their help in reversing the negative social and environmental effects of
the application of scientific knowledge.
22 Johnston, 'Social Responsibility of Science', pp. 315-318.
22 Ross, Interview, 3 5 1989.
Figure 4.2: The emergence of pressure groups from the AAS
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The scientific community pressure groups which have emerged from the AAS
regularly and significantly influence government policy andoccasionally participate in
the policy process. Their members exercise influence but the agencies themselves
must be considered only as the core group of the attentivepublic and not members of
the subgovemment.
The first of the groups, the Science and Industry Forum, was set up in 1967 as
part of an attempt by the AAS to stimulate the Gortongovernment to develop a more
rigorous science policy.37 In 1969 the Forum invited Fraser, as Minister for
Education and Science, to make the first major Coalition speech on science policy in
which he said:
We may then be wisestto continue ourpragmatic evolutionary approach seeking
advice from different people as different projects arise. In this way we can
establish a network of informal ad hoc relationships.38
In the previous year Prime Minister Gorton, for several years Minister-in-
Charge CSIRO, had made his famous remark about an advisory council being a
The initiative again came from Oliphant who wrote to the then President of the AAS, Sir
Mcfarlane Burnet, urging him to promote the establishmentof an 'Advisory Council on Scientific
Policy' based on the British model.
The Australian Academy of Science, The First Twenty-Five Years, p. 107.
3^ Fraser, 'Government Approaches toScience', p. 414.
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'...group of individuals pushing the barrow for their own disciplines.'39 Clearly
policy advisory councils were not part of conservative political ideology and this fitted
well the elite values of the current leadership of the AAS.
In 1976 the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering
(AATSE) was established in response to AAS intransigence on the issue of
broadening the Fellowship of the Academy to include scientists of excellence in the
applied sciences, particularly those employed in private sector research organisations.
The new Academy, which had been critical of the relationship between CSIRO and
the needs of industry, was immediately co-opted by the Eraser government into a
major enquiry into the organisation of CSIRO. Professor Howard Womer, who has
worked in all sectors of science over a forty-year career, and who is a Fellow of both
Academies says:
It really took the comments and the input from the AATSE that started moving
people in high places, particularly in CSIRO, [towards] the report into the
performance of CSIRO ...which for the first time stressed that taxpayers'
money should be spent on some goal that was of benefit to the community... .It
caused considerable ill feeling when the report first went out, but it became the
basis on which pressures built up in government to force changes in CSIRO and
led ultimately to the replacement in the Chair of CSIRO of a scientist by a
politician, or an ex-politician, Neville Wran. His role has been to keep pressing
throughout the whole structure of CSIRO for them to change their endeavours
to be more in common with the objectives of the AATSE, ie the application of
scientific and engineering knowledge to practical commercial purposes. That's
putting it in a nutshell. If you study the changes that have taken place in CSIRO
it really began with those studies. The first that really had the courage to say it
was that of the AATSE.'^o
Thus Eraser who in 1969 had eschewed the idea of intervening in the
relationship between science and industry, was forced by the realpolitik of techno-
economism, espoused by influential members of the attentive public, to change the
rules of the organisation of the production of science in public sector science agencies.
By 1984 this ideology of techno-economism, refined through the agency of the
Minister for Science, was threatening the interests, norms and values of scientists by
asserting state autonomy in the allocation of resources to science. Jones stung the
scientists into action by labelling them as 'wimps' because of their inability to
represent their interests to government other than by complaining after the event of
budgetary constraints. The AAS responded to this challenge by arranging a series of
meetings of scientists' representative organisations. The Federation of Australian
Scientific and Technological Societies (EASTS) was bom out of this confrontation.
EASTS quickly asserted itself as the flagship of the scientific community's
newly-found political purpose. In addition to working behind the scenes to influence
science policy decisions, EASTS used the print media to arouse public misgivings
39 Quoted in Encel, 'Pushing the harrow uphill', p. 21.
Womer, Interview, 3.11.89.
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about the Hawke Government's policies for science. ASTEC, through the initiative of
its then Chair, Professor Ralph Slatyer, also co-opted FASTS into an annual
'independent' scrutiny of the science and technology budget.^! FASTS claims to
represent the interests of 60,000 scientists in Australia, but, like most peak
associations, became a mouthpiece for the most vociferous and politically active in the
scientific community.^2 Its Executive Director has consistentlyexpressed pro-Liberal-
National Party opinions in his discussions of Hawke govemment science policy. This
led to the exclusion of FASTS from the policy process in 1993.43
The National Science and Technology Analysis Group (NSTAG) was
established in 1986 as the Science and Technology Societies' Budget Analysis Group.
It was an co-operative initiative of the AAS, the AATSE, FASTS and the Institution of
Engineers. Together they represent 100,000 scientists, technologists and engineers.
The Group analysed and evaluated Budget allocations to research and development
and presented their findings at a public fomm in November 1986. The aim of the four
parent organisations was to ensure a 'proper' input into the science and technology
budget.44
NSTAG is probably the most influential of the scientific community pressure
groups. The November post-Budget public fomm has become institutionalised and
scmtiny of the Budget now forms only a small part of the proceedings. Each of the
four parent organisations takes the responsibility of organising the Fomm around a
topic. The issues are discussed in sessions spread over two days and at the
concluding session a set of recommendations is formulated. In 1990, speakers from
public and private sector science organisations discussed ideas for the creation of
wealth by science and technology in Australia. In 1989 the Fomm had focussed on
the nature and role of innovation in the economy. The proceedings and papers of the
Forums are published each year and include a definite set of numbered
recommendations for govemment. A measure of the Group's influence is the number
of these recommendations adopted by government. Out of the 26 recommendations
41 T.F. Smith, 'More Facts on FASTS', Search, vol. 17, Nos 1-2, Jan-Feb, 1986, p. 13.
42 Dr Les Rymer, DITAC, challenges the claim of FASTS to represent all scientists in Australia.
He says that there is no two-way communication between scientists and the Executive of FASTS:
To my mind FASTS does'nt really represent its members. For example, I am a member of
scientific societies affiliated to FASTS but the only way I know what FASTS is doing is
through reading their press releases. FASTS is developing committee mechanisms to
develop views on issues but I doubt whether they are representative because FASTS interests
are centred on the higher education sector and do not represent the views of scientists in
industiy.
Rymer, Interview, 30.4.90.
43 See, for example: David Widdup, 'Politics is People', Search, vol. 21, no. 1,
January/February 1990, pp. 11-12, published shortly before the 1990 election; 'Five Years down
the FASTS Track', Search, vol. 21, no. 7. October/November 1990, pp. 227-229, p. 228;
'Science and Technology Meets the Juggemaut'5ea/-ch, vol. 22, no. 7, October/November 1991,
pp. 219-220; 'Reading the Schizophrenic Mind of Government', Search, vol. 20, no. 6,
November/December 1989, pp. 178-179.
44 Ditta Bartels, 'FASTS moves Quickly', Search, vol. 17, Nos 3-4, Mar-April 1986, p. 6.5.
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made in 1988, six have been implemented by the government in either the 1989, 1990
or 1991 Budgets.45
In 1988 young scientists in Canberra from CSIRO and ANU set up a pressure
group called Australian Science Action (ASA). They were concemed about reduced
funding to CSIRO; the consequent reduction in the number of research programs
which could be undertaken by the Organisation; and the likely reduction in staff
numbers. The restructuring of the system of allocating research resources in the
higher education sector, to areas designated to be of high national priority, were also
considered to be 'contentious issues heavily tainted by pohtical expediency'.
The ASA employed pressure group methods of political persuasion to influence
not only the Commonwealth government but also the leaders of science organisations
and agencies.45 ASA interacted with Parliament and the core executive through
lobbying, the presentation of submissions and personal contact. The group organised
a rally at the opening, by the Prime Minister, of the National Science and Technology
Centre in Canberra, which gained widespread media coverage. They invited speakers
from all political parties to present 'a balanced view' of science in society. In order to
gain the credibility of other scientists they attempted, and accomplished publication of
the results of their survey in Nature, the most prestigious journal in the international
scientific community. As a consequence, ASA was asked by the government to
comment on the findings of the Smith Report; on the structuring of the Research
Training Section of DEBT; and on the ARC funding of Research Fellows. They also
achieved intervention by senior Ministers into CSIRO human resources policy on
staffing structures.
In addition to scientists pressure groups there are 2500 industry and trade
asssociations which regularly lobby government on behalf of their member
organisations. Examples are the Australian Biotechnology Association, the Australian
45 They are: • anannual science and technology Budget statement;
• inter-departmental co-ordination of science and technology policy initiatives;
• increased co-operative research between industry, academia and public sector
organisations;
• increased stipends for post-graduate students;
• increased exemption from graduate tax for postgraduate students;
• a national fellowship scheme similar to the NH&RMC scheme;
• increased communication to industry of government R&D grants.
NSTAG, The Nature and Role ofInnovation in the Economy, 1988.
NSTAG, Science and Technology Creating Wealth for Australia, Report of the 1990 Forum, The
Institution of Engineers, Canberra, 1990, pp. 13-19.
45 Thebasic elements of theprocess are:
• writing letters to newspapers to gauge the extent of public reaction;
• circulating surveys among scientists with similar interests;
• assembling an empirically-based argument of the social value of scientists' interests';
• targetting sympathetic newspapers with press releases;
• securing interviews on current affairs television programs.
Morell, M., K. Hubick, & B. Wellington, 'Lobbying and Influencing Budget Processes', Paper
presented to the Public Affairs Conference Science and Society, ANU, 7-9 June, 1989.
45 This does notmean that the internationality of science is a phenomenon of recent history; in fact
the practice probably dates back to the foundation of universities in Europe in the 11th and 12th
centuries.
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Chemical Industry Council and the Australian Information Industry Association. This
organised politicisation of the science system is the most significant change in the
attentive public in the 1980S.4'' Pressure groups use the media extensively to engage
colleagues and the general public in debate about the issues which they see threatening
the norms and values of the scientific community.
The attentive public of science policy in Australia in 1990 confirms Pross'
observation that pressure groups are the agents of change and criticism in a policy
community. As individual and organisational actors criticise government action or
inaction they form pressure groups which may or may not be taken up by the
government to advise on policy matters. It is interesting in this respect that in both
1965 and 1990 a group of scientists within the attentive public chose to align
themselves with the opposition parties rather than the govemment. The difference is
that in 1965 the scientists who helped Whitlam to write the ALP's science policy
chose to remain anonymous, whereas in 1990 the FASTS executive were public in
their espousal of Liberal science policy.
4. The Subgovernment of Science Policy
Science is a policy arena which fits well Ripley and Franklin's observation that
subgovernments proliferate in complex, hidden areas of government.^s Until 1965
ideas and decisions about resources for the production and application of scientific
knowledge were confined to the sectoral subgovernments of the science policy
community. Interaction occurred through networks of clientele pluralism in which
separate groups within the science system assumed a policy advocacy role for their
particular set of policy issues and interacted individually with the state which depended
on their expertise, information and compliance. A superstructural subgovernment, of
actors with portfolio responsibility and actors who advised on science policy,
developed as science pohcy became economically, and therefore pohtically salient. By
1990 a corporatist superstructural subgovernment was located within one of the most
powerful central agencies of the Australian political system: the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet.
4.1 The sectoral subgovernments
Science policy in 1965 was formulated and implemented by a set of sectoral
subgovernments concerned with controlling the structures, ideas and resources of the
parts of the science system in which their interests lay. These subgovernments were
composed principally of scientists who decided the objectives of the science system
(defence excepted) and oversaw the organisation of scientific activity. Only in the
These and many other associations are listed in The Scitech Technology Directory compiled by
Jane Ford.
Ripley, & Franklin, 'The Nature of Policymaking in the United States', p. 53.
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rural sector was there any user involvement in these issues. There was no overarching
mechanism for intersectoral co-ordination.
4.1.a Higher education
The participation of the higher education scientificcommunity in science policy relates
to the two broad functions of the higher education system in the production of
scientific knowledge: namely, the conduct of research and the training of scientists. In
1965 the Minister-in-Charge, Commonwealth Activities in Education and Science
received advice on research in higher education from the Australian Universities
Commission (AUC) of which Sir Leslie Martin was Chair. From 1959 this agency
had been responsible for Commonwealth government funding for universities and
since 1961 had separated general funds from research funds."^^
Although the Commission did not intervene in the selection of research areas by
individual universities it exercised power through its control of the way in which the
university system was structured and of the ideas underlying the organisation of
research. Funds for research were divided between the AUC and the Australian
Research Grants Committee (ARGC) in a ratio of 3:2.^0 Both the AUC and the
ARGC had virtual autonomous control over the allocation of both human and financial
resources for research: the ARGC on the basis of 'scientific excellence' to individual
researchers and the AUC on the basis of 'comparative general level of postgraduate
activity' to individual universities. Within the universities the funds were usually
distributed by autonomous Grants Committees.
The allocation of funds was subject only to Ministerial approval with both
agencies reported directly to the Minister. The AUC hada prescribed role in advising
the Minister on science policy issues within the higher education system; the ARGC
considered that it did not, professing a steadfastly traditional attitude of scientific
political neutrality andorganisational autonomy. Fraser, as Ministerfor Education and
Science in 1969, was unsuccessful in trying to persuade the then Chair of the ARGC,
Rutherford Robertson, that 'the national interest' should be included as one of the
criteria for successful grant applications.The situation was one of clientele
pluralism in which the state is dependent on the skills and expertise of organised
interests. The ideology of the science system prevailed over techno-economism in the
rules governing university research.
4.1.b Higher education in transition
Until 1987 there were two predominant characteristics of the subgovemment of higher
education research policy. The first was the stability of the structures of policy-
making in the sector. The second was the division of responsibility for research in the
49 Ibid., p. 353.
Australian Universities Commission, Third Report, Parl. Paper 330, Canberra, 1964-66, p. 66.
5^ Johnston & Buckley, 'The shaping of contemporary scientific insitutions', p. 387.
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universities between the agencies of higher education administration and smaller,
isolated granting systems. The situation changed in 1987 with the establishment of the
Australian Research Council as the principal agency of higher education research
policy and a concomittant re-organisation of the rales and resources of research.
In 1972 the Department of Education and Science was divided into two separate
departments and responsibility for higher education research was split between two
portfolios. The AUC became part of the Department of Education and the ARGC
became part of the Department of Science. The ARGC continued to demonstrate an
explicit, reactive rather than proactive pursuit of excellence across all disciplines
despite a 1974 OECD recommendation that the ARGC should take a more proactive
role in identifying certain fields of science for 'special care and concentrated
financing'.52, 53
The proposed widening of the functions of the ARGC to include policy advice
on areas of research priority was not implementedby the Eraser governments. Instead
other agencies were beginning to develop policy initiatives in the higher education
research system. The AVCC and CSIRO, prompted by the tightening of resources in
1976, were echoing the call of the OECD Examiners that there should be more co
operation between research organisations in both the public and private sectors in the
use of resources for research. In 1977 the AVCC announced in a submission to
ASTEC that it had proposed the establishment of a joint committee with the CSIRO
Executive to, among other concerns: '...consult with ASTEC in advising government
on major aspects of science policy'.54 The committee never achieved government
recognition and the subgovernment functioned 'in virtual isolation' from other
governmentagencies until 1986.55
This allowed the ARGC to continue its policy of scientific autonomy and to
sidestep ministerial pressure through such statements as the following:
The ARGC considers it has a relevant advisory role to play in assisting the
government to pursue its policies. This role is expressed directly in its
statement on research strength among applicants from Australia's tertiary
institutions.56
Another indicator of the ARGC's apolitical ethos is its passive role in the
establishment of the Key Research Centres in 1982. In 1979 Johnston noted the
rigidity of the institutions for the allocation of resources to science and suggested that
some funds should be set aside by the ARGC or the CTEC for the promotion of
52 With theexception that, in 1972, Eraser, asMinister forEducation, hadfor thefirst time directed
the ARGC to allocate a small amount of the triennial funds to 4 priority areas of research.
53 OECD, Examiner's Reporton Science and Technology in Australia, 1974, p. 31.
54 ASTEC, Science and Technology in 1977-78, vol. lA, p. 86.
55 Marshall, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the Demise of the Tertiary Education Commission',
Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. XLVII, no. 1, March 1988, pp. 19-34 , p. 20.
55 ARGC, Report on Grants Approvedfor 1985, Parl. Paper 123, Canberra, 1984, p. 6.
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excellent mission-oriented science.57 In 1981 a Commonwealth Centres of Excellence
Research Committee was set up and advised the Minister that ten Centres of
Excellence should be established and administered not by the ARGC but by the
University Council of CTEC under the Commonwealth Special Research Centres
Program.58
The higher education science policy subgovernment in 1983 was therefore
divided both between agencies and over control of the ideology of scientific
excellence. It was loosely integrated with other science policy subgovernments
through informal networks and the co-membership of key agencies. These agencies
formed a spectrum of influence and control of the system from the broad, highly
political macro-level actions of ASTEC, through to the narrow scientific expertise and
funding influence at the micro-level interactions of the ARGC sub-committees.
The incoming Hawke government decided to restructure higher education
research. The re-organisation of the ARGS scheme was foreshadowed in comments
by the Minister for Education at the review meeting of the OECD Examiners in
Canberra in 1985, despite the opposition of researchers who favoured the current
pluralistic system of funding.59 In May 1985 ASTEC responded to a government
request for advice by recommending that higher education research funding should be
more direct, should be increased by at least 25 per cent, and should be co-ordinated
into one statutory agency which should report directly to theMinister for Science.^o
In 1986 the ARGC was restructured into the Australian Research Council
(ARC); in 1987 the ARC became part of the Department of Education, Employment
and Training; and in 1988 CTEC and the binary system of higher education in
Australia was abolished and re-organised as the National Board of Employment,
Education and Training (NBEET) and the Unified National System. CTEC had
lobbied the Minister for Education to have the ARC as a standing committee within its
own structure, but this was vigourously opposed by DITAC and Finance who wished
to gain control of the ARC funds and who branded CTEC as incompetent in the
allocation of research funds.^i
NBEET is not a statutory authority and has an advisory rather than a managerial
role. ASTEC had not recommended any major changes to the system of
administration in higher education but had simply advocated a more corporate style of
management in order to increase the efficiency and accountability of the use of
R. Johnston, 'Political, Administrative and Policy Aspects of Science and Technology', in
Science and Technology for What Purpose?: An Australian Perspective, ed. A.T.A. Healy,
Australian Academy of Science, 1979, pp. 97-102, pp. 101-102.
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, Report for the Triennium 1982-84, vol. 3,
Parl. Paper 220, Canberra, 1982, pp. 72-73.
OECD, Examiners' Report 1985, p. 113.
ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance of Australia's Universities and Other Higher
Education Institutions, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, pp. 5-11.
^1 Marshall, 'Bureaucratic Politics and theDemise of theTertiary Education Commission', p. 31.
1.
research funds. In 1987 DEBT released a Green Paper on the restructuring of higher
education, and in 1988 this was followed by a policy statement claiming, on the basis
of 600 written responses and numerous consultations, overall agreement with the
basic objectives of the govemment for the highereducation system.62
The decision of the Minister to re-structure the system has been explained by
Williams as the result of the displeasure of the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC)
over the public lobbying of CTEC for increasing funds at a time when the govemment
wished to project an image of decreasing public spending;63 and by Marshall as the
result of bureaucratic ambition to control greater areas of policy resulting from the
culture of corporate management introduced into the Commonwealth Public Service by
the Hawke govemment.^ 4
From a policy community perspective it is a classic example of the concertation
of policy networks in which state decision-making is concentrated in a single agency
for the sector. The capacity of the existing higher education subgovernment to
negotiate the available mles and resources had served the autonomy-seeking ideology
of the science system well. It also fitted the conservative ideologies of the Eraser
government which was loth to establish new policy agencies. The gap between
political rhetoric and policy reality appeared in the early 1980s when the demands of
clientele and government exceeded the capacity of the ARGC to accommodate both.
Consequently, the core executive exercised its power of veto and reduced the
autonomy of the higher education subgovernment. The situation was not one of a
state-led network because organised interests in the form of ASTEC were directly
involved in policy formulation.
4.1.C CSIRO
CSIRO is not an analytical category in the same sense as 'rural industry' or
'manufacturing industry', but the importance of the Organisation in Australian
scientific activity, and the concomittant influence of its senior scientists warrant its
inclusion as a sectoral subgovemment of Australian science policy. What is under
consideration here is the changing pattem of influence exerted by CSIRO on science
policy rather than the scientific activities of the Organisation.
In 1965 the administrative stmcture of CSIRO was that of a nine-member
Executive, five of whom were scientists and one of whom was the Chair appointed by
the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister in Education and Research.66 The Chair
Department of Employment, Education and Training, Higher Education: A Policy Statement,
AGPS, 1988, p. 3.
^3 Bruce Williams, The 1988 White Paper on higher education'. The Australian Universities
Review, vol. 31, no. 2, 1988, pp. 2-8, p. 7.
^4 Marshall, 'Bureaucratic Polities', pp. 22-23.
The changing pattem of scientific activity in CSIRO is discussed in chapter 6.
D.T.C. Gillespie, 'Research Management in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization, Australia', Public Administration, (Sydney), vol. 42, Spring 1964, pp.
11-31, p. 18.
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was always the most senior CSIRO scientist: indeed, until 1989 all the Chairs (and
later Chief Executives) of CSIRO had spent the majority of their careers within the
Organisation.67 The Chair of the Executive was also the Chair of the Advisory
Council, a body of State representatives which advised the Minister on the role of
CSIRO. The functions of the Executive were concerned with advising the Minister on
the policy and work of the Organisation, and on the appropriation and allocation of
funds necessary for that work. The powers and functions of the Organisation were
concerned with:
• the conduct of research for the promotion of primary and secondary industry;
• the training of scientific research workers;
• the establishment and awarding of scholarships;
• grant-making for pure science;
• the recognition of research associations and the granting of monies to them;
• the collection, publication and disseminationof scientific information;
• the testing andstandardisation of industrial scientific instruments.68
The Organisation, and in particular the Chair, therefore had considerable power
over the conduct of research in Australia. The formal powers were strengthened by
the underlying assumption that sciencecould only flourish when unencumbered by the
control of non-scientists. This principle extended to the selection and expectations of
administrators. As Gillespie (himself an Assistant Secretary to the Executive)
explains:
In CSIRO the position of Chief must be occupied by a man who has himself
established a reputation in scientific research and who is capable of determining
scientific policies and appreciating the requirements and conduct of research.
...The Chief, therefore, has almost complete freedom to manoeuvre. If a new
development is of such magnitude as to go beyond his resources, he has
recourse to central office which, with the co-operation of the Treasury,
maintains an equally flexible attitude to theoverall vote.69
Similar ideas were expressed when the Chair of CSIRO, Sir Frederick White,
responding to a suggestion by R. S. Parker that governments should plan research
activities, made it clear that no such 'interference' had occurred during his term of
office:
We cannot proceed, of course, unless we have money and this involves the
support of the Minister, so that his authority is concerned in that way in the first
instance. As far as his requiring us to do something, all I can say is that the
Ministers we have had have been rather sensible people. I don't think that there
is one instance where the government has come along to us and said, we require
you to do research in this field; it would of course be rather an odd thing for a
government to do...
67 Within CSIRO the Chair was always referred to as 'the Chief. This nomenclature was also
adopted at divisional level where the most senior scientist was, and still is 'the divisional chief.
6® Science and Industry Research Actno. 13 of 1949, Section 9.
6^ Gillespie, 'Research Management in CSIRO', pp. 19 & 30.
70 SirFrederick White, 'Administrative Problems in theDevelopment of Scientific Research', Public
Administration (Sydney), vol. XXVII, no. 2, June 1968, pp. 113-140, p. 139.
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Nor should private industrial interests be involved in directing the activities of
scientists. In his 1964 Presidential Address to ANZAAS White had given his opinion
that scientists were more capable than industrialists of deciding which scientific
knowledge should be developed for economic production.''^ Casey had expressed
similar views in 1948.''2
The subgovemment of CSIRO in 1965 therefore consisted of a closed policy
network of the type described by Coleman and Skogstad as concertation in which a
long-established, single agency has a monopoly over decision-making in its policy
arena, in this case the relationship between the science system and economic
production. In concertation networks organised interests are similarly represented by
a single association. The Chair of CSIRO had control of both the Organisation and its
advisory body of organised interests and was subject to minimal ministerial scrutiny.
In 1965 CSIRO dominated the non-military, non-nuclear, science system in Australia
and through its statutory obligations controlled the research - economy interface.
4.1.d CSIRO in transition
In 1966 the CSIRO Executive moved from Melbourne to Canberra in order to be
closer to the processes of government, but, paradoxically, its influence in science
policy was to be diluted by changing ideology in both the political system and the
science system.The AAS was proposing an independent advisory committee which
would challenge CSIRO's dominance of resource allocation in scientific activity. In
response CSIRO continually disrupted efforts to consolidate opinion in the preparation
of a Cabinet submission on the issue:
Throughout the development and extensive consultation processes associated
with the preparation of a cabinet submission, CSIRO consistently sought not so
much directly to oppose as to use the full range of bureaucratic techniques to
divert, refer back, and seek wider consideration.'''^
In order to force some degree of co-operation within the subgovemment Eraser sent
the Secretary of the Department, (later Sir) Hugh Ennor and the Chair of CSIRO to
Europe together on a mission to collect information about governmental science policy
machinery.''5
^1 White, 'The Strategy of Australian Science', p. 194.
He speaks of:
...giving well-equipped scientific workers freedom to roam at will over the spheres in which
they have specialised, so enabling them to extend the frontiers of their sciences in every
direction that promises new knowledge.
Casey, Double or Quit, p. 47.
Ironically, Shedvin sees the move as the beginning of the end for the 'golden age of scientific
autonomy',
Schedvin, 'The Culture of CSIRO', pp. 86-87.
In August 1992, the Chairman of CSIRO, Professor Adrienne Clarke, announced that CSIRO
headquarters would be moving back to Melboume.
Johnston & Buckley, 'The shaping of contemporary scientific insitutions', p. 386.
''5 Ibid., p. 388.
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Whitlam, through his political rhetoric of the late 1960s, upheld the role of
CSIRO in science policy formulation. CSIRO would be a member of an Australian
Science Council as well as acting as an 'operational' organisation acting autonomously
to implement policies formulated by the Council.'^ ^ However, when the ALPformed
the government in 1972 responsibilty for CSIRO was placed with the Minister for
Science, William Morrison, who was not a scientist and had taken no part in writing
the ALP science policy.
The CSIRO Executive baulked at having to interact with a junior Minister, but
took even greater exception to having to negotiate with the Minister through Secretary
Ennor even though he was a scientist. Morrison recounts:
Then we had CSIRO which for long time had been an authority unto itself and I
don't think that they were all that keen on having a Department of Science, and
certainly there were a lot of difficulties in bringing them into the relationship.
They didn't want to work through the Secretary of the time and that was OK
and so they reported directly to me andI kept both sides informed."^"^
Morrison found himself between CSIRO: '...which [was] an enormously
competentpiece of political bureacracy not terribly anxious to have a review' and the
Department of Science which he described as 'failed scientists and incompetent
bureaucrats'.^^ He wanted a source of information and advice about science policy
independent of CSIRO. Australia had just become a member of the OECD and
Morrison's solution was to call in the Science Division of the OECD as a neutral
observer and to commission a report on public sector research and development as part
of theRoyal Commission onAustralian Government Administration (RCAGA).'^ ^
The OECD Examiners' Report and the Report of the Science Task Force of the
RCAGA were the first external reviews of CSIRO's role since 1948. The Science
Task Force recommended that the Executive of CSIRO should be allowed greater
flexibility in formulating science policy:
Accordingly,we recommend that the Executivebe reduced to three full-time and
two part-time members; and that the structure of CSIRO be decentralized so as
to leave the Executive free to concentrate on projecting (in consultation with
ASTEC and other appropriate bodies and individuds) the scientific needs of the
nation, deciding CSIRO's part in meeting these needs, coordinating and
allocating resources accordingly andmaintaining standards.^^
The Science Task Force's Report was released shortly before the election of the
Eraser government in December 1975 and Eraser decided that a more complete
Whitlam, 'A National Science Policy', p, 135.
Morrison, Interview, 8th November 1989
Ibid..
79 Ibid..
RCAGA, Science Task Force, Towards Diversity and Adaptability, p. 61.
153
investigation of CSIRO's role in Australian scientific activity was required.^! The
ensuingBirch Report recommended enlarging the Executive; separating the Chairship
of the Executive and the Advisory Council; and strengthening the role of the Advisory
Council in order to make CSIRO researchers more responsive to user needs. The
Report also recommended that: 'CSIROshould not includein its role the obligation to
provide advice to government on broad scientific and technological policy'.^^
However, the Report did recommend that the relationship between CSIRO and
Commonwealthgovernment departments shouldbe moreformally structuredto enable
a better fit between CSIRO programs and government policies.xhe ensuing re
organisation was gradually implemented over several years.
The next major change for CSIRO occurred as a result of the 1985 OECD
Review of National Science and Technology Policy. The Examiners criticised CSIRO
for continuing:
• a bias to basic reseaieh;
• a bias to rural research;
• a tendency to avoid interaction with other institutions;
• encouraging researchers with an orientation to science in general rather
than to the benefits theirwork couldproduce for Australia.84
While none of these criticisms relates directly to science policy-making, the fact
that they were still relevant eight years after the Birch Report indicates an
unwillingness by the CSIRO subgovemment to implement the policy objectives of the
Eraser and Hawke Governments. The solution proposed by the OECD involved the
corporatisation of the CSIRO Executive. This was seconded by ASTEC which
recommended the creation of an Executive Board with eight Directors and a part-time
Chair. xhe head of the Organisation was to be a Chief Executive with experience
outside CSIRO, and the heads of the industry-sector-oriented Institutes were to be
giventhe status of Directors withtheconcomittant financial responsibilities.^^ These
changes indicate a shift in the type of policy network from concertative to corporatist
81 He commissioned a Professor of Organic Chemistry at ANU; a former Chairman of the
Melhourne Stock Exchange; and the Chairman of Comalco and Hammersley Holdings to
undertake an independent inquiry into CSIRO.
Australia, Independent Inquiry into CSIRO, Report, August 1977, p. 146.
82 Mozley Moyal disagrees with this interpretation. Reporting the changes to theCSIRO Executive
she says:
However, it will no longer perform its historically accepted function of providing advice to
Government on hroad scientific and technological policy - a role now seen as devolving on
the broad national shoulders of the Australian Science and Technology Council.
Mozley Moyal,'The Effect of Institutional Evolution on Science Policy', p. 71.
83 Ihid.,p. 150.
84 OECD, Reviews ofNational Science and Technology Policy: Australia,1985, p. 52.
85 ASTEC, Future Directionsfor CSIRO, AGPS, Canberra, 1985, p. 8.
86 Theactual structure was designed byMcKinsey Associates.
Keith Boardman, 'Changes in R&D: too far or not enough?. Paper presented to the ANZAAS
Centenary Congress, University of Sydney, 1988.
154
as non-government actors were co-opted by the government to ensure the
implementation of subgovemmental strategyfor CSIRO.
In 1986 the Science and Industry Research Act 1949 was substantially amended
without specific statutory definition of a policy role for the Organisation. In 1988 the
Minister for Science, who had retained portfolio responsibility for CSIRO within
DITAC, issued a set of eleven guidelines under Section 13 of the Science and Industry
Act. The guidelines effectively determine that CSIRO's function is to conduct
research in accordance with the priorities of the govemment and to ensure effective use
of its resources. There is no mention of the provision of advice on science policy to
the government. In 1990 the science portfolio was moved into the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet but CSIRO stayed in DITAC illustrating the shift to an
industrial focus for the Organisation and accentuating its loss of influence over science
policy.
Thus one of the major transitions in the organisation of science policy between
1965 and 1990 has been the displacement of CSIRO as the principal actor within the
science policy community. From its position of de facto predominance the
Organisation is now the primus inter pares of research organisations and its role in
deciding the direction of research in Australia has been diminished by the advent of a
multiplicity of advisory agencies. The transition was only achieved when there was a
fit between political ideology in the form of govemment objectives for the science
system and the political will to restmcture the Organisation, despite the influence of the
CSIRO subgovemment.
4.1.e Manufacturing
In the early 1960s the Menzies Government's attitude to research in manufacturing
industry was classically laissez-faire. Decisions about research directions for
manufacturing industry were left to CSIRO divisional chiefs, the leaders of industrial
firms, and scientists in universities who sometimes undertook research funded by
local industries. Industrial leaders generally preferred to lobby govemment for tariff
protection ratherthan for innovation subsidies.^® Thisbegan to change in 1965 as the
govemment came under pressurefrom industry to subsidise researchin manufacturing
industry.
The most significant actors in the manufacturing industry science policy
subgovemment were The Institution of Engineers, the Australian Industry Research
Group (AIRG) the Industrial Research Study Group (IRSG), the Minister for Trade
and the Treasury. In 1963 the Institution, not the govemment, had appointed a
Research and Development Committee to assess the research needs of manufacturing
CSIRO, Annual Report 1987-88, CSIRO Public Affairs, Canberra, 1988, p. 10.
^^ Nevile, The DisasterofPrivate Sector Research andDevelopment inAustralia, p. 6.
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industry in Australia. Similarly the IRSG was established by sectors of
manufacturing industry concerned about the lack of innovation and the need for
information on the issue of research in manufacturing industry. These two groups
interacted with the Manufacturing Industries Advisory Council (MIAC) - an agency
established by The Department of Trade to advise on ways of developing
manufacturing industry in Australia.
The MIAC commissioned a survey of businesses to find out what research was
being done, what barriers existed and how government could help minimise the
difficulties.90 The MIAC recommended a 200 per cent tax deduction for research and
development activity in private firms but this was vetoed by 'Treasury and Taxation
authorities'.^! fhe MIAC's recommendation was endorsed by the Vemon Committee
which received submissions recommending tax concessions from both the MIAC and
the IRSG.92
The Holt government decided to act on the advice of Treasury rather than the
manufacturing subgovemment of the science policy community (a nice example of the
influence of the executive core - see section 5 below) and in 1967 introduced a grants
scheme instead of an incentive scheme based on tax deductions. The scheme was
administered by a Board of three and an Advisory Committee consisting of four
private sector representatives and four managers of public sector research agencies.
The Act stipulated that the Chair of the Board must always be from the private sector.
The MIAC had continuing influence through its Chair, Sir James Vemon, who was
consulted by Eraser, as Minister for Science and Education, over the composition of
the proposed Advisory Council on Science and Technology, and who was a member
of the Australian University Commission.93
In 1965 the manufacturing industry subgovemment consisted of policy
networks in which sectoral interests existed in a weak assoeiational system. An
autonomous state, in the form of the Commonwealth govemment, had traditionally
chosen not to impose a defined policy upon the weakly-organised interests assuming a
policyadvocacy role. '^! The policynetwork was therefore one of pressure pluralism.
4.1.f Manufacturing in transition
In the 1970s manufacturing industry research came under increasingly intense
govemment scrutiny as the fall in commodity prices and the Whitlam Govemment's
tariff policies highlighted the deficiencies of industrial innovation in Australia.
Organised interests in the seientific community outside CSIRO and the AAS began to
L.P. Coombes, 'Research and Development in the Manufacturing Industries of Australia', The
Journal of The Institution of Engineers, vol. 37, no. 6, June 1965, N40-N44.
Peter Stubbs, Innovation and Research, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne 1968, p. 173.
^! Coombes, 'Research and Development in the Manufacturing Industries ofAustralia', N43.
92 Australia, Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report May 1965, p. 425.
93 Johnston & Buckley, 'The shaping of contemporary scientific insitutions', p. 388.
94 Coleman &Skogstad, Policy Communities andPublic Policy in Canada, pp. 27-29.
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question the relevance of scientific work undertaken by government research
establishments. Leading scientists in such firms as BHP and ICI Australia openly
criticised the MacMahon government for its lack of action.^s The Whitlam
government initiated examinations into the issue by the OECD and a special Science
Task Force of the Royal Commission of Australian government Administration.^^
The two enquiries, while disagreeing widely on the normative criteria for optimal
relations between government and industry in science, agreed that more government
research should be contracted out to private laboratoriesin order to enhance industrial
interests' appreciation of the benefits of domestically-generated innovation over the
importing of technical know-how.97
The Erasergovemment was in powerby the time that the findings of the Reports
had been digested by the science policy community. Eraser, as a former Ministerfor
Education and Science, was familiar with the policy arena and its issues. He chose to
restructure the existing incentives scheme rather than to change the relationship
between the public and private sectors of the science system. The new Australian
Industrial Research and Development Incentives Scheme (AIRDIS) operated from
1976 to 1986 and was unusual at the time because the legislation included a 'sunset'
clause which required review of the scheme after five years.
However, the revamped scheme was not effective. The 1977 ASTEC Report
found that research in manufacturing industry had diminished due to lack of
government incentives. Again the Eraser government's response was an ad hoc
expansion of the AIRDIS scheme, and a shuffling of portfolio responsibility for
manufacturing research and development.^s It was not until 1980 that AIRDIS was
brought into the same portfolio as CSIRO, and therefore under the same
See, for example, L.W. Davies, 'Federal Policy for Industrial Research And Development in
Australia', Search, vol. 3, no. 11-12, November-December 1972, pp. 423-426, p. 425;
Ward, R.G. 'Science and Industry', Search, vol. 3, no. 4, October 1972, pp. 371-375, p. 374;
W.I. Wbitton, 'An Industrialists's View', Search, vol. 3, no. 6, June 1972, pp. 212-216, p. 215.
96 OECD, Examiner's Reporton Science and Technology inAustralia;
RCAGA Science Task Force, Towards Diversity and Adaptability.
97 The OECD Examiners found that:
.. .as a rule the contacts between these three sectors are still only sporadic and often confined
to personal relationships (p. 22)....barriers of a cultural or psychological nature [exist]
between the academic world and the world of industry.
Whereas the Special Task Forcequoted froma recentUK Science Research Council Report and
offered their endorsement:
"...success (in collaboration) depends strongly on the compatibility of the individuals in
contact, and their enthusiasm for the project. Clearly defined objectives and responsibilites
are important, but rank second to satifactory human relationships."...We agree.In our
experience of collaborative activites, personal relations between individuals are of the essence
(p. 79).
98 Fromits inception in 1967 until 1983 the scheme was administered by the following portfolios:
• Trade and Industry 67-72;
• Secondary Industry 72-74;
• Manufacturing Industry 73-75;
• Industry and Commerce 75-76;
• Productivity 76-80;
• Science and Technology 80-83.
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subgovernmental influence.99 The then Minister for Seience and Technology,
Brigadier David Thompson, was 'increasingly influential in a quiet way' in the
portfolio by organising seminars between industry leaders, department officials and
scientists about the process of innovation. lO® Nevertheless, he put the onus firmly
back onto industry to take the initiative in producing scientific knowledge for
innovation. 101
Thompson also increased the size of the AIRDIS Board from five to nine
members (all new members being industry representatives), widened the powers of
the Board to include advice to the Minister and public relations with the industrial
research and development community, and gave the Board responsibillity for inter
departmental eo-operation in manufacturing research. These changes were
implemented against a background of almost continuous enquiries into technological
and scientific activity in Australia, Against such a barrageof demands for action
some changes were wrought, but in a way befitting the conservative political ideology
of the Fraser government; that is, by minimising the establishment of new agencies of
seience policy for manufacturing industry, and re-structuring the existing agencies,
particularly the advisory councils.
The election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 was on a Party Platform
which included 67 propositions about the way in which scientific knowledge should
be produced and used in manufacturing industry Australia. The 13 guiding policy
principles included thepromise of a 'pluralist approach' to deciding between 'old' and
'new' industries and declared that: 'Major decisions should be made after considerable
public debate and not left to expert, professional elites operating in isolation.'^ 04 in
the manufacturing industry sectorthis principle was effected by convening a National
Technology Conference; by establishing a Public Relations Committee as part of
99 An indication of theperceived separateness of CSIRO from scienee andtechnology policy is that,
despite comprehensive descriptions of suchresearch agencies as the Antaretie Division and the
Bureau of Meteorology, which were now ineluded in the Departmentof Seience and Technology,
the Annual Report 1980-81 eontains no reference to CSIRO heyond a marked hox on the
organisational flowehart.
too Neville Hurst, 'Government SciencePoliey: Future Direetions and Lessons from History', Paper
given at the University of Melbourne, 4.6.85, p. 6.
Department of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Statement 1980-81, AGPS,
Canheixa, 1980, preface (no page number).
102 The 1985-86AIRDIB AnnualReport lists 10 significant reports between 1978and the fall of the
Fraser Government in 1983. They are:
1978, 79, 80 & 83 various ASTEC Reports;
1979 Auditor-General's Audit of AIRDIS;
1979 Crawford Study Group on Structural Adjustment;
1979 Senate Standing Committee on Seienee and the Environment;
1980 Committee of Inquiry into Teehnologieal Change in Australia;
1980 Newton, Johnston & Smythe, The Effectiveness of Government Support
for Australian Industrial Research and Development;
1983 lAC Report on Certain Budgetary Assistance to Industry;
Ihid., p. 13.
1112 Johnston, 'Australian Seience Poliey: Nowwe can steer, where do we wantto go?',p. 21.
1114 Australian Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rulesl9S2, pp. 147-148.
105 Policy ideas emerging from theNational Technology Conference arediscussed in chapter 3.
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the AIRDIS structure; by appointing as AIRDIB Chair an expert in management; and
by re-defining the role of the Board.
After the National Technology Conference of 1983 the Department of Science
and Technology circulated a Draft Technology Strategy incorporating the whole
spectmmof activities in science and technology frombasic research to the provision of
venture capital.The National Technology Strategy was acclaimed by Sir Gustav
Nossal, in his 1984 ANZAAS Presidential Address, as 'one of the most significant
and courageous statements to come out of Canberra on any topic in the last
decade'.^0'^ Other elements in the science policy community saw it as a 'pragmatic
compromise between the major power brokers in Australian society' which would
simply channel research and development funds to the most influentialorganisations in
industry.One of the outcomes of the Conference was the establishment of the
Australian Industry and Technology Council as a forum for Federal and State
Ministers of Science and Technology. The Council was modelled on the Agricultural
Council and served by a Standing Committee on Industry and Technology.
The AIRDIS scheme became the main implementation agency of science policy
for the manufacturing industry sector. For the first year of the new government the
scheme was part of the Department of Science and Technology under Jones, but in
1984 it was moved to DITAC. Before the portfolio change Jones had widened the
industrial scope of the Board to include two experts in the 'new' biotechnology-based
industries - Sir Gustav Nossal of the Walter & Eliza Hall Institute, and Dr. Alexandra
Pucci, the founder of Austrahan Monoclonal Development Pty. Ltd.. He also gave the
Board much greater autonomy to advise not only the govemment but also industry on
areas of priority in manufacturing industry research,
The move to DITAC coincided with the second sunset review of the scheme.
The Board held public meetings in all the mainland capital cities and conducted a
survey of the scientific community and industry to elicit the opinions of the
'producers' and 'users' of research in manufacturing industry and concluded that the
existing AIRDIS scheme was notfulfilling the requirements of this consituency.ii^
The new Grants for Industry Research and Development (GIRD) scheme
extended the powers of the Board even further to include the issue of collaboration
between research organisations 'including those in academe and industry'.^ In this
way the Board was given the authority to influence the conduct of research, not only
106 Anon, 'TheDraftTechnology Strategy', Search, vol. 15,no. 5-6, June/July 1984, p. 141.
107Sir Gustav Nossal, 'The Horizons of Science', Search, vol. 15, no. 7-8, August/September, 1984,
pp. 214-216, p. 214.
108 R. J. Badham, 'TheNational Technology Strategy: What degree of Public Choice?', Search, vol.
15, no. 7-8, August/September, 1984, pp. 198-199.
109 Australian Industrial Research andDevelopment Incentives Board (AIRDIB), AnnualReport1983-
S4,Parl. Paper 121, Canberra, 1984, p. 3.
110 AIRDIB, Annual Report 1984-85, Parl. Paper431, Canberra,1985, p. iii.
111 lindustry Research & Development Board (IR&DB), Annual Report 1986-87, Parl. Paper 74
Canherra,1988, p. 56.
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in public sector research organisations, but also in the higher education research
sector.
By 1989 the GIRD scheme was the linchpin of the manufacturing science policy
network but it was a network which did not have a peak co-ordination council
performing the same function in manufacturing industry as the Primary Industry and
Energy Research Council does in rural industry research (see 4.3 below). There
existed only indirect liaison through the representation of senior DITAC officials on
the Australian Industry and Technology Council and its Standing Committee; and
through the Australian Manufacturing Council and the associated advisory Industry
Councils to all industries in the manufacturing sector. Responsibility for the
formulation of policy was vested in the Science and Technology Policy Branch of
DITAC which was responsible both to the Minister for Industry, Technology and
Commerce, and to the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Science.
The transition in the manufacturing subgovernment has therefore been from a
situation in which pressure pluralist policy networks of an autonomous state interacted
with separate policy advocacy groups, to one of clientele pluralist networks in which
the state has deliberately co-opted the skills and expertise of organised interests to
participate in the policy process. The move to corporatism has not yet been made.
Suggestions of a levy-based system of research funding similar to that operating in the
rural sector have not been taken up by govemments because manufacturing interests
have claimed that such a scheme would be unworkable in the climate of domestic
competition which exists in manufacturing industry in Australia. Organised interests
therefore remain relatively weakly associated.
4.1.g Rural
The subgovernment for rural research policy has traditionally been the most highly
organised of all sectors. The economic importance of maintaining the international
competitiveness of rural exports has been a significant factor in the development of a
subgovernment closely integrated with its attentive public through a strong
associational system of rural research funds, and capable of ensuring the participation
of producers in central decision-making agencies.
A group who had significant influence on rural science policy were the
producers' representatives on rural commodity and industry research committees.
Both their financial contributions and their demands on scientists could be substantial.
For example, in 1965, 74 per cent of all non-Treasury contributions to CSIRO came
from the Wool Research Trust Fund.ii^ xhe 1957 Wool Research Act allowed two
committees to advise the Minister on the allocation of research funds: the Wool
Production Research Advisory Committee and the Wool Textile Advisory Research
Rymer, Interview, 30.4.90.
^ A fuller account of theactivities andfunding is given in chapter 5.
114 CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report 1965-66, p. 219.
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Committee. Each committeehad a fixedproportion of scientists, producers and public
servants. Members of the Wool Textile Advisory Research Committee in particular
exercised considerable power over which research would and would not be
undertaken. The WoolMarketing Conunittee of Enquiry (thePhilp Committee) found
that:
The woolgrowermembers, who together form the majority of the Conunittees
haveexpressly or impliedly dictated certain fundamental policies, an important
resultbeing that the CSIROhas done little workon the effects of blendingwool
with man-made fibres. Many woolgrowers have an almost fanatical aversion to
recognising that a textile composed of a blendof wool with man-made fibres
has any value. It is this attitude which, in part, has prevented the CSIRO from
undertaking research into blends.
These producers had a considerable effect, through the mechanism of advisory
committees, on the direction of research in such public sector organisations as CSIRO
and the laboratories of State departments of agriculture. Furthermore the producers
were deliberately manipulating the rules under which the trust fund operated. The
Philp Committee found that, although the Wool Research Act allowed the
representation on the research advisory committees of persons skilled in textile
production, all the relevant membership allocations were occupied by woolgrowers.
116 The producers exercised their economic and political power to control
membership of thekey resource-allocating committees despite thechairmanship of the
Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry and the
presence of of the Chairof CSIRO as a member.
There were opportunities of overlapping membership which provided
considerable potential influence on the direction of research effort. A university
seience professor could be a member of the Australian Universities Conunission, the
CSIRO Advisory Couneil, a CSIRO State Committee, the research advisory
committee of an industry research trust fund, and alsoparticipate in the executives of
ANZAAS and the AAS. For example, in 1965 Sir William Gunn, Chair of the
Australian Wool Board and member of both the Wool Production Research Advisory
Committee and the Wool Textile Research Advisory Committee, was also on the State
Committee of CSIRO in Queensland,hi
The combination of strongly associated industry representation with considerable
control over financial resources and the membership of subgovernmental advisory
agencies indicates a poliey network in rural research in 1965 of the corporatist type
described by Coleman and Skogstad. In this type of network multilateral
H5 Committee of Enquiry into Wool Marketing, Report, Park Paper, 51, Canberra, 1962, p. 106,
paragraph 584.
H6ibid., p. 106, paragraph 582-583.
H7 Australian Wool Board, Annual Report 1965-66, Park Paper 56, Canberra, vol. XIII, 1964-66,
pp. 437-438.
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report 1965-66, p. 176.
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user/producer groups combine in a highly integrated associational system to negotiate
conditions which will enable them to protect their interests. They are then co-opted by
governments to cope with social or economic problems - in this case the maintenance
of Australian rural export competitiveness. Government policy for the sector is
implemented through the interest groups, in this case again through the rural research
trust funds sponsoring research in the national interest.
4.1.h Rural subgovernment in transition
In the 1970s policy decisions for the organised but fragmented system of rural
research funds were made by individual advisory councils consisting of scientists,
producers and State and Commonwealth officials concerned with the wool, wheat,
dairy, meat, chicken and dried fruit industries.Major inquiries commissioned by
the Whitlam and Fraser Govemments eventually led to an overhaul of the system of
rural research policy advice.The Australian Agricultural Council and its
companion Standing Committee on Agriculture, which had existed since 1929 but
which had not participated to any great extent in the science policy process, were
found wanting by the Industries Assistance Commission which recommended an
additional agency for the co-ordination of rural research.xhis advice led to the
establishment in 1978 of a Commonwealth Council on Rural Research and Extension
(CCRRE). The Council's role was to advise the Minister for Primary Industry across
the entire spectrum of rural researchin Australia. The Council was also, among other
matters, to:
• develop interactions with all Commonwealth research agencies in order
to co-ordinate rural research within other institutions;
• advise the Minister on the role of rural research in the Australian
economy;
• ensure the practical application of research findings; and
• developpriorities for mral reseach.^^i
The Fraser government obviously perceived the need to co-ordinate policy-
making and implementation for the production of scientificknowledge to be applied to
rural economic production but not for manufacturing industry. Fraser's private status
as a rural producer may have been influential in this issue. The Standing Committee on
Agriculture resented the intrusion into its intergovernmental role and promptly
established its own Advisory Committee on Priorities in Rural Research and Extension
(ACPRRE) in 1980. However, the Councils proved ephemeral or redundant. The
CCRRE was abolished in 1981 on the finding of the Commonwealth Review of
A more detailed account of the funding mechanisms of these industries is given in chapter 6.
Australia, Working Group, The Principles of Rural Policy in Australia: Report to the Prime
Minister by a Working Group, AGPS, Canherra, 1974.
Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, Parl. Paper 155, Canherra, 1977.
Ihid., p. 8.
Department of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Statement 1980-81, AGPS,
Canherra 1981, p. 59.
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Government Functions that the Council duplicated functions of the States. ACPRRE
survived until 1988 with little to show for its existence.122
The Hawke government revitalised the Australian Agricultural Council and the
Standing Committee on Agriculture by re-affirming the roles andfunctions of the two
agencies andincreasing thefrequency of meetings. Rural research policy became the
responsibility of the Policy Development Branch of the Development and Co
ordination Division of the Departmentof Primary Industry, and also of the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics which convened a national workshop on the organisation,
funding and planning of research and the application of research results. Such
workshops have become a regular feature of networking in the rural science policy
community. The list of organisations represented by participants in the 1989
Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocation for Rural Research and
Development is an illustration of the science policy community in rural research in
1989:
• seven State & Territory departments of primary industry;
• the Wool, Wheat, Meat and Livestock, Egg, and Fish Research
Councils;
• university agricultural science departments
• ASTEC
• CSIRO
• Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics;
• Bureau of Rural Resources;
• Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy;
• Departmentof Primary Industries and Energy;
• Departmentof Technology, Industryand Commerce;
• Department of Finance,
At the Workshop the then Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John
Kerin, explained how the policy community had evolved:
In the past we have recognised the right of fund providers, and of those
conducting research, to manage theirownaffairs. As ruralresearch has become
more complex, with tight limits on total resources, as thenumbers of interested
parties increases and the demands of thesystem intensify, weshould be able to
influence the outcomes we expect by careful management.
.. .What I have just described to you could be represented as a grid of interests
with vertical and horizontal connections. It is thus entirely appropriate to
suggest at this point that we all give fresh consideration to networking, the
activity through which we make all the necessary connections in our grid of
interests.124
For example, the announcement in 1992 of reductions in the rural research levies on
producersi25 (which means a concommittent reduction of government matching
funds) was part of the rural research policy network consisting of relationships
122 Williams & Evans, 'Commonwealth Policy for Rural Research Past and Present: A Review', p.
108.
123 The Hon. John Kerin, Opening Address for Bureau of Rural Resources, SCA Workshop on
Research Priorities and Resource Allocationfor Rural R&D, Canberra,2-3 November 1989, p. 6.
124 Ibid., pp. 4 & 6.
125 'Cabinet slashes rural grants'. Weekend Australian, August 1-2 1992, p.l.
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between the federal Department of Primary Industry and Energy; the State
Departments of Agriculture; the various rural research development corporations;
producer associations; the CSIRO, university research and private research
laboratories; the Department of Finance; the Treasury and the Expenditure Review
Committee of Cabinet. The corporatist subgovemment reacted collectively against a
threat to its interests from the executive core.
The rural community, with its long tradition of collective action on research
funded partly by producers and partly by government, is an integral part of the
subgovemment of raral research. This has led to a system of interaction in which
rules, ideas and resources of interaction have been generally decided jointly by the
state, the producers and the scientists. The state provides the stractures (mles and
legitimacy) for producing the knowledge and gathering the levies, and also matches
industry contributions which enhances economic production. The producers, who
exist in a highly-integrated associational system of multi-lateral consumer/producer
groups, are committed to funding new knowledge and technology. The scientists
maintain a degree of autonomy from the state and can use the value of their
contribution to negotiate working conditions which will bring them their ultimate
objective of intemationally-recognised scientific competence.^26
5. THE Executive Core
In chapter one the shortcomings of the policy community approach in explaining
policy were discussed. The most problematic of these is the failure to distinguish a
group of actors who do not participate regularly in the routine decision-making of
science policy but whose concurrence is necessary for cmcial decisions about the
allocation of resources to science. This category of actors is designated the executive
core in the modified policy community approach used in this thesis.
The concept of the executive core is based on the observation that, in analysing a
particular policy using the policy community approach, it becomes apparent that the
notion of subgovemment does not cover the entire field of action involved in policy-
making. The approach is particularly problematic when discussing the role of central
agency actors who participate only occasionally in decision-making about research.
For example. Cabinet ministers with non -research portfolios would discuss resource
allocation or restmcturing of the science system; the senior officials of the Department
The tradition of preferring basic to applied research dies hard in the science system. The Chief of
the Wool Technology Division of CSIRO recently wrote:
The wool industry's approach to basic science is far-sighted and unique in Australia. All the
more so when one has the opinion, as I do, that much of the basic research effort in Australia
has been pursued out of personal preference rather than community need. Some of the most
exciting fundamental breakthroughs I have been fortunate enough to witness have been
developed by scientists working under pressure on very apphed projects. Indeed many, if not
most, of the great breakthroughs in science have sprung from minds addressing very tangible
threats and opportunities in everyday life.
Ken Whitley, 'Wool in the Future', Agricultural Science, New Series, vol. 5, no. 2, March 1992,
pp. 16-19.
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of Prime Minister and Cabinet have influence through the portfolio agencies for
research (see section 8.2 below); and the Treasurer or Minister of Finance certainly
can veto the allocation of resources for policy implementation. These actors are
officials and politicians who, although of central importance in the whole arena of
gnvp.rnmp.Tit action, do not make routine or important decisions about particular
policies. Their advice is not automatically sought in such issues but without their
approval action on general issues could not occur.
5.1 The executive core in 1965
Because of the nature of Cabinet-level decision-making in Menzies' governments the
executivecore for science policywas virtually non-existent. Ministers brought their
decisions to Cabinet for discussion and ratification. Their judgement in their policy
arenawas considered to be paramount. ^27 In the science policy arenait was the Prime
Minister himself who announced the major policy initiatives in Parliament. The
Minister Assisting thePrime Minister in Science and Education sat in the Senateand
made few, if any, policy speeches. The roles of the Treasurer and Senior Treasury
officials would be confinedto approval of budgetary allocations which, according to
White and Gillespie, were usually perfunctory even when large projects were being
resourced. 128 The fact that the CSIRO Executive later rebelled at Ministerial control
suggests that overall Cabinet approval had never been a problem in obtaining
resources. 129
5.2 The executive core in 1990
In 1990 the process of central decision-making about the allocation of resources to
science had enlarged to include the scrutiny of the Expenditure Review Committee
(ERC) and the processes of program budgeting overseen by the Department of
Finance. The executivecore for the sciencepolicy community would therefore consist
of the non-science portfolio members of theCabinet and theERC(including the Prime
Minister, the Treasurer and the FinanceMinister), and the Joint Committee of Budget
Officials. 120
127 Sir John Bunting,R.G. Menzies, a Portrait, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p.81-82.
128 White, 'Administrative Problems in the Development of Scientific Research', p. 139.
Gillespie, 'Research Management in CSIRO', pp. 19 & 30.
129 Johnston & Buckley, 'The shaping of contemporary scientific institutions', p. 384.
120 The CBO is composed of public servants from the three co-ordinating agencies; the Departments
of Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Treasury. The CBO advises the ERC on outlays
and timetables for the Budgetprocess. It also provides a forum for the discussion of broad fiscal
issues between officials from departments with a special responsibility for economic
management. The ERC and theCBO together account for themostsignificant interaction of the
executive core of any policy community.
Christopher Higgins & DavidBorthwick, 'TheRole of Central Agencies', in Decision Making in
Australian Government: The Cabinet and Budget Processes, eds. Brian Galligan, J.R. Nethercote
& Cliff Walsh, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, ANU, Canberra, 1990, pp.
43-61, p. 50.
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The ERC is guided in its decisions by the work of the Department of Finance
which prepares detailed analyses of departmental outlays, potentialareas of saving and
new policy proposal costing. The Department of Finance also liases with Treasury in
the production of forward estimates of the state of the economy. These forward
estimates model the economic environment in which future government action will
occur. Particular forward estimates are also passed on by the Department of Finance
to each department to be used in the preparation of Budget Submissions.
The Department's functions are managed in divisions by branches which
correspond roughly to portfolios.^31 There is no special branch with responsibilities
for a science and technology budget. The control of the allocation of resources for
scientific purposes is fragmented across departmental divisions in the same way that
the research activities are dispersed among departments. The preparation of the
Science and Technology Budget Statement is carried out by officials in the Department
of Industry, Technology and Commerce.
The process of allocating resources includes the following steps:
• the Department of Finance issues forward estimates to departments on the
assumption that there will be no pohcy changes;
• the FRC sets overall budgetary targets;
• ministers are asked to give an indication of prospective policy changes;
• the Department of Finance advises ministers on strategies to manage
these pohcy changes;
• ministers are expected to suggest areas in which savings might be made;
• the FRC reviews savings and new policy measures on a portfolio basis
and consults with ministers;
• Cabinet in plenary session considers FRC proposals in finalising the
Budget;
• each Commonwealth government program is evaluated every 3-5
years. 132
Department of Finance officials insist that the role of the Department is not to cut
particular expenditure but to assist the ministers and staff of other departments in
priority setting and evaluationprocedures. This role inevitably brings the Department
into conflict with researchers and program managers who may be unfamiliar with
these procedures and who view them as unnecessary bureacratic additions to their
professional activity. 133
However, many examples have been given in the above discussion and in the
previous chapter of how the executive core can influence science policy. The power
of the Treasury to block a tax subsidy for manufacturing research was exercised
during the Menzies, Holt and Fraser govemments. The granting of such a subsidy in
1985 has to be seen as a major victory for the science policy subgovernment, but the
131 Ibid., p. 57.
132 Stephen Bartos, 'Competing Demands for Commonwealth Funding - the effect on rural research
and development', in SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocation for Rural
R&D, Canberra, 2-3 November 1989, pp.47-57, p. 52.
133 Ibid., p. 51.
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subsidy is under continuing threat from Treasury which is partly responsible for its
operation.
The executive core also can make fairly arbitrary decisions without notice to the
subgovemment. For example in 1992 it was announced by press release that the
Commonwealth government contribution to rural research funds would be changed
from an almost universal dollar-for-dollar basis to one in which rural producers in
certain industries would contribute a larger proportion than the government. This
decision had been made in full Cabinet rather than by the Minister for Primary
Industry and Energy. The ensuing mediaexposure forced the executivecore to back
down on its decision to force cutbacks in this way.i34
6. The Superstructural Subgovernment
The above discussion illustrates the increasing complexity of the science policy
process in Australia. Figure 4.3 summarises the changes which have taken place in
the subgovemments in time segments corresponding to changes of govemment.
The continued separation of decision-making into functional sectors has severely
constrained the development of a coherent set of objectives for the publicly-funded
sciencesystemin Australia. This has suited the interests of many scientists who have
resisted, in the name of scientific autonomy, the centralisation of science policy
decision-making. For many years the need for co-ordination was also resisted by
governments whose conservative ideology preached non-intervention. However, the
need to co-ordinate the allocation of steady state or diminishing resources and the
direction of research effort has resulted in the development of a set of techno-political
agencies whichstraddlethe sectors andattempt to co-ordinate research activity within
them. This category of actors in the policy community is here called the
superstructural subgovernment and the following section analyses the
development and significance for science policyof these agencies.
'Cabinet slashes rural grants', WeekendAustralian", 1-2 Aug. 1992, p. 1.
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6.1 The superstructural subgovernment in 1965
In 1965 the superstructural subgovernment was rudimentary, consisting of the Prime
Minister, who made important policy announcements (e.g., the establishment of a
grants scheme for university research); significantly-placed individuals from each
sectoralpolicy community interacting semi-formally or informally with each other or
with the Prime Minister; and a Minister-in-Charge, Commonwealth Activities in
Education and Science who assisted the Prime Minister on science policy issues.
Menzies himself had held the portfolio in 1962-63 as Minister-in-Charge CSIRO',
and from 1950-1960R.G. Casey had been in the position.135 Gresford wrote of the
situation in 1965:
So far, Australian moves towards any sort of centralized policy-making or
advisory body for science policy havebeen indecisive. For manyyears ... the
CSIRO hs&defacto filled tMs role to a certain extent.
...it [CSIRO] was for many years the dominant government scientific
instmmentality in thecountry and the principal initiator ofscience policy.^36
There was no statutory provision for the Chair, the Executive, the Advisory
Council or the State Committees of CSIRO to proffer advice to governments other
than that conceming CSIRO.Senior CSIRO scientists were occasionally involved
in Cabinet discussions on policy, but, according to Sir Frederick White, such matters
were 'highly confidential' and had 'no effect on scientific activities' in the
Organisation.138
For several years there had been somepublic airing of the idea of an overarching
science advisory council but no formal moves had been made in that direction. The
idea had been expressed by Oliphantin his 1958 ANZAAS PresidentialAddress but
had not gainedfavour with Menzies.i39 in 1961 the Executive Commissioner of the
Australian Atomic Energy Conunission (AAEC) had suggested that there should be a
Department of Government 'specially charged' with the definition of researchpolicy
135 Johnston & Buckley, 'Theshaping of contemporary scientific institutions', p. 379.
In 1948Casey had outlined his visionfor a post-warAustralian economy based on research and
overseas capital. Casey advocated a science system based on a network of industry research
associations informed by a government research organisation undertaking basic research and
international liasion. He saw the necessity for a planned research policy integrated with
incentives for the expansion of secondary industry in Australia. He had used innovative
management techniques suchas 'Organisation andMethod' andtheindustrial relations practices of
Elton Mayo in his terms as Governor in Egypt and Bengal and had far-sighted views about the
transformation of Australian industrial relations. However, Casey's ten-year term as Minister-in-
Charge, CSIRO, is almost invisible in the Australian science policy literature. A possible
explanation is that his plans for the science-based expansion of manufacturing industry in
Australia were neutralised by the Country Party and its leader, McEwen.
Casey, Double or Quit.
136 Gresford, The Organisation ofScience Policy inAustralia, pp. 11 & 15.
137 Science andIndustry Research Act, no. 13 of 1949.
138 White, Administrative Problems in the Development of Scientific Research', p. 130.
139 Ohphant, 'Science and the Survival of Civilization', p. 11.
and its operation.i^o in 1962 university researchers expressed similar views but
preferred:
...an advisory council of strong and distiguished scientific-economic
composition and with a suitable breadth of representation, reinforced by the
nomination of a senior minister to convey its recommendations to Cabinet,
By 1965 the idea of establishing such a council was expressed by Menzies
himself in Parliament. According to Encel, Calwell, the ALP Leader of the
Opposition, hadused the ideain his 1963 Election Campaign.142 Encel considers that
Menzies' appropriation of the idea was not unusual:
Neither the Menzies government,nor the Liberal Party at large, made any direct
response to the ALP's espousal of science policy. On the well-established
conservative principle of stealing the Whig's clothes, applied by Menzies
throughout his political career, the Liberalgovernment nevertheless moved step-
by-step in the same direction.143
However, neither Menzies nor his successors Holt, Gorton or Eraser, acted to
concretise the policy rhetoric of the proposed advisory council. Policy advice
continued to come from individuals highly placed in the ehte organisations of science.
One of these was Oliphant (laterSir Mark) whose influence in the organisation
of science in Australia dates from 1945 when he had returned to the UK from his
involvement in the development of the atomic bomb in the USA. He was
subsequently 'head-hunted' by Coombs, appointed Head of the Research School of
Physics at ANU, and co-founded the Australian Academy of Science (AAS).
However, it was not only through these two agencies that Oliphant was influential.
Cockburn and Ellyard speak of the '...close personal relationship' with Menzies
which was '...exceptionally beneficial to science'.^44 Oliphant in return found
Menzies' ideas about science '...fiizzy and very limited in scope', but was reassured
by Menzies' opinion that 'the Treasury boys' should not interfere with the allocation
of resources within the science system. These sentiments demonstrated to Oliphant
169
340 A.D. McKnight, 'TheRole of the Public Servant in Research', Public Administration (Sydney),
vol. XX, no. 2, March 1961, pp. 139-163, p. 139.
341 Anon, 'Science in Australia', Current Ajfairs Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 7, August 13, 1962, pp. 99-
112, p. 111.
342 Noformal expression of theideacanbefound in theoffical FederalPlatform.
Australian Labor Party, Federal Platform, Constitutionand Rules, no. 1, (as amended by the 25th
Commonwealth Conference, 1963), ALP Federal Secretariat, Canberra, 1964.
343 Encel, 'Pushing the barrow uphill', p. 27.
344 In 1948he had written to Rivett, the then Chairmanof CSIR, regarding the 'Red Scientist' scare:
Would it not be wise to transfer all secret work and all contacts with secrecy from CSIR to
the SupplyDepartmentand force themto set up a scientific organisation of their own? They
could then revel in red stamps and stultify work to their heart's content and CSIR could be
free!
In 1949 the defence work of CSIR was tranferred to the new Weapons Research Establishment and
CSIR became CSIR0.344
Cockburn & Ellyard, Oliphant, p. 212.
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that Menzies was 'with us'.145 Oliphant's ideas about an autonomous science system
fitted Menzies conservative political ideology of elites and they were united in their
desire to withstand economic ideas about research from the executive core in
Treasury. 146
In addition to Oliphant, Mozley Moyal identifies five other influential scientists
in this period all of whom were Fellows of the AAS. They were:
Sir Philip Baxter Vice Chancellor of theUniversity of NSW
Chair of the AAEC
Sir Leslie Martin Chair of the Australian Universities Commission
Defence Scientific Adviser
Chair of the Report on Tertiary Education
Member of the AAEC
Sir Ernest Titterton Director, Research School Physical Sciences, ANU
Member, National Radiation Advisory Committee
Sir John Eccles Professor, John Curtin School of Medical Research
President AAS, 1957-61
Sir Macfarlane Bumet Director, Walter & Eliza Hall Institute
President, AAS 1965-69.14^
They each interacted both individually and organisationally with Menzies. For
example, Eccles personally negotiated with Menzies the knighthood conferred on
Bllerton Becker after he donated £100,000 for the completion of the AAS building in
Canberra.148 Menzies appointed Martin Chair of the Commission on the Future of
Tertiary Education which had recommended the establishment of a national science
foundation to manage research grant funds andevaluate grant proposals.149
The CSIRO Executive, the AAS, a handful of senior academic scientists
(particularly from ANU), and the Minister constituted a weakly associated policy
network of the type described by Coleman and Skogstad as clientele pluralism.
Governments were dependent on the scientists to run their particular sector of the
science system and allowed them considerable autonomy. Outside this network the
other sectoral subgovemments were small and fragmented. Medical research policy
had been autonomous since the establishment of the NH&MRC in 1936. Defence
policy had become the responsibility of the Department of Supply. It was the
145 Ibid..
146 Professors Karmel and Melville regarded Oliphant's grasp of economics as: '...inadequate and
dangerous in one with so much influence'.
Ibid., p. 326.
Crisp regardedMenzies' graspof economicpolicy as 'less thandeep-seated and fluctuating'.
L.F. Crisp, 'Central Co-ordinationof Commonwealth Policy-making:Roles and Dilemmas of the
Prime Minister's Department', Public Administration (Sydney), vol. XXVI, no. 1, March 1967,
pp. 28-76, p. 38.
147 AnnMozley Moyal, 'The Making of the Federal Government's Science Policy', in The Pieces of
Politics,2nd edn., ed. R. Lucy, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 459-475, p. 465.
148 Ibid., p. 215.
149 Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, Report.
171
scientists or scientist-administrators in the research organisations funded by the
Commonwealth and State Governments who were responsible for establishing
structures, setting priorities and making decisions about the application of research
results.
6.1.a The superstructural subgovernment in transition
Thepattems ofchange in thescience policy process which began in 1965 accelerated
as greaterexpectations of sciencedeveloped to dealwiththe increasing complexity of
government (science in policy) and the increasing centrality of science to national
social and economic well-being (policy for science). Some of the changes were of
long gestation when the political ideology ofthe executive core didnotfit the demands
of significant actors in the science policy community. Change was more rapid when
political ideology was congruent with such ideas. Resulting structural changes often
initiatedcounter-responses from members of the science systemwhose interests were
most at risk. The most significantchanges are illustrated by the changing portfolio
responsibility for science and the establishment of a permanent advisory agency for
science policy in 1977. The pattern of change is one of increasing institutional
complexity within distinct functional sectors.
6.1.a. i Portfolio responsibility for science
There has always been a polarity of opinion within the science policy literature in
general and the science policy community in Australia in particular, about whether
portfolio responsibility for theproduction and use of scientific knowledge should be
vested in a singleministry or dividedamong those portfolios with significant science
agencies. Both Menzies and Hawke espoused the cause of science in their political
careers and located the central agency of science policy-making into the Prime
Minister's Department. Eraser placed ASTEC in the Prime Minister's Department but
kept other agencies well-dispersed in order to be able toexertexecutive control over
scientific activity. Whitlam used science policy as an electoral issue and advocated a
separate Minister for Science andTechnology who would have a co-ordinative rather
than a directive role. The first Hawke government, with a science policy formulated
by Jones, had a similar philosophy but later abandoned the idea in the face of
opposition from the science system and the sectoral subgovemments.i^o
The separate science portfolio created by Hawke was subsumed into the
Industry, Technology and Commerce portfolio in 1987. This continued a pattern of
political and ideological expediency in the location of responsibility for science within
the ministry. Only once, for the period 1967 to 1972, was responsibility for science
Marshall, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the Demise of the Tertiary Education Commission', p. 20.
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in one ministry for more than three years, and during this seemingly stable period
there were five changes between four different ministers.
For each science policy sector there have been different patterns of portfolio
location. Rural science policy has always been in a department of primary industry
and the Universities Commission has always been under the auspices of a department
of education. The industrial research grants scheme has shown the greatest variety of
portfolio location and nomenclature moving from Trade through Manufacturing
Industry, Productivity, Science and Technology to Industry, Technology and
Commerce. This variety illustrates the ambivalent attitude of Commonwealth
governments to the seemingly intractable problem of the development of
manufacturing industry in Australia, andtheplace of science in thatdevelopment.
The pattern of portfolio responsibility for CSIRO is the most indicative of the
changing attitude ofgovernments tothe production and use ofscientific knowledge in
national affairs. From the establishment of CSIR in 1926 until the quickening of
interest in science policy in the early 1960s portfolio responsibility for CSIRO was
isolated from any particular department and was of a nominal nature. The first
departmental placing, in 1964 under a Minister for Commonwealth Activity in Science
and Education, indicates that CSIRO and scientific activity was primarily seen as a
non-industrial activity despitethe overwhelming significance of rural industry interests
in CSIRO at the time. 1^2 From 1967 until the fall of the coalition government in 1972
this part ofthe portfolio became a separate Department ofEducation and Science. This
five-year period was the only time that ministerial responsibility for CSIRO andthe
higher education research system was vested in a single portfolio, butit was notuntil
Eraser took over in 1968 that science came out of the shadow of education.153
Under Whitlam CSIRO was located within firstly, the Department of Science
and then the Department of Science and Consumer Affairs. Both ministers were
involved in organising change elsewhere in their portfolios.In the Eraser
Governments CSIRO was located in portfolios named consecutively. Science, Science
and the Environment, and Science and Technology. It was not until 1987 that the
Organisation was located, consistent with the increasingly predominant ideology of
techno-economism, in the same portfolio as industry policy (Departmentof Industry,
Technology and Commerce).
The ministers were: Gorton (Feb. '67-Feb. '68); Fraser (Feb. '68-Nov. '69); Bowen (Nov. '69-
Mar. '71); Fairbairn (Mar. '71-Aug. '71) and Fraser (Aug. '71-Dec. '72).
152 The internal allocation of funds in CSIRO in 1965 indicates that over 60% was for research
connected with rural production. See chapter 5, p. XXX.
153 Johnston & Buckley, 'The shaping of contemporary scientific insitutions', p. 384.
154 Morrison wasoverseeing independence forPapuaNew Guinea.
Morrison, Interview, 8 November 1989.
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6.1.a. ii A science policy advisory council
An advisory council for science policy, hinted at in Menzies' 1965 speech, and
advocated by some organised interests, was established as a pre-election gambit by
McMahon in 1972 to appease the growing chorus of criticism from industry and the
scientific community at the Coalition's lack of purpose in science policy.155 xhe
membership of the Council was perceived by Whitlam to be weighted too heavily in
favour of organised industrial interests and a temporary body was created to fit the
ALP's platform on science. It was finally made permanent by Fraser in 1978 as the
Australian Seience and Technology Council (ASTEC).156 From then until 1989
ASTEC was the major source of adviee on science and technology policy for Prime
Ministers. The Council has always been located in the Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet and reports directly to the Prime Minister.
The composition of the Council is primarily of representatives of industry and
the universities. The first Council consisted of 15 members: seven were from the
higher education reseach sector and five were from private industry. The remaining
members consisted of a unionist and a political scientist specialising in science policy.
There was no representative of CSIRO and the only representative of rural industry
was the President of the Woolgrowers' and Graziers' Council.i57 in 1986-87 this
composition had changedonly slightly with eightmembers from the highereducation
research sector, six from industry and one union member. The Chairpersons have
always been from the higher education sector. There is still no representative of
CSIRO. Members are chosen by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the
Chair. 158
ASTEC functions by preparing reports on topies suggested by the Prime
Minister or by Couneil; by providing briefing notes for Cabinet; by advising on
Budget proposals and by offeringadvice on seience and technology issues which arise
in different portfolios. Reports are prepared by working parties of ASTEC members
and co-optedmembers with relevantskills and experience. Ministersare invited to the
Couneil meetings of which there are usuallyeight a year. The agenda for each meeting
is sent to all departments with a scientifie eomponent (15 in 1987); to the largest
government research agencies (CSIRO, DSTO, ANSTO); to the Office of the
Economic Planning Advisory Council; to CTEC (later NBEET); and to the Australian
155 Mozley Moyal, 'The Making of theFederal Government's Science Policy', p. 471.
155 Although a major report on science and technology in Australia was produced hy the interim
ASTEC in 1977-78 the Australian Science and Technology Council Act was not passed until
1978 and the interim Council not made permanent until 1978.
157 ASTEC, Science and Technology in 1977-78, vol. lA, AGPS, Canberra, 1978, p. vii.
158 Dr Alexandra Pucci, a member of ASTEC from 1987-1990 says:
I couldn't tell you exactly how the nominations go through. Presumably there is a
suggestion to the Prime Minister from the Chairman and others he takes advice from and
then a recommendation for names. Lastly it is the Prime Minister's decision.
Interview, 8.11.89.
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Telecommunication Commission.159 In the 1980s ASTEC organised or participated
in several large-scale conferences or workshops aimed at encouraging the scientific
community to participate in formulating policy recommendations to government, and
atengendering a sense ofcommitment within the science system.i50
ASTEChas been criticised for representing the conservative organisations in the
science system and therefore being out of touch with small, innovative science
organisations. Professor Ian Lowe, for many years a member of the National Energy
Research and Development Demonstration Council (NERDDC) said of ASTEC in
1989:
Generally ASTEC has represented an older generation of good scientists and
engineers fromindustry. It's beena consistent criticism of ASTEC from many
people over the years that, apart from the late Leon Peres who was on it for a
short time, it has never had anyone on it who knows anything about science
policy, setting up priorities in science, the politics ofscience or the organisation
of science. It consists largely of scientists who have prospered under the
present system. Generally they see scientific advice as being more of the past
recipe.151
This assertion, however, is not borne out by an examination of the members in the
years 1977, 1986 and 1990. Table 4.1 illustrates the membership of ASTEC by
sector and discipline and reveals that at least one member of ASTEC through this
period has had considerable experience ofscience and technology policy.152
If there is a trend it would seem to be that expertise in the management and
financing aspects of the commercialisation of research is gaining prominence of
membership. However, the capacity to control membership (for example, the
exclusion of CSIRO) and the use by consecutive governments of ASTEC as a means
of formulating and ensuringcommitment to policy in the science system, means that
ASTEC couldbe seen as a corporatist development in the sciencepolicycommunity.
However, as mentioned above in discussing the networks of the international attentive
public, the type of policy interaction exhibited in ASTEC does not quite fit any of
Coleman andSkogstad's policy network categories, in this case because of the lack of
a corporatist implementation function for ASTEC. However, its influence and role
over fifteen years cannot be categorised as pressure pluralism or clientele pluralism
because it is a state-established agency. Perhaps quasi-corporatist is the most
appropriate termto describe the ASTEC relationship with theexecutive core.
159 Ibid., p. 39.
160 por example:
1981 with UNESCO, the National Objectives and Priorities Workshop;
1983 with the Department of Science, the National Technology Strategy;
1989 with the Centre for Technological and Social Change, Profile of Australian Science.
151 Associate Professor Ian Lowe, Griffith University, Interview, 1.11.89.
152 Searches of Australian business directories revealed no trace of 'BWD Industries'.
Brett & Co. is a supplierof building requirements. Lloyd Zampatti is a director and memberof
ASTEC.
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Table 4.1: The composition of ASTEC 1977-1990
Union & Other Higher Education Industry
Victorian Trades
Hall Council
1977
organic chemistry
electrical engineering
political science
vice chancellor
ex-vice chancellor
pastoral
radio & telecommunications
mining
medical research institute
chemical
mining & steel
paper manufacturing
Federated Clerk's Union
1986
biological science
physical science
economics
science & technology policy
political science
medicine
mechanical engineering
electrical engineering
rural producer supplier
monoclonal manufacture
BWD Industries
mining
computers
Brett & Co
Federated Clerks' Union
1990
chemistry
economics
jurisprudence
physical geography
physical sciences & engineering
medicine
vice chancellor
science & technology policy
private university representative
management
steel
grazier
computer manufacturer
Brett & Co
Data source: ASTEC Annual Reports, 1977, 1986, 1990.
The period from 1965 to 1989 in science policy saw the gradual, if lumpy,
development of an overarching set of decision-making relationships in the science
policy community. These have changed from the conservative clientele pluralist
networks of the Menzies and Holt governments to the more corporatist techno-
economistic networks of the Hawke governments. The lumpiness of the transition
was in many ways due to the continuing perception of thecoreexecutive thatresearch
was not central to the nation's economic wellbeing. Both Whitlam and Fraser toyed
with the concept but either lost interest or deferred to the organised interests of
subgovemments. The messianic techno-economistic zealof BarryJones furthered the
development of a superstructural subgovemment, but it was not until Hawkehimself
became personally involved in the issues in 1989 that fundamentally new structures
were established.
7. The 1989 May Statement on Science and Technology: A
Watershed in Science Policy-making in Australia
The intense process of change in the science policy community in the 1980s created
foci of discontent among the organisedinterests in all sectors of the policy community.
The discontent was highest in areas where scientists perceived incongruence between
subgovemment rhetoric about the benefits that sciencecouldbring to Australia and the
realities of increasing subgovemment control over their research agencies, resource
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allocations and the organisation of research. The economic rationalism of the core
executive and the techno-economism of the science policy subgovemment merged, for
the scientists, into a political and bureaucratic ideology which threatened the autonomy
of the 'scientific estate'.
Against this background of increasing conflict Science Minister Jones took a
proposal on research funding to Cabinet in October 1988. Cabinet's response was to
form an Inter-DepartmentalCommittee to examine support for science and technology
in Australia. 163 in the same month the Prime Minister opened the National Science
and Technology Centre in Canberra and was met by a thousand scientists waving
placards with such slogans as 'Sow science and reap prosperity'; 'Foster science not
sport'; and 'Would the last scientist in Australia tum off the bunsen burner!'. From
this timeHawke tooka personal interest in science policy.164
In November 1988 CSIRO and the Commission for the Future held workshops
on the Greenhouse Effect. This publicity about the way in which science can be
important in informing public debateon contentious issues was seen by government as
a positive aspect of sciencewhich couldbe electorally useful. Also in November the
Inter Departmental Committee on Science and Technology reported to the Structural
Adjustment Committee of Cabinet. This period was one of decision about which
departments should participate in the core processes of science policy. 165 The
Committee used information being compiled by various agencies including:
IDC:
Jones:
DEBT:
DPIE:
DCSH:
ASTEC:
Draft Science and Technology Statement;
Oustanding Issues in Science and Technology Capacity;
Review of Higher Education Research Policy & Postgraduate Awards;
responses to the MackinnonReport on Marine Science & Technology;
Research Innovation and Competitiveness Report;
new policy proposals for public health and medical research;
Core Capacity of Australian Science;
Profile of Australian Science.
A Science and Technology Statement Cabinet Sub-Committee consisting of the
concerned Ministers was set up to negotiate the final contents of the Statement. Keir
reports that this was an 'important and interesting' process because of the variation in
demands by the different Departments. DITAC, DEET and the Minister for Science
were asking for quite large amounts of money but DPIE was suggesting greater co
ordination and management of existing resources and asked for only $1.3m extra.
The demands proliferated the process of negotiation according to Hendrickson's
163 Marie Keir, (Consultant to the Minister for Primary Industry and Energy on Research and
Development Policy), 'The emergence of science policy on the agenda'. Science and Society,
ANU Public Affairs Conference, Canberra, 7-9 June 1989.
164 Ibid..
165 Ibid., Keir reports that at first only five departments (Prime Minister & Cabinet; Industry,
Technology & Commerce; Primary Industry & Energy; Education, Employment & Training;
Community Services & Health; were involved with Defence 'coming in and out'. Later Arts,
Sport, Environment, Tourism & Territories; and Finance joined the Committee.
Ill
Law. 166 The process of deciding the wording and substance of the Statement
involved many meetings of Ministers and ministerial staff. Keir's impression is that
those who actually wrote the Report (officers of the Innovation Branch of DITAC)
were: '...the ones who had their points of view most strongly represented'. 167
A major factor in keeping the issue alive for the government was the continual
and unprecedented barrage of television and radio interviews about science policy,
press articles, press releases, personal visits, faxes and letters to ministers (although
special pleading for individual projects was declared by Ministers at this time not to be
an effective form of lobbying because they wanted to dispel the impression that
priority decisions were made by politicians rather than by scientists).168 Typical of
these was the article in the Weekend Australian by sciencewriter Julian Cribb, entitled
'A dark age dawns in Australia'. This article gave details of scientists who had left
Australia and the results of the ASA/ANU poll showing that sixty per cent of young
Australian scientists were prepared either to leave Australia or sciencebecause their
future was too uncertain. 169 In the same issue of the Weekend Australian was a
three-page feature article on CSIRO achievements. Much of the material was
generated by scientists who presented theissues forthepublic in simple terms such as
the dollar value to the Australian public of completed and potential research projects
from individuallaboratories. By the end of November 1988 Laurie Hammond, Vice-
President of FASTS, wrote in an Age editorial that 'science's phantom army' had won
the battle for recognition to such an extent that Prime MinisterHawke, with his keen
sense of electoral salience, had personally taken up the colours for the scientific
community.1'^ 6
The formation of an InterDepartmental Committee was hailedas a breakthrough
in the co-ordination of science policy in Australia. This ad hoc stmctural response to
discontent throughout the science policy community was made permanent in 1990.
Other measures announced in the May 1989 Scienceand Technology statement, such
as the announcement of a Chief Scientist to advise the Prime Minister, further
cemented the existence of a superstructural subgovernment for the science policy
community.
166 Ibid., 'If a problem causes many meetings the meetings become more important than the
problem'.
167 Rymer, Interview, 30. 4. 90.
168 Keir, 'Theemergence of science policy on theagenda'.
169 Julian Cribb, 'A DarkAgeDawns in Australia', Weekend Australian, October 1-2, 1988, p. 25.
170 Laurie Hammond, 'A win for science's phantom army'. Age, 26 November 1988, p. 11.
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8. The Superstructural Subgovernment
8.1 A new Minister for Science and Technology
In the 1990 election campaign Hawke and his ALP advisers used the issue of the
production and use of scientific knowledge in Australia as a major component of the
speech launchingthe campaign. It was therefore something of a shock to the scientific
community when Barry Jones was relegated to the backbenches and newcomer Simon
Crean was made Minister for Science and Technology in his place. Several
explanations were put forth. One suggested that the reply Jones had made to a
question on notice, which had revealed extensive cuts in funding for certain
environmental CSIRO programs, had severely embarrassed Hawke at a time when he
was trying to woo the votes of both the environmentalists and the scientific
community.!'^ ! Another is that his abrasive negotiating style and reluctance to accept
short-term compromises within the political system lost cmcial votes in Caucus.
The appointment of former ACTU President, Simon Crean, to the position of
Minister for Science and Technology was seen in the science policy community as an
indication of the increasing seriousness with which science policy is seen in the
executive core.i'^^ Crean tried to assert some autonomy into the position. With the
support of both the Chief Executive and the Chair of CSIRO, he insisted that
ministerial requests for research to be undertakenby CSIRO should be scrutinised by
him personally.i'^ 4 jje also blocked the appointment of a senior DITAC official to the
Office of the Chief Scientist against the wishes of the Chief Scientist and the Secretary
of the Department of the Prime Minister in which the Office is located. The
interference is reported to have caused 'much bitterness and resentment' in the upper
levels of the DTTAC bureaucracy.
8.2 The Co-ordination Committee on Science and Technology
The establishment of the Co-ordination Committee on Science and Technology
(CCST) was announced in the May Statement. The Committee: '...facilitates the
sharing of information and assists the co-ordination of programs and policies
concerned with science and technology.^ ^as established to enhance the
coherence of the allocation of government resources to scientific activity by creating a
'Jones reveals woeful state of CSIRO R&D', Scitech, vol. 9, no. 9, September 1989, p. 11.
'Sadness at Jones' Demise', Scitech, vol.10, no. 4, April 1990, p. 1.
"S&T Gains High Profile At Last', Ibid..
'Crean Vets Requests', Scitech, vol.10, no. 8, August 1990, p. 10.
'Ministerial Action Rocks Bureaucracy', Scitech, vol.10, no. 9, Septmenber 1990, p. 3.
Dr. Bell, formerly Head of the Policy and Projects Division, and having had four years as Director
of Science and Technology Policy for the OECD, was displaced by the abolition of the Division
and appointed to the Building and Services Industries Division. After the Crean blocking, and
under a new Minister for Science and Technology, Ross Free and a new Secretary for DITAC, he
was later re-instated at the top level of science policy-making as one of the two Deputy
Secretaries; also holding the position of Chief Science Advisor for DITAC. In 1993 he was
appointed the Secretary of DITAC.
176 Ibid., p. 10.
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forum in which officials from the most important science portfolios could inform
colleagues in other departments of their activities,
The Council is expected to redress some of the grievances of Ministers outside
DITAC who, for example, find that their influence on such issues as research
priorities in CSIRO are being blocked by the DITAC Minister and the Minister
Assisting the Prime Minister on Science and Technology. One such Minister is the
Minister for PrimaryIndustries andEnergywhose portfolio parallels the operations of
four of the six CSIRO Institutes, but who, in opening a conference entitled 'Crisis in
Science', revealed that he had little input into policy for CSIRO.
8.3 The Prime Minister's Science Council
The creation of the Prime Minister's Science Council provides a forum outside normal
departmental channels for the Prime Minister, other Ministers, members of the
scientific community andrepresentatives of industry to 'eonsider' issues concerning
science andtechnology, xhe membership of the Science Council canbe considered
as the heart of the core of the subgovemment of sciencepolicy in Australia. In 1989
the original membership was:
MinisterAssisting the PrimeMinisteron Science and Technology;
Minister for Employment, EducationandTraining;
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy;
Minister for Community Services and HeaJth;
Chief Scientist;
Chair of ASTEC;
Chief Executive of CSIRO;
Director of the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute;
Managing Director of Computer Power;
Managing Director of CRA;
Managing Director of Wesfarmers;
Managing Director of TNT;
Managing Director of AMRAD
Head of Department of Systems Engineering,ANU;
Professor of Pure Mathematics, University of Western Australia.
In 1991 to the above were added:
Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce;
Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourismand Territory;
Chair of Memtec Ltd.;
President of the Academy of Science;
In the first year of its existenee the Committeeconsideredsuch issues as:
• human resources for R&D and the related question of career structures for scientists and
engineers;
• ways of setting directions for Australian research;
• action following the Government's statement on the environment
• the Committee's role in the provision of advice to the Government on major research
projects and facilities.
Ibid..
178 'Ministers want more say in CSIRO',Scitech, vol. 9, no. 6, June 1989, p. 10.
Australia, Science and Technology for Australia, p. 20.
180Prime Minister's Science Council, Resourcesfor Science and Technologyand their Utilisation,
Commonwealth of Australia, 1989(no page number).
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President of the Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering;
President of the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee;
Assistant Secretary,Federated Clerks'Union.i^i
The Council meets twice a year to discuss an agenda set primarily by the Chief
Scientist, and to listen to papers prepared by independent working groups.
Significantly the Department of Defence and the DSTO are not included. The 1991
membership shows a widening to include the higher education system and the
Academies of the scientific community. In 1965 it would have been unthinkable that
these agencies were not included in the first round of membership. Their original
omission and the inclusion instead of industrial scientists and managers is a dramatic
instance of the ideological shift in science policy from conservatism to techno-
economism, and a concommittant change in type of superstructural subgovemment
policynetwork from chentele pluralist to corporatist.
8.4. The Chief Scientist
In 1989 the policy role of ASTEC was supplemented by the establishment of the office
of Chief Scientist. The first incumbent is Professor Ralph Slatyer who was for
several years a member, and then Chair, of ASTEC. Slatyer affirms the advantages of
being close to the Prime Minister and Cabinet:
You see, ASTEC is seen to be independent of government, in other words free
to criticise government whenever they want to. That's what I used to call when
I was Chair of ASTEC, an 'outsider role'. It has its benefits in that you can say
whateveryou want to say. That's the up side. The down side is that you're not
an insider. We used to try and play an insider role as well at ASTEC, that's
providing briefing to the PM on Cabinet submissions and things like that, but
it's just not the same. I hadn't realised quite the difference as being inside the
department. So all the formal advice that goes to the PM which might be on
migration or economic policyor anything, this department has an overview role
across all arms of government. My advice is incorporated in the flow of
information which goes to the PM. There'sa whole structurethat takes care of
that. He's got an office staff at Parliament Housewhich is aimedat just getting
all that stuff in front of him in an orderly and balanced way, so to be part of that
is extremely valuable. I hadn't realised the difference that that would make.1^2
The Chief Scientist personally advises the Prime Minister on science and
technology affairs, chairs the Prime Minister'sScience Council, the interdepartmental
Co-ordination Committee on Science and Technology and the Cooperative Research
Centres Committee. His Office also administers the Cooperative Research Centres
Program. Under this program, which is a personal initiative of the first Chief Scientist
(though the idea was first proposed in the Vernon Report of 19651^3)^ 50 new
The Managing Director of TNT was replaced by the Chairman of Memtec. The Managing
Director of AMRAD in 1989 was Dr John Stocker, the Chief Executive of CSIRO in 1990.
Scitech Technology Directory 1992 Edition, p. 84.
182 Personal Communication, Professor Ralph Slatyer, 30.4.90
Australia, Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report 1965, p. 424.
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research centres will be establishedjointly by universities, public research organisation
and private industry, between 1990 andl995 at aneventual costof $100m a year.
Through control over the structures, orientation and resources committed to
these centres the Chief Scientist therefore has considerable power in the science policy
community. Through the chairs of the Science Council and the Co-ordination
Committee the Chief Scientist can present agendas for consideration by the Prime
Minister, other Ministers and top public servants. The office is a nexus between the
political system and the science system and is responsible to Parliamentonly through
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The advice given is therefore independent of
Ministers in whose portfolios lie responsibility for government science agencies and
programs involving the funding of scientific activity outside the public sector. This
position gives theChief Scientist considerable personal influence in theformulation of
science policy.
9. THE Sectoral Subgovernments
The science policy subgovernments are now formally linked through the Prime
Minister's Science Council and the CCST. DPIE is the only department to have an in-
house research council to co-ordinate scientific activity, but DITAC and DASETT
both have Chief Science Advisers and DEET has the ARC to provide intra-
departmental advice on research activity andscientific issues. CSIRO playsa much-
reducedrole in sciencepolicyformulation. The location of the Organisation under the
auspices of DITAC rather than DPIE or DASETT symbolises the intention of the
government to emphasise the relationship between CSIRO and manufacturing
industry. The extent to which this rhetoric has become policy reality was
demonstrated recently when it was reported that signficant bureaucratic actors in the
sectoral subgovernments had decided that CSIRO was to be excluded from
membership of the new rural research committee which will replace the standing
committees on agriculture, soil and water resources. The Minister for Primary
Industries had to intervene to ensure the representation of CSIRO.
DPIE has, through a series of structural innovations, consolidated its control
over rural research. Through the establishment of the Primary Industries and Energy
Research Council, the Rural Industry Research Corporation, and the proposed
The Keating government changed the name of the Prime Minister's Science Council to Prime
Minister's Science and Engineering Council to reflect the applied nature of the role of the
scientific community in Australia in the 1990s.
In 1993 the 'administration' of ASTEC was merged with that of the Chief Scientist in the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet after protracted discussion about the future of the
agency.
Peter Pockley, 'ASTEC partially merged with PMSEC, Search, vol. 24, no. 7, August 1993, p.
195.
'Crean may dump CSIRO in rural policy',Australian,lO November 1992, p. 5.
'Crean hacks CSIRO in policy debate', Australian, 11 November 1992, p. 2.
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standing committee, the Department has the capacity to exercise control through a co-
ordinative matrix not yet achieved by other science policy subgovemments.
The main portfolio responsibility for sciencepolicy lies with DITAC.i^^ The
Science and Technology Strategy Section is responsible for the reactive process of
writing speeches, answering ministerial correspondence and preparing answers to
parliamentary questions. The Branch briefs Ministers before meetings of the Prime
Minister's Science Council, presents issues to the Co-ordination Committee on
Science and Technology and interacts with the Committee on Science and Technology
Policy of the OECD. The Science and Technology Resources Analysis Section
produces the Budget Paper on Science and Technology and the data for the ongoing
Science and Technology Indicators program. The Science and Technology Awareness
Section, which was established after the 1989 May Statement runs programs designed
to increase the broad science and technology awareness of the general public,
The subgovernmental actors in DITAC see the science policy community in
Australia as consisting of 'funders, users and performers' of scientific research. The
Department's science policy functions are embedded in a wider mission of '...the
support of sustainable intemational competitiveness throughout the manufacturing and
service sectors'.Science and technology policy form only a small part of the
Departmental activity and show signs of isolation from other subgovemment agencies.
The impression gained is that the policy section of DITAC does not foster outreach
interaction. For example, when asked about contact with the two main industrial
lobby groups, the AIRG and the Institution of Engineers, the Director of the Science
and Technology Strategy Section of DITAC conceded that there was none and that
there 'should be more'.^^^ Marshall reports that, until 1990, there was a deliberate
DITAC policy of maintaining distance from client groups in order to avoid too-close
identification of officers with the interests of industry groups. He cites the lack of
interaction between the IR&D Board and the ARC; the absence of liasion between
senior DITAC officials and CSIRO staff; and the avoidance of co-ordination between
DITAC and DPIE on science policy issues as evidence.
This may be a harsh judgement. The Joint Committee on Public Accounts in its
recent comprehensive Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development did not
186 jjj J990 theDepartment consisted of seven divisions, the Patents Office, the Bureau of Industry
Economics and the Commission for the Future. The Innovation Division administers the
portfolio's granting and advisory programs for science policy. Within the Division is the Science
and Technology Policy Branch which supplies information and analysis for science policy
agencies inside and outside the portfolio.
Rymer, Interview, 30.4. 90.
188 Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector Research and
Development, AGPS,Canberra, 1992, Submissions and Incorporated Documents, vol. 5, pp.
S644-S645.
189 Rymer, Interview, 30.4. 90.
190 Neil Marshall, 'Pressure Groups, Bureaucratic Pluralism, and the Fragmentation of Australian
Science and Technology Policy', Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 50, no. 2,
June 1991, pp. 154-169, p. 160.
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censure DITAC for bureaucratic ineptitude.The Committee did see a need for
more interaction between DITAC and DPIE as the two largest research-oriented
departments, particularly in the area of information collection and dissemination.
However, the interpretation by Marshall of bureaucratic territorialism over ageneies
and ideas certainly fits Press's notions of subgovemmental defence of policy activity.
10. Conclusion
Since 1965 there has been a general transition in the science policy community of
Australia from weakly associated clientele pluralist networks of organisational and
individual interests to the situation in 1990 of corporatist networks participating in
advisory and allocatory agencies designed partly by the core executive and partly by
the superstructural subgovemment. Table 4:2 summarises these changes.
Table 4.2: Changes in science policy networks 1965-1990
1965 1990
superstructural
subgovemment chentele plurahst corporatist
Higher education clientele plurahst concertation
CSIRO concertation corporatist
Manufacturing pressure plurahst chentele plurahst
Rural corporatist corporatist
The overall pattem is one of increasing core executive control over the organisation of
the science policy process. In order to protect their autonomy from what they perceive
as further erosion, scientists have organised pressure groups within the attentive
public which seek to influence the allocation of public resources to the production of
scientific knowledge and to retain control over research agencies. Political actors
have come to appreciate the importance of scientific knowledge not only in solving
problems in rural economic production and providing an image of Australia as a
civilised nation, but also to the position of Australia in the global economic
community. Significant actors from the pressure groups are co-opted by
subgovernments into policy formulation and implementation. Underlying the
significant changes in the organisation of the science policy process is the continuing
power play between actors supporting ideologies with eonflicting ideas about the
objectives and organisation of research. It is no longer sufficient for governments
simply to hand out resources for scientists to maintain their research organisations and
their international reputations. Corporatist research agencies and superstructural
Of 102 submissions to the Committee 37 per cent were from private sector users of public
sector research funding. Nineteen per cent of these expressed negative opinions about the system
of funding and the majority of these were ideological objections to the concept of government
intervention in the marketplace. Only two users of DITAC innovation grants had negative
experiences of the process. Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector
Research and Development, Submissions and Incorporated Documents, vols. 1-10.
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councils have been created to widen both political and scientific perspectives.
Decisions have to be made about co-ordinating and prioritising objectives and
outcomes in the increasingly complex and costly process of the production of scientific
knowledge. The next four chapters analyse the way in which this has been achieved,
beginning in the following chapter with an account of changes in the allocation of
public resources to the production of scientific knowledge in Australia.
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Chapter 5
The Rationalisation of Resource Allocation
...the outputs of the policy-making process can be said to reflect the relative
strengths of those involved, so that stability in a power structure will result in a
certain stability of policy... .If the policy output appears to have a coherence and
substantive content that might justify the description 'rational', then this reflects
the abilityof a particular group to dominate proceedings.^
In any policy arena the outputs of the policy-making process derive from a complex
interaction of the political system, the organisational systems of administration and
performance, the exercise of power through the capacity of certain actors to change
rules, ideas and resources to further their interests and ideologies, and the environment
in which policy action occurs. These outputs can be used to measure different patterns
of influence. The allocation of public financial resources to a policy community is by
far the most cogent indicator of political commitment to policy and of interest group
power. Financial resources can be considered as intermediate outcomes because they
are both the end of one set of policy decisions and the means to the achievement of
other policy outcomes.^ There are therefore three issues to be considered in the
analysis of the distribution of financial resources: who controls the processes of
allocation; who receives the resources; and under what conditions of use?
1. Changes in the General Pattern of Funding
One of the most significant elements in the transition in science policy between 1965
and 1990 has been the way in which the allocation of resources for the production of
scientific knowledge has changed both in the pattern of resource distribution and in the
mode of decision-making about how resources should be allocated. The change has
been from a pattern of resource allocation based on objectives of national and cultural
importance, such as defence and radio astronomy research, to one based on techno-
economistic assumptions by governments that scientific knowledge is part of
economic production. Control over decisions about the allocation of funds has passed
from elite scientists to specialised, broadly-based, subgovemmental agencies. This
chapter focuses on the changing patterns of resource allocation by examining the
budgets of significant science agencies and the mechanisms of resource allocation in
several sectors of the science system. This is done by comparing not only the two
'snapshot' years, but also the intervening period. Wherever possible the amounts
have been converted to 1990 values.^
1 Freedman, quoted in W.I. Jenkins, Policy Analysis: APolitical and Organisational Perspective,
p. 35.
2 Jenkins, Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective, p. 225.
^ ABS government expenditure implicit price deflators were used to calculate thedeflators foreach
year since 1965.
1.1 Funding proportions in the budget: 1965 and 1990
Portfolio funding can be used as an indicator of the perceived importance of scientific
knowledge to governments. The composition of portfolios changes quite considerably
through time but examination of the agencies within the portfolio, and analysis of the
funds allocated to each, can show where the functional priorities of different
governments lie.^
l.l.a Research and development resource allocation by portfolio
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distribution of financial resources allocated to research
and development through Appropriation Acts 1 and 2 in the 1965-66, and 1990-91
Budgets.The estimated total of these appropriations in 1965 is $110m ($909m in
1990 dollars). The largest portion is allocated to the Department of Defence and 68
per cent of this allocation of $41m was spent on the Weapons Research Establishment.
The next largest portion of 26 per cent of total funds was allocated to the Department
of National Development. Funding for science in the Department is increased by the
presence of two large agencies. The Bureau of Mineral Resources accounted for
$14m of the Department's $31m for research and development and $10m of the
Bureau's budget was spent on oil exploration. Funds for the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission, which was a statutory authority, account for another $8m.
CSIRO received 24 per cent of the government's total budget outlays on research and
ABS, Australian National Accounts Historical Estimates, Cat. no. 5206, 1982, pp. 18-21;
Australian National Accounts, Cat. no. 5207, March Quarter, 1990, p. 61.
The fragmented nature of resource allocation to the science policy community means that the data
used in this chapter have been compiled from a variety of sources. In 1965 the reporting of
public sector finances was fairly simple and usually consisted only of the annual accounting
procedures of the Budget processes. In 1990 the process is much more complex and, in some
ways, equally as impenetrable. The longitudinal sets of data represented here cannot therefore be
taken as absolute. The data for this section was taken from the following sources.
Australia. Budget 1965
Advance to Treasurer - Statement ofExpenditure, Park Paper 314, 1964-66, vol. V.
Auditor-General's Report & Treasurer's Statements ofReceipts and Expenditure, Park Paper 312,
1964-66, vol. VI.
Commonwealth Payments to orfor the States, Park Paper 185, 1964-66, vol. YE.
Estimates of Receipts and Summary of Estimated Expenditure, Park Paper 184, 1964-66, vol.
VE.
Supplementary Report by Auditor-General, Parl Paper 359, 1964-66, vol. VI.
Australia. Budget 1990
Budget Paper no. 1, Budget Statements, 1990-91, Park Paper 115, Canberra, 1990.
Budget Paper no. 2, Commonwealth Public Account, 1990-91, Park Paper 116, Canberra, 1990.
Budget Paper no. 3, Portfolio Program Estimates 1990-91, Park Paper 117, Canberra, 1990.
Budget Paper no. 4, Commonwealth Relations with Other Levels of Government, 1990-91, Park
Paper 118, Canberra, 1990.
A spreadsheet of all research and development monies and the agencies to which they were
allocated was compiled from the Parliamentary Papers documenting the three Appropriation Bills
for the issue of monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. In 1965-1966 some funds were
given in pounds; other were in dollars. All amounts used in the analysis have been converted to
dollars using a 2:1, dollar to pound ratio.
Since 1989 there has been a separate Budget Paper for Science and Technology funding; however,
in order to analyse the appropriations in the same detail as the 1965 appropriations,
appropriations from the four major Budget Papers for 1990-91 have been computed. The data set
includes Appropriations Acts 1 and 2,
186
development (a more detailed analysis of the changes inCSIRO's budget is given in
section 2.2 below).
Figure 5.1: Australia, research and development, Appropriations Acts 1
& 2, 1965-66
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Data source: Parliamentary Papers, 1964-65-66, vol. V, pp. 517-819; vol. VI, pp. 853-855.
Figure 5.2: Australia, funds for research and development.
Appropriations Acts 1 & 2, 1990-91
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Data source: Budget Paper No. 2: The Commonwealth Public Account, 1990-91, pp. 40-50.^
Figure 5.2 illustrates appropriations from Appropriation Acts 1 and 2 for 1990-91 in order to
make the comparison with the situation in 1965 and to emphasize the increase in certain
appropriations for science and technology. The figures for the Department of Defence in
Appropriations Acts 1 and 2 for 1990-91 indicate a total sum of $7.7m for science in the
portfolio and this would have given a misleading comparison with 1965, so the total allocation
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The allocation of resources to the production and use of scientific knowledge in
the Department of Primary Industry appears low considering the importance of
primary industry in economic production in Australia in 1965. However, the
Department was then responsible only for minor agricultural research agencies and
extension services. Research and development for Australia's mining, petroleum,
timber and fishing industries were not part of the portfolio. Most research for rural
production was undertaken by CSIRO where nearly 70 per cent of the budget was
devoted to rural research.
The remainingDepartments had minor research budgets. The Antarctic Division
formedpart of the Department of Extemal Affairs. The Department of the Interior was
responsible for the Bureau of Meteorology and the Ionospheric Prediction Service.
The allocation for the Department of Health shown here includes $0.8m for the
Medical Research Endowment Fund and $1.4m for the salaries and allowances of
medical and scientific officers which cannot be separated. In 1965 responsibility for
education at the federal level consisted of the Commonwealth Office of Education
located in the Prime Minister's Department. Therefore there is an allocation for
research and development to that department of nearly $2m. The items listed include
grants to the Australian Academy of Science; the Commonwealth Postgraduate
Awards and $94,000 for the purchase of laboratories and equipment for independent
schools in the ACT and the Northem Territory.^
An estimate of the total allocation in 1990 using the same calculations as for
1965 is $1492m: a 50 per cent increase in real terms. In 1990 the picture of the
allocation of resources had changed quite markedly to one in which more departments
havemoreequal shares of the research anddevelopment allocation. Mostnoticeable is
the drop in defence research from 36 percent to 14 percent of appropriations.^ The
total DITAC appropriation including CSIRO is now over 40 per cent of the total
research and development budget; however, this includes the 52 per cent of CSIRO's
budget in 1990which is for rural research (see section 2.2 below).
The Department of Arts, Sports, the Environment, Tourism and Territories
(DASETT) is responsible for many science-based agencies and the research and
development appropriation comprises 17 per cent of the allocation to science in
Appropriation Acts 1 and 2. TheBureau of Meteorology accounts for nearly $128m
for defence science given in Budget Paper 3 is included instead. Similarly, there was no
appropriation for science for the Transport and Communications portfolioin Appropriations 1 and
2 for 1990-91 but a figure of $9.3m was given in Budget Paper 3 and this also was included to
complete the science resource allocation picture for 1990.
Ibid., p. 581.
Unlike CSIRO, ANSTO, AIMS and other Commonwealth Government science organisations,
the Defence Science and Technology Organisation is not mentioned in Appropriation Acts 1 and
2. Amounts of $211.2m; $215m and $213m are given respectively in Science and Technology
Budget Statement 1990-91, p. 31; Budget Paper no. 3 1990-91, and Defence Report 1990-91,
AGPS, Canberra, 1991, p. 123.
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of the Department's $262m research budget. Other sizeable agencies within the
Department are theAntarctic Division with $63m of research funds; the Office of the
Supervising Scientist and Alligator Rivers Research Institute with an allocation of
$6.6m a year^o and the Tasmanian World Heritage Area which accounts for nearly
$6m a year.
Theproportion of resources allocated to theDepartment of Primary Industry and
Energy has increased sixfold in real terms since 1965. The portfolio now has
responsibility for overseeing the development of mineral and energy resources and
within its juridiction are included suchagencies as the Bureau of MineralResources
and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. In
Appropriations Acts 1 and 2, DEET is allocated $7.2m; however, the Australian
Research Council funds, whicharepartof Special Appropriations, boost the allocation
by $175m.
The share of the science budget allocated to the Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet has fallen from 1.7 per cent to 0.4 per cent. This proportion will rise
considerably from 1991-92 as theCo-operative Research Centres program reaches its
target allocation of up to $165m by 1995. Responsibility for theCentres will then be
given to: ' ...the appropriate operating area of government'!! The Department of
Community Services andHealth research budget rose from 2 percentin 1965 to 8 per
cent in 1990. The allocation to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade includes
$17m for the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research; $11.5m for
international research and development organisations, and$3.2mfor the International
Atomic Energy Authority. This appropriation is not mentioned in the Scienee and
Technology BudgetStatement. TheDepartment of Administrative Services in 1990is
responsible for three scientific agencies, two of which operate from Trust Acounts.
The two are the Australian government Analytical Laboratories (AGAL) and the
Australian Survey and Land Information Group (AUSLIG). The Ionospheric
Prediction Service is funded totally from the departmental budget.!2
l.l.b Other appropriations 1965 and 1990
Some appropriations for research are by Special Purpose Acts of Parliament which
obtain monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the Loan Fund; and by
!® The Office of the Supervising Scientist was established in 1978 under the Environment
Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978 to monitor the effect of uranium mining on the
region. Department of the Arts, Sports, the Environment, Tourism and Territories, Annual
Report 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra, 1991, p. 157.
!! Australia, BudgetPaper no. 1: Budget Statements 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra, p. 3.322.
!^ There is a reporting inconsistency in that the AGAL ($16.5m) and the Ionospheric Prediction
Service($2.4m) are mentionedin the Science and Technology BudgetPaper but AUSLIG ($33m
in Appropriations Acts 1 & 2) is not.
Specific Purpose payments.These appropriations are illustrated in figures 5.3 and
5.4.
Figure 5.3: Australia, funds allocated to research and development,
other appropriations 1965-66
S Cattle and Beef research 6.63% 6.72% • rural r&d payments to States
8.29%
D] university research grants (ARCS)
Wool research 24.64%
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E] Meat research 8.00%
I Atomic Energy Commission
27%
Data source: Parliamentary Papers, 1964-65-66, vol.. VI, pp. 853-855;
vol.. Vn, pp. 493-499;
vol.. VII, pp. 705-709;
vol.. vn, p. 719.
Figure 5.4: Australia; funds allocated to research and development,
other appropriations, 1990-91
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Data source: Budget Paper No. 2: The Commonwealth Public Account, 1990-91, pp. 40-50.
Budget Paper No. 4: Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of
Government, 1990-91, Table 9, pp. 196-201.
Australia, Budget Paper no. 2, The Commonwealth Public Account 1990-91, AGPS, Canberra,
p. 1.
Specific Purpose payments began during the Depression as a means of Commonwealth
Government support for emergency relief measures. The use of such grants proliferated in the
1940s when the Commonwealth Government formally took over some of the States' financial
responsibilities in the areas of health and welfare; and again in the 1970s when the Whitlam
Governments used such payments to finance certain policy initiatives in areas of States'
responsibility.
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In the 1965-66 Budget $25m ($216m in 1990$) was alloeated to research and
development and associated activities through Specific Purpose grants. Special
Appropriations and other appropriations. $3.6mwas through Specific Purpose grants
for research and development under thirteen areas of State government activity
including university funding, natural diaster relief, long service leave for coal miners
and blood transfusion services. Six of the areas are related to research and
development. xhey are:
Research grants 55%
Dairy Industry Extension Service 19%
Agricultural Advisory Service 15%
Minor agricultural research 0.7%
Tobacco Industry Extension Service 1.4%
Cattle Tick control and research 10%
This amount is 3 per cent of the appropriations for research and development from
Appropriations Acts 1 and 2. The major beneficiaries were rural industry researchers
(44 per cent) and academic researchers (55 per cent).
The research grants appropriated here are the first funds for the newly-
established Australian Research Grants Scheme (ARGS) announced by Menzies in
Parliament in 1965 as part of the recommendations of the Report on the Future of
Tertiary Education.15 Until this time university research funding had been funded
mainly by the States (a more detailed analysis of research funding to universities is
given in section 2.1 below).
A further $12m was alloeated to rural research and development through Special
Appropriations. These are listed in the budget papers as departmental appropriations
under the Acts which authorise monies to be held in the Trust Accounts. So, for
example, $3.1m was to be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund into a trust
account under the Wool Industry Research Act 1962-64. Similar appropriations are
listed for meat, dairy produce, wheat and cattleandbeef research.i^ The proportions
for these allocations are:
Wheat Research Act No. 22 of 1957 10.12%
Dairy Produce Research Act 1958-65 10.93%
Cattle and Beef Research Act 1960-64 13.33%
MeatResearch Act 1960-65 16.08%
Wool Industry Research Act 1962-64 49.53%
14 A broad understanding of research and development is used here in keeping with the Hawke
Government's belief that science and technology policy should encompass all the activities of the
'funders, performers and producers' of research whether it be of an economic or a cultural nature
(Science and Technology Budget Paper no. 7 1990-91, p. 2.). Consequently the provision of
extension services and environmental measures in 1965 are considered to be part of the cost of the
production and use of scientific knowledge as they are in 1990.
15 Committee on theFutureof Tertiary Education in Australia. Report, 1965.
15 Australia, Auditor-General's Report & Treasurer's Statements ofReceipts and Expenditure, Park
Paper 312, 1964-66, vol. VI, pp. 853-855, Table 5; and
Commonwealth Payments to or for the States, Park Paper 185, 1964-66, vol. VII, pp. 705-709,
Table 5.
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Apart from the ARGS research grant allocation, the only non-rural research to be
funded from other appropriations was nuclear research. The Commonwealth
govemment allocated $9.6m to the Australian Atomic Energy Commission in 1965-
66.1^
In 1990 estimated funds appropriated by specific purpose grants for research
and development totalled $276m. An additional $306m was appropriated by special
appropriations for the primary industry research agencies under their various enabling
Acts.i^ These two sets of appropriations together comprise 26 per cent of the
appropriations for research and development in Appropriation Acts 1 and 2 in 1990.
This compares with 23 per cent in 1965 indicating that indirect appropriations
continues to be a major means of authorising funds for the production and use of
scientific knowledge.
The large proportion of funds (52 per cent) for primary industry research
corporations and tmsts is appropriated through special appropriations and is divided in
the following way:
Aus Meat & Livestock R&D Corporation Act 1985 9.34%
Coal Research Assistance Act 1977 (a) 2.40%
Fishing Industry R&D Act 1987 0.31%
Horticultural R&D Corporation Act 1987 1.33%
Primary Industries & Energy R&D Act 1989 16.83%
Rural Industries Research Act 1985 (a) 3.35%
Wool Marketing Act 1987 - Promotion & research 66.43%^^
Wool marketing and research receives the largest level of govemment funding through
special appropriations and this amount is a larger proportion than in 1965 (50 per
cent). However, it is interesting that the use of Special Appropriations as a funding
mechanism has not expanded beyond that of Commonwealth government
contributions to rural research corporations. An additional 7 per cent of other research
and development appropriations is allocated to mral industry in the form of Specific
Purpose grants to the States. This is a slight increase on the proportion allocated for
this purpose in 1965.
The use of Specific Purpose Grants has been amplified considerably since 1965
with an introduction of grants to environmental concems (12 per cent) and secondary
industry promotion (2 per cent).20 The funding of environmental programs in this
12 In the budget paper Estimates ofReceipts andSummary ofEstimated Expenditure, under the sub
title of 'Other Details of Estimates', Table 9, are given the details of funds for the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission. It is not clear how this is related to the $8m allocated to the
Commission tlu-ough the Department of National Development under Appropriation Act 1.
Estimates ofReceipts and Summary ofEstimated Expenditure, vol. VII, p. 719, Table 9.
Advance to Treasurer - Statement ofExpenditure, vol. V, p. 573.
1® Budget Paper no. 2, The Commonwealth Public Account 1990-91 pp. 1.
19 Ibid., pp. 40-50.
20 In 1987 the Commonwealth Government established, on a matched-funding basis with the States,
the National Industry Extension Scheme (NIES). NIES offers small and medium-sized businesses
in secondary industry the services promoting innovation, efficiency and export -orientation that
have for so long been a feature of primary industry in Australia.
way reflects increasingCommonwealth govemment involvementin this area of States'
responsibility. Such programs now total nearly $43m in payments to the States.^i
The grants for 1990-91 are:^^
Soil Conservation 42.88%
Assistance for water & sewerage 16.99%
S-W Tasmania-Heritage Area 13.67%
Wet Tropics Queensland-Heritage Area 9.34%
Environmental restoration 7.01%
Rainforest eonservation 6.79%
Afforestation program 3.32%
Increased funding for environmental concems occurs in other areas of Commonwealth
govemment funding. Analysis of the functional budget allocations given in Budget
Paper No. 1 reveals that, for example, funding for the National Estate and Parks sub-
function has more than doubled in real terms in the 1980s; and that seven of the ten
items listed under sub-function '8D General and Scientific Research' are for research
anddevelopment into areas such as Kraft pulp mills andCape Yorklanduse.23
University research continues to be funded through Specific Purpose grants. In
1988 the ARCS scheme for funding university research was replaced by the
Australian Research Council (ARC) and the amount of funds distributed in the new
scheme was augmented by funds taken from university operating grants. In 1990-91
ARC grants accountfor 27 per cent of all Specifie Purposeand special appropriations.
The Australian Atomic Energy Commission, whieh was funded by 'other'
appropriations in 1965, has been renamed the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and is funded in 1990-91 by appropriations to the
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce underAppropriations Aets 1 and
2. In real 1990values this represents a fall from $84m to $60m.
The pattem of broad researchfund allocation outlinedabove shows that the most
signifieant change has been the diversification of fund destination in terms of
portfolios. This has largely been at the expense of defenceand nuclear research. The
level of funds for rural research have stayed high. The main winners have been
medical and manufacturing research. This indicates that the poliey rhetoric of techno-
economistic ideology for science policy reality has been transformed into the policy
reality of resource alloeation.
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce,Science and TechnologyStatement 1987-88,
AGPS, May 1988, p. 109.
Environmental funds such as the $33m appropriation for South West Tasmania have not been
included because there is no evident scientific component in the activity to which they have been
allocated.
22 The percentages have been calculated from data inBudget Paperno. 4, pp.A30-A34.
22 Budget Paperno. 1: Budget Statements 1990-91, pp. 3.22 & 3.197.
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Summary of total appropriations 1965 and 1990
Figure 5.5 illustrates the estimated total appropriations for 1965 and 1990. In 1965 an
estimated $137m was spent by the Commonwealth government on research and
development. This is the equivalent of $1136m in 1990 values. Using similar
methods of calculation for this thesis the total obtained for 1990 is $2058m, an
increase of 55 per cent.24 This indicates a greatervalue placed by government on the
benefits of research, and in particular towards manufacturing industry. However,
'snapshot' allocations for widely separated years, while having immediate impact, do
not reveal consistent trends. The following section unpacks the intervening years and
looks in more detail at particular research agencies.
Figure 5.5: estimated total appropriations for research 1965 and 1990
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Data source: Parliamentary Papers, 1964-66, vol.. V, pp. 517-819; vol.. VI, pp. 853-855;
Parliamentary Papers, 1964-66, vol.. VI, pp. 853-855;
Parliamentary Papers, 1964-66, vol.. VEI, pp. 493-499; pp. 705-709; vol.. VII, p. 719.
Budget Paper No. 2: The Commonwealth Public Account, 1990-91, pp. 40-50
Budget Paper No. 4: Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of
Government, 1990-91, Table 9, pp. 196-201.
2. Funding for Major Research Agencies
The above analysis of appropriation allocations reveals the difficulties of obtaining
longitudinal comparisons of government activity in scientific production when the
components of the portfolios change through time. Comparing the Departments of
Primary Industry in 1965 and 1990would require excluding the Energy component of
the 1990 portfolio, or adding to the 1965 portfolio elements of the Department of
National Development. However, individual agencies have remained more consistent.
24 The data were obtained by identifying allocations to research in the appropriation bills in 1965
and then using similar allocations for 1990. Consequently the estimates for 1990 given above do
not include areas which were not funded in 1965. For example, in 1990 the estimated total in
theScience and Technology Budget Paper No.6 is $2422m, or over twice the amount in 1965.
This amount, however, includes revenue foregone through the 150 per cent tax concession. In
1965 the 100 per cent tax concession allowed would not have been included in any formal
estimate of research and development funds.
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Figure 5.6 illustrates the allocations to the eight major research agencies since 1965.
The allocations have been changed into 1990 dollars to allow a more realistic
comparison.
There are two agencies which have dominated research and development funding since
1965: CSIRO and DSTO. Defence research declined sharply after 1972 and has been
decreasing ever since (the rise in 1979 is probably due to a disjunction in data).25
This reflects the decline in colonial and nationalistic ideology as a rationale for science
funding. The figures used for CSIRO are the appropriation funds only. External
funds (or 'contributions' as they were known until the mid 1980s) have not been
included above but will be discussed in section 3.2 below. Commonwealth
government funds for CSIRO have increased steadily so that appropriation funds in
1990 are almost double the 1965 figures in real terms. The most dramatic increase in
the 1980s has been the introduction of the tax concession which, at $376m of revenue
foregone in 1990, is almost equivalent to funding another CSIRO.
The decreasing funds for AAEC/ANSTO reflect the falling expectations of
nuclear power and the inability of the pro-nuclear science lobby to maintain its
influence over funding decisions. The high early funding for the Bureau of Mineral
Resources is probably due to the oil and other mineral exploration work undertaken by
the Bureau in the late 1960s and 1970s. The downturn in IR&D grant funding must
be offset against the foregone revenue under the tax concession introduced in 1985.
Grants for research in the higher education system remained stable in real terms until
1987 when they were increased by funds tranferred from university recurrent funding.
The second highest single agency funding increase has been that to the
NH&RMC (indicated in the graph by a white square). However, this position is
being challenged by the Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) which, by 1993 had
reached an equivalent level of funding to the NH&RMC in 1990. By 1996 funding
for CRCs will reach $130m in 1990 values.
This set of data allows an interesting insight into the pattern of funding over the
twenty-five year period. If the total resources spent on the agencies and programs
included above (excluding the tax concession) are calculated in 1990 values for each
year, the totals range from $760m in 1965 to $917 m in 1990. The highest allocation
There are considerable difficulties involved in finding longitudinal funding statistics which are
consistent. For example, figures for the allocation of funds for research and development in the
Department of Defence for 1979-80 are given as $90m in the 1990-91 Science and Technology
Budget Related Paper; $93m in an Independent External Review of DSTO for 1979-80 (Parl.
Paper 201, 1981); $120m in the estimates reported in the Defence Report 1979-80; $126m in the
Science and Technology Statement 1980-81, and are not mentioned at all as actual expenses for
1979-80 in the Defence Report 1980-81. Similarly, in the mid 1970s under both the Whitlam
and Eraser Governments, budgets for the smaller agencies simply disappeared from the Annual
Reports of their Departments and from the Auditor-General's Budget Report. Consequently
figures had to be taken directly from Appropriation Papers and therefore may not represent the
complete budgets of the agencies.
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Figure 5.6: Appropriations for major research agencies and programs,
1965-1990, in 1990 $m
500 n
400-
o
a\
o\
CSIRO
DSTO
AAEC/ANSTO
BMR
Antarctic Divn
ARGC/ARC
IR&D
NH&RMC
Tax concession
Data source; CSIRO Annual Reports, 1965-1990;
Science and Technology Budget Statements, 1989-93;
ARGCIARC Annual Reports, 1965-1990;
AIRD/AIRDIS/IR&D Boaid Annual Reports, 1966-1990;
AAEC/ANSTO Annual Reports, 1965-1979;
NH&MRC Annual Reports, 1965-1979.
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was in 1974 when the value in real terms was $971m and the lowest was in 1965.
Given the limitations of the data (that only the 8 largest agencies and programs are
included, and that the data sets are not continuous through time), it would appear that
the proportion of public funds allocated to research and development in the agencies
has remained remarkably stable in real terms over the past twenty-five years.
What has changed significantly is the distribution of funds between agencies,
and the way in which the funds are controlled. When the tax concession and CRC
funding are added in, the total amount has almost doubled since 1965. Significantly,
control over these new funds is placed in the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet (CRCs) rather than DEBT; and jointly between the Australian Tax Office
(ATO) and the IR&D Board (the tax concession). This enhances the control of the
core executive and the science policy superstructure over funding for research and
development.
3. Funding in the Subsystems of Science
Resources for the science system have traditionally been allocated in two forms: funds
for research agencies and funds for research programs. The following section
amplifies the above analysis by examining in greater detail the changing patterns of
resource allocation to key research agencies and programs in the four science
subsystems corresponding to the four science policy subgovernments analysed in
chapters three and four. This closer analysis is intended to reveal changing objectives
for research from notions of scientific knowledge created for its own sake to science
created for economic ends; and changing pattems of control as governments demand
greater accountability from scientists for the public funds they use.
3.1. Higher education
The implementation of the Murray (1958) and Martin (1965) Reports moved financial
control of universities from State Governments to the Commonwealth govemment.26
The Commonwealth government also assumed responsibility for the allocation of
resources to both general and specific research activity.27 Since 1965 the
Commonwealth govemment has provided general funds for research in the form of a
designated proportion of the block grant allocated to the Australian Universities
Commission (later the Tertiary Education Commission, and then the Higher Education
Council of the National Board of Education, Employment and Training).28 These
general research funds are of less use for science policy analysis than the individual
research grants because the pattern of their internal allocation to the various scientific
26 Committee on Australian Universities, Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1957.
Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia, Report, 1964-65.
27 It was not until 1973 that the Commonwealth Government assumed complete responsibility for
funding general research in universities.
ASTEC, Science and Technology in Australia 1977-78, vol. 2, p. 51.
28 Ibid., p. 65.
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disciplines cannot easily be traced. Analysis of the funds allocated to foster individual
research provides a more useful indicator of changing governmental objectives for the
higher education sector in the production of scientific knowledge because the areas of
the science system to which they are allocatedcan be traced, and because changing
pattems of government intervention can be identified.
3.1.a Australian Research Grants Scheme in 1965
The establishment of the ARGC in 1965 was a direct response by Menzies to concerns
expressed in theMartin Report about the lowlevelof funding for research available to
scientists in Australian universities. Martin, Chairman of the Australian University
Commission and also Chairman of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education
in Australia, had trained in the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge under Rutherford,
and was a firm believer in the British tradition of universities as centres of research
excellence in pure rather than applied science. Hehadrecommended that$10mshould
be made available in 1965-66 for research in all universities in Australia at
postgraduate level.29 Halfthese funds would come from the States andbe matched by
Commonwealth government allocations. Menzies subsequently announced that an
advisory committee would be set up to distribute grants from the Commonwealth
government to individuals or research teams subject to matching funds beingawarded
by State govemments.^o
The ARGC was responsible to the Minister-in-Charge of Commonwealth
Activities in Education and Research. The Committee was allowed to establish its
own rules and procedures with its only departmental liaison being through the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for administrative support. Grants were
decided on the individual merit of each proposal with no prioritisation of disciplines.
States or universities.
3.1.b The development of the ARGC in the 1970s
By 1967 the ARGC was funded totally by the Commonwealth government and by
1972 the Committee was overseen by the Department of Education and Science. The
Committee was enlarged from the original 10 members to 18 in 1973 in order to
provide a 'broader range of knowledge and experience'.Members sat on the
Committee on a rotating system. A larger group of 35 former members was also
available to provide specialist advice.
In 1972 Eraser, as Minister for Education and Science in the McMahon
government, began to prioritise grants. He earmarked $3m, of the $20m allocatedto
the ARGC for 1973-75, for four specified areas of research: upper atmosphere
Australian Universities Commission, Third Report 1964-69, Parl. Paper 330, Canberra, 1964—
66, p. 668, section 4.6.
30 Australia, House of Representatives 1965, Debates, vol. HR45, pp. 261-21A.
31 ARGC, Reportfor Triennium 1973-75, Parl. Paper, 285, Canberra, 1976, p. 1.
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science; the acqusition of a nuclear resonance spectrometer; multi-disciplinary
research; and marine science. In 1979-80 the Marine Sciences and Technologies
Research Grants Scheme, worth $0.4million in the first year and $2m a year
thereafter, was added to the list of funding sources also available to researchers in the
universities.
Apart from these minor changes, at the end of the Frasergovernment in 1983 the
ARGC was remarkably unchanged in structure and process from the position in 1973.
When ASTEC was established in 1977 it had argued that, because of the large increase
in the number of professional staff capable of undertaking research in the university
system, ARGC funds had diminished in terms of the funds available per potential
researcher.32 There was no response from the govemment and 1980-81 funds were
allocated on the basis of the maintenance of real value. Interestingly, while ASTEC
(and a majority of the public sector scientists on ASTEC were currently or had been at
some time members of the ARGC) perceived ARGC grants to be funding fundamental
research, the Department of Science saw the scheme as stimulating 'basic, pure and
applied research of the highest excellence in non-government institutions'.33 Jones,
who became Minister of Science in 1983, also considered that ARGC should fund the
complete spectrum of types of research in universities. The differences seem to lie in
the fact that the ARGC saw the grants as unattached and Minister Jones perceived
relevance to socio-economic objectives as an integral aspect of university research.34
3.1.C The transformation of ARGS in the late 1980s
The Hawke government began its relationship with the ARGC by requiring the
Committee to implement some of the recommendations of the 1978 ASTEC Report.
Consequently, the 1984 ARGS Report announced a four-part categorisation of grants
designed to nurture young scientists and the processes of research in universities as
well as funding the usual areas of research strength.35
However, the govemment expected the changes to be made within a steady state
of resources. Funding for the scheme in 1985 was increased by only 6.5 per cent to
$23.8m. The Committee complained bitterly that the 1226 projects to which it had
awarded grants in 1985shouldhave been allocated $49mto be undertaken effectively.
An additional $6m should also have been provided to implement the govemment's
initiatives announced in 1984. In order to cope with the increased demand for funds
and the implementation of new initiatives the Committeeintroduced the concept of the
'nil grant'. Projects awarded a nil grant were assessed as being worthy of support but
as there was no money in 1985 these projects would have first consideration in
Science and Technology in Australia 1977-78, vol. 2, p. 64.
^2 Department of Science, Science and Technology Statement 1980-81, p. 77.
The Hon Barry O. Jones, 'Government funding of scientific research', Vestes, no. 2 1985, pp. 4-
10, p. 8.
ARGC Report on Grants Approvedfor 1984, Parl Paper 151, Canberra, 1984, pp. 6-7.
1986.36 In the opinion of the Committee basic research funding in Australian
universities was being devalued in favour of research funded through such other
agencies as the NH&MRC.^^ The Committee also continued to push for the ASTEC
recommendation that ARCS should subsidise international travel for scientists.
In 1985 some elements of the Committee's Terms of Reference were changed.
The most significant was the requirement that the ARGC should consult CTEC to
ensure that funding overlap or duplication was not occurring and that the Committee
should redirect applicants whose projects were more appropriately funded by other
agencies.38 The ARGC Reports of 1986 and 1987 continued to emphasise the
difficulties of allocating funds which the Committee felt were grossly inadequate to
meet the expectations of both the research community and the government. The
Committee repeated its plea for increased funding up to $150m a year to provide the
human and knowledge resources in science needed if the standards of 1965 were to be
achieved. In 1987, despite funding increases of 36 per cent over the previous two
years, the Committee had decided to fund urgent equipment purchases rather than to
increase grants to meet rising costs.39
3.1.d The ARC and the rationalisation of research funding
In 1987 ASTEC reported to the Prime Minister that the existing fragmented system of
funding higher education research should be scrapped and replaced with a single
council responsible for overseeing a more comprehensive and competitive system of
research funding for higher education. In the Report, which ASTEC claimed was
based on extensive consultation with the scientific community in all sectors of
operation,40 ASTEC recommended that the basic premises upon which the new
council would distribute its funds should encompass not only excellence but also
accountability and relevance to socio-economic objectives
The government approved the establishment of the Australian Research Council
(ARC) which was to be directly responsible both to the National Board of
Employment, Education and Training (NBEET) and to the Minister for Education.
36 ARGC Report on Grants Approvedfor 1985, Parl Paper 123, Canberra, 1985, p. 3.
37 Ibid., p. 7-9.
38 Ibid., p. 1.
39 ARGC, Report on Grants Approvedfor 1987, Parl. Paper93, Canbera, 1897, p. 4.
Assistant Professor Ian Lowe of Griffith University disagrees. He considers that ASTEC decided
in advance of consultations what their recommendations would be. He says;
When ASTEC came here to air their views when they were partway through their studies on
higher education funding they were'nt really interested in consulting people but in propounding
their views which were that you need to concentrate funds to achieve critical mass and support
the best researchers. Their view was that the reason we in Australia lag behind other countries
is that we are a small country and we can't afford to research across the board. We have to
concentrate resources on the best workers.
Interview, 1.11.89.
ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance of Australia's Universities and Other Higher
Education Institutions, p. 2.
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The new Council was to be responsible for administering all the higher education
grants schemes, shown, with their 1990 allocations, in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 ARC Funding for 1990
1990$m
ARC Research Grants 66.4
Research Fellowships 9.5
Special Research Centres 9.2
Key Centres of Teaching and Research 6.7
Australian Postgraduate Awards 35.8
Research Inffastmcture 25.7
Assistance to Technological Institutions 1.3
Large Equipment 1.0
NH&MRC 4.4
Evaluation OA
TOTAL 161.6
Source: ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, Parl Paper 317, 1990, Canberra, p. 6.
Under the Higher Education Funding Act 1988, funds for the new competitive system
were increased by transferring, to the ARC, some of the research funds previously
allocated through operating grants to individual universities.xhe re-distribution (or
'clawback' as it became known) was effected in two stages. Firstly, between 1988
and 1991 $60m was transferred from operating grants to ARC funds.^^ Secondly,
$150m, or 6% of the research component of operating grants, was transferred to the
ARC to be redirected to the universities on the basis of the proportion of funds
allocated to each university through the competitive granting system. In 1990 funds
totalling $162m were allocated to the ARC to be redistributed through the above ten
programs."^4,45,46 xhe shift from block funding to itemised program funding
indicates a greater degree of control of research in tertiary institutions by the higher
education subgovemment. Figure 5.7 illustrates the change.
•^2 Australian Research Council (ARC), The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, Parl.Papers
1990, no. 317, pp. 1-5.
Department of Education, Employment and Training, A New Commitment to Higher Education
in Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p. 12.
The NH&MRC component is part of a re-distribution of the research component of university
operating grants.
Ibid., p. 6.
According to the 1990 ARC Report the infrastructure grant of $26m is 'new' DEET money.
Ibid., p. 8.
The Australian Postgraduate Awards also became the responsibility of the ARC in 1988 and new
funds totalling $57m over five years were announced in the 1989 May Science and Technology
Statement.
Australia, Science and Technology for Australia, p. 26.
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Figure 5.7: Higher education research funds, 1982-90.
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Data source: Science and Technology Budget Statements, 1993-94, p.40.
The graph shows the enormous increase in the proportion of competitively awarded
funds for research in higher education. This increase has been at the expense of
university research formerly awarded funds from operating grants by internal
evaluation. The funds are now allocated to research projects judged to be excellent by
external evaluation. This process of evaluation will be discussed further in chapter 7.
The ARC also now has a statutory obligation to select and support certain fields
of research in preference to others on the grounds of relevance to national economic
objectives as well as to the traditional criterion of scientific excellence.^?
One of the most persistent conflicts in the higher education science policy
community has been over the level of funding for research. The above figures show
that there was a massive increase in real terms of ARGS/ARC funding between 1982
and 1990."^® At the time of the 'clawback' changes in 1987-88 there was an uproar of
dissatisfaction from researchers in the attentive public of higher education, but was
this justified? The following section places the changes in the context of the period
from 1965 to 1990 and examines how they have affected research in the higher
education system.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, p. 1.
If 1993 budget data for the period are translated into 1990 values the percentage increase is:
ARC funds 1797%
Identified research funds 13%
general research 31%
Australia, Science and Technology Budget Statement 1993-94, AGPS, Canberra, 1993, Table 6,
p. 40
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3.1.e Supply and demand for higher education research funding
Figure 5.8. shows the the relationship between the number of scientists applying and
the overall real level of funding between 1965 and 1990.
Figure 5.8: the relationship between the number of applicants and
funding for ARGC/ARC grants for the natural sciences, 1966-90.
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Data source: ARGC and ARC Reports, 1965-1990.
The graph illustrates the relationshipbetween funds awardedfor research in the natural
sciences through the ARGC/ARC schemes from 1966 to 1990 in 1990 dollars, and the
number of applicants for these funds.'^ ^ 1966 there were approximately 3000
scientists working in the natural sciences in universities in Australia.^® Of these
scientists 909 applied for ARCS grants and 326 (36 per cent) were successful in
obtaining grants averaging $91,000 in 1990 values.^i Until 1975 the pattern of
49
50
51
The graph includes only those grants awarded on the traditional basis of excellence for individual
projects and does not include tbe supplementary grants introduced in the late 1980s.
Lamberton gives Bureau of Census and Statistics estimates that in 1965 there were 40,468
scientists in Australia. He claims that 4 per cent of engineers; 13 per cent of chemists and 50 per
cent of physicists were working in Australian universitities. This proportions give a total of
3255 scientists. However, Lamberton offers no data on Agricultural Scientists or Biologists.
Lamberton, Science, Technology and the Australian Economy, pp. 70-71.
Project Score figures for scientists in universities in 1969 are given as 4,450 for the natural
sciences. Of these 2,308 were professional scientists; 923 were sub-professionals and 1,219 were
classed as 'other'.
Department of Science, Project Score Report 3: Research and Development Expenditure by
Higher Education Sector 1969, p. 37.
In this first round of allocation the grants were high because of the relatively low number of
applieants considered bt the Committee to be of sufficient standard.
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increase in funds and the pattern of applications are roughly similar. In the decade
from 1975 to 1985 there is a dramatic separation between the inereasing number of
applieations and the decrease in the real level of funding. In 1974 1004 natural
scientists applied for grants and 735 (74 per eent) were successful. The average grant
was $27,300 in 1990 values.jhis success rate would account for the scientists'
memory of 1974 as the golden year of ARGC funding and for the increasing
antagonism between scientists and govemments about the level of higher education
research funding in later years. In 1981,1579 natural scientists apphed for grants and
1044 (68 per cent) were successful, but the average grant was only $20,239 in 1990
values.53
It is only in the 1980s that there has been a dramatie inerease in the funds
awarded in comparison with the number of applicants. In 1990 the ABS estimates that
there were 19,000 natural science researchers in the higher edueation sector.54 In the
natural sciences 2429 researchers had applied for $186m, and $44m was awarded to
1059 (44 per eent) suceessful applicants.55 The average grant was $42,222 or over
twice the amount of 1981 in real terms. If other grants such as the small project
grants, equipment grants and career fellowships whieh are now also awarded by the
ARC were also to be taken into account the change would be seen to be even more
dramatie.
The pattern of change is one of a greater number of natural scienee researchers
competing for the same number of grants which have doubled in average size. The
success rate has gradually diminished since 1974 and dramatieally so sinee the mid-
1980s as more university research is funded through the competitive seheme.56 It is
obvious that the minority who reeeive grants will be happier than the majority who
were unsuccessful. As the ARC funds have inereased, the selection committees have
chosen to give larger average grants to fewer researchers. What is also of interest is
the changing pattern of the internal allocation of resources among the seientific
diseiplines. The question is one of whether the same areas of seience are being funded
These figures exclude applications and grants for the Social Sciences and Humanities.
ARGC, First Report, p. 2.
52 ARGC, Report 1973-75, pp. 146-147.
53 ARGC, Report 1981, Parl. Paper 33,Canberra, 1981, pp. 8-9.
54 ASTEC estimates from ABS Research and Experimental Development data that there were 11,384
professional researchers in the higher education sector in 1986-87. ASTEC, Profile ofAustralian
Science, AGPS, Canberra, 1989, p. 367, Table 2-2. However, ABS figures for 1988-89 indicate
that there were 19,318 such researchers. This figure is used. ABS, Research and Experimental
Development All Sector Summary 1989-90, Cat no. 8112.0, 1990, p. 3.
55 The textof the 1990 ARC Report states that 1350 successful applicants for large research grants
were awarded $53.1 million. However, Tables 1 & 2 show that 1357 successful applicants were
awarded $51.9 million. These figures have been used for compiling Figure 5.13 below.
ARC The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, p. 17 & pp. 44-48.
56 It must be remembered that in 1990 theARC grants covered the whole of the unified national
system of universities which includes former colleges of advanced education, and that universities
are now expected to encourage researchers to apply for ARC grants and produce a 'research profile'
which is part of the DEET assessment process.
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in 1990 as were in 1965, or has the changing ideology in science policy affected the
areas of research funded.
3.1.f The inter-discplinary allocation of ARGC/ARC grants 1966 and
1990
Grants for the natural sciences have traditionally been classified into the five broad
categories illustrated in Figure 5.9. However, these broad discpline areas are of little
use in identifying patterns of change associated with the socio-economic areas in
which the resultant knowledge might be used. For the purposes of comparison in this
section the 1990 data have been re-classified into 1966 categories and vice versa.
Figure 5.9 indicates that the distribution of grants has changed very little since the
grants began in 1966. '^^ Grants to the Physical Sciences have stayed constant at 32
per cent. Biological Sciences have droppedby 1 per cent to account for 33 per cent of
funds. The allocation for Chemical Sciences fell by 5 per cent and that for
Engineering and Applied Sciences increased by the same amount. Apart from these
latter categories the interdisciplinarypicture has not changed significantly.
Figure 5.9: ARGC/ARC grants by 1966 categories
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Data source: ARGC, First Report, p. 2.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 53-58.
The 1990 ARC Report has two graphs illustrating the distribution of discipline grants (pp. 61-
62). One of these graphs roughly corresponds to the 1966 categories, the other illustrates priority
grants distribution. Since it is not indicated whether the data for the priority grants has been
included in the broader category data these figures are not used in Figure 5.7 The author compiled
a separate spreadsheet which assigned each of the grants detailed in the specific categories on pp.
53-58 to the 1966 broad categories.
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The 1966 categories are very broad and the way in which scientific work is described
and identified has changed considerably. For example, in 1966 there was no
recognition that Earth Sciences were distinct from physical, chemical or biological
sciences. Molecular biology was in its infancy and the science of the behaviour of
different materials was studied in Departments of Chemistry, Physics and
Engineering. A more detailed picture has been sought by re-classifying the five 1965
categories for the natural sciences into the twelve more specialised categories used in
1990.58 The result is figure 5.10.59
Figure 5.10: ARGC/ARC grants by 1990 categories
Biological Sciences 1&2
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Earth Sciences
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Cognitive Science
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Scientific Instruments
1966
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Data source: ARGC, First Report, Parl. Papers Session 1965-66-67, pp.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 53-58.
The graph shows that by far the largest proportion of grants (29 per cent) is still going
to the biological sciences. This proportion is lower than in 1966 when 34 per cent of
grants were classified as for Biological Sciences. The difference is probably due to
classification. 8 per cent of grants which were classified for Biological Science in
1966 can now be estimated to be classified in such areas as Marine Science and
Technology, Materials Science and Molecular Approaches. Obversely, 3 per cent of
58 Thefour specialised categories forBiological Sciences and for Engineering andApplied Sciences
are collapsed into one for each science to simplify the comparison.
59 Fora non-scientist this sorting process is complicated by the fact that the 1990 categories arenot
mutually exclusive. For example, cell membrane studies are funded under the categories
Biological Science - Molecular Biology and Cell Metabolism; Biological Science - Plant and
Animal Biology, and Molecular Approaches. Similarly, studies of soil and rock mechanics occur
in the Earth Sciences, Marine Science and Technology and Materials Sciences. Usually there is
enough information in the title of the 1966 project to allow intelligent guesswork about the
appropriate 1990 category. However, some misclassification may have occurred.
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grants classifiedin other disciplinarycategories would in 1990 have been classified as
Biological Science. Within the Biological Sciences in 1966 the largest grants of over
$35,000 each went to cell physiology (2) and neurology. In 1990 the largest
proportion of grants went to molecular biology,biological energy conversion and the
biochemistry of proteins and enzymes; the largest single grant of $45,000 went to a
study of electron microscope technology in biology.
The largest increase in grants in 1990 was to Earth Sciences which became a
category in its own right in 1970. In 1966 the grants for this category were classified
mainly as Physical or Chemical Sciences. The largest grants in 1966 were for seismic
strain studies ($18,600), crystallography ($15,500) and the origin of base metal ores
in Tasmania ($14,850). In 1990 the largest percentage of funds went to 'other earth
sciences' where 12 per cent of researchers in Earth Sciences took 21 per cent of the
funds: an average of $80,000 per project. Among the identified subgroups of the
disciphne the highestaverage grant of $55,000 went to petrology studies.
Engineering and Applied Sciences also had a larger share of funds in 1990: 19
per cent compared with 9 per cent in 1966. The largest increase was in the category
Engineering and Applied Sciences 1 which includes computer systems. Within this
subgroupthe highest-funded researchers were in fluid mechanicswhere 17 per cent of
the projects received 21 per cent of the funds. They also received the highest average
grants of $54,000 compared with a category average of $44,000. In the 1990 ARC
Report grants for computer science and electronic control systemshave been separated
into six subgroups. If these are aggregated they account for 31 per cent of the funds
for the Engineering and Applied Science 1 category.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that in 1966 Materials Science research
accounted for a greater proportion of funds than in 1990 despite this being a priority
area in 1990. The discontinuity between expectation and result is large enough to
warrant detailed justification of the way in which the 1966 grants were re-classified
into 1990 categories.
Table 5.2: Re-classification of 1966 grants in Materials Science
1990 Categories
Biochemistry & metabolism of microorganisms
Inorganic & metal chemistry
Electrochemistry
Environmental & analytical chemistry
Polymer & colloid chemistry
Industrial & mineral chemistry
Mineral processing
General civil engineeering
Soil & rock mechanics
Fluid mechanics
Heat & thermodynamics
Electronic devices & circuits
Applied physics
Condensed matter physics
Metallurgy & metals
General chemical engineering
Ceramic & polymer engineering
1966 Project titles
Surface bonds
Grain boundaries in metals
Magnetic resonance in minerals
Low temperature density waves in metals
Electrical properties of crystalline films
Heterogeneous polymerization
Electric & magnetic molecular behaviour
Cationic polymerization mechanisms
Vinyl polymer molecule size and shape
Block copolymers
Metal/metal oxide surface reactions
Respiratory organelles of microorgans.
Absorption on mineral surfaces
Surface chemistry in mica clays
Ionic solid reaction diffusion mechanisms
Stress-strain properties in materials
Mechanics of discontinua
Technology thin semi-conductor films
Data source: ARGC, First Report, pp. 5-15.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 53-58.
In 1966 a total of eighteen projects could have been classified as Materials Science in
1990. The funds awarded to these projects totalled $408,334 giving an average grant
of $22,685. In 1990 dollars these sums would be $3.2m and $180,000 respectively.
By contrast in 1990 the total spent on this priority category was $1.59m with an
average grant of $49,600.
A similar situation exists for Scientific Instrumentation. Table 5.3 shows the
way in which the 1966 grants can be re-classified into 1990categories. Only projects
involving the development of instrumentation techniques are included.
Table 5.3: Re-ciassification of 1966 grants in the category
Scientinc Instuments and Instrumentation
1990 Categories
Environmental & analytical chemistry
Medical chemistry
Sedimentology
Communications
Applied physics
Accoustics & optics
Instruments & techniques
1966 Project Titles
High voltage electron diffraction
Transmission specimen stages electron
micros.
Mass spectrometry in Geology and Chemistry
High resolution NMR spectrometer studies
Mass spectrometric studies
Low temperature spectroscopy
Infra red spectroscopy
Absorbed molecule spectroscopy
Data source: ARGC, First Report, pp. 5-15.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 53-58.
In this category again the level of funding in 1966 was considerably higher than in
1990. In 1966 the average grant was $20,600 and the total spent was $163,900. In
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1990 dollars these amounts would be $164,000 and $1.3m respectively. In 1990 the
average grant was $46,000 and the total spenta meagre$368,000.
3.1.g Summary of higher education resources
The pattern of resource allocation which has emerged from the above analysis is one
of decreasing autonomy for individualuniversities in the allocation of their diminished
research resources, and increasing superstmctural subgovernment control of the
funding of specifically targeted priority area programs of research. Through the ARC
the superstructure now controls a vastly increased envelope of research resources
which they have chosen to allocate according to different patterns of distribution:
rewarding more researchers now compete for a higher average level of grant.
Although the total amount of resources allocated to higher education research has
increased quite markedly, there is greater dissatisfaction because the majority of
applicants are unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the two specific examples of Materials Science and Scientific
Instmmentation raise questions about whether the ARC is in fact allocating resources
to government-nominated priority areas or whether in fact projects are simply
reclassified to conform with government rhetoric about priority areas. Why, for
example, there are two subgroups of polymer and colloid chemistry; one in the
Chemical Sciences and one in Materials Science?^^
The system would seem to allow for obfuscation which favours the scientists.
Considerable scientific expertise is necesary to unravel the pattern of resource
allocation and so governments are dependent upon the scientists on the
subgovemmental selection committees to ensure that the criteria of prioritisationare
strictly applied when choosing among projects. This aspect of funding for higher
education research seems to offer an example of Wright's congruence of ideologies
hypothesis discussed in chapter one. Wright argues that subgovemmental actors
cannot always control particularistic behaviour by the imposition of general norms.^^
In this instance researchers may be using the policy rhetoric of priorities in order to
avoid the sanction of not receiving funding while actually continuing previous pattems
of research.
The difficulty of accountability at this micro-level of resource allocation in the
science policy community is part of, and contributes to the inherent tension between
scientific values and political values. This is particularly so in higher education basic
research in which the distinction between disciplines and areas of research may be
blurred. In CSIRO, where the research is intended to be of a more applied nature, the
areas of funding should be clearer. The following section examines changing pattems
of funding to, and within, the Organisation between 1965 and 1990.
ARC, TheAustralian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 54-55.
^1 Wright, 'Policy Coininunity, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies', p. 596.
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3.2. Funding for CSIRO
In 1965 CSIRO was still the Commonwealth government's 'principle chosen
instrument' for civilian scientific research.^^ Changes were beginning to be made to
the provision of federal public funding for the production of scientific knowledge in
the secondary industry and academic sectors of research but decision-makers in
CSIRO controlled to a large extent the direction of non-miltary scientific research in
Australia, and their focus was primarily on research for primary industry. The most
significant changes in the funding of the production of scientific knowledge in CSIRO
between 1965 and 1990 have been: the requirement that up to 30 per cent of CSIRO's
total budget should be generated from outside direct government funding; the
increased financial accountability of the Organisation to the government; and the
changed focus in scientific activity which accompanies CSIRO's location in the
Department of Industry Technology and Commerce.
3.2.a CSIRO's share of the federal budget
The proportion of funds for research and development allocated to CSIRO has
changed relatively little over the 25-year period. In 1965 CSIRO received 24 per cent
of the research and development funds allocated in Appropriations 1 and 2, and in
1990 the Organisation received 27 per cent. Compared with the allocation for defence
science which fell from 36 per cent to 14 per cent; and the allocation for medical
research which increased fourfold, the allocation of resources to CSIRO has remained
fairly consistent. The two major sources of funding for CSIRO are appropriations and
external 'contributions' from public and private sector organisations sponsoring the
production of scientific knowledge. Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between the
two types of funding from 1965 to 1991.
The data show that there has been an overall increase in real terms in
appropriations to CSIRO. Until 1974 the increases were gradual but substantial,
rising by 68 per cent in nine years. Between 1974 and 1980 funding stabilised,
increasing by only 4 per cent. In 1980 funding increased in real terms by 16 per cent
in one year. This increase is due to two administrative decisions. Firstly, in 1978,
acting upon the recommendations of the Independent Committee of Inquiry into
CSIRO, the government decided that CSIRO funding should continue to be through
budgetary appropriation and that the Organisation should avoid over-reliance on Rural
Industry Research Funds for the generation of revenue. Consequently, research
funds, which had hitherto been allocated to other agencies who re-allocated them to
CSIRO, were now to be paid by direct appropriation. In this way, for example,
money from the Department of Defence's Materials Research Laboratories; funding for
Gresford, The Organisation ofScience Policy in Australia, p. 11.
fisheries research and 60 per cent of the Wool Research Trust Account were
transferred to CSIRO's direct appropriation.^^
Figure 5.11: CSIRO, expenditure, appropriations and external funding,
1965-1991
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Secondly, in 1981-82 the Fraser government implemented another recommendation of
the Independent Inquiry that CSIRO should operate under a system of global
budgeting in which: 'the government approves a total level of activity for the
Organization and the Executive is free to allocate resources to objectives within that
lever.65 Direct appropriations were increased by 14 per cent in the 1981-82 Budget to
enable CSIRO to cope with the new accounting and management requirements.
3.2.b Increasing accountability
These changes in financial and accounting procedures for CSIRO mark the beginning
of the end of the organisational maintenance phase of the allocation of resources to the
Organisation. The Organisation now had to meet all increases in costs from a single
budget rather than simply passing them on to be met by the government in the form of
63 CSIRO Thirty Second Annual Report 1979-80, Part. Paper 95, Canberra, 1981, p. 77.
64 Theway in which expenditure, appropriations andcontributions havebeen reported in theAnnual
Reports has changed over the period. Total expenditure data is taken from statements of
Consolidated Funds. Appropriations were traditionally listed as 'Treasury Contributions'.
Contributions from 1968-1986 are taken from the first table in each Financial Statement.
Contributions include funds from the research trust funds which also include a government
component.
66 CSIRO, Thirty Fourth Annual Report 1981-82, Park Paper 397, Canberra, 1982. p. 129.
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increased appropriations for the following year. In the mid-1970s Fraser had
continued the tradition of allowing scientists to decide the internal allocation of
resources within the Organisation, and the above changes continued that policy.
At the same time considerable questioning of the role of CSIRO was occurring
through such forums as the Royal Commission on Australian Government
Administration; the Independent Committee of Inquiry into CSIRO in 1977, and the
first ASTEC Report on Science and Technology in Australia in 1978. In the 1980s the
Hawke government has had a very different concept of CSIRO's role and the
allocation of resources to the Organisation reflects the political will to make the
scientific activity undertaken within the Organisation more closely follow the needs of
economic production across all industrial sectors.
Between 1984 (the first Budget totally controlled by an ALP government) and
1990 appropriations to CSIRO fell by 4 per cent. There were three years in the 1980s
when, for the first time since the Organisation was in its infancy in the Depression,
the government actually reduced the level of funding to CSIRO. The first (5 per cent)
occurred in 1984-85 and was explained by Jones as due partly to the fact that
govemment needed to assess its resource priorities in terms of an early general election
(and that scientists are not effective political lobbyists); partly by the fact that certain
functions such as the Landsat activity had been transferred to other agencies, and
partly by the fact that the research and development phase of the aircraft landing
system, InterScan, was complete.66
From the above discussion it is evident that considerable changes have taken
place in the control of resource allocation to CSIRO in the 1980s. These changes have
been concerned with forcing researchers in CSIRO to make their research more
relevant to the needs of industry. CSIRO scientists have traditionally been allowed
considerable autonomy and looseness of financial accountability in the internal
allocation of resources to research projects. Govemment is increasingly exerting
centralised control over the organisation of research through parliamentary scmtiny of
accounting practices, and is expecting the Organisation to tighten intemal control over
its divisions.
3.2.C External fund generation and distribution
Between 1986 and 1988 appropriations for CSIRO were cut by 16 per cent in real
terms. It was at this time that the government-induced organisational reforms took
place: '...to align its [CSIRO's] stmctural elements with Australia's major economic
and social activities'.^7 The financial means of achieving this realignment was a
reduction in appropriation funds and a concommittant exhortation through ministerial
guidelines to the Organisation for more reliance on outside sponsorship. The
Jones, 'The 1984 Science and Technology Budget', pp. 245-248.
67 CSIRO, Annual Report 1987-88, Pad. Paper 37, Canberra, 1989, p. 46.
government's objective was for CSIRO to achieve extemal funding at the level of 30
per cent of total revenue. Figure 5.12 shows the level of contributions to CSIRO
between 1965 and 1990.
Figure 5.12: CSIRO, external funds (contributions) as a percentage of
total expenditure, 1965-1990, in 1990 $
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Data source: CSIRO, Annual Reports, 1965-1991.
The figure shows that external funding has always contributed a considerable
proportion of CSIRO funds. In 1966 the level reached 24 per cent but declined
gradually to a low of 9 per cent in 1983. Between 1977 and 1986 such contributions
had hovered between 9 and 12 per cent of total expenditure, with a low point of 9 per
cent in 1983. The change since 1986 has been dramatic. After the restructuring and
redefinition of CSIRO's role in 1986, contributions became known as 'external
funding' and increased from 11 per cent in 1986 to 33 per cent in 1990. As explained
below, not all of this funding is from private sources and therefore cannot be
interpreted as coming direct from industry. Nevertheless the increase has been
substantial.
Of equal importance to the govenment's objectives for CSIRO is the use to
which the sponsored research is put. Figure 5.13 shows the distribution of extemal
funds for 1965 and 1990by socio-economic objective.^s
As the 1965 contributions have been sorted into 1990 categories by the author it is unlikely that
there is a perfect comparison.
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Figure 5.13: CSIRO the distribution of external funds by socio
economic objective, 1965-90
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Canberra, 1991, pp. x-xii.
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisationfor the Year1965-66, pp. 207-233.
The most strikingfeature is that in 1990, as in 1965, the major proportion of external
funds were for research connected with rural production. Nevertheless, the figure
also shows that there have been some marked changes in the classification of
contributions according to socio-economic objective. The greatest change has
occurred in the manufacturing and environment categories. Manufacturing industry
accounts for the largest category change since 1965. The environment category in
1990 included research intoproduction-based environmental issues.®
There is some controversy over the Commonwealth government's use of the
term 'external funding'. The funds listed as contributions and external funds in
CSIRO's Annual Reports include funds from the private sector and funds transferred
from other government agencies, both Commonwealth and State. Until 1969 the
amount and name of each contributor was listed in the Annual Report, and private
sector contributions could be distinguished from public sector transfers. Since 1970
this has not been possible. The situation is compounded by the use of funds from
research trust accounts which include private and public funds. It becomes very hard
to separate the two and therefore to ascertain exactly how much research work
undertaken by CSIRO is being produced for commercial enterprises.
69 CSIRO, CSIRO Research 1990-91: Directory of CSIRO Research Programs, CSIRO, Canberra,
1991, pp. x-xii.
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The issue of external funding for CSIRO is one which has provoked close
parliamentary scrutiny. The situation was investigated by the Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO) in 1991, and by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts in
1992. The ANAO found that CSIRO's management practices did not allow a
systematic evaluation of efficiency and productivity with regard to the generation and
use of external funds.'^ ^ For example, the information published by CSIRO is not
detailed enough in terms of sources of extemal funds, or the way in which the funds
are used, to allow an assessment of financial performance. The Report recommended
that CSIRO should adopt reporting practices which allow explicit definitions of
funding arrangements, and that such practices should be uniform throughout all
divisions of the Organisation.'^ ^
The Joint Committee endorsed the findings of the Auditor-General and
recommended that a follow-up audit should be undertaken in 1993-94 to examine how
CSIRO had responded to the efficiency report. In addition the Committee
recommended that CSIRO (and other government research agencies) should ensure
that overhead costs are included for all contracted research projects, including those
undertaken for govemment agencies.''^
Nevertheless, the data demonstrate a definite shift in the patterns of extemal
funding both in the increased amount of funding and in the use to which the research
is directed. The increases indicate a sizeable increase in the amount of sponsored
manufacturing industry research. An examination of the internal allocation of
resources within CSIRO should indicate the extent to which there has been an
accompanying shift to techno-economistic objectives for the Organisation's
appropriation funds.
3.2.d The internal allocation of resources in CSIRO
Figure 5.14 compares the proportional distribution of financial resources within
CSIRO for the years 1965 and 1990. The figures used represent the total expenditure
of CSIRO including appropriations, earnings and extemal funds.'^ ^
Australian National Audit Office, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
- Extemal Funds Generation, 2.3.61, p. 28; and 2.3.52, p. 27.
"71 Ibid., 3.1.28, p. 34.
Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector Research and
Development, p. 215-218.
The form in which such data has given has changed markedly in the 1980s. CSIRO Annual
Reports now give only abbreviated financial data. Therefore in order to make the required
comparison a spreadsheet was compiled of the data given in the CSIRO Annual Reportfor 1965-
66 and sorted according to the categories used in the CSIRO National Research Priorities Exercise
1990 which is the form in which the allocation of resources within CSIRO is presented in the
1990-91 Directory of CSIRO Research Programs. This method is relatively simple but the
figures obtained for 1965 cannot be considered as absolutely comparable with the figures for 1990
because of the difficulty of disaggregating scientific work done in any one organisational division
or sub-division 25 years ago and re-categorising this work according to the final use to which the
scientific knowledge was put. The Environment category shown on the graph is formed from the
CSIRO National Research Priorities categories Environment and Economic Development -
Environmental Aspects. Two other 1990 categories. Transport Industries and Commercial
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Figure 5.14: CSIRO, internal allocation of resources 1965 and 1990
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Thegraph shows thatthe shift away from mral research to research for manufacturing
industry and environmental affairs has been at the expense of rural-based
manufacturing research. The component of research categorised asPlant andAnimal
Production and Primary Products for 1965 and 1990 hasremained relatively stable at
28 percentand 27percent respectively of research expenditure. Because there is no
detailed breakdown of contributions/sponsorship for 1990 it is not possible to gauge
the extent to whichmral research expenditure in the various Institutes and Divisions is
industry-oriented. However, the 1991 CSIRO publication Australia's Science:
Australia's Future confirms that the level of expenditure on research categorised as
being for mral-based manufacturing is substantially lower than expenditure for plant
and animal productionand for manufacturing industry
CSIRO research for manufacturing industry increased markedly from 1965 to
1990. In 1965 research for secondary industry accounted for only 10 per cent of
CSIRO's total expenditure. This low level indicates the lack of interest in
manufacturing as opposed to mral industry by CSIRO and the Menzies government.
The strong electoral influence of mral interests and the political dependence of the
Services have been grouped togetherbecauseof the difficulties of including the tiny proportions
involved on the same graph as the largest categories.
CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia's Future, CSIRO Operational Plan 1991-92, CSIRO,
Canberra, pp. 13; 29; 45; 67; 89 & 109.
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Liberal Party on the Country Party meant that CountryParty members occupied key
positions in the executive core and subgovernment^^ In 1990 the proportion of
funding allocated to secondary industry researchhad risento 19 per cent which is the
same amount as that allocated by CSIRO to environmental research. However, given
the Hawke government's continuous rhetoric about the need to increase the amount of
scientific knowledge produced for and used by secondary industry, and the
introduction of the tax concession which in 1990 equalled two thirds of CSIRO'
appropriation revenue, this relatively low allocation indicates the extent to which
CSIRO in 1990 is no longer trusted to be the Government's 'chosen principle
instrument' for the distribution of funds for manufacturing research.
The smaller categories of research of Health and Defence are explained by the
existence of the NH&MRC since 1937 and the separationof civil and military defence
after the 'Red Scientist' political scandal in 1947. The low but consistent level of
funding for mineral research in CSIRO has two causes. Firstly, the private minerals
industry in Australia has always funded its own research, either in-house or at
specialised institutes, at a level much higher than most Australian private industry.'^ ^
Secondly, the Commonwealth governmentfunds mineral research through the Bureau
of Mineral Resources at a higher level ($53m in 1990) than the minerals research
allocation of CSIRO ($34min 1990).
The anomaly of a higher proportion of funding in 1965 for the Information and
Communication Industries category reflects the greater emphasis in 1965 on
Radiophysics and Research (mainly computing) Services. Whilst total CSIRO
funding has almostdoubled in real terms between 1965 and 1990($212m to $414m)
the category Information and Communications Industry, which includes the above
divisions, has decreased ($28m : %2Ava)J^ The lower allocation reflects the lower
techno-economic utility of pure research in this area.
In the area of environmental research the Board of CSIRO has obviously
decided that CSIRO has a major role. The types of research included in each of these
Fadden, McEwen, Page and Anthony were in control of the Treasury and Trade portfolios.
Crisp, 'Central Co-ordination of Commonwealth Policy-making:Roles and Dilemmas of the
Prime Minister's Department', p. 39
^^ Professor Howard Worner, one time Research Director of CRA, holder of many academic and
business positions in science and eurrently Professor of Microwave Physics at Wollongong
University, indicated that, in his opinion the mining industry, both through the Australian
Mining Research Association and through individual firms such as BHP, CRA and Western
Mining Corporation, has been much more far-sighted in its integration of research and production
than manufacturing industry.
Worner, Interview and Personal Correspondance, 3.11.89 & 6.11.89.
It is unlikely that this is due to the compilation of the category in 1965. The sub-divisions
included are; Radiophysics; Upper Atmosphere; Radio Research Board; Computing Research;
Mathematical Statistics; Extramural Investigations; and Other Research Services. Of these only
Extramural Services (4% of category) and the Radio Research Board (2% of category) are not
included in the 1990 Institute ofInformation Science and Engineering .
CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia's Future, CSIRO Operational Plan 1991-92, p. 7.
categories is given below ^8 Also listedare the areas of research from 1965 whichare
considered to be equivalent.
Table 5.4: CSIRO, environmental research categories 1965 and 1990
1965(10%) 1990(19%)
Fisheries and Oceanography Economic DeveloDment(9%)
Land Research Rural production
Tropical Pastures Mineral production
Wildlife Research Energy production
Soil Mechanics Industrial production
Meteorological physics Construction
National Welfare (10%)
Climate
Atmosphere
Oceans
Land use
Water resources
Nature ecosystems
Environment, impact & protection nec
Other environment
Source: CSIRO Eighteenth Annual Report, Part. Paper no. 316, 1964-65-66, pp. 207-231.
CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia's Future, CSIRO Operational Plan 1991-92, p. 7.
The 1965 grouping of research areas correspond closely with the 1990 National
Welfare Environment category (theFisheries component is not separable in the 1965
Annual Report). However, examination of the titles from the list of pubhcations from
each Division in 1965 indicates that only in Wildlife Research was there a majority of
articles not obviously connected with economicproduction. Awareness of the effect
of human settlement and production on the Austrahan ecosystem has been a traditional
concern of CSIRO. The allocation of 'new money' for environmental research
through concern about the global environment has allowed this facet of CSIRO
production of scientific knowledge to be emphasised. However, the 1991-92 internal
allocation of resources shows that 'economic' aspects of the environment are being
researched more than 'pure' environmental issues.'^ ^
3.2.e Summary of CSIRO resources
It would appear that CSIRO's basic role is still that of producer of scientific
knowledge for rural industry, though with decreased emphasis on rural
manufacturing. The second most important roles are in research for secondary
industry and environmental research. Cultural research in such areas as radiophysics
and the non-economic study of the environmentis receiving a decreasing proportion of
CSIRO funds. This reflects the view of the Hawke government that govemment-
78 CSIRO, CSIRO Research 1990-91, p. xii.
79 The proportion of resources allocated to environmental research in 1991 fell slightly to 8.8%
whereas projects researching economic aspects of the environment received 11.5% of total
resources.
CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia's Future, CSIRO Operational Plan 1991-92, p. 7.
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funded research institutions should be instrumental in the restructuring of Australia's
secondary industry. The requirement to generate external funds has also forced the
Organisation to reassess its internal distribution of resources away from rural
manufacturing and towards environmental and manufacturing research. The changes
have been accompanied by an increased level of scrutiny of the use of funds within
CSIRO by parliamentary agencies. The result of all the changes is that scientists's
autonomy over the use of funds has been decreased.
3.3 Manufacturing industry
Australian manufacturing industries traditionally have the lowest level of research and
development activity of all sectors of the scientific community. In 1961 Encel gave
three reasons for this low level of scientific knowledge production in Australian
manufacturing: Australia's industries weresmall-scale; there was a largeproportionof
overseas ownership; and a culture inherited from British firms of demanding tariff
protection from government rather than investing in innovation.^o This cultural
inertia, combined with the political power of the Country Party to control ideas and
resources for research, resulted in a low level of government intervention in the
innovative policies of the manufacturing sector in the 1960s, and a low level of
financial resources, both public and private, committed to manufacturing research.
The growing awareness of the need for intervention, and the need for governments to
overcome industrial inertia through techno-economistic programs of incentives for
research, has resulted in an increased level of public and private research investment in
1990.
3.3.a Protection and innovation
In 1964-65 manufacturing industry policy was based primarily on the premises of
import replacement and full employment to maintain consumption. The policy was
underpinned by a strategy of tariff protection for local industries which in effect
constituted a form of subsidy by consumers to domestic producers.This protection
allowed a diversification of industry at the expense of innovation and efficiency.
Australian manufacturing firms were guaranteed domestic markets and did not have to
compete with imports or compete in global markets for survival. A scientist who
worked in manufacturing industry in the 1960s describes the situation thus:
I had enormous fmstrations in trying to persuade a company like AWA to adopt
a relevant approach towards its innovative efforts. It was very happy to
continue doing the things it had done for the last decadeor two and did'nt really
want to get involved in new developments. That was very frustrating for me
because I was running a research laboratory and we kept on coming up with
new developments that they did'nt want to know about... .You did'nt have to be
innovative, you just had to make sure that that tariff wall stayed there because
once you got 40% or 90% or 220% or whatever it was - and there were specific
Encel, 'Financing Scientific Research in Australia', p. 265.
81 Ibid., p. 210 & 354,
219
220
as well as percentage tariffs such as 37c or 3/3d on every radio valve - so ifyou
could make a valve for l/4dyou had over 200% protection.82
In 1965 theCommittee ofEconomic Enquiry had calculated that tariff protection
had given Australian producers the advantage of a 25-30 per cent general cost
disability.83 xhe Committee argued that manufacturing industry in Australia should
begin to diversify away from pure import replacement by concentrating more on
exports. To this end the dependence on imported technological know-how should be
reduced by increasing investment in local research and development. Financial
incentives for research and development insecondary industry should beprovided by
the Commonwealth government.^"^ In 1967 the government's response to the Vemon
Committee's Report was to introduce a system of grants to encourage industry to
invest in the production of scientific knowledge as a means to greater wealth
production and the replacement of imports.
3.3.b The Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants
Scheme 1967-1976
In 1967 the Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Scheme
(AIRDGS) was established under the auspices of the Department of Trade and
Industry. The government's objective was to increase the amount of research and
development activity in the manufacturing and mining industries. Grants were
calculated on the basis ofthe increase inresearch and development activity measured
against the base year of 1965-66, and therefore were biased towards firms already
undertaking research. Grants could be awarded for research undertaken outside the
firm but only in laboratories in Australia. There were two categories of grant: general
grants which gave 50 per cent of research and development increases up to $50,000 a
year (ie amaximum grant of $25,000); and selective grants which consisted of up to
50 per cent of expenditure on increases in research and development above $25,000.^3
h i Analvsis of the ATRDS grants bv class of industrial activitv
The first grants were made in 1967-68 and totalled $650,000 ($5m in 1990 values).
However, the first year ofawards cannot be considered typical because ofthe haste
with which the Board was established; the fact that the first financial year offunding
included only ten months of operation, and the fact that explanatory notes helping
82 Professor Richard E. Collins, Chairman ANSTO, member NERDDC, Department of Applied
Physics, University of Sydney, Intervierw, 8.11.89.
83 Committee of EconomicEnquiry,Report1965, pp. 356-357.
84 Ibid.,p. 212.
Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Board (AIRDGB), FirstAnnual Report
1967-68, Parl. Paper 110,Canberra, 1968, p. 58.
86 Ibid., pp. 3-5.
companies to interpret the Act were not available until the second year of operation. '^^ -
Figure 5.15: AIRDS grants 1968-77, selected grants by class of
manufacture
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Data source: Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Board, Annual Reports, 1967-
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Figure 5.15 gives the proportions of AIRDGS grants awarded from 1968-77 by the
eight most significant classes of manufacturing and mining activity.Research and
development activity, and therefore presumably science-based innovation, was highest
in machinery and metal manufacture (24 per cent). Grants within this category of
manufacturing were spread evenly across the subcategories with agricultural,
construction and refrigeration equipment receiving the highest proportion of funds. A
similar situation occurred with research and development grants for electrical
manufactures with telephone, radio and television producers receiving the highest
Ibid., pp. 1-2; and
AIRDGB, Annual Report 1968-69, Parl. Paper 142, Canbera, 1968, p. 1.
In the Second Reading debate for the Industrial Research and Developments Grants Bill, Whitlam
was doubtful about the Scheme's chances of effectiveness:
The haste with which this proposal has been brought before Parliament indicates how little
time has been available for carefully thinking out the implications and consulting the bodies
which might be in a position to give advice. The original proposal was given in the last
Budget by the Treasurer (Mr McMahon) in what was virtually an election promise. It has
now been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Trade and Industry. From our
knowledge of what happens in the Department of Trade and Industry, we can have no
confidence that the scheme will be administered in a disinterested fashion. The Department
has no great knowledge or expertise in this field and it is likely that the administration of the
scheme will be animated by the same spirit as the policy of protecting its industrial friends,
regardless of the efficiency or of the benefit to the country as a whole.
Australia, House of Representatives 1967, Debates, vol. HR55, p. 2345.
The categoriesfood and beverages and machinery and metal manufactures have been aggregated
from four separate categories. No other categories of activity were so obviously similar in
output. The graph uses figures aggregated over the life of the AIRDGS because yearly
fluctuations in amounts awarded make longitudinal analysison an annual basis meaningless.
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amounts. However, the funding for some categories, such as ores and metals, and
transport, were consistently dominated byresearch activity in particular areas such as
copper production androad transport respectively. Often very largegrants went to a
single manufacturer. For example, in 1969 $0.47m of the $0.97m total awarded for
new scientific knowledge in the transport area went to General Motors-Holden Pty.
Ltd. Ten grants were over $100,000, representing 23 percentof funds allocated to
only 2 percent of the 450 recipient companies.^o
At the time of the Second Reading of the AIRD Bill in 1967, Whitlam had
argued that not all research and development leads toeconomic growth therefore only
selected areas of research should be funded, and small manufacturers should be
favoured.9i In 1974, under the Whitlamgovernment, there was a marked change in
direction for some of the hitherto largest beneficiaries of the scheme. Between 1968
and 1973 research and development grants for ores and metal production had
consistently formed over 16 percent of annual AIRDG funding. For the next four
years the proportion barely reached 8 per cent. Transport production research and
development suffered a similar fate with the proportion dropping from 17 per cent to5
per cent. In 1974 only nine firms received grants over $100,000. This constituted 1
per cent of all firms and they received 8 per cent of the year's funds. The areas of
production tobenefit were chemical, machinery, electrical and electronic production.
3.3.b.ii The availability of funds for AIRDS
By 1976 the scheme was in considerable trouble. Figure 5.16 illustrates the
relationship between available funds and applicants for grants. From 1974 industry
was increasingly asking for research and development money that had been cutback to
1967 levels in real terms. A new approach was needed and a new scheme was
introduced by the Fraser government.
90 The ten were: General Motors-Holden's ($.47m); Amalgamated Wireless ($.27m); Imperial
Chemical Industries ($.25m); The Broken Hill Proprietary ($.23m); Electrolytic Refining &
Smelting ($.19m); Fibremakers ($.16m); Chrysler Australia ($.16m); Australian Iron and Steel
($.13m); Massey-Ferguson ($.llm); Radio Corporation ($.10m).
AIRDGB, AnnualReport1969-70, ParkPaper 126, Canberra, 1970, pp. 454-461.
91 Australia, House of Representatives 1967, Debates, vol. HR55, p. 2346.
Figure 5.16: AIRDS grants 1968-77, numbers of applicants and
available funds in (1990$).
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Data source: Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Board, Annual Reports, 1967-
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3.3.C The Australian Research and Development Incentives Scheme
(AIRDIS), 1976-86
The new scheme differed from the old in several ways: in the type of grants offered, in
its structure, and in the criteria by which companies were selected for grants (structure
and criteria will be discussed in chapter 6). The scheme survived until 1986 with
numerous amendments but its inherent lack of flexibility and capacity to adapt to the
needs of the Hawke govemment's sciencepolicy eventually led to its demise.
S.S.c.i Tvpes of grant
The grants at the disposal of the Minister were of three types: commencement grants,
project grants and public interest grants. Commencement grants allowed a company
the lesser of an amountequal to 25 per cent of the eligibleexpenditure of the company
in that grant year, or $25,000. They were intended to allow smaller companies the
opportunity of establishing research and development activities and to that end
companies which had already received either $125,000 in grants, or which had
received grants over the previous eightyears wereexcluded.
Project grants allowed a company up to 25 per cent of the amount that, in the
Board's opinion, would be the company's expenditure on a project subsequent to the
date of agreement. The maximum project grant was to be be $250,000 unless
approved otherwise by theMinister. Each yeartheallocation forProject Grants would
be 80% of the preceding year's allocationplus any amount that the Minister chose to
allocate during the year.
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Section 39 of the Act allowed the Minister to authorise the Board to make
arrangements for the carrying out of specific projectsof industrial research which the
Minister determined to be in the public interest. These public interest grants were
designed to encourage co-operation between government and industry on projects
which otherwise would not be undertaken because of lack of short -term commercial
viability but which were, in the long-term, of national interest.^2 Such grants were
first awarded in 1978 and 77 had been awarded by the end of the scheme in 1986.
The funding of such grants indicates the recognition by the Fraser government that
intervention was as necessary in the relationship between research and manufacturing
industry as it was in rural industry.
3.3.c.ii The availability of funds
Figure 5.17 illustrates the relationship between the availability of funds and the
number of firms applying to the AIRDIS Board for both commencement and project
grants.
Figure 5.17: AIRDIS grants 1977-86, numbers of applicants and
available funds (1990$).
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The graph shows that throughout the life of the scheme funds generally paralleled the
rise and fall in applications except for the large cut in funding in 1981 when the 'razor
gang' approach was used by Fraser to reduce the Budget deficit. In 1979-80
applications outstripped funds and in 1980-81 funds were increased to meet demand.
^2 Australian Industrial Research and Development Incentives Board (AIRDIB), Annual Report 1985-
86, Parl. Paper 130, Canberra, 1987, p.9.
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In fact eventual demand fell below expected levels because 11 per cent of applications
were judged as ineligible under the conditions of grants. Midway through the
following (1981-82) financial year the appropriations already set for AIRDIS were
reduced by withdrawal of warrant. Commencement grants were cut by 8 per cent;
project grants by 34 per cent; and the funds for public interest research by 60 per cent.
Such drastic cuts at such short notice demoralised a staff already pruned below its
1978 levels, and caused confusion in industries where prompt receipt of fimds was
necessary to maintain or begin complex research and development projects.^^
Coupled with changes in structure and grant processing which delayed the Board's
first selection meeting for three months into the same financial year these uncertainties
reduced the credibility of the scheme in industry. Knowledge of the scheme was not
widespread and of those who applied for the incentives many were unaware that
grants were awarded on a competitive basis believing that it was necessary only to
satisfy the criteriato obtaina grant.94
3.3.c.iii The need for change and the Jones solution
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a succession of enquiries into incentives
for industrial research and development, and a consequent restructuring of the AIRDIS
scheme which widened the criteria of selection. The establishment of a technical
committee with the capacity to advise on the potential market viability of new scientific
industrial knowledge effectively gave the government the sanetion of witholding
grants from eompanies on the grounds of market competence as well as scientific
competence.
With the change of govemment in 1983 the AIRDIS scheme, enlarged to cover
the computer industry, was placed under the auspices of the new Department of
Science. The membership of the Board was increased to include market specialists
and scientists from the new biotechnology industryThe Board advised the Minister
that the present scheme was unlikely to be able to implement his new policy because
the need to operate through the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce,
and the Public Service Board, constrained autonomy, and therefore flexibility and
speed in the allocation of resources.^^ jn 1986 a new incentive scheme was
established under legislation designed after consultation with industry, research
organisations, professional organisations anduniversities.^^
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1980-81, Parl. Paper 113, Canberra, pp. iii, 5-7; &
AJRDlBAnnual Report 1981-82, Parl. Paper 88, Canberra, pp. iii, 3-5, 22-25.
94 Ibid, pp. 2 & 22.
93 Ibid., p. 60.
96 In 1984-5 the Department of Scienee was merged with the Department of Industry, Technology
and Commerce.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1984-85, Parl. Paper 431, Canberra, pp. iii-iv.
97 AIRDIB, Annual Report 1983-84, Parl. Paper 321, Canberra, p. iii.
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3.3.d The GIRD scheme 1986-1990
The new scheme is entitled the Grants for Industry Research and Development
(GIRD) scheme and consists of four major programs for govemment support of
industrial research and development: a 150% Tax Concession, Discretionary Grants,
Generic Technology Grants and the National Procurement Development Program.
3.3.d.i The 150 % tax concession
The concession allows companies to deduct 150 per cent of the cost of research and
development either performed in-house or contracted to approved research
organisations. The full concession is only allowable when expenditure is $50,000 or
more. All contracted research is deducted at 150 per cent. In the 1991 Industry
Statement the then Prime Minister Hawke confirmed that the concession, which had
been under threat of removal several times since 1985, was to be a permanent fixture
of the incentive system. By 1989 there were 2202 manufacturing companies
registered as eligible for concessions and the revenue foregone by the government
totalled$1056msince the scheme's inception.^s
It is interesting to note that, in 1980-81, the then Minister for Science and
Technology, DavidThomson, included a shortdiscussion of the tax concessions for
research and development in the first Science and Technology Statement. He noted
advice from the Commissioner for Taxes that in the financial year 1979-80
approximately $1 million of revenue was foregone asresearch and development under
Section 73A of the Income Tax Assessment Act and another $lm as accelerated
depreciation ofplant used for scientific activity. This was equivalent to$6.5m in 1990
terms and was estimated to be at the level of a 46 to 55 per cent concession. At the
present tax concession of 150 percent this would be the equivalent of $19.5m which
indicates a much lower level of researchand development activityby industry in 1979-
80. The Commissioner advised the Minister for Sciencp and Technology that to claim
the tax foregone as a form of govemment expenditure on research and development
would be against normal practice and be 'meaningless' since the tax foregone would
be recouped in the long-term by the revenue on extraincome which results from the
innovation process.^^
However, in the same year ASTEC advised the PrimeMinister that the business
community was overwhelmingly in favour of tax concessions as the major mechanism
for research and develpment subsidy in Australia. The Council cited the AIRG,
whose members perform 85 per cent of the privately-conducted research and
development in Australia, giving the advantages of a taxconcession schemeas:
Industry Resesarch &Development Board (IR&DB), Annual Report 1991-92, Parl. Paper 236,
Canberra, 1992, pp. 96-97.
Department of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Statement1980-81, pp. 117-
118. The Holt Government also rejected the tax concession as the form of subsidy for research
and development to be used in the originalAIRDG schemein 1967.
Australia, House of Representatives 1967,Debates, vol. HR55, p. 2357.
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• autonomy in deciding which research should be undertaken;
• speed in initiating and carrying our research projects;
• the plans for, and the results of the research can be kept secret;
• reduction in the bureaucracy for application and selection procedures.
Despite ASTEC's enthusiatic endorsement of the tax concessionmechanism it was not
introduced by the Eraser government, and did not receive Cabinet approval in the
Hawke government until 1985.
3.3.d.ii Discretionary Grants
Discretionary Grants are aimed at small firms beginning to undertake research and
development but which do not have enough taxation liabilities to benefit from the tax
concession. The grant covers 50 per cent of eligible expenditure in excess of
$50,000. In 1990 67 firms were awarded grants totalling $14m. In the five years of
the GIRD scheme 370 firms had received a total of $92m.i0i In 1991 the scheme was
enlarged to include service industriesand market research.
3.3.d.iii Generic Technologv Grants
Generic Technology Grants are designed to support pre-competitive strategic R&D in
particularnew or emerging technologies whichare designated by the Ministeras being
of fundamental significance for industry competitiveness in the 1990s but which are
unlikely to develop if left to market forces alone.
Researchers working in industry, higher education and other research centres are
eligible for generic technology grants. The share of project costs met by the grant is
determined on a case-by-case basis. In most cases grants will only be awarded to
public sector researchers who have definite arrangements with private sector backers.
For example, in 1990 the University of Tasmania and Australian Newsprint Mills
received a grant worth $318,000 for research into the bleaching of recycled
newsprint.
Figure 5.18 shows that the funds for generic technology have been evenly
distributed to the originally specified areas - Communications Technology was
declared a priority area in 1987and Waste and EnvironmentManagement Technology
was declared a priority area only in 1990. Overall, 615 companies have applied for
grants and 25 per cent of these have been successful. The most competitive area is
Information Technology where only 19 per cent of applicants have been successful
compared with 44 per cent in Communications Technology. The least competitive
1®® ASTEC, Industrial Research and Development; Proposals for Additional Incentives, AGPS,
Canberra, 1980, p. 33.
The figures used in this section have been computed using data from each Annual Report. The
way in which claims are received, processed and awarded for this type of scheme means that
claims and awards are often backdated to the year in which the research activity was performed.
Consequently, reported totals of applications, approvals and awards may vary. For example, the
1990-91 Annual Report states that 373 firms have received grants totalling $102 million.
IR&DB, Annual Report 1990-91, p. 26.
102 Ibid., p. 240.
area in 1990 was for New Materials Technology where 91 per cent of applicants
received grants.
Figure 5.18: The distribution of generic technology grants by area of
research, 1986-90
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Data source: Industry Research and Development Board, Annual Reports, 1986-90.
3.3.d.iv National Procurement Development Program
The National Procurement Development Program was established in 1988 to fund
projects which encourage government departments and agencies to seek Australian
solutions for their forward procurement needs. In 1990 $6m was awarded under the
program to such firms as Vision Systems in South Australia which, with the South
Australian Police, developed and trialled a computerised management system for
digital audio recording. The program, which in 1990 was included in the Industry
Research and Development Act 1986, was due to end in 1990 but has been extended
until 1994.'03
3.3.e The proportional distribution of industrial research incentives
from 1968-1990
Figure 5.19 illustrates the pattern ofchange in the allocation ofgrants to different areas
of manufacturing according to International Patents Classification (IPG) between 1968
and 1990.'04 The GIRD tax concesssion and discretionary grants have been used for
'03 IR&DB, Annual Report 1988-89, Parl. Paper 23, Canberra, 1990, p. 57.
'04 Thedatafor the periods 1968-76 and 1977-86 used in Figure 5.16 are the same as those used in
earlier figures. Datafor discretionary grants in the GIRD scheme correspond to those for the
earlier schemes. The tax concession data are presented in a slightly different way in the Annual
Reports, in that the table in which the IPG data is given is sub-divided into manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sections (see, for example, IR&DB, Annual Report1990-91, Table A5.2, p.
140). However, unlike previous practice and for discretionary grants, data for the mining,
construction and computer areas of manufacturing are given in the non-manufacturing section.
This is because the tax data are preparedby the Tax Officewhich uses a different categorisation
from DITAC which prepares the dataon discretionary grants. Forease of comparison these data
have been re-aggregated into the manufacturing data .
the period from 1986-90 because they are most similar in function to the projectand
commencement grants of AIRDIS, and the general and selective grants of the first
AIRDG scheme. Some areas of manufacturing which receive incentives below five
per cent of the total have been excluded in order to simplify the comparison. In
analysing the graph it must be remembered that the data representpercentages of the
amounts awarded and not the actual funds. The tax concession revenue foregone is
roughly ten times the monies allocated as discretionary grants.
Figure 5.19: Comparison of AIRDS, AIRDIS and GIRD grants 1968-90
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The graph shows that the GIRD discretioitary scheme favours comparties in the
scientific apparatus and computing area. Discretionary grants are intended for small,
often new, firms which cannot take advantage of the tax concession. Research in this
scheme is to some extent govemment-selected whereas research in the tax concession
scheme is company-selected.The scientific and computing area also has the
105 Obviously government outreach activity on research and development stimulation also has an
effect on firms claiming research activity as a tax concession.
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second highest amount of research and development tax concession and therefore is
the area of manufacturing in Australia which not only has the most government
approval but also conducts the most self-generated research. The higherproportions
of tax concessions over discretionary grants in the chemistry, food and beverages, and
miscellaneous areas indicate that it is the larger, more established firms which are
doing more research. The mining (ores and mineralproducts) area claimedthe largest
amount of tax concession in 1989. Research activity in the electrical industry is
occurring at a proportionally higher rate in smaller firms, whereas machinery and
metal manufactures research is more evenly balanced between discretionary grants and
tax concessions.
Over time the pattern of change is from the area of machinery and metal
manufacture which accounted for 25 per cent of grants in 1965, to scientific apparatus
and computing (remembering thatcomputing onlybecame eligible for AIRDIS grants
in 1983). The minerals industry continues to invest in research, particularly through
the tax concession scheme. Research in the chemical industries remains constant. The
transport industry undertakes the leastamount of research of the major categories in
1990.
3.3.f. The pattern of change in manufacturing research
The above discussion of govemment intervention into manufacturing research shows
that the most significant changes in policy occurred when the Hawke govemment
implemented its techno-economistic objectives for publicly funded research and
development. Examination of the patterns of change in business expenditure on
research and development (EBRD) will indicate the effectiveness of these policies in
encouraging manufacturers to commit private funds to science-based innovation.
Between 1965 and 1990 EBRD tripled from 13 per cent to 41 per cent.
Figure 5.20: Australia, business expenditure on research and
development, 1965-1990, in 1990$m
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8112.0, 1985, p. 5.
Research and Experimental Development All Sector Summary, 1984-85, Cat No.
8112.0, 1987, p. 8.
Research and Experimental Development All Sector Summary, 1989-90, Cat No.
8112.0, 1985, p. 3.
Business Research and Experimental Development, 1978-79, Cat No. 8104.0, 1991, p.
2.
Stubbs, Innovation and Research, p. 29
Figure 5.20 shows that this dramatic increase ooccurred principally after 1983. It was
not until 1985 that BERD regained the level in real terms of 1973. Since 1985 the
amount has doubled indicating that the government's measures have been successful
in encouraging the private sector to invest in researchand development. Figure 5.21
shows the areas of manufacturing in which the response has been greatest. The
figures for 1991 havebeen includedto indicate the continuing trend.
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Figure 5.21: Business expenditure on research and development by
ASIC category, 1976-1990, in 1990$m
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8112.0, 1985, p. 7;
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8112.0, 1987, p. 11.
Research and Experimental Development All Sector Summary, 1989-90, Cat No.
8112.0, 1985, p. 11.
Business Research and Experimental Development, 1988-89, Cat No. 8104.0, 1991, p.
3.
Research and Experimental Development Business Enterprises (Inter Year Survey)1991-
92, Cat. no. 8114, 1993, p. 3.
The graph shows that the manufacturing area exhibiting the greatest increase in
research and development expenditure has been that of electrical equipment which
includes computer and other electronic equipment. The areas which have decreased
levels of research and development spending are the more traditional areas of textiles,
wood products, industrial machinery and fabricated metal products. One area of
interest is that of scientific instmments in which growth has been fairly stagnant in the
1980s. The rise between 1990 and 1991 may be due to new technology arising from
the increased emphasis on this area of research in higher education grants funding
discussed in section 3.1 .f above.
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3.3.g Summary of manufacturing resources
In the area of manufacturing research both government and private expenditure has
increased markedly in the period from 1965 to 1990. The increase was not uniform
through time with the analysis indicating that in the 1970s the pace of innovation
declined considerably. The major increases have occurred since 1985 in the areas
targetedby the Hawkegovernment asbeingessential to its techno-economistic science
policy of orienting research and devlopment in Australia towards the radical
restructuring of manifacturing production. There is someevidence that there is still a
long way to go in this area.
In 1964-65 manufacturing industry in Australia employed 28 per cent of the
workforce, produced 12.5 per cent of exports and accounted for 26 per cent of GDP.
By 1990 manufacturing industry in Australia employed 16per cent of the workforce,
produced 18 per cent ofexports and accounted for 17 per cent ofGDP.IO^ Apart from
the fact that a greater proportionof exports are of manufactured goods, these figures
encapsulate the manufacturing dilemma for Australia. Fewer people are engaged in
producing a smaller proportion of the country's wealth. In terms of value-added to
manufacturing as a percentage of GDP Australia has fallen from 14th place in the
OECD with25 per cent to 22ndin 1989 with 17per cent; that is the fourth lowestwith
Norway, Greece and Denmarkjust above New Zealand, Canada and just below the
United Kingdom.Scientists still bemoan the lack of interest in science displayed
by industry managers:
...of all the problems we face, the worst is the lack of understanding at the
highest levels of the wealth-making ability of science....I have been truly
shockedat the lack of expertise in our financial and legal sectors. They simply
don't know how to make a buck out of science. They have no experience of
it.108
It seems that, in some sectors of industry, twenty five years of increasing
government intervention in the shape of incentives schemes for research and
development in manufacturing industry still has not been sufficient to overcome
industrial inertia and instil a market-driven ethos of innovation. Government can
provide programs of support based on techno-economistic objectives of restructuring
manufacturing industry; and can force public sector research organisations to align
themselves with the needs of producers, but in the end it is the producers themselves
who must transform the scientific knowledge into products and services. In this
106 Poster & Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics, pp. 214-215.
ABS, Australian Economic Indicators, January 1992, pp. 24-25.
Bureau of Industry Economics, Australian Industry Trends, no. 18, May 1993, AGPS, Canberra,
p. 46.
107 OECD, Historical Statistics I960-I989, p. 63.
108 Professor David Neilson, School of Physics, University of NSW, 'Thinking small's our big
chance', Australian, July 21 1992, p. 2.
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respect manufacturing industry in Australia has always lagged behind rural industry in
its capacity to generate and apply commercially new scientific knowledge.
3.4 Rural industry
Rural industry in Australia has had a long-term and productive relationship with the
scientific community which has been articulated through State and Commonwealth
governments. The political domination ofmral interests, a tradition of relatively stable
export markets and colonial constraints on encouraging Australian manufacturing
industries have been responsible for science policies which have traditionallyallowed
scientists and producers considerable autonomy in the allocation of public resources
provided forrural research.io^ Between 1965 and 1990 the relationship has continued
to evolve as part of the increasing techno-economism in the relationship between
government and the scientific community.
The pattern of funding for rural research has changed in size, scope and the
mechanism of funding. In 1965 funds were allocated almost equally from the
Commonwealth and States governments, through direct and special appropriation
funding, to research projects in Statelaboratories and CSIRO. In 1990 morefunds in
real terms are allocated through a plurality of sources, including rural research
corporations. This complexity means that there are difficulties in monitoring the
changes: every majorenquiry into rural research reiterates the difficulty of defining
global funds. In 1989 the Bureauof Rural Resources reported that:'.. .dataon finance
allocated to rural R&D are not well documented at all'.^O There are not many sources
of data which are constant through timewhichcan absolutely confirm or deny a trend.
Consequently the following section uses a variety of sources to discem the trends.
3.4.a Budget funding for rural research
The importance to national economic well being of wool and other rural produce in
1965 is reflectedin the proportionof research funds allocated to rural industry by the
Commonwealth government. The Vemon Committee estimated that Australia spent
three times as high a proportion of GNP onrural research as the USA.m There are
no official estimates for rural research funds in 1965, but in 1968 it was estimated
that, from all sources, the amount was $58m ($43Im in 1990 values).In 1986-87
the Department of Finance estimated thatthe amount spent on rural research from all
sources was $545m ($684m in 1990 values).^13 This represents an increase in real
1®^ See chapter 2, footnote 36.
110G. Evans, C. Swinbank & R. T. Williams, 'An introduction to public sector resources allocated
to research from the rural industries', SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource
Allocation for Rural R&D, AGPS, Canberra, 1989, pp. 8-14, p. 10.
111 Australia, Committeeof EconomicEnquiry, Report 1965, p. 424.
112 Australia, ProjectScore: Survey and Comparison ofResearch Expenditure, Report 5, p. 13.
113 The 1986data do not includeCSIROfunding allocated to rural research. It is not clear whetherthe
1968 data include CSIRO funds.
Bartos, 'Competing demands for Commonwealthfunding', p. 55.
terms of 59 per cent. Figure 5.22 gives the estimated proportional distribution by
source of funds.
Figure 5.22: Source of funds for rural research, 1968 and 1986 in 1990
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Datasource: Project Score, Survey and Comparison ofResearch Expenditure, Report 5, 1973, p. 13;
StephenBartos, 'CurrentMethods of Allocating Resources', p. 55.
The graph shows that funds from all sources have increased in real value between
1968 and 1986. In 1968 the Commonwealth government contributed 41 per cent of
the total: in 1986 this had increasedto 49 per cent. However, it is difficult to ascertain
exactly what proportion of State funds comes from theCommonwealth government in
the form of Special Appropriations, Specific Purpose grants and programfunds.
Figure 5.23 compares the way in which the proportions of selected funding for
rural research, from Special Appropriations and other sources, have changed in real
terms between 1965 and 1990. The disparity between the two years in the amounts
appropriated under Appropriation Acts 1 and 2 is indicative of the growth of
Comonwealth government support for rural research in the twenty five years. In
1965 only$2m ($16min 1990 value) was appropriated for dairy, wheat, tobacco and
barley research and for research advisory services.
In 1990 a total of $62m was necessary to support such activities as the Rural
Industries Research, and Horticultural Research and Development Corporations; the
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and payments to CSIRO
for screwworm research. In 1965 there was no Annual Report from which to gauge
the Department's involvement in rural research (the first Annual Report of the
Department of Primary Industry was tabled in 1980) and thehalf-dozen or so research
funds in existence at the time seem to have enjoyed a very loose relationship to the
Department. The Department of Primary Industries andEnergy Annual Report 1990-
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91 presents a complex array of financial statements reflecting the range of rural
research activity carried on under the auspices of the Department.
Figure 5.23: comparison of selected funding for rural research and
development, 1965 and 1990 (1990 $)
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Data source: Parliamentary Papers, 1964-65-66, vol. V, pp. 517-819; vol. VI, pp. 853-855; vol. VU,
pp. 493-499; vol. VII, pp. 705-709; vol. VII, p. 719.
Budget Paper No. 2: The Commonwealth Public Account, 1990-91, pp. 40-50.
Budget Paper No. 4: Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of
Government, 1990-91, Table 9, pp. 196-201.
CSIRO, CSIRO Research 1990-91, CSIRO, pp. x-xii;
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisationfor the Year 1965-66, pp. 207-233.
The use of funds by CSIRO shows the same pattem. The figures used here are
the appropriation funds only because CSIRO has more control over the use of these
funds than over external funds (or 'contributions' in traditional parlance) and they are
therefore a more accurate indicator of the Organisation's objectives. In both years
rural research accounted for 26 per cent of appropriations funds.in 1965 this
amount was $49m in 1990 values. In 1990 $86m was allocated to rural research,
indicating that more money is internally allocated to rural research in CSIRO in 1990
than in 1965. In 1965, 88 per cent of contributions to CSIRO were for rural research
and 37 per cent of the research designated above as rural was funded by
contributions.! 1^ In 1990 34 per cent of all sponsored research activity in CSIRO was
11^ Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Annual Report 1990-91, AGFS, Canberra, 1991,
pp. 326-395.
! TheCSIRO dataused for thegraph is that designated in thetwo Plant andAnimal Production and
Primary Products categories in 1990 ($85.5m), and the Animal Research Laboratories, Plant
Industry, Entomology and Horticulture and Irrigation categories for 1965 ($49m in 1990 values).
CSIRO, CSIRO Research 1990-91: Directory of CSIRO Research Programs, CSIRO, pp. x-xii;
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report, pp. 207-233.
! In 1965 68 per centof all contributions to CSIRO came from the Wool Research TrustFund the
majority of which would be Commonwealth Government contributions.
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rural and 25 per cent of all rural research was sponsored. This would suggest that in
1990 rural research in CSIROis more dependent on appropriated fiinds than in 1965,
and therefore more open to government direction of funds.
In 1965 Specific Purpose grants were used far less frequently than in later years.
In that yearpayments to the Statesfor ruralresearch constituted 45 per cent of Specific
Purpose grants for research and were concerned mainly with agricultural extension
services. In 1990 only 15 per cent of Specific Purpose grants were for rural research
but the amount ($47.8m) was nearly four times the 1965equivalent allocation. Over
$47m of this money was spent on Bovine Brucellosis and Tuberculosis eradication
programs in the States.
Allocations of funds for the rural industry research funds are made through
Special Appropriations. In 1965 all research funds allocated by Special
Appropriations were for rural research under themeat, daily, wheat andwool research
legislation. Suchfunds formed 15per centof total Commonwealth and Statefunding
for rural research.i^^ In 1990 Special Appropriations research funds included monies
for coal, fishing, mining andenergy research andtheproportion for rural researchhad
fallen to 26 per cent.119 The lesser amount of money allocated in real terms in 1990
fits the government's policy of reducing certain allocations for rural research.
The Trust Fund is the only source from which funds for rural research have
declined in real terms, in 1965, 53 per cent of monies held in the Trust Fund for
research were spent on rural research. In 1990 this proportion was 35 per cent. In
1990 values $95m was spent in 1965 and $81m in 1990. This fall is probably due to
the decline in wool exports and consequent fall in producer and government levy
contributions.
In addition to the above broad conduits for governmental support of rural
research there are, in 1990, other less obvious pathways by which public monies are
used to fund the production of scientific knowledge for use by rural producers. For
example, 70 companies claim $15m in tax concessions for rural research. In the
discretionary grants scheme $1.8mwentto research concemed solelywith agricultural
production. Similarly, biotechnology research funded under the GIRD generic
technology scheme is oftenintended for commercial use in ruralproduction. In 1990-
The data for the SpecificPurpose allocation are classified according to the CSIRO categories so
that the 26% of the 1990 appropriation which was spent on environmental research programs
such as soil conservation which could be thought of as beneficial to rural industry has not been
included.
Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, p. 2.
119 One third of the $5.2 million appropriated under the Primary Industry and Energy Act 1989was
considered to be for rural research purposes.
120The Trust Fund monies used here do not include $8.5m (1965 value) designated for the Specific
Research Fund even though a large proportion of these funds wouldbe used by CSIRO for rural
research.
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91 the scheme funded $3.5m-worth of biotechnology research, $2.5m of which could
be applied in agrieulture.i^i
3.4.b The rural research trust funds and research associations
Despite the fact that the rural research funds account for only eight per cent of total
public funds for rural research, this mechanism is often discussed by science policy
analysts because of the unique way in which the relationship between governments,
producers and scientists is articulated within the funds.^^2 x^e relationship has
changed markedly in recent years because of the way in which the Hawke
governments have forced producers to take more financial responsibility for the
research sponsored through the funds. It is worth examining the development of the
relationship because it is a model of resource allocation which is repeatedly advocated
for the manufacturing sector.
In 1965 there were four statutory rural research tmst funds under the following
legislation;
Dairy Produce Research Act 1958-65;
Wheat Research Act 1957;
Wool Industry Research Act 1962-64;
Meat Research Act 1960-65 (formerly the Cattle and Beef Research Act).
Other funds included those for tobacco, honey and dried fruits which at that stage did
not have a fund specifically for research.1^3 in general, the rural research funds
operated in the following way:
1) a compulsory levy waspaid by the producer through the taxation authority
to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and thence under Special Appropriation
to the relevant tmst account;
2) an equivalent or negotiated amount was paid by the Commonwealth
government under Special Appropriation intothe tmst account;
3) funds for approvedprojects were awarded to State departments, CSIRO,
universities, agricultural colleges or other research agencies.1^4
121 Industry Research and Development Board, Annual Report 1990-91, pp. 139-140; 21-213, & 223.
122 The Industries Assistance Commission described the funds as: '... a unique system of resource
allocation and priority determination which provides for a degree of accountability equivalent to
that recommended in the Rothschild Report'.
Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, p. 47.
123 The government also funded, through CSIRO, private research associations. In 1965 CSIRO
supported research in four suchresearch associations, one of which, the WineResearch Institute,
received $15,000 in grants. The Institute was established in 1955 out of the Oenological
Investigations Section of CSIRO from funds raised by an excise on fortified spirits. The
Institute reeeivesequal funds annuallyfrom CSIROand the Australian Wine Board. The others in
1965 were the Bread Research Institute; the Coal Research Institute and the Australian Leather
Research Institute. In 1967 The Sugar Research Institute at Mackay was also recognised by
CSIRO as a research association and received annual grants of $200,000. It had been in existence
since 1949 as Sugar Research Ltd., formed by a group of 26 sugar mills.
CSIRO, Eighteenth Annual Report 1965-66, p. 218.
124 Australia, Report of theAuditor-General, 1965-66, pp. 671-691.
Each fund was administered by an industry research council consisting of
members from universities, CSIRO, the Commonwealth Department of Primary
Industry, representatives from producers' associations and a representative from each
of the State industry research committees. The State committees in turn had
representatives of producers. State departments of agriculture, universities and
specialist rural institutions. Expenditures on wool research were made, with
Ministerial approval, by the Australian Wool Board on the recommendations of
research advisory committees.
Proposals forprojects arose in two ways. Either a committee contacted research
organisations advertising the availability of funds; or the committee decided on
research priority areas and advertised for tenders, Research was spread across a
range of research organisations in all sectors. The exception was the Wool Research
Trust Fund, which allocated the bulk of its funds (81 per cent in 1965) to CSIRO.
Figure 5.24 illustrates the effect thatwool research funds hadon thetotal distribution
of resources from the mral Trast Funds.
Figure 5.24: Research organisation sectors receiving rural research
trust fund monies, 1965
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Datasource: Report of theAuditor-General, 1965-66, Parl. Papers vol. VI, 1964-65-66, pp. 671-691.
The majority of wool research funded by the industry was carried out by CSIRO.
This situation continued until the mid 1980s despite continuing wamings about the
over-dependence of certain CSIRO divisions on the fluctuating value of wool; the
potential lack of fresh perspective on industry problems, and the lackof support given
to scientists in the universities.1^6
125 Industries Assistance Commission, Fininacing Rural Research, p. 47.
126 Sgg Report Financing Rural Research, chapter 7. TheAustralian Wool Corporation was
obviously sensitive about the issue. Unlike other Rural Research Trust Funds' Annual Reports
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The amount of funds at the disposal of the Trust Funds, although representing
only 15per centof total spending onrural research, is at thecoreof the fact that, in the
1960s and 1970s, the trust fund advisory committees influenced to a large degree the
direction of rural research in Australia by providing extra research funds. The large
research organisations in the Commonwealth, State and university sectors of the
scientific community had to bear the escalating costs of scientists' salaries, and since
most scientists were in tenured positions, the research institutions were constrained in
their operational flexibility.^27
3.4.C The transition in rural research funding
Figure 5.25 shows the pattern of contributions to the four largest and longest-
established rural research funds (dairy, meat wheat and wool) between 1965 and
1989.128 The most apparent feature of the graph is the wayin which Commonwealth
govemment contributions to thefunds exceed industry contributions in years in which
conservative political partieswere in power. In 1974, 1984 and 1989,when the ALP
is in govemment, the contributions were more evenly balanced.
Figure 5.25 The four major rural research trust funds, contributions by
government and industry, 1965-1989 in 1990 $m
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Data source: Auditor-General's Reports, 1965-76;
Department of Primary Industry Annual Reports, 1980-89;
Australian Meat Industry Research Corporation, Annual Report 1990-91.
details of payments to CSIRO were separated from details of payments to other research
institutions. In later reports the details were sometimes given in tables on separate pages from
the others, and sometimes buried in the text.
127 p. G. Jarret & R. K. Lindner, 'Rural Research in Australia', in Agriculture in the Australian
Economy, ed. D B Williams, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1982, pp. 83-105, p. 92.
128 By 1990 mostof the funds were incorporated. Themeat industry research fund was one of the
first of the funds to be incorporated in 1985. The 1989 data for meat industry research is therefore
that of the Australian Meat Industry Research Corporation.
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An examination in greater detail of one particular fund modifies this
interpretation somewhat. The level of tax which producers pay is an indicator of a
government's policy regarding the activity funded by thetax. Raising thetax commits
a higher allocation of public funds to thatactivity, but also increases industry's share
of the costs. Figure 5.26 illustrates the relationship between industry contributions
and Commonwealth contributions to the Wheat Industry Research Trust Fund, and the
real value of wheat tax paid. The wheat industry is used as an example because the
Commonwealth government and industry contributions have been evenly matched
over the thirty years of operation. The Wheat Research Trust Account receives 100
percent of the tax raised. All amounts have heen converted into 1990 dollars and
cents.
Figure 5.26: Wheat Research Trust Account, Commonwealth and
industry contributions in 1990 $ (5 year moving average), and tax per
tonne in 1990 0, 1965-89
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Data source: Wheat Industry ResearchAct 1957,AnnualReports 1965-1989.
The graphs show a close fit between Commonwealth contributions and industry
contributions as is to be expected when both contributions are tied to production
levels. In 1965 the wheat tax was 0.25 cents per bushel in current values (9 cents per
tonne). In 1973 this was raised to 11 cents per tonne current value and the tax rate
gradually rose to reach 65cents per tonne in 1989.^^*^
129 For the fund contributions the data have been smoothed to allow the trends to show through
annual fluctuations. The tax data are not smoothed but are represented in amounts of 10c to allow
comparison on one graph. Thefirst datum for taxin 1965 is shown as 7.5,andshould be read as
75 cents.
130 WheatResearch Act 1957, Annual Report 1988-89,KGPS, Canberra, 1990, p. 23.
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The dotted line on the graph, however, shows that the real value of the tax rate
followed a different pattern. From 1965 to 1973 the real tax rate value fell by 70 per
cent. Between 1973 and 1975 it continued to fall against a rising rate of production as
indicated by the increasing level of industry contributions. The rate was stable in
value from 1975 to 1978 and then fell sharply, again against a rising rate of
production, and reached its lowest-ever real value in 1982. From 1983 the real tax
rate has risen with the rate of production. This would seem to indicate that it was not
until 1983 there was a dramatic change in policy about government contributions to
wheat research. The Hawke government intended that the level of the wheat
industry's commitment to research activities should rise if the government was to
continue to invest public funds in wheat research.
3.4.d Rural industry research funding in 1990
The changes were not confined to the wheat industry. Figure 5.27 shows the pattern
of Commonwealth contributions to the rural research trust funds since 1965. Data on
the four major funds are individually plotted. 'Other' funds in such industries as
chicken meat, barley, honey, oilseeds and cottonare added in to the data as the funds
were opened. Specialrural research funds havebeen allocated only since 1984.
Figure 5.27: Commonwealth contributions to rural research funds,
1965-89 (1990 $)
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The most significant aspect of the funding pattern is the outstanding commitment of
successive Commonwealth governments to the support of wool research which for
many years received twice the level of government contribution of other commodities.
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The contributions for wool have been calculated on a value basis since 1964 and the
pattern ofcontributions shows the fluctuating nature ofthe value ofwool production.
In 1985 the real value of the level of wool research funding was the same as in 1965.
Contributions for the other commodities have been on a value basis only since 1985.
The graph shows the way in which research funding for the dairy and meat industries,
which were corporatised early, has increased at a much greater ratesince 1985.
Also significant is the rate of increase in funding to the smaller funds and to
special rural research. This indicates an increasing rate ofproduction and value in line
with the government's policy to decrease Australia's dependence ona narrow range of
rural commodities. Contributions to all commodities except wheat and wool have at
least doubled in real terms since 1984 which indicates that the rural industry research
corporations have been a major mechanism for the Hawke government's restructuring
of the rural industry.
The restructuring of theresearch funds and councils has changed thebalance of
control over the direction of research. Producers and researchers now have to share
decision-making with commercial expertise, and to a more nominal extent, with the
Minister. The structure which has been established is of eleven autonomous rural
research anddevelopment corporations reporting directly to theMinister for Primary
Industries and Energy. In addition there are five Research and Development Councils
for smaller rural industries which come under the umbrella of the former Australian
Special Rural Research Council, now re-constituted as the Rural Industries Research
and Development Corporation (RIRDC). These Councils are legally required to
present annual reports of their activities to the RIRDC before submission to the
Minister, but in practice the RIRDC has so far allowed the Councils to report
independently. The RIRDC also funds research into developing rural industries not
eligible forother funding. 1^2
Within the Department ofPrimary Industries and Energy a Rural Policy Division
hasbeensetup to oversee thecorporations. The Bureau of Rural Resources operates
at a technical level acting as an interlocuteur between scientific and policy
communities. The Primary Industries and Energy Research Council advises the
Ministers on theperformance of theRural Research and Development Corporations.
Resource allocations are decided within the Department of Primary Industries and
131 In August 1992 the Keating Government announced that the Commonwealth Government's
contribution to the ruralresearch corporations would be decreased. Insteadof matching industry
contributions up to 0.5 percent of Gross Value of Production (GYP), theGovernment intended to
allocate $1 for every $2 raised by an industry up to 0.25 per cent; $1 for every industry $1
between 0.25 and0.5per cent, and $1 for every $2 from there up to 0.75 per cent of GYP. The
decrease is saidto havebeenagreed to by theExpenditure Review Committee on the advice of the
Department ofFinance butagainst the wishes of the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy.
The decreases were withdrawn after intense lobbying by the rural subgovernment. Tim Stevens,
'Cabinet slahes rural grants'. Weekend Australian, August 1-2, 1992,p. 1.
132 Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Annual Report 1990-91, Parl. Paper
437, Canberra, 1991, p. 1.
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Energy by the Minister on advice from the Department of Finance. The use of policy
caps on expenditure for portfolios has meant that the responsibility for deciding the
allocationof resources for rural researchlies squarely with the Minister.133
3.4.e Summary of rural resources
The funding of rural research is a complex set of arrangements involving industry,
public policy agencies in Commonwealth and State governments and the many
institutions of the science system. The information analysed for this thesis indicates
that the overall envelope of public resources allocated to rural research has increased
slightly in real terms between 1965 and 1990. The Bureau of Rural Resources
estimated that public sector funding for rural research increasedby 108 per cent in real
terms between 1979 and 1988. These changes reflect the changing objectives of
governments for rural reseach, and the assertion of centralcontrol in the reallocation of
resources to meet these objectives. The Hawke governments in particular have
established new patterns of resource distribution. Corporatisation of the major rural
research trust funds has passed greater financial responsibility to market forces.
Resources are now allocated to research for smaller rural industries as restructuring of
production attempts to compensate for fallingprices in traditionalmarkets. However,
central control has taken the form of Commonwealth government monitoring of the
use of rural research funds as declining markets demand greater efficiency. This has
entailed the re-organisation of funding arrangements described above and the
development of evaluation procedures which will be examined in chapter seven.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the pattern of funding for research and development in four
sectors of the science system between 1965 and 1990. The science system is funded
through a multitude of mechanisms including direct appropriations, special
appropriations, matching levy contributions, competitive grants, recurrent grants, tax
concessions, intergovernmental transfers and private funds. It is therefore very
difficult to obtain an absolute picture of change. There are several significant points
which emerge from the above analysis.
Firstly, there has been an overall increase in real terms in the amount of public
funds allocated to research. Estimates of total research and development funding are
inherently difficult to obtain because of fragmented sources and destinations of the
allocations. In 1965 an estimated $137m was spent by the Commonwealth
government on research and development. This is the equivalent of $1136m in 1990
values. Using similar methods of calculation for this thesis the total obtained for 1990
is $2058m. In 1990 the estimated total in ih&Science and Technology Budget Paper
^33 Bartos, 'Competing demands for Commonwealth funding - the effect on rural research and
development', in SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocationfor Rural R&D,
pp.47-56.
245
No.6 is $2422m, or over twice the amount in 1965 in real values. This amount,
however, includes revenue foregone through the 150per cent tax concession. In 1965
the 100 per cent taxconcession allowed would nothave beenincluded in any formal
estimate of research and development funds.
Secondly, research funding is spread more evenly between portfolios and
research agencies. There has been a definite shift away from defence research and
towards health research, and research undertaken in the higher education sector. The
proportion of rural research funding remains high but the level of public funds
allocated to research in the manufacturing sector demonstrates ALP governments'
commitment to restructuring Australian economicproduction away from over-reliance
on unprocessed mral commodities.
Thirdly, the traditional pattem of dependence on CSIRO to stimulateresearch of
national economicbenefit,has been replacedby a model of resource distributionbased
on superstructural andexecutive coremonitoring of a plurality of research schemes.
This control trend has occurred in all sectors. In higher education there has been a
redistribution of resources away from recurrent grants to the competitive grants
scheme. This has decreased the autonomy of significant actors in the individual
institutions. The introduction of the Co-operativeResearch Centres under the control
of the Chief Scientist in the superstrucmral subgovernment has further centralised
power in the higher education science policy community away from the higher
education subgovemment andits domination by academic scientists. In manufacturing
research control of the tax concession has been shared jointly between the ATO and
DITAC. In the rural research sector the establishment of the Primary Industry Rural
Research Council to co-ordinate the allocation of portfolio resources to research, and
the corporatisation of the trust funds has changed the balance of control away from
researchers and towards govemment and market agencies.
Fourthly, the eventual adoption of a 150 per cent tax concession after twenty
years of sciencepolicy advocacy indicates the government's determination to impose
techno-economic objectives in the face of the failure of market mechanisms to
stimulate the emergence of science-based industries. However, manufacturing
industry is still loathto adopt the ruralresearch model of leviesdistributed by market-
oriented research corporations for pre-competitive research, claiming that such a
systemis not tenable given theirgreater dependence on thedomestic.market. Thejoint
funding by companies of genericresearch through the IR&D scheme, and through Co
operative Research Centres is a step in the direction of collective manufacturing
research funding.
Fifthly, there is an increased awareness within the executive core and the
attentivepublic of the need to monitor the use of publicfunds allocatedto research and
development. This chapter has shown that, in CSIRO, in the higher education sector,
and presumably in the health research subsystem, the way scientists label their
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research creates a potential for the obfuscation of the micro-level objectives of
scientists. Thisgap between political accountability and scientific jargonis recognised
by Parliament which is demanding closer scmtiny ofresearch allocations. ^34
Sixthly, there has been an increase in funding labelled 'environmental'. This is
explicitly reported as such in CSIRO but inspection of the internal allocation of
resources in 1965 reveals that similar research was undertaken twenty five years ago
without being labelled 'environmental'.
Finally, there is a difference between the way in which funds are allocated to
rural research, and to research in the higher education sector, from the way in which
funds are allocated to non-rural research. The former process occurs through specific
purpose and special appropriations: the latter through direct appropriations. This
difference is historial in origin, occurring as Commonwealth governments assumed
responsibility for areas of researchformerly funded by the States. The question must
be asked why some agencies such as CSIRO, ANSTO and the manufacturing industry
research grants systems were brought under direct financial control, and why rural,
health and highereducationresearchhaveremained indirectly funded. It may simply
be a case of administrative and legislative inertia. More likely is the perception that
these areas of research are seen as of less importanceto the radical techno-economistic
objectives of Commonwealth govemments for the science system.
It seems that in the areas in which Commonwealth govemments want to keep
close centralised control, as in CSIRO, ANSTO and grants for manufacturing
research, such inertia can be overcome. However, in general all sectors are more
closely observed. Public sector research organisations are increasingly funded
according to government priorities rather than scientists' priorities. Grants to
individual and institutional scientists are now awarded according to criteria based on
the prioritisation of certain fields of research. Publicly-funded research organisations
have been forced to raise a proportion of their revenue outside the public purse.
Govemments have increasingly used public funds to underwrite the production of
scientific knowledge for the use of private economic production. In line with other
allocations to government activities, funding for the production of scientific
knowledge has become much more open to processes of accountability. The
outcomes of the changes will be examined in the following three chapters.
134 Theseconcerns are expressed by the JointCommittee on PublicAccounts in its recommendations
to reetify the poor management of research organisations,and to increase the role of the Bureau of
Industry Economics, the Bureau of Rural Resoiu-ces and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and
Resource Economics.
Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Inquiry into Public Sector Research and
Development, paras. 9.26 & 9.36, pp. 169 & 171.
Chapter 6
Restructuring the Organisation of Research
Chapter five revealed changingpatternsin the control of the allocationof resources in
the science policy community. In this and subsequent chapters other significant
outputs of science policy are analysed. They are: the restructuringof the organisations
of the production of scientific knowledge; the processesof prioritisation, selection and
evaluation; the characteristics of the knowledge produced; and the way in which this is
applied to societal needs. This chapter examines the way in which research
organisations and funding mechanisms have been restructured by subgovemmental
actors to achieve techno-economistic objectives. Chapter 7 discusses the way in
which the evaluation techniques of research have been changed by similar objectives;
and chapter 8 looks at the effects of both these outcomes on the type of scientific
knowledge produced and the uses to which it is applied.
The restructuring of research organisations and funding mechanisms changes the
patterns of interaction which lead to the productionof scientific knowledge. The new
structures reflect the extent to which interaction accords with the norms of techno-
economism rather than the norms of science. Similarly criteria for prioritisation,
selection and evaluation reflect the relative values which validate scientific competence.
These may be generated by the international attentive public, by governments
sanctioning the use of public funds, and by market forces which decide the
commercial potential of the knowledge produced. The type of knowledge produced
will also reflect these values. In the ideal world of the basic scientist, knowledge adds
to a body of rigourously-tested ideas which is universally accessible to all scientists.
Techno-economism values applied science which can be used to further national
economic production. In a privatised, competitive, global economic system
knowledge and ideas are commodities to be accumulated and exploited by individual
firms and protected from competitors by internationally-recognised rules on intellectual
property.
As we saw in chapter 3 which discussed the orientation of science policy, policy
based on techno-economistic objectives requires different ways of organising the
production of scientific knowledge from one based on nationalistic and cultural
objectives. Governments need scientists to re-orient their production away from
scientific values and towards techno-economistic values. This can be achieved either
through the imposition of government control over research activities, or through
influencing the scientific community to accept the new objectives in return for some
measure of retained autonomy in the organisation of research. The following section
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examines how restructuring has been achieved in the four subsectors of the science
system under examination.
1. Higher Education
The organisation of the production of scientific knowledge in the higher education
sector has changed in several ways. Firstly, the focus of the production of scientific
knowledge has changed fromindividual researchers in individual universities pursuing
projects of international competence and excellence to one in which the focus is on
teams of workers from the tertiary sector co-operating with researchers from
government research agencies and private industry to produce excellent work of
relevance to economic production. Secondly, the sector has increased both
numerically and functionally to include tertiary education institutions outside the
university system.
1.1 Research organisation in 1965: individual excellence
In 1961 the Commonwealthgovemment assumedthe major responsibilityfor funding
tertiary research activities. Until 1965 the fifteen existing universities each received an
allocation from the SpecialResearch Grantbasedon 'their comparative generallevel of
postgraduate activity'. Total autonomy was granted by the Australian Universities
Commission (AUC) to the universities in deciding upon the intemal allocation of these
funds. In 1965 the Commonwealth govemment introduced the ARCS scheme to be
used for funding university research on a competitive basis between individual
researchers or projects irrespective of the research record of theuniversity in whichthe
researcher worked. ^
In response the AUC reminded university research committees and individual
researchers of the need to use these new funds with caution;
The Commission believes that university science departments also have a
national responsibility to develop researches in areas of applied science provided
they represent theproper intellectual challenge. Thealert intelligence of a good
research man is likely to uncover in an appliedresearch project many problems
which have all thequalities ofbasic research, [emphasis added].^
In addition the Commision counselled universities to adopt a conservative approach to
the areas of researeh they funded:
Universities cannot all aspire to be in the forefront of research activities in every
discipline. Australia has neither the men nor the money to achieve this, and to
attempt to do so can lead only to mediocrity. The time would seem to have
arrived when universities in Australia should give thought to co-operative
arrangements.
1 Australian Universities Commission, ThirdReport, pp. 591-815.
^ Ibid., p. 669.
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.. .The Commission does not suggest that this co-operation should take the form
of specialist institutes off the campus as this would inevitably lead to a
weakening of the link between the two prime responsibilities of universities -
teaching and research.^
Throughout the 1970s the majority of research in Australian universities continued to
be conducted on the basis of individual excellence linked to the training of new
scientists. As noted in the previous chapter, there was a minor degree of prioritisation
in the earmarking of someresearch funds for marine andupperatmosphere research.
1.2 Research organisation in 1990: concentration, co-operation and
selectivity
By the late 1970s the number of researchers claiming excellence had outstripped the
funds available in the ARGC scheme. Scientists began to lobby the Fraser
government for a different type of research organisation in higher education. The first
ASTEC Report in 1978 endorsed the University Commission's call for another level
of grants which would sustain 'Centres of Concentration' by the employment of an
'appropriate' mix of trained, rather than training, researchers.4
The government responded by establishing, in 1981, a Commonwealth
Research Centres of Excellence Committee. The terms of reference of the Committee
outlined the characteristics of the centres:
• they shouldbe organisedas a concentration of researchers and resources:
• they should undertake research likely to lead to a 'significant and major'
development of knowledge;
• they shouldbe led by a researcher with intemational recognition in the area
of research;
• they could be established off campus in co-operation with research
organisations from other sectors but the funds would be allocated through
the university system;
• the Committee was to consult ASTEC, the ARGC, the NH&MRC and the
University Council of CTEC: '...as it considers appropriate'.^
By making consultation optional these terms of reference virtually gavethe Committee
carte blanche in deciding how the funds should be allocated. In 1982 ten research
centres were estabhshed in the following areas of research:
3 Ibid., p. 670.
4 ASTEC, Science and Technology inAustralia, 1977-78, vol. lA, pp. 88-89.
The suggestion that universities shouldconcentratetheir researchefforts was first published by the
Universities Commission in its Fifth Report in 1975 and endorsed by the first OECD Report on
science and technology in Australia.
OECD, Examiner's Report on Science and Technology in Australia, 1974, pp. 30-31.
3 Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, Review of Commonwealth Special Research
Centres, Parl. Paper 103 , Canberra, 1987, Attachment A.
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• clinical immunology; • environmental fluid dynamics;
• cancer and transplantation; • mathematical analysis;
• gene technology; • plantcellbiology;
• nerve muscle research; • microelectronics;
• neurobiology; • policy studies.
The Commonwealth Research Centres of Excellence Committee noted in its
report that twice the number of centres could have been funded, without
compromising the required standards of excellence, if sufficient funds had been
available. This observation led the University Council of CTEC to recommend the
establishment of Key Centres of Teaching and Research which would foster
excellence across a wider range of disciplines and including researchers working in
advanced education insitutions other than universities. In the Council's opinion such
centres would:
... lead to a valuable concentration of effort and could be an important means by
which higher education responds to emerging national needs to develop
expertise in particular fields, especially in the natural and social sciences,
technology and other areas important to the process ofnational development.^
The rationale for Key Centres was to broaden the focus of the concentration of
research resources to include objectives of social relevance in addition to academic
notions of excellence. This required the exercise of selection of areas of research
considered to be relevant to 'emerging national needs'. The government responded
quickly to the proposal and in 1985 seven such centres were established, followed by
fifteen in 1988 and another ten in 1989. By 1990 there were therefore 32 Key Centres
of Teaching and Research of which 19were concerned with the natural sciences and
computing in the following areas:
advancedcomputing science; resource exploration;
knowledge-basedsystems; schoolof mines;
software technology; economic geology;
statistical science; petroleum geology and geophysics;
land information studies; strategic mineral deposits;
aquaculture; oredeposit & exploration studies;
food industry development; toxicology;
drylandagriculture andlanduse systems; advanced materials technology;
Antarctic and Southem Ocean studies;
advancedmanufacturing and industrial automation.''
^ Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, Reportfor the 1985-87Triennium, vol. 1, Part
3, pp. 100-101.
^ Two centres, those of statistical studiesand petroleum geology, were terminatedin 1991; and three
others, aquaculture, ore deposit and Antactic Studies, became Co-operative Research Centres in
1991-92.
Scitech Technology Directory 1992 Edition, p. 54.
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A comparison with the fields of research of the SpecialResearch Centres set out
above shows a marked shift from predominantly medical research to research into
resource industries, and the information technology studies which underly high
technology industries.
The location of the centres has also changed: 25 per cent of the 30 centres are
situated in existing or former Institutes of Technology or Colleges of Advanced
Education.^ When the Key Centres were first established in 1985 higher education
institutions in Australia were in a binary system of universities and other institutions.
It was unusual for non-university institutions to be awarded research grants. After the
introduction of the Unified National System (UNS) in 1987-88, researchers in non-
university higher education institutions could competefor research resources.
The second major change in the organisation of research in higher education has
been the introduction, in 1990, of the Co-operative Research Centres (CRCs)
designed to encourage collaboration between higher education, public sector and
private sector research agencies. The Centres are the initiative of the first Chief
Scientist, Ralph Slatyer, though the idea was mooted as long ago as 1965 in the
Vemon Report.^ The Co-operative Research Centres Program, even though it is an
initiative linked most closely with the higher education system (the participation of at
least one higher education research institute for each centre is mandatory), was
introduced, and continues to be administered by the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet.io
The basic concept of the CRCs is that there should be a three-way interaction
between the users of research in economic production and public service, and the
producers of research in all types of researchorganisation. Each centre is intended to
foster the involvement of researchers in the higher education sector, in public sector
research organisations, and producers in both the private and public sectors, at an
early stage in the development of research programs. Researchers being trained in all
sectors will learn how to design their programs to accommodate the needs of end-
users of their results. A key requirement of participation in the program is a detailed
strategy for the application of research results and a commitment by all participants to
8 Ibid..
^ The Committee concluded that:
Research and development in industry can be advanced in a number of ways: by closer
contacts between industry and university research, including the financing by industry of
work in particular fields; by the development of co-operative research institutions; and
through collaboration with CSIRO [emphasis addedf
Australia, Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report 1965, p. 424.
1®A note in Budget Paper no., 1990-91 said:
Initial administration of the scheme will be undertaken by a management committee
appointed by the Prime Minister with administrative support located within the Deaprtment
of Prime Minister and Cabinet. When the scheme is fully developed administration will be
appsed to the appropriate operating area of Government.
Australia, Budget Paper no. I: Budget Statements 1990-91, 3.322.
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fund at leastfifty per eentof thecostof theCentres. Anindividual Centre may consist
of several geographically-dispersed units linked by a common, specially-appointed
management.
The importance of the concept in achieving science policy objectives is
underlined by the level of public funds allocated to the centres. Eventually there will
be 65 CRCs for which annual government funding will reach $165 million (in 1990
dollars) by 1995. This will almost double the $176m spent on higher education
research in 1990. i^
By 1992 there were 91 specialised research centres funded through the
Department of Education, Employment andTraining. These consisted of 26 Special
Research Centres, 31 Key Centres of Teaching and Research and 34 Co-operative
Research Centres (increasing to 50 in late 1992). In addition to these centres funded
through DEET there was an enormous increase in the 1980s of higher education
research centres funded outside the Key/ Special/ Co-operative Research Centre
system. In 1992 the Centre forResearch Policy at Wollongong University undertook
a survey of institutions within the 34 universities of the UNS and found that there
were 888 such centres already established and another 200 in the process of
formation. 13 Figure 6.1 shows the rate at which research centres in the natural
sciences grew between 1980 and 1992.
The data show that the number of centres increased slowly until 1984 and tripled after
the introduction of the UNS, and the restructuring of university research funding, in
1988.14 In 1980 there were approximately 33 research centres in the namral sciences
some of which were established in that year, others were of longer-standing. Almost
half the centres in 1980 were in the field of medicine and health. Between 1981 and
1984 few centres were established in any discipline. The greatest increase for all
disciplines came between 1988 and 1991. Research in the traditional physical sciences
have been the slowest to adopt the research centre mode of organisation. The rate of
growth decreased after 1991 for all disciplines except information technology, and
applied technology andengineering which started from a very lowbase. In 1980 there
was no selectivity in the way in which researchcentres werefunded therefore it can be
assumed that the centres in existence then were the product of factors intemal to
1^ Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet, Co-operative Research Centres Program: Round
Three Applications Guide, pp. 4-10.
Department of the Prime Minister& Cabinet, AnnualReport 1990-91, AGPS, 1191,pp. 86-87.
13 The Centre for Research Policy, Concentration and Collaboration: Research Centres in the the
Australian National University System, p. 20.
14 The Centre for Research Policy received 610 replies to the survey hut not all institutions
completed all the survey questions. The data base for figure 6.1 includes 476 research centres of
which 269 (57%) were in the natural and applied sciences.
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Figure 6.1: The rate of establishment of higher education research
centres in the natural sciences, 1980-92
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Data source: The Centre for Research Policy, Concentration and Collaboration, 1992, Table 9, p. 20.
the higher education research system. Since the election of the first Hawke
government the emphasis has increasingly been on selectivity and concentration of
research resources and this has been reflected in the pattern of establishment of
research centres.
1.3 From informal groups to organised teams
The majority of government-funded centres are required to collaborate with research
agencies and the producers of goods and services in the public and private sectors.
This indicates that teamwork and collaboration have taken over from individual effort
as the preferred mode of research organisation. The shift has been more marked in the
universities formed after the establishment of the UNS, and in other institutions of
higher education. The Wollongong study examined the question of whether funding
for research centres was focussed on teams or on individual researchers, and whether
this varied according to the age of the university. It found that funding for the
majority of centres is directed to teams rather than individuals but that this was more
marked in the universities created since 1987. In the 'old', pre-Second World War
universities the distribution was 56 per cent group funding to 46 per cent individual
funding, but in the 'new' post-1987 universities the distribution is 63 per cent group
to 37 per cent individual funding. This may indicate a reluctance among researchers in
the traditional mode of research organisation to accept the new structures, or that
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researchers in the old universities can still attract research funding on an individual
basis.
To overcome this reluctance the Hawke government has also used the grants
system to restructure the organisation of researchin universities. In 1984the ARGC
announced a four-part categorisationof grants designed to encourage the development
of teams of research excellence and to give young researchers a career structure
independent of individual projects. The Committee also flagged the need for the
Scheme to provide teaching release to give researchers time to write up their project
results. These initiatives on the part of the Committee were expanding its role into the
organisation of research effort in universities.
Summary: higher education
The patterns of research organisation since 1965 show thatchangewill only occur in
the higher education system when governments tie funding to preferred modes of
organisation. Outcomes are not changed if decision-makers in the subgovernment
expect scientists automatically to change their objectives in line with government
expectations. The myth of the god-professor persisted as long as the funding system
was centred around the premise of 'the one good man'. Govemments seeking change
had to tailor funding to specific forms of interaction. By changing the bases of
resource allocation, the criteria by which such funds were awarded; the composition of
the funding bodies; and by suggesting new forms of interaction between individual
and organisational actors in the science system, govemments can realign the objectives
of highereducation researchers towards moreeconomically and socially relevant ends.
2. CSIRO: 'Fiefdoms' to Corporations
Chapter five showed how, by 1990, CSIRO had become the largest research
organisation in Australia in terms of financial resources with 24 per cent of all direct
appropriations to research being allocated to the organisation, and how the Hawke
government imposed new external funding requirements on the Organisation as a
means of making CSIRO researchers more accountable for the public resources they
consume in the production of scientific knowledge. The government has also
restructured the Organisation to complement and strengthen these financial incentives
towards achieving techno-economisticobjectivesas well as scientific objectives. This
required changing the organisational culture of CSIRO to reflect changing policy
objectives. The organisational objectives of CSIRO, as statedin the enabling Act, had
remained virtually unchanged since 1920^6 Administration of the Organisation has
1^ AARGC, Reporton GrantsApprovedfor 1984, pp.6-7.
^®In factthe words detailing thefunctions of theOrganisation arealomost identical to those usedfor
the original Institute of Science and Industry Act (no. 22 of 1920), through the Science and
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changed from one based on the autonomy of researchers to a corporate-based internal
and external interdependence. The principle shift in the organisation of CSIRO
between 1965 and 1990 has been from one of isolated divisions aligned with scientific
disciplines to one in whieh research is performed in institutes aligned with sectors of
industrial production. Table 6.1. illustrates the changes.
In 1965 the produetion of scientifie knowledge in CSIRO was organised in, at
best, loosely-coupled divisions based either on scientific subjects or disciplines (eg.
Chemieal Physics), or on projects or industries (e.g. Forest Products).The
divisions were autonomous in the direetion of their researeh with individual seientists
deeiding priorities within the broad parameters of a division's responsibilities. There
existed what Dr John Stocker calls 'a fiefdom mentality'.Divisional Chiefs
provided 'inspiration' to the scientists and secured the neeessary alloeation of
resources to fund their research.White describes this management ethos:
David Rivett taught us how to manage a research team whieh, through notable
scientific achievement, could contribute to the practical interests of
Australia... .Once convineed of the validity of their findings he would back them
publielyagainstthe viewsof conservative praetieal opinion.^O
Industry Research Acts (no. 20 of 1926 and no. 13 of 1949) until alteration in the Science and
Industry Research Legislation Amendment Act in 1986 (no. 121 of 1986).
Table 1 is constructed to reflect the way in which divisions/institutes were discussed in
contemporary CSIRO publications. The slightly chaotic grouping of 1965 follows a vaguely
chronological and geographical schema of dispersed research units. The 1965 Annual Report gave
no organisational chart and no description of the way in which the separate parts of the
Organisation were connected. In contrast the 1990 publications are redolent of the era of
coporatism in government organisations with mission statements, operational plans and budgets
for each Institute and Division, photograhs of the Board and an inspirational message from the
then Chairperson, Neville Wran.
1^ John Stocker, 'CSIRO's knight lowers the drawbridge to research', Australian, November 6 1990,
pp. 40-42.
Gillespie, 'Research Management in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization, Australia', p. 19.
20 White, 'CSIR to CSIRO', pp. 292-293.
The tradition was written into the 1949 Act in the form of Section 8 (2) which states: 'The
Organization shall consist of the members of the Executive, and of the Officers, of the
Organization..This survived into the 1986 Act but was not part of the Acts of 1920 or 1926.
Sir David Rivett himself summarised these ideas in 1951 at an Australian National University
Seminar held in Canberra to celebrate the Jubilee of the Commonwealth of Australia. He
expressed mistrust of comprehensive research programs on the grounds of the serendipitous nature
of scientific research and was thankful that no-one in power in Australia appeared to want to direct
science that way. Scientists needed autonomy, not only in the conduct of scientific research, but
in controlling their conditions of work, status and pay. Scientific organisations should not be
allowed to grow beyond a certain size because of the dangers of developing bureaucratic hierarchies
which would stifle autonomy. Too much emphasis on teamwork would hold back those who, by
natural talents, could lead the rest in discoveries.
Sir David Rivett, Reported in Science in Australia, Proceeds of a Seminar organised by the
Australian National University on the Occasion of the Jubilee of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, July 24-27, 1951, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1951, pp. 161-163.
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Table 6.1 Changes in CSIRO structure, 1965 to 1990
1965
Animal Research Laboratories
Animal Genetics
Animal Health
Animal Physiology
Nutritional Biochemistry
Plant Industry
Entomology & Wildlife
Entomology
Wildlife Research
Soils
Tropical Pastures
Land Research
Horticulture And Irrigation
Horticultural Research
Imgation Research
Processing Agricultural Products
Food Preservation
Dairy Research
Wheat Research
Wool Research
Chemical Research Of Industrial Interest
Chemical Research Laboratories
Protein Chemistry
Fisheries And Oceanography
Physical Research Of Industrial Interest
National Standards Laboratory
Processing Mineral Products
Coal Research
Chemical Research Laboratories
Mining and Metallurgy
Processing Of Forest Products
Forest Products
General Physical Research
Radiophysics
Meteorological Physics
Upper Atmosphere
Radio Research Board
General Industrial Research
Building Research
Tribophysics
Soil Mechanics
Mechanical Engineering
Research Services
Other LServices
Executive
Chairman
8 others
Advisory Council
Chairman
8 Executive members
18 co-opted members
6 State Committee Chairmen
iState Committees
Chairman
15-35 members
1990
Information Science & Engineering
Information Technology
Mathematics and Statistics
Radiophysics
Austraha Telescope
Office of Space Science & Applications
Industrial Technologies
Applied Physics
Biomolecular Engineering
Chemicals and Polymers
Manufacturing Technology
Materials Science &Technology
Minerals. Energy & Construction
Building, Construction & Engineering
Exploration Geoscience
Geomechanics
Mineral and Process Engineering
Mineral Products
Coal and Energy Technology
Animal Production & Processing
Animal Health
Animal Production
Tropical Animal Production
Food Processing
Human Nutrition
Wool Technology
Plant Production And Processing
Entomology
Forest Products
Forestry
Horticulture
Plant Industry
Tropical Crops and Pastures
Soils
Natural Resources & Environment
Atmospheric Research
Fisheries
Oceanography
Water Resources
WildUfe and Ecology
Centre for Environmental Mechanics
Corporate Services
Sirotech
Board
Chairman
Chief Executive
8 others
Csiro Executive Committee
Chief Executive
6 Institute Directors
Chief Executive Sirotech
Director Corporate Services
Advisory Committees
at Institute and Divisional levels
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Eighteenth Annual
Report, Parliamentary Papers, Commonwealth government Printer, Canberra, 1964-65-66, p. 8.
CSIRO, CSIRO Research 1990-91: Directory of CSIRO Research Programs, CSIRO, Canberra,
1991, pp. x-xii.
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The problem for government is thatscientific validity or excellence does not always
ensure achievement of CSIRO's statutory obligations of application to industrial
needs, as the Science Task Force pointedout in 1975.21
TheTaskForce agreedwith the OECD thatundersuch arrangements thereexists
a continuing tendency for the objectives of the Organisation to becomeisolated from
the needs of the users of research in industry. The solution is to develop executive
mechanisms which facilitate intra- and inter-organisational linkages particularly
between scientists and users of research.22 The Birch Committee on CSIRO
suggested that the solution would be: to regroup Divisions into Institutes based on
'national development sectors' ratherthan natural resources or scientific disciplines; to
make Institute Directors members of the Executive of the Organisation and responsible
for maintaining industry linkages; and to give the Executive greater planning and
evaluatory capacity through the provision of economic and industrial expertise in the
form of a Planning and Evaluation Advisory Unit.23
By 1986 the OECD Examiners found thatCSIRO was making 'some efforts to
bridge the gap between its laboratory needs and the needs of manufacturing'. The
tension between maintaining cohesion in a large multi-disciplinary research
organisation anddeveloping closer ties with industry was proving difficult to achieve.
The Examiners concluded that the temptation was to set strategic goals which fitted
organisational interests rather than industry needs. They recommended the
introduction of a corporate planning model rather than further restructuring.24
Without considerable political commitment the norms of science were still proving
resilient to techno-economism.
In 1985 ASTEC too had recommended that research be even more tightly
orientedto external needs by introducing a partial user-pays arrangement for CSIRO
services to industry, by allowing the movement of scientists in and out of the
Organisation without loss of superannuation privileges, and by re-organising the
existing executive machinery from one based onpart-time advisory members to a fully
corporate Board with the capacity to dismiss the Chief Executive.25 1986 the final
steps towards partial corporatisation of CSIRO began with the amendment of the
ScienceandIndustryAct.26 Subsequent events haveadded to the broad objective that
21 RCAGA, Science Task Force, TowardsDiversity and Adaptability, p. 57.
22 OECD, Examiner's Reporton Science and Technology inAustralia, 1974, p. 17.
23 Australia, Independent Inquiry into CSIRO, pp.47, 80& 83.
24 The Examiners cited the case of research into the development of a high speed passenger train
which had no support from Australian Railways or transport manufacturers. The train was a
particularinterest of J.P. Wild who was Chairman of CSIRO from 1977 to 1985.
OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy: Australia 7955,1986, pp. 34-35.
25 ASTEC, Future Directionsfor CSIRO, Park Paper no. 470 of 1985, pp. 7-9.
26 It is difficult to ascertain the exact sequence of advice to Government at this time. Although the
OECD Report was not published until 1986, the Review Meeting, at which the Examiners
explain their findings to invited representatives of Government and interestgroups, tookplace on
CSIRO should be responsiblefor producingmost of the strategic research in Australia
while at the same time increasing the amount of tactical research undertaken for, and
directlypaid for by industry.27
The most significant changes have been:
• strengthening the role of the Minister responsible for CSIRO by inserting in
the Science and Industry Act a clause (Section 13 (1)) which allows the
Minister to issue to the Board a set of guidelines with which the Board must
ensure comphance;
• enhancing the power of the Chief Executive to be responsible for the affairs
of the Organisation at the same time as making that position accountable to a
part-time Board appointed by the Governor-General and led by a part-time
Chairperson also appointed by the Governor-General (Section 14);
• writing into the Act the requirement for Annual and Strategic Plans to be
submitted by the Board to the Minister with the requirement that only
research approved under the plan can be undertaken by the Organisation
(Part Vn 36(1));
• commissioning management consultants McKinsey and Co. to design
management structures for each Institute which would both serve existing
businesses and research users, and allow for the development of new
industries;
• introducing the requirement that up to 30 per cent of the income of each
Division should be derived from external sources;
• allowing individual scientists to benefit financially from developments of
their research, and introducing a system of discretionary fiancial rewards by
the Chief Executive for excellent research which cannot be
commerciahsed;28
• ensuring a process of prioritisation and evaluation which allows input from
all levels of the Organisation;
• appointing for the first time in CSlRO's history a Chief Executive from
outside the Organisation.
The result has been to make CSIRO both more outward-looking, in terms of two-way
interaction with the community, and more aware of the need to co-ordinate research
within the Organisation.29
7 April 1985. On 7 May 1985the PrimeMinisterannounced thatASTECwould be conducting a
review of CSIRO. In the June issue of Search the then CSIRO Chairman, J.P. Wild, wrote an
article suggesting that CSIRO should not be singled out as a scapegoat for the research
deficiencies of the private sector. ASTEC presented its Report in November 1985.
27 The Hon. Barry O. Jones, 'The Role of Government Research Organisations and Tertiary
Institutions in Basic, Applied Research and Experimental Development',Annual General Meeting
Symposium, Australian Academy of Science, Canberra, 1986, pp; 12-23, p. 16.
28 Dr OliverMayo, Chief,Division of Animal Production, CSIRO, Interview, 4.11.89.
29 Dr John Stocker, CSIRO Chief Executive since 1990, tells of how he had to change the attitude
of CSIRO scientists that consulting users and other disciplines would not harm the scientific
rigour of their research. He gives the exampleof an historic meeting of CSIRO scientists from
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Summary CSIRO
The government's policy objective hasbeen to change theperspective of both CSIRO
scientists and the industrial producers they serve. The interaction is two-way with
individual scientists in field and laboratory being given the opportunity to persuade
management and users that investment in a particular area will be of value to the
industry. AdvisoryCouncils exist at the level of Divisions to keep the scientists aware
of industry needs and for scientists to persuade industrial managers of the commercial
viabiliy of new research. At the same time the operational plan imposes a financial
discipline whichkeeps scientists aware of theneed to contain their creativity within the
bounds of national priorities.^o The organisational framework withinwhich research
action takes place in CSIRO has been re-structured so that it fits the objectives of
techno-economism rather than the autonomic prescriptions of scientific ideology.
Eventually this should change the way in which scientists perceive their work,
especially if the higher education system trains young scientists to organise their
creativity in line with industry's needs.
3. Manufacturing Industry
The relationship between manufacturing industry and the Commonwealth government
has been the most problematic of all the science policy sectors because of the often
contentious issue of govemment intervention in the market. By contrast with the mral
sector of production, Australian govemments have traditionally showna reluctance to
intervene in the management of private sector manufacturing research and
development. On theirpart, as notedin chapterfive, manufacturers in Australiahave
demonstrated a marked reluctance to consider research and development as part of
normal production activity. Whereas by 1965 research and development was an
intergralpart of raral production, in non-rural production the interaction between the
science system and industry whichhad been developed in the second world war had
not become institutionalised. Since 1965 there has been a change in the mechanisms
of interaction and in the policy outcome in the form of the amount of research and
development undertaken by private manufacturing industry and its commercialisation.
The change was incremental until 1986 at which point the incentives offered by the
govemment were restmctured; their size, the type of activity whichwas deemedto be
different divisions who met in 1990 to discuss their mutual work on land and soil care and to
formulate ways in which the findings could be communicated to the public. Incredibly, a formal
event of this kind had never happened before. The scientists, who had been initially sceptical
about the process, later agreed that their scientific creativity had been enhanced by the
understanding that their work was valued in the community.
Stocker, 'CSIRO's knight lowers the drawbridge to research', pp. 40-42.
30 Ibid..
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eligible for subsidy, and the direction in which the results of the incentives were to be
applied were all transformed.
3.1 The incentives schemes
Chapter five indicated that, in the science policy community of secondary industry, the
most significant form of interaction between Commonwealth governments and private
firms has been the system of grants and subsidies for research and development. The
industrial research and development grants scheme introduced in 1967 remained
largely unchanged until 1986 when the system changed from being grant-based to
being tax-based. The changes have substantially altered the amount of research
conducted in the sector of manufacturing industry. The changes began in the late
1970s under the Fraser government but were not effective until the election of the
Hawke government with its policy of radical techno-economism objectives for re
structuring manufacturing industry in Australia to be science-based.
3.1.a AIRDGS:1967-1976
The Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Scheme (AIRDGS),
stated that:
..."industrial research and development", means systematic experimentation or
analysis in a field of science or technology carried out by the company
concerned, or procured by it to be carried out, in Australia with the object of -
(a) acquiring knowledge which may be of use for the purpose of devising
or developing new or improved material products or new or improved
processes for or in connexion with the production or use of material
products; or
(b) applying knowledge for the purpose referred to in the last preceding
paragraph; ...3i
Although this definition seems fairly broad, certain activities were excluded from the
Scheme. These non-eligible activities, at the time considered by Whitlam to be
essential to the commercialisation of research, included:
methods engineering operational research
routine property control routine materials testing
market research sales promotion
feasibility studies management studies
labour efficiency surveys technical services to customers
exploration & prospecting design work.32
Their exclusion indicates the lack of understanding of commercial processes by the
decision-makers who designed the scheme. The Scheme was administered by a Board
2 Lamberton, Science, Technology and the Australian Economy, Tudor Press, Sydney, 1970,
Section 5 of the Industrial Research and Development Grants Act 1967, given in Appendix G, pp.
248-265.
22 Australia, House of Representatives 1967, Debates, vol. HR55, p. 2341.
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of three members assisted by an Advisory Committee of eight, four of whom were
public sector research agency managers andfourof whom were managers or directors
of private manufacturing firms.33
In 1974 the OECD Science and Technology Examining Panel reported four main
criticisms of the scheme. Firstly, the scheme only funded research which was
additional to a base year of activity and therefore not pre-selected for maximum
commercial potential. Secondly, because the scheme worked by refunding monies
already spent, largecompanies (often under foreign control) benefited more than small
companies who could not make the initial expenditure. Thirdly, the fact that the
subsidies were taxable reduced their worth to 25 per cent; and finally, the $200,000
upper limit precluded research and development on large prototype projects. The
OECD recommended three basic principlesfor an industrialresearch and development
aid scheme:
• enterprisesshouldbe judged on detailedproposals;
• enterprises should shareup to 50 per cent of the costs of research;
• enterprises should refund the researchcosts of successfulprojects and
government should receive a proportion of royalties.34
By 1976 the scheme was in considerable trouble due to the increasing demands of
industry at a time whenthe govemment had reduced available funds to 1967 levels in
real terms.
3.1.b AIRDIS: 1976-86
In 1976 the Australian Research and Development IncentivesScheme was established
to:
.. .promote the development and improve theefficiency of Australian industry by
encouraging industrial research and development in Australia in mattersrelating
to science and technology.35
Despite the OECD criticisms the definition of research anddevelopment differed from
the 1967 definition only in its inclusion of environmental concerns and a slight
relaxation of the stipulation that products and processes should be 'new', to one that
they should be 'substantially improved'.
However, the new scheme differed from the old in several ways: in its structure;
in the type of grants offered; and in the criteria by whichcompanies were selected for
grants. The new structure enhanced the power of the Board and the Minister, and
decreased the influence of the Advisory Committee which was reduced to three
members who made decisions about the professional status of employees whose
33 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
3^ OECD, Examiner's Reporton Science and Technology inAustralia, 1974, pp. 21-23.
33Industrial Research and Development Incentives Act 1976, (no. 85), (Cwlth) Section 3, pp. 872-
903.
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activities were to be subsidised. The Board was enlarged to a maximum of four part-
time members with a full-time chairman and functioned as a mechanism for
legitimising the activities claimed as research and development by applicant firms by
declaring certain agencies as approved research organisations. The scheme was placed
under the jurisdiction of the Minister for Productivity.
The Board's decisions on the allocations of grants were subject to ministerial
guidelines. These ranged from concern with the national economic usefulness of the
product to concern about the conduct of the applicant company in relation to the
research activity being subsidised. Forthe first time since 1967 Section 39 of theAct
was invoked allowing the Minister to authorise theBoard to make arrangements for
the carrying out of specific projects of industrial research which the Minister
determined to be in the public interest. These grants were designedto encourage co
operation between govemment and industry on projects which otherwise would not be
undertaken because of lack of short-term commercial viability but which were, in the
long-term of national interest.36 The govemment was beginning to make decisions
about the type of industrial research and development which should be undertaken.
In the early 1980s the Board was in an unenviable position. There had been
eight reports or enquiries into technology, science and industry which addressed the
question of industrial restructuring in Australia.^^ The Auditor-General's Report in
particular criticised the scheme for operating without an adequate understanding ofthe
effects of market forces on the use of scientific knowledge in productive enterprises.
At the same timethe Fraser govemment did not seem willing to allocate funds either
forre-stmcturing oreven for thecompetent administration of theincentive scheme for
industrial research.38 The policy which emerged in 1980-82 was a redefinition of the
existing scheme with new areas of research and grant conditions which widened
considerably theBoard's field of action. The establishment of a technical committee
with the capacity toadvise on the potential market viabihty ofnew scientific industrial
knowledge effectively gave the government the sanction of witholding grants from
companies on the grounds ofmarket competence as well as scientific competence.39
36AIRDIB,AnnualReport 1985-86, p.9.
3^ See chapter 4, footnote #101.
38 The Chairman's letters to the Minister in the AIRDIB Annual Reports for 1979-82 indicate an
increasing frustration about the lack ofconcern by the Government that firms needed funds tobe
immediately available in order to minimise thedevelopment period of new products.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1970-80, p. iii.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1980-81, p. iii.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1981-82, p. iii.
39 Thechanges were:
• inclusion of construction R&D;
• inclusion of software R&D;
• increases to commencement grants;
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3.1.C The GIRD scheme: 1986-1990
In 1983 theAIRDIS scheme was placed under theauspices of the new Department of
Science. The Minister promptly enlarged the Board to include such scientist-
entrepreneurs as Dr Alexandra Pucci who had started Australian Monoclonal
Development, and Sir Gustav Nossal whose management ofthe Walter and Eliza Hall
had kept that institution at the forefront ofworld microbiology. Also on the Board
was a market specialist, Peter Redlich ofRedlich Holdings. The Board were given a
staff of 59 in the Industrial Research and Development Branch of the Departmentof
Science, anda new Public Relations Committee to enhance reciprocal understanding
of the incentives offered by the govemment to industry. One such exercise was the
canvassing by the Board ofthe opinions ofthe scientific community (at meetings held
in the six mainland capital cities and through mailed questionaires) about the type of
incentive preferred in the industry sector.^O
The new scheme operates under the Industry Research and Devlopment Act
1986, the objective of which is to 'promote the development, and improve the
efficiency and international competitiveness, ofAustralian industry, by the provision
of assistance for research and development activities.'^ ! Unlike thechanges in 1976
the new Act redefines researchand development in such a way as to enlarge the scope
of govemment intervention inmanufacturing research:
• restrictions on the payment of commencement grants to exclude companies receiving R&D
grants for 5 years; or spending more than $250,000 on R&D in the 8 years prior to
application;
• advance payments tobemade only where firms provide adequate security for any repayments
that may be necessary
• Advisory Committee replaced bya Technical Standing Committee
• enlargement ofthe Board to comprise apart-time Chairman, an Executive Member and 6-10
other part-time members;
• broadening of powers andfunctions of Board to include:
i) increased communication between the Board &members ofIR&D 'constituency' in
Australia;
ii) thefostering of interdepartmental co-operation in industrial R&D;
ill) the provision of Ministerial advice on incentives for industrial R&D.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1981-82.
40 TheBoard reported thattheunanimous view was that both taxand grant incentives were necessary
but that the present scheme was unlikely to be able to provide the flexibility and depth of
evaluation necessary tobeeffective under existing administrative constraints, particularly the lack
of autonomy in the allocation of administrative resources because of the need to operate through
the Department ofIndustry, Technology and Commerce and the Public Service Board. In 1986 a
new incentive scheme was established under legislationdesigned after consultation with industry,
research organisations, professional organisations anduniversities.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1983-84, p. iii.
4! Industry Research andDevelopment Actno. 89of 1986, Section 3.
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..."research and development activities" means systematic investigation or
experimentation activities -
(a) that involve innovation, technology transfer into Australia or technical
risk;
(b) that are carried out in Austraha
(c) the object of which is new knowledge (with or without a specific
practical application) or new or improved materials, products, devices,
processes or services:...^2
The new Board has fourteen members, ten of whom are scientists, economists
or lawyers in private firms.43 The Board is advised in its functions by eight
Committees:
Tax Concession Committee;
Discretionary Grants Committee;
National Procurement Development Committee;
Communications Technology Committee;
Biotechnology Committee;
Information Technology Committee;
Manufacturing and Materials TechnologyCommittee;
Waste and Environmental Management Technology Committee.
In addition to administering the Act, advising the Minister on research and
development incentives for industry, monitoring theeffectiveness of the programs in^,
the scheme and maintaining State-based field offices, the Board is also currently
responsible for fostering relations between Australian and overseas research and
development activities. There is also a Research Committee which has an overseeing
role in advising the Board on such macro-structural issues as the distribution of
industrial research and development and the identification of which factors facilitiate
and which factors inhibit commercialisation of industrial research and development.
There are now five main incentives programs for government support of
industrial research and development: a 150% Tax Concession, Discretionary Grants,
Generic Technology Grants, the National Procurement Development Program, and the
National Teaching Company Scheme. Each scheme (described in chapter 5) affects
the organisation of research in the private manufacturing sectorin different ways.
S.l.c.i The 150 % tax concession
The concession applies to research and development activities which do not attract
other government assistance, the results of which will be exploited on normal
commercial terms to the benefit of Australia. Its use is restricted to companies
incorporated in Australia undertaking research in Australia. The tax concession is
open to all companies undertaking activity which fulfills the statutary definition of
research and development. There are no priority areas.
42 Industry Research and Development Actno. 89 of 1986, Section 4.
43 IR&DB, Annual Report 1990-91, Appendix 1, p. 107.
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3.1.c.ii Discretionary grants
Discretionary grants are for small firms beginning to undertake research and
development but which do not have enough taxation liabilities to benefit from the tax
concession. TheBoard may only award discretionary grants when it is satisfied that a
company inmanufacturing, mining, construction orsoftware is planning toundertake
research and development from which normal commercial exploitation for the benefit
of the Australian economy will ensue, but which would be unable to undertake the
project without govemment support. The grant is also payable for work done in an
outside research organisation undertaking work onbehalf of two or more companies
that fulfil these criteria. In 1991 the scheme was enlarged to include service industries
and market research. Funds in the discretionary grants scheme are awarded
competitively to areas of govemment preference or other areas which can prove
commercial viability or national economic significance for the products or processes
which are developed.
3.1.c.iii Generic Technologv Grants
Generic Technology Grants are designed to support pre-competitive strategic research
and development inparticular new oremerging technologies which are designated by
theMinister as being of fundamental significance for industry competitiveness in the
1990s but which are unlikely to develop if left to market forces alone. By 1990 five
such technologies had been declared. They are:
Biotechnology;
New Materials Technology;
Information Technology;
Communications Technology;
Waste and Environmental Management Technology
Generic grants encourage interfirm collaboration inparticular areas ofproduction and
between these firms and all areas of the science system. They are the closest
approximation yet inthe relationship between manufacturing industry and govemment
to the collective interaction of the mral research funds and corporations.
3.1.c.iv National Procurement Development Program
The NPDP was established in 1988 to fund projects which encourage government
departments and agencies to seek Australian solutions for their forward procurement
needs. The program brings together govemment purchasers and innovative Australian
businesses. It is directed at the development, trialling and demonstration end of the
research anddevelopment process. To qualify projects must demonstrate a sustainable
IR&DB, Annual Report 1990-91, p. 240.
competitive advantage in international markets. The NPDP Committee includes
representatives fromindustry and the trade unions.
3.1.C.V National Teaching Companv Scheme
In 1984 the government introduced the National Teaching Company Scheme to
encourage collaboration between the higher education and industrial sectors through
the use of personnel. The government funds research projects in which graduates
work in private firms supervised jointly by academics and company personnel to
develop new products or processes. The projects may be in a wide spectrum of
activities including the areas of manufacturing methodology, marketing, management
accounting, design or strategic planning.46
Summary: manufacturing industry
AT P governments since 1983 have pursued a policy of restructuring the allocatory
system for the public funding ofmanufacturing research and development in order to
address perceived economic needs ofdecreasing the technological balance ofpayments
by increasing the technological component of exports. Table 6.2 summarises the
changing patterns of interaction in the organisation of public resources for
manufacturing research.
Table 6.2: Industrial R&D incentives schemes 1967-90
1967 1976 1981 1990
Board Chairman
(private sector)
2 part-time
members
Chairman
(private sector)
2-4 part-time
members
Chairman
(privatesector)
6-10 part-time
department officer
Chairman
(private sector)
12 part-time
2 departmental
Advisory
Committee
Chairman
4 public sector
research managers
4 private sector
managers or
directors
Chairman
2 members
Chairman
4 members
Tax Concession;
Discretionary
Grants;
National
Procurement Dev.;
Biotechnology;
Communications;
Environmental;
Information;
Materials &
manufacturing;
Other
Committees
none Technical Director
2 scientific or
technical staff
Technical Standing
Committee
Public Relations
Committee
Research
Committee
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45 IIR&DB,Annual Report 1988-89, Part. Paper 23, Canberra, 1990, p. 57.
46 Bureau of Industry Economics, The National Teaching Company Scheme, AGPS, Canberra,
1991, p. VII.
267
The changes simultaneously allow producers greater autonomy in the selection of
research to be subsidised andallow governments to direct other funds to selected areas
of research. The proliferation of subgovernmental agencies, the enlargement of
activities designated as research and development, and the widening of interests
represented on the Board, reflect the complexity ofthe selection processes and the
willingness of the government to enlarge the scope of its intervention. However, at
the same time, the introduction of the tax concession has both encouraged
manufacturing industry to invest in research and development and allowed a wide
measure of market demand intothepublic subsidisation of research.
4. RURAL Industry
Rural research has traditionally been undertaken bya wide range ofresearch agencies
in Australia: by CSIRO, university researchers, researchers in State higher education
institutions and departments of agriculture; and by specialised research institutes.
Since 1965 the most significant change in the way research is organised in the rural
sector has been the shift in the focus of decision-making in the rural science policy
community about which research should be undertaken. In 1965 this was primarily
the responsibility ofrural producers and scientists. The restructuring of the Rural
Research Trust Funds has altered control of the process of prioritisation so that
decisions are now taken on the basis of sophisticated economic modelling ofpotential
markets by bureaucrats as much as on the basis ofscientists solving existing problems
ofrural production. The seeds ofchange were sown inthe late 1970s when the Eraser
government undertook an enquiry into rural research funding. However, significant
change occurred only when the Hawke govemment restructured the mechanisms of
decision-making in the rural research system to reflect govemment techno-economistic
objectives.
4.1 Rural research organisation in 1965
Earlier chapters have shown that the principle ofpublic support for mral research has
been a long-term policy of Australian governments, and that the principles were
concretised in research stmctures and funding. By 1965 two main mechanisms had
been developed - research associations and research trust funds. Research
associations are voluntary industry groups partly funded by the Commonwealth
govemment through CSIRO. They employ their own scientists in autonomous
institutions.^ '^^ ^ Research trustfunds were established to aid research in particular
industries and usually contracted research projects in public or private organisations.
47 Science andIndustry Research Act, no. 13of 1949, Section 9 (1) (d).
48 In 1965 thesewerethe WineResearch Institute; the SugarResearch Institute; the BreadResearch
Institute; the CoalResearch Institute; andthe Australian Leather Research Institute.
CSIRO, EighteenthAnnual Report 1965-66, p. 218.
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It is this form of organisation of research which most closely reflects government
objectives for puhlicy funded research, and which has undergone major restructuring
under the ALP governments of the 1980s.
4.2 Changes in rural research funding agencies
In the 1970s both the Whitlam and Fraser governments examined the system of rural
research funding in Australia. In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a
Green Paper on Rural Policy in Australia which was published in 1974. This Report
examined the funding of rural research and found that the burden of levies fell
unequally throughout the rural community with some industries paying no levies at all.
Other criticisms of the system were:
• there was a bias towards producing research of interestto largeproducers;
• the system produced too much basic scientific knowlege with no specific
applicationin the industry;
• the narrow sectoral base of the tmst funds hmits the inter-disciplinary nature
of the scientific activity. This type of work often generates the most
innovative research findings;
• therewas not enoughresearch into lessestablished crops with the result that
the industry was too narrowly focused in the face of market changes;
• there was notenough emphasis onmarketing research.49
The Report concluded that rural research should continue to be funded partly by
government but that current institutional arrangements mitigated against efficient use of
resources. An overall advisory body was needed to ensure that the scientific
knowledge produced covered all aspects of rural production, and that the research
commissioned by the rural producers should be carried out in as wide a range of
institutions as possible in order to stimulate inter-disciplinary innovation and
collaboration.^^
Similar conclusions were reached in the Industries Assistance Commission's
(lAC) 1976 report on rural research funding. The lAC supported the principle of
government support for rural research and development and concluded that, on the
whole, the system of funding provided more benefits than costs to the Australian
public. The IAC offered a blueprint for a new system of funding which would
maintain the close industry/research community relationship but at the same time
reduce the uncertainties of output-based ineome for the funds and the broader system
inefficiencies of lack of research co-ordination. The most significant of the
Commission's recommendations for rural research were:
• the establishment of an Agricultural Research Council to advisethe Standing
Committee on Agrieulture on research issues;
49 Australia, ThePrinciples of Rural Policy inAustralia, paragraphs 5.125-5.190.
Ibid., paragraphs 5.245-5.256.
• a new Bureau of Rural Research should manage the trust funds, act as a
secretariat for the new Agricultural Research Council, and develop an
inventory of research;
• to alleviate the Funds' problems with research costs outstripping income
levies should be based on value produced rather than volume produced;
• Rural Research Industry Funds should appoint technical conunittees to
advise on the allocation of research funds.^i
ASTEC, too, in its first Annual Report, advised Prime Minister Fraser that the
proposed Commonwealth Council for RuralResearch and Extension (the outcomeof
the lAC REport) shouldbe giventhe task of prioritising, co-ordinating and evaluating
rural research policy objectives.^^ aSTEC found that rural research in Australia
lacked any co-ordination and was in general 'site specific' because there was no
overarching, co-ordinating agency at thenational level.53
The OECD reiterated this theme of the co-ordination of rural research policy in
its 1977Review of Australiansciencepolicy. The Organisation approvedof the close
ties between industry and researcher fostered by the quadripartite (Commonwealth,
States, CSIRO, industry funds) system of funding, but recommended the
establishment of a central agency to managethe relationship betweenthe rural research
system and the global market.
The overall picture is of a research system which was fulfilling its fundamental
mission of the short-term needs of its commodity-based clientele but which was not
encouraged by its major resource provider, viz. the Commonwealth government, to
develop a wider role in articulating the interaction between users of knowledge,
producers of knowledge andthewider socio-economic environment.
4.3 The corporatisation of the Trust Funds
1980 heralded a decade of change which began slowly but accelerated from 1983 as
the Hawke government began to implement the changes advocated by the various
reports of the late 1970s. The issue of theco-ordination and centralisation of advice
on rural research was embedded in an ideological debate about States' Rights. The
direction of research funded by the Trust Funds was strongly influenced by State-
based advisorycommittees and the scientists who benefitedfrom their funds; and the
Fraser government was reluctant to upset the power of the Agricultural Council and
the Standing Committeeon Agriculture even though the two bodies had traditionally
not exertedtheir statutory rights in thatdirection.55
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^1 Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, pp. 7-9.
ASTEC, Science and Technology in Australia 1977-78, vol. IB, p. 25.
53 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 117.
54 OECD, Review ofNational Science Policy: Australia 1985, p. 159
55 Keith O. Campbell, Australian Agriculture: Reconciling Change and Tradition, Longman
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1980, p. 150.
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By 1980 some changes had been made in thedirection indicated by thereports.
A Commonwealth Council for Rural Research and Extension had been established to
advise the Minister on rural research and to evaluate the needs of the funding system;
and the Department ofPrimary Industry was finally required to table anAnnual Report
documenting the financial activities of the Rural Industry Research Trust Funds for
whichthe Minister had stamtory responsibility.56
The Hawke government was elected on a platform which contained a science
and technology policy with no reference to rural research or the funding thereof.57
The Minister for Science and Technology considered that such funding should not be
cut but that more efficent use should be made of allocations to rural research by the
reorganisation of priorities within the system.58 The government began by
establishing a Bureau of Rural Research and continued with a gradual proces of the
corporatisation of theRural Industry Research TmstFunds.
Theroleof theBureau is to provide scientific and technical advice on sustainable
rural economic activity. However, when it began working in the mid 1980s the
Bureaudiscovered that very littlewas actually knownaboutwhere, how and why over
fivehundred million dollars is spent onmralresearch in Australia eachyear. The staff
therefore developed a directory of rural research which identifies 73 separate
organisations doing rural research in Australia under the definition of the Rural
Industries Research Act 1985.59 The compilers of the directory, completed in 1989,
were surprised at the complexity of the rural science system, and, in face of the
difficulties of evaluating the efficiency of such a system, advocated no immediate
radical changes.
In 1984 a Public Service Board Joint Management Review examined primary
industry research schemes. The Review recommended once more the centralisation of
the financial control of each scheme with a tightening of the conditions under which
grants were awarded.^o In 1985 the Rural Industries Research Act was introduced to
provide greater accountability for the use of research funds by standardising the
administration of the existing Rural Industry Research Funds.61
Under the Act the Research Comittees for each industry were replaced by
Research Councils. The primary objective of the Councils is to increase the
56 Department of Primary Industry, Annual Report 1980-81, pp.38-53.
57 Australian Labor Party, Platform, Consltutlon and Rules as approved by the 35th National
Conference, Canberra, 1982, ALP National Secretariat, Canberra, 1982, pp. 147-154.
58 Jones, 'The 1984 Science and Technology Budget',p. 247.
59 The Bureau therefore included fisheries and forestry research in its directory.
Evans, Swinbank & Williams, 'An introduction to public sector resources allocated to research
from the rural industries', p. 10.
60 Public Service Board, Annual Report 1983-84, Parl. Paper no. 278, 1984, p. 44.
61 The exceptions were the wool and meat and livestock industries which were in the process of
changing to corporate status; and the fishing and wine industries which were undergoing
investigations at the time.
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commercial returns to the industries by funding research into a wide range of activities
involvedin rural economic production including production, processing, processing,
storage, transport andmarketing. In addition the government transformed theSpecial
Research Grant into a new scheme for the funding of rural research falling outside the
ambit of the existing Rural Industry Research Funds. The scheme would be
administered by an Australian Special Rural Research Council awarding funds
provided by the Commonwealth government into the Australian Special Rural
Research Fund.^^
Despite these changes in structure and process the industries and the
Commonwealth government were still notsatisfied thattheresearch anddevelopment
being funded by the Research Councils was directed towards those aspects of rural
production which would lead to the greatest national commercial benefits. At two
major forums debating the funding of rural research the Minister for Primary
Industries and Energy, John Kerin, expressed the govemment's view that, with $500
million being spent on rural research in Australia, it was the government's
responsibility to see that efficient and effective funding arrangements were
established.63 porproducers and fund managers there was still theperception that the
persisting influence of scientists on the direction of research led to over-emphasis on
production techniques to the detriment ofresearch into the processing and marketing
of commodities. They considered that the process of asserting industrycontrol over
research had not gone far enough. The Manager of Research andPromotion for the
Australian Wool Corporation said:
In the past wool production has been excessively influenced by scientists'
perceptions of the needs of industry. Expenditure on the development and
commercialisation of results has generally been small....I believe that a major
issue for the future in rural R&D is the balance between research and the process
of development and commercialisation of new technologies arising from
R&D.64
In a similar vein the Chairman of the National Farmers' Federation spoke of his fellow
members concern over the issue:
In the discussion we have had about the changes taking place in agricultural
researchit is very clear that many researchscientists and administrators are very
uncomfortable with the rising trend for control of funds and priorities to rest
with non-scientists outside of their organisation. I can offer no comfort on that
Australia, Senate 1985, Debates, vol. S108, pp. 1598-1601.
63 Hon. John Kerin, Opening Addresses for Bureau of Rural Resources, Workshop on the
Organisation and Funding ofRural Research, 12-13 May 1988, AGPS, pp. 7-10; and Bureau of
Rural Resources, SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocationfor Rural R&D,
AGPS, Canberra 1989, pp. 3-7.
64 Bob Richardson, 'Rural commodity research priorities', in SCA Workshop on Research Priorities
and Resource Allocationfor Rural R&D, AGPS, Canberra, pp. 18-25, p. 24.
score. In fact the NFF considers that the process should be taken even
further.65
Consequently, in 1989 the process of privatising the administration of the
remaining Councils whichhad not already become corporations was legislated in the
Primary Industries andEnergy Research andDevelopment Act. The Act effectively
allowedthe industries greater financial flexibihty and commercial controlin return for
increased accountability through the centralisation of representative selection and
reporting requirements. Thecorporations are allowed to enter intojointventures, take
out patents and licences and raise funds from arange ofsources.66
Of particular interest is the Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation (RIRDC) which has been established to fund rural research in areas
which would otherwise not be funded through market mechanisms. The RIRDC
incorporates such previously autonomous small rural research trusts aschicken meat,
egg, and honey bee into one overarching corporation which also funds research into
potential rural indutries such as cashews, coffee and teatree. The Corporation sees its
role as 'innovative, catalytic and coordinative' in developing Australia's rural
industries of the future.^'^
Summary: rural research
For the greater partof the last twenty five years mralindustry research in Australia has
beenorganised on an adhoc, fragmentary basis which saw a proliferation of research
organisations undertaking work on behalfof industry funds and State governments.
The Hawke government inherited a rural research system which had been intensely
investigated but which had undergone only partial restructuring to fit the changing
needs of Australian economicproduction and global trade. The corporatisation of the
rural research funds and councils, and the establishment of agencies to inform the
funding process have, together with the changes occurring in CSIRO and higher
education, demythologised the organisation of rural research. Fundamental to the
transition were the processes of prioritisation, evaluation, and selection discussed in
the next chapter.
5. CONCLUSION
Control over the organisation of researchis one of the fundamental tenets of the ethos
of science, which proselytises universal, socio-cultural objectives for both the
production anduse of the products of research. It was therefore inevitable that, when
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John Mackenzie, 'The views of the rural sector', in Workshopon the Organisation and Funding of
Rural Research, pp. 70-78, p. 72.
Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol. HR 169, 1989,pp. 2463-2473.
Australia, Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation,Annual Report 1990-91, Park
Paper 437, Canberra, 1991, p. 3.
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govenments began to impose techno-economistic objectives on the science system,
scientists would resist all attempts to reduce their organisational autonomy. In
Australia the need for governments to change their ideas about science began to be
expressed in the attentive public in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1980s that
relatively systematic restmcturing was attempted. Implementation of the proposed
changes required a firm commitment to the principle ofgovernment intervention in
publicly-funded research.
TheHawke government was elected in 1983 on a platform which included plans
to restructure Australian economic production away from dependence on theexport of
commodities and towards a more science-based economy. Inevitably such
restructuring involved the organisation of research and development, and it was
resisted by sections of the scientific community in both CSIRO and the higher
education system which had hitherto enjoyed considerable autonomy in formulating
objectives for research. Inorder to overcome this resistance ALP governments have
had to use a whole armoury of restructuring mechanisms including publicly-funded
financial incentives, statutory obligations andtheestablishment of agencies more open
to industry needs and market forces.
Industry too has had to be persuaded to consider research as an investment
strategy. Making research institutions more open to industry requires that industry
should want to interact in this way. In rural researchsuch interaction had long been
insitutionalised but required to be systematically catalogued in order to avoid
duplication ofresource use. Restmcturing in manufacturing industry research had to
be achieved ontwofronts: by convincing the core executive of theneed for a research
tax subsidy; and byconvincing firms that their long-term survival could be achieved
through collectively, as well as individually, funding research and development.
At the heart of this restmcturing and its resistanceby scientists lies the process
of evaluating the worth of research projects. As government assumed greater
involvement in directing the organisation ofresearch the processes of evaluation and
prioritisation into the selection of research projects came under scratiny. The next
chapter analyses the changes that occurred inthis aspect ofscience policy.
274
Chapter 7
Prioritisation, Selection and Evaluation
The third major change in the ouput ofscience policy has been inthe development of
processes ofprioritisation, selection and evaluation ofpublicly-funded research. The
most fundamental changes have occurred in the objectives, criteria, processes and
agencies ofevaluation. Changes in the objectives for research are discussed in chapter
three which documented the development of techno-economism as the rationale for
allocating public resources toresearch and development. This chapter concentrates on
the way these objectives have been implemented inthe science science system. The
criteria by which research activity is evaluated have changed from those based on
values of scientific excellence to those based on the economic benefits to be derived
from investment into research and development.i The change has entailed a
considerable increase in the level of non-scientific accountability to which government
funded or subsidised research activity is subjected, ha Australia the activities of the
public sector science system have traditionally been evaluated by scientists with
minimal input from users, including non scientific govemment actors. Asteady state
of resources, and the burgeoning costs of research have resulted in a situation in
which managers and subgovernmental program administrators have developed new
methods of evaluation which attempt to incorporate elements of both administrative
and scientific rationality. The introduction ofthese methods has caused considerable
conflict within the science policy community as scientists have resisted accountability
mechanisms which encroach on their traditional freedom from notions of
administrative and economic eficiency.
The type ofevaluation introduced into the decision-making processes ofscience
have been adapted from those used elsewhere to monitor and evaluate the delivery of
goods and services in the public sector. Public and private sector consultants agree
that there are three stages to this type of evaluation:
The Bureau of Industry Economics defines evaluation as being theprocess of facilitating 'better
choices' where 'better'means the extentto whichactivity contributes to the underlying objectives
of public policy. Such objectives may be socially or economically defined. A significant
objective for many public programs is the maximisation of economic welfare which involves
making choices about which projects will make the largest contribution to national economic
welfare.
Bureau of Industry Economics, Evaluation ofpublic sector supportfor industrial research and
development, AGES, Canberra, 1986, p. 2.
The ideology of techno-economism inscience policy fits this notion ofprogram evaluation. The
cultural aspects of science policy cannot hesoeasily evaluated. Forexample, how is it possible
to assess whether the cultural life of the nation will benefit more from funding certain esoteric
aspects of radio astronomy or studying the distribution of flora in the Tarkine Wilderness of
Tasmania?
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• ex ante evaluation: which occurs prior to project selection;
• concurrent evaluation: which involves the continuous monitoring of
research activity in terms of project objectives;
• expostevaluation: which involves determining whether theproject has
achieved its stated objectives.^
The extent to which these evaluation processes have beenintroduced is an indication
of the political resolve of the subgovemment of science policy to create a research
environment in Australia which is centred on the commercialisation of research results.
Prioritisation, selection and evaluation have been introduced at different rates, and by
different means, in each of the four sectors of the science policy community under
examination.
1. Higher Education
Peer evaluation of research in universities has traditionally been part of the basic
premise ofthe autonomy which protects academe from undue political influence. The
political ideology oftechno-economism requires that the production ofnew knowledge
should be evaluated in terms of economic and social utility. Thus there is a potential
conflict of values between the evaluators of research in terms of international
competence and academic acclaim, and the evaluators ofresearch interms ofeconomic
andsocial utility. One of themajor changes effected by science policy in recent years
has been the superimposition of criteria of utility over the criteria of international
scientific competence. This has been achieved bydeliberately centralising control of
major funding programs outside the higher education subgovemment; byreducing the
autonomy of the granting system; and by opening the process ofresearch evaluation to
peers outside the highereducation system.
1.1. Prioritisation, selection and evaluation in 1965
In 1965 the evaluation of university research was undertaken by two principal
mechanisms. Firstly, recurrent and special research grants were distributed to
individual universities on the basis of the level of post-graduateactivity. Autonomous
university research committees then distributed the funds intemally according to the
priorities of each university. There was little superstractural or subgovernmental
intervention in the internal allocation process. In 1966 the University Comnpssion
advised research councils that they shouldnot attempt to fund all areas of research in
each university. In 1975 the Commission proposed that some co-operation and
concentration should occur between universities undertaking the same type of work,
but there were no incentives within the funding system to encourage university
researchers to interact in this way.
2 T.G. Parry & P.P. Baxter, 'Evaluation of the Industrial Research and Development Incentives
Scheme: A Case Study in Program Evaluation', in Evaluation ofpublic supportfor industrial
researchand development. Bureau ofIndustry Economics, AGPS, Canherra, 1986, pp. 57-63.
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Secondly, the ARGS grants were awarded on the basis of 'outstanding
individual merit' according to the judgement of the ARGS Comrmttee.3 Funds were
distributed to scientists outside Commonwealth or State government research
agencies. The grants were made purely on the individual merits ofeach proposal, and
with no consideration of equity of distribution between states or universities, or any
prioritisation of disciplines:
Inreaching its decisions the Committee concerned itself only with the quality of
the project and ofthe investigator. The Committee considered that it should not
attempt to achieve any preconceived balance ofgrants as between disciphnes and
institutions."^
Although there were provisions within the terms of reference for ministerial
involvement in deciding which proposals were to be supported there no formal
evidence that suchinvolvement occurred in the first few years of the scheme.
1.2. The introduction of prioritisation
In 1972Eraser, as Minister for Education and Science in the McMahon government,
designated 15 per cent ofARGS funds into four specified areas ofresearch: upper
atmosphere science, the acquisition ofanuclear resonance spectrometer, the vaguely-
worded 'multi-disciplinary research' and marine science. The Queen's Fellowship
Scheme dating from 1970 was also earmarked for research into marine science and the
Queen Elizabeth 11 Fellowships, dating from 1964 and designated at that time for
physical and biological science, were also the responsihility of the Department. Each
scheme hadseparate advisory andgranting committees.
In 1975 the ARGC reasserted its policies of supporting excellence rather than
prioritydisciplines:
The Committee has consistently sought to direct itself to supporting the most
outstanding and promising research being carried out in universities and
research institutions. This has had the effect of striking some balance between
the disciplines in ensuring that the most outstanding work in each discipline is
supported. However, ifwork ofsufficient merit in aparticular discipline isnot
offered, the Committee has resisted the pressure to allocate money for second-
rate work.^
The policy was endorsed by the 1978 ASTEC Report which called for a higher
and stable level of funding for the ARGS scheme and the maintenance of the 1974
level of recurrent grants (and therefore the 'block' special research grants) in real
terms.6 ASTECfurther endorsedthe systemin 1979, recommending that the process
of allocation and evaluation should not be changed except insofar as:
3 The Committee consisted of nine professors and a Chair: Professor R.N. Robertson, a botanist
from Adelaide University and President of ANZAAS.
Australian Research Grants Committee, First Report, Parl Paper, p. 571.
Ihid., pp. 1-2.
3 Australian Research Grants Committee, Report 1973-75, p. 3.
^ ASTEC, Science and Technology inAustralia, 1977-78, vol. lA, AGPS, 197R, p. 5.
ASTEC recommends that universities re-examine their procedures for the
distribution of research funds derived from the Recurrent Grants and the Special
Research Grants with a view to giving greater support to their best research
workers, and, when appropriate, to group and teamefforts7
However, there should be no selection according to any other priority than the
traditional one of excellence:
ASTEC believes that excellence in research needs to be supported irrespective of
any immediate orperceived social, economic or other benefit.^
In 1983 the process of selection for grants had remained virtually unchanged
since 1972 and consisted of the following elements
• applications, called for in February of any year were first seen by the full
Committee in April;
• an Executive Committee of the full Committee then divided the applications
for examination by sub-committees according to discipline;
• the sub-committees appointed panels and assessors for each project;
• reports from the assessors and panels were read by the full Committee in
June;
• interviews were arranged with the applicants whose projects required
further clarification;
• the Committee made its final recommendations which were sent for
ministerial approval;
• the successful applicants were announced in October of each year.
The Committee, which was still evaluating projects on grounds of academic
excellence alone, was accountable to a new government and a Minister for Science and
Technology who envisageda far moreproactiverole for the grants scheme in advising
the government on areas of research with the greatest socio-economic benefit to
Australian society. The resulting clash of values was reflected in statements made in
the Committee's Reports for 1984 to 1986. In 1984 the Committee absolved itself of
the responsibility of discrimination between 'subject areas' as well as between States
and institutions. However, the Committee felt that it could include evaluation and
reporting of areas of research strength within its role, but expressed yet again its
central criterion of excellence:
It is no exaggeration to say that the development of many new Australian
initiatives in commercial apphcation... are possible because the ARGS has in the
past supported many excellent proposals in Universities,
^ ASTEC, TheDirect Funding ofBasic Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1978,p. 67.
8 Ibid..
9 In 1968 the Committeeintroduced a process of evaluation of projects which had been funded for
three years in order to assess the success of the project and whetherfunding should be continued.
The grantee was required to submit a progress report which wasevaluated by assessors appointed
by the Committee. Publications arising from the project were used as an indicator of success. In
1975 a further evaluation was introduced for projects which had been funded continuously for six
years. Grantees were required to submit for subsequentgrantsab initio applications which would
undergo the same selection processes as first-time applications.
^® Jones, 'Government funding of scientific research', p. 8.
^^ Australian Research Grants Committee, Report on GrantsApprovedfor 1984, pp. 6-7.
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In the following year the Committee felt obliged to clarify that its area of concern
was with 'outstanding and promising research' which should lead to the publication of
results and that the development of scientific knowledge to the stage of patentable
products or processes was beyond its purview and resources. Neither would the
Committee favour teams rather than individual researchers. 12 This obvious reluctance
to change led the government to ask ASTECto review the functions of the ARGC.
1.3. Excellence and selectivity
In 1987 ASTEC endorsed the government's changed expectations of university
research, finding that existing granting procedures in higher education were 'limiting
the sector's research performance' in providing the 'research base upon which
Australia's future industrial performance will increasingly depend'.^3 In the 1987
Report, which ASTECclaimed wasbased on extensive consultation with all sectors of
the scientific community, ASTEC recommended that the basic premises upon which
the new council would distribute its funds should encompass not only excellence but
also accountability and relevance:
While basic research is motivated primarily by curiosity in the selection of topics
and the conduct of research, we do not consider it relieves individual researchers
or their institutions of the requirement to be accountable to the public for the
support which is provided for research. We see no conflictbetween the pursuit
of excellence in research and the relevance of that research to important
economic or social issues.
ASTEC also recommended that the primary objective of research in higher
education institutions should be its contribution to national economic and social
objectives: the advancement of fundamental scientific knowledge was considered
secondary. To this end ASTEC suggested that the role of a new council should be
expanded to include: '...the identification and selective support of emerging or
undeveloped fields of research which are likely to be important in the national
interest.. .'.12 This recommendation was taken up by the government and written into
12 Australian ResearchGrants Committee, Reporton GrantsApprovedfor 1985, p. 2.
ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance of Australia's Universities and Other Higher
Education Institutions, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, p. iii.
1^ AssociateProfessor Ian Lowe of GriffithUniversitydisagrees. He considers that ASTEC decided
in advance of consultations what their recommendations would be. He says:
When ASTEC came here to air their views when they were partway through their studies on
higher education funding they weren'treally interestedin consulting people but in propounding
their views which were that you need to concentrate funds to achieve critical mass and support
the best researchers. Their view was that the reason we in Australia lag behind other countries
is that we are a small country and we can't afford to research across the board. We have to
concentrate resources on the best workers.
Interview, 1.11.89.
13 ASTEC, Improving the Research Performance of Australia's Universities and other Higher
Education Institutions, p. 2.
1^ Ibid., p. 6.
12 Ibid., p. 36.
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the enabling legislation for the Australian Research Council (ARC).18 It was repeated
in the terms of reference in two clauses which required the Council to advise the
government, through NBEET, onthe formulation ofresearch policy relating to:
• the support to be given to fundamental research and to research that will
contribute directly to the economic or social development of Australia;
• measures aimed at improving interaction amongthe higher education sector,
the private research sector and the industrial sector;...
The ARC has control of a large proportion of the resources allocated to higher
education research. Among the major programs are the ARC Grants Program, the
Special Research Centres Program, the Key Centres of Teaching and Research
Program, theResearch Fellowships Scheme and the Queen Elizabeth 11 Fellowships
Program. Most of these now have atleast one criterion ofrelevance tonational socio
economic interests which must be fulfilled. Table 7.1 lists the broad objectives of the
major schemes.
Table 7.1: The objectives of ARC funding schemes in 1990
ARC Grants:
Special Research Centres:
Key Centres of Teaching
and Research:
ARC Research Fellowships:
are awarded on the likelihood of the project's making
a real advance in knowledge, either by making a
significant contribution to understanding or by
making a contribution to the solution of an
important practical problem.
are intended to support outstanding research in fields
that will contribute substantially to Australia's
development and in which Australia has gained
international recognition.
combine teaching and research activities and
are closely linked to the needs of industry and
commerce.
are awarded on criteria of (among others)
• relevance to priority areas of national interest;
• the likelihood of producing benefits to Australian
industry.
Data source: Department ofEmployment, Education and Training, The Australian Research Council
Awards 1989, AGPS, Canberra, 1989, pp. 10-13.
The newgeneral criteriaare applied within a two-tier selection andevaluation system
of peer review which is basically the same process as that refined over many years in
The ARC is directly responsible botb to the National Board of Employment, Education and
Training (NBEET) and only indirectly to theMinister forEducation rather than theMinister for
Science. The ARC has a more formal structure; an envelope of funds bolstered by research funds
previously allocated to the universities as part of recurrent grants, and a more explicit set of
mission statements emphasising the contribution that scientific research can make to the nation's
socio-economic wellbeing rather than merely the pursuit of excellence. The new Council has ten
members, two of whom sit on NBEET. This arrangement replaces the previous informal
consultation with CTEC to avoid duplication of award recipients.
ARC, The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 1-5.
1^ ARC, TheAustralian Research Council Awards J989, AGPS, Canberra, p. 15.
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the ARGC grants scheme.20 in addition the ARC is developing strategies toevaluate
the quality ofresearch across the entire spectrum ofits programs. These will consist
of internal reports by the Chairmen ofdiscipline panels, and external reports of fields
ofresearch towhich large amounts offunds have been allocated.^i
Another aspect ofresearch evaluation inhigher education which is in transition
is the redistribution of the research component of recurrent funds for higher education
institutions. In 1991 a working party from theARC, DEBT andthe Higher Education
Council (HEC) were in the process of formulating a 'composite research funding
index' for future allocations of this money.22
1.4. A wider spectrum of decision-makers
Aswell as broadening thecriteria ofselection, successive governments have widened
the spectrum ofsocial interests represented on the various committees and councils
which make the most important decisions in the allocation of resources within the
higher education research system.23 Similar changes are evident inthe composition of
the Co-operative Research Centres Committee in comparison with the Steering
Committee to Review Commonwealth Special Research Centres. The CRC
Committee formed in 1990 has a third of its members from outside the higher
education system whereas in 1986 only a sixth of the members of Special Research
Centres Assessment Panels were non-academics and two-thirds of these were from
CSIR0.24
The most significant change is in the composition of the ARC and its various
committees. Until 1975 the ARGC and the pool of experts upon which it called for
assessment were composed almost entirely of academics with the one exception of a
CSIRO scientist. In 1990 one third of the ARC members are non-academics and
almost every committee has at least one non-academic member. The Planning and
Review Committee hadequal representation of non-academics, andtheInstitutional
Grants Committee was chaired by the Chief Science Adviser of DITAC (now the
Department of Industry, Technology and Regional Development). Such external
representation brings to the processes of prioritisation, selection and evaluation a
wider set ofexpectations ofthe research outcome ofhigher education.25
20 GeoffWilson, 'Research funding best served by peerreview', Australian, February 13, 1991, p.
16.
21 Department ofEducation, Employment and Training, Higher Education: Quality and Diversity in
the 1990s, Policy Statement by the Hon. Peter Baldwin, MP, Minister for Higher Education and
Employment Services, AGPS, Canberra, 1991, p. 35.
22 The community also requested that the means of allocation of the funds should be as simple as
possible.
The Australian Research Council Awards 1990, pp. 14-15.
23 Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee, Commonwealth Research Training Centres and
the Future of the Program, Attachment B.
24 Department ofthe Prime Minister and Cabinet, Co-operative Research Centres Program, p.25.
25 Ibid.,pp. 33-42.
ARGC, Report 1973-75, pp. 1-3.
Australian Universities Commission, Third Report 1964-69, Appendix 1.
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1.5. Summary: evaluation in the higher education research system
In analysing the extent and impact of the changes in evaluation processes for the
allocation of resources to research in higher education it is useful to examine the
impact of changing science policy at three levels. At the micro-level of individual
projects the criteria of selection have been broadened from traditional academic criteria
of excellence to include explicit notions of contribution to national economic welfare.
At the meso-level of the allocation of resources to institutions there has been a loss of
autonomy, due in large part to the general failure of universities to concentrate their
areas of research and co-operate in the use of research facilities, and a corresponding
increase in the formalisation of selection processes. At the macro-level of the
interaction of the institutions of higher education with other societal agencies there has
been an apparent loss of autonomy in the increased accountability of the ARC, the
Higher Education Council and NBEET to departmental and ministerial control.26
However, the potential for political control and intervention has always been written
into legislation and terms of reference. What changed in the mid 1980s was the
political will to enforce upon the higher education research system increased
accountability for public funds accordingto criteria whichembraced a wider definition
of economic and social benefits than had hitherto been expected of an evaluation
system informed by scientific norms and values.
2. CSIRO: Scientific Norms to Multiple Rationality
In the mid-1960s the process of evaluation of any public policy was relatively
undeveloped. This was particularly so in science policy where governments were
only just beginning to come to terms with the idea that the internal allocation of public
sector science funding could not be left to the scientists. The need to evaluate CSIRO
research programs occurred as research budgets ceased to be open-ended, as the cost
of research increased with the complexity and number of fields of science, and as
research became more important in economic growth. The problem has been the
choice of criteria used in the process of calculating the costs and benefits of altemative
programs. Governments had to impose techno-economic objectives onto selection
National Board of Employment, Education and Training, Annual Report 1990-91, Parl. Paper
267,Canbera, pp. 80-81.
Accounts of the extent of this interference in the allocation of resources vary. Professor Wilson,
Chairman of the Research Grants Committee of the ARC declares that there has been very little
ministerial influence on either the areas of research to be given priority or on the aarding of
individual grants. Professor Wilson says that more pressure comes from scientists than from
public servants or politicians. On the other hand, reports of ARC meeting documents sent to The
Australian newspaper claim that, in 1990, the Minister for Education relayed to the ARC
Cabinet's wishes that a research centre in a certain area of health care should be established.
Professor Wilson was purportedly present at the meeting. The problem seems to lie in academics'
notion of autonomy as absolute rather than relative to the enabling legislation or the terms of
reference of the ARC.
Wilson, 'Research funding hest served by peer review', p. 16.
William West, 'Politics "at play" in research centre', Australian, November 7 1991, p. 11.
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processes traditionally controlled by scientists using criteria more suited to
nationalistic-cultural objectives.
2.1. Evaluation in 1965
In 1965 CSIRO used two 'equally important' criteria for deciding which projects were
to be undertaken. Firstly, as prescribed in the Science and Industry Research Act
1949, a project must be likely to yield benefits to primary or secondary industry.
Secondly, projects were decided according to whether or not there is a scientist in the
organisation with 'original and bright' ideas about the research to be done. Thirdly,
and only if the other two criteria were met, it may be possible to catalogue areas 'of
economic or practical importance' which would yield benefits.^^ Scientists should
decide which areas of manufacturing were suitable for research since:
In my experience, scientists are rather more capable than industrialists of
perceiving from their knowledge of both science and industry the points where
the most successful attack may be launched.^s
It was the function of the CSIRO Executive to make a 'reasoned judgement' as
to whether a project was worth supporting in the long-term in terms of practical
application of the results.^^ The Executive decided which work was 'misdirected or
unproductive' or which had failed to reach its full potential. Considerableemphasis
was placed on selecting 'the right man' because the philosophy of research
management in CSIROwas that the degree of controlneededis inversely proportional
to the research capability of thestaff. Less capable staffneed greater direction.30 As
much attention seems to have been paid to monitoring the development and needs of
individual researchers as of the projects themselves.
Gillespie (a CSIRO administrator) gives a similar account of the process of
evaluation in CSIRO in the mid-1960s. The Executive selected the broad areas of
research in relation to national economic need. The Chief refined these broad areas
into more specific fields of research within divisional responsibility. The researcher
was then:'.. .encouraged to select from these fields those problems which are the most
important'.
However, Peres (also then a CSIRO administrator), speaking to the Harvard
Graduate School of Public Administration, reported that individual scientists had
retained considerable autonomy:
Within the exceedingly broad definition of a Division's or a Section's mission,
the determination of scientific programmes is left with that Division or Section.
The predominant emphasis is that programme determination rests with
individual research workers....at no point in the allocation process within the
White, 'Administrative Problems in the Development of Scientific Research', pp. 113-140.
38 White, 'TheStrategy of Australian Science', p. 194.
39 White, 'Administrative Problems in theDevelopment of Scientific Research', p. 120.
30 Gillespie, 'Research Management in theCSIRO', p. 23.
31 Ibid., pp. 21-23.
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Organization is a decision taken by a non-scientist; available funds are
distributed in accordancewith the judgementof scientists.32
Accountability between the Executive and the scientists was minimal. According to
Peres, the function of the CSIRO Executive was not to set goals and policies but:
..to stop goals and policies being imposed on individual research workers'.
...If it were to concentrate on policy planning and lay down policies and
programmes the Organization would lose one of its most important attractions,
this being the opportunity that individual scientists have of determining their
own research programmes. Far from reflecting administrative inefficiency the
CSIRO Executive's activities seem a rational recognition of its proper role in a
research organization.33
This autonomous management style is also reflected in the fact that, although CSIRO
introduced program budgeting in the late 1960s, until 1973 divisional participation
was voluntary. If divisional chiefs decided not to join the system there was no
compulsion for them to do so.34
This lack of accountability for the activity of the researcher, the divisional chief
and the Chairman was also evident in the articulation between the science system and
political system through the relationship between the Executiveand the Minister. This
was, according to Peres, carried out on the basis of the 'old boy' system with its
reliance upon trust in the 'calibre and integrity of the Executive to bring forward those
matters that intrude on public policy'.^5 Nowhere in Peres' account, is there a
recognition that research projects should be discontinued for any other than scientific
reasons. This attitude no doubt stems from the fact that, in the mid-1960s:
Although the Executive and associated advisory committees devote some time to
persuading the Cabinet, through the Minister and the Treasury, to endorse its
annual proposals, finance is not a severely limiting factor....The comparative
abundance of money has meant the Organization has not been restricted greatly
in its ability to provide research workers with the equipment and materials
necessary to pursue investigations.^^
In those days it was the lack of human resources in the form of scientists which
curtailed the researchers' plans and from this stemmed the lack of political control
through administrative accountability and the fact that scientific norms were used in
evaluation rather than economic or political rationalism. Australian governments
needed scientists more than scientists needed government. The autonomy norms of
the science system could be upheld and held up in later years as the normal way of
Leon Peres, 'Research Organization and the Control of Incentives: The Case of an Australian
Scientific Organization', Public Administration, (Sydney), vol. XXU, no. 4, December 1963, pp.
330-349, p. 332.
33 Ibid., p. 347.
34 J.S. Marsden et. al.. Returns on Australian Agricultural Research, CSIRO, Melbourne, 1980, p.
15.
33 Peres, 'Research Organization and the Control ofIncentives', p. 336.
36 Ibid., p. 345.
284
evaluating research. The policy was rational to scientists because theirs was the
prevailing ideology.
2.2. Research evaluation in 1990
In 1990 the process of evaluation in CSIRO has shifted from one based on choice
exercised by individualresearchers to onebased on a systematic process of collective
corporate choice. The moves towards increased accountability did not come from
within the Organisation but from changing perceptions within the subgovemment and
the attentive public (particularly Parliament) thatpublicsector funding for researchand
development was inadequately monitored. The process began with the 1986
amendment to the Science and Industry Act and was continued with the Joint
Committee of Public Accounts Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development
and the Australian National Audit Office's Efficiency Audit into CSIRO's External
Funds Generation.
The 1986 Science and Industry Act laid the foundations for a new form of
accountabilityin CSIRO by repealingthe traditional annual report requirement of the
1949 Act and relacing it with a three-stage process of reporting.37 Firstly, the Act
determined that the Board should declare a 'planning period' of not more than 5 years
during which a strategic plan must be formulated and implemented. Secondly, the
strategic plan had to outline not only objectives, and strategies for their achievement,
but also meehanisms for their review and revision and a prohibition on organisational
'functions' not included in the strategic plan. Thirdly, the Board had to approve
annualoperational plans subject to similar reviewand revisionpractices.
These requirements were operationalised in CSIRO by the development of a
system of research priority selection and actively encouraged by the first Chief
Executive (Stocker) with extensive experience in commercial research. At the
Organisational level this proeess is implemented by the Chief Executive and six
Institute Directors of CSIRO with the 'active involvement' of Board members.38
Research purposes in CSIRO are classified according to a modified version of the
Australian Bureau of Statistics' national research classification approach which has
seventeen sub-divisions of researchpurposes.39 For each of these research purposes
37 Science andIndustry Research Act, no. 13of 1949, PartVn (Miscellaneous);
Science and Industry Research LegislationAmendmentAct, no. 121 of 1986,Part Vn (Strategic
Plans and Annual Operational Plans).
38 John W. Stocker, 'CSIRO on the move'. Scienceand Technology Creating Wealth for Australia,
NSTAG 1990 Forum Report, pp. 31-40, p. 32.
39 They are:
• plant productionand primaryproducts •animalproduction and primary products
• rural-hased manufacturing • minerals industry
• energy resource industry • energy supply
• manufacturing industries • information and communication industries
• transport • construction
• environment • economic devlopment. - environment aspects
• health • defence
• social development • commercialservices
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key data have been gathered on such issues as gross value of production, imports,
exports, value-added, research expenditure, major performers of research, and
research intensity. Four broad criteria for assessing the return on research and
development have been developed from criteria used by the Industrial Research
Institute of the USA. They are:
1. the potential economic, social and environmental benefits possible from
technological improvements resulting from the research;
2. Australia's ability to capture the benefits by conversion to commercial
products or processes;
3. the research and developmentpotential of relevant research areas;
4. the research and development capacity of relevant research areas, i.e.,
Australia's capacity to conduct both the research and the development
which ensues.
Each research purpose and criterion combination is given a score by each group
participant. Criteria 1 and 2 are then multiplied to give a measure of 'attractiveness'
and criteria 3 and 4 to give a measure of 'feasibility' on the likely returns to Australia
of investing in a particulararea of research. Attractiveness is therefore the productof
potential benefits andAustralia's capacity to maximise the benefits, and is considered
external to CSIRO's capacity to influence. Feasibility is the product of research and
development potential and capacity andis a measure of the ability to achieve technical
progress in Australia. Here there is some measure of control by the research
organisation. Discussion and iteration allow scores to be averaged across the group.
The analysis is used to decidethe level of support that CSIRO shouldprovide for each
purpose.40
The analysis is also used in the review process through annual monitoring of
divisional and sub-divisional spending expenditure and other resource allocation.
Guidelines based on the classification are issued to research managers who are
expected to allocate resources accordinglyThe first Operational Plan was pubhshed
in 1991 and set out for each division:
• advancement of knowledge
40 Ibid.,p. 34.
The CSIRO model has also been approved hy the Joint Committee on Public Accounts which
recommended that the model be used hy the Government to set national research priorities and by
other research agencies to assess internal priorities. Australia, Joint Committee of Public
Accounts Inquiry into Public Sector Research and Development, p. 128.
41 Australia, CSIRO Annual Report 1990-91, p. 134.
• the divisional objective;
• the intended strategy;
• specificobjectives with the proportion of resources allocated to each;
• the planned outcomes of specific objectives;
• the total appropriation allocation;
• the amount of sponsored research to be undertaken;
• the expected proportion of extemally-generated funds.42
Some divisions have introduced additional processes of evaluation. For
example, since 1988, research projects in the Division of Chemicals and Polymers,
have been evaluated from two different perspectives, that of 'business area' and that of
'science and technology'. This has meant the closure of some projects which were
judged inadequate either in terms of their commercialisation potential or that
expenditure on that particularaspect of strategic science could not be justified in terms
of excellence foregone in other areas.43
The Division of Wildlife and Ecology has been developing over five years a
system of researchevaluationwhich addresses the question of how to allocate funds to
scientists of different abilities in order to maximise results. In the scheme each
scientist is given a research accountability score comprising scientific publications,
research effect and contribution to science management and communication. The
research effect component is measured by the influence of the individual's work on
both social and national interest objectives and on the scientific discipline. Projects are
budgeted on the basis of the scores of the researchers working on the project. The
application of the scheme has had dramatic positive effects on the careers of some
scientists whose contributions had been hidden behind the politics of internal
budgeting and negative effects on others whose poor contribution had been similarly
hidden. Manyof these haveleft the Organisation.44
2.3 Summary: evaluation in CSIRO
The process of evaluation in CSIRO remained stubhomly science-based from 1949
until 1986. Change did not occur until policy-makers with a techno-economistic
ideology of international economic competitiveness, based on an expanded rate of
innovation, became powerful enough to withstand the political influence and
organisational inertia of scientists. Change was effected by a combination of
organisational restructuring, legislative amendment and financial stringency/
incentives. Within the Organisation new processes of prioitisation, selection and
42 CSIRO, Australia's Science: Australia'sFuture, CSIRO Operational Plan 1991-92.
43 The Division Advisory Committee, consisting of eight private and two public representatives of
user groups are involved in the process of project evaluation at the annual strategic level to ensure
that criteria of relevance are used in the process and that the Division pursues only those projects
for which there are Australian companies capable of commercialisation. Joint Management
Committees are also set up with industrial partners (such as Du Font or Kodak) which participate
in the evaluation of pre-competitive stages of research.
CSIRO, Division of Chemicals and Polymers, Research Report 1988 and 1989, CSIRO, 1990,
pp. 1-4.
44 b.H. Walker, 'Assessing Scientific Performance', Search, vol. 22, no. 2, March 1991, pp. 62-64.
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evaluation were introduced by scientists appointed by the subgovernment for
commercial as well as scientific success. Scientists in CSIRO now have to organise
theircreativity in linewithcommercial, economic andpolitical criteria as well as those
of scientific competence.45
3. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Objectives of economic benefit are implicit in the raison d' etre of economic
production. The issue for govemments in Australia has been to encourage firms to
incoporate science-based innovation into their management of economic production.
In 1965 the choice of research area to be subsidised was left to individual firms.
Increasing concern about the need to restructure economic production away from
reliance on commodities has led to selection processes based on the notion that
govemments have theright to prioritise the areas of manufacturing research funded by
public resources.
3.1. Selection process and criteria in 1967
In 1967 the process of evaluation for industrial research and development grants
involved what Lamberton called 'a narrow approach to a major problem'.^e The
major problem was the low domestically-generated knowledge base of non-raral
production in Australia. The narrow approach was the definition of research and
development andthe assumption thatincreasing private expenditure on the production
of scientific knowledge would automatically lead to commereialistion of that
knowledge. The evaluation process for the allocation of grants was based solely on
whether the activities proposedby the grant applicants fitted the activities defined as
research and development by the Industrial Researeh and Development Grants Act.
The Board of three members decided which firms were eligible under the Act.
The process of evaluation was different for the two types of grant, but the
difference between the grants was only that of size. For companies which increased
the research and development expenditure by up to $50,000 the evaluation process
was virtually non-existent and grantswere awardedsemi-automatically on a dollar for
dollar basis.47 Beyond this amount the grants became selective and could require
Ministerial approval. As would be expected the criteria on which the awards were to
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An example of the ehanging nature of priorities is given in the account by the AssistantChief of
the Division of Wildlife and Ecology of how a project of international scientific significance, that
of the effects of the environment on the pineal gland of marsupials, was abandoned in favour of
one examining the way in which vimses can be manipulated to cause infertility in vertebrate pests
such as rabbits. Both projects were of equal scientific excellencebut the scientists decided that the
applied nature of the rabbit research was more urgent. The motivating force was that the second
program would definitely attract external funding but the first would not. The leader of the
research expressed surpriseat how exciting the process of appliedresearch could be.
Hugh Tyndale-Biscoe, 'Priority Rules, OK!', CoResearch, no. 341, June 1991, p. 4.
Lamberton, Science, Technology and the Australian Economy, p. 66.
Stubbs, Innovation and Research, p. 188.
be made were almost unequivocally to do with national economic interest (the
relevance of the fifth criterion is oblique).
• the development and use of Australian resources;
• the expansion of exports;
• import saving and improvement of the ability of Australian products to
compete with imported products;
• the improvement of productivity and reduction of costs in Australian
industry; and
• the development of the Australian economy in a manner conducive to the
defence of the Commonwealth.48
For the first two years of operation funds were available for all applicants who
passed the eligibility tests. By the third year the Board were having to decide which
firms were able to meet a higher proportion of their increased expenditure on research
and development and which merited the full grant allocation. Priority was given to
those projects which would decrease the amount of imported technology and overseas
licence and royaltypayments.'^ ^
In addition to these criteria there were provisions that firms would be eligible
only if they had produced goods in the last twelve months and if the research was to
be undertaken by full-time scientific staff. There were also conditions which restricted
the eligible use of plant and buildings to research and development activities. These
constraints favoured allocation of the grants to firms which could afford full time staff,
full-time research laboratories, and which already had a history of innovative activity
through research and development.
Eventually even the flexibility of the Board's interpretation of the Act could not
cope with increasing demand and the Australian Industrial Research and Development
Grants Scheme was replaced by the Australian Industrial Research and Development
Incentives Scheme (AIRDIS) in 1976.
3.2 Widening the scope of selection criteria
The new grants were introduced under legislation which limited the life of the scheme
to five years after which the scheme itself would be evaluated.^® Board was
assisted in the selection process by a staff of thirty which, for the first time, included
scientists and technologists to assess the merits of the research proposed. Previously
Ibid., section 27 of the Industrial Research and Development Grants Act 1967, given in Appendix
G, pp. 248-265.
Australian Industrial Research and Development Grants Board, Annual Report 1969-70, Parl.
Paper 126, Canberra, 1970, p. 4.
The three new types of grant were designed to stimulate research and development activity in a
wider range of companies. Commencement grants allowed firms which had not previously
undertaken research and development up to 25 per cent of the eligible expenditure of the company
in that grant year, or $15,000. Project grants allowed firms already performing reseach and
development up to 25 per cent of the amount that, in the Board's opinion, will be the company's
expenditure on a project subsequent to the date of agreement. The maximum project grant was
$250,000 unless approved otherwise by the Minister.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1977-78, Parl. Paper 308, Canbera, 1978, pp. 4-5.
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grants had been denied purely on the basis of non-eligibility according to the Act.
Now the criteria became more selective and, unlike the former scheme, were given in a
specific Ministerial direction as:
• the technical and commercial merits of the project including its likely
contribution to improvements in industry efficiency and in utilisation of
resources, particularly Australian resources;
• the capabilities and resources of the company to undertake, or have
undert^en, theresearch and development work necessary
• the ability of the company to exploit commercially the results of the project;
and
• the need by the company for the provision of Commonwealth financial
assistance to permit the necessary research and development work and the
commercial exploitation of the project to proceed at a satisfactory level and
withina reasonable periodof time.^^
These selection criteria for the new grants required the Board to investigate not only
the research and development activities of a firm but also its capacity to market
products andprocesses whichincorporated the results of the subsidised research.
Commencement and project grants were largely improvements on the grants
under the original scheme. Selection for these grants still relied upon a Board of five
part-time members assisted by a Technical Standing Committee of three part-time
members. The third type of grants - public interest projects - allowed the Minister to
authorise the Board to make arrangements for the carrying out of specific projects of
industrial research which the Minister determines to be in the public interest:
Where the Minister is satisfied that it is in the public interest that the
Commonwealth should undertake a project of industrial research in a field of
science or technology he may authorize the Board to make arrangements, on
behalf of the Commonwealth, for the carrying out of that project.^2
By introducing these grants the govemment was acknowledging that decisions
about what type of manufacturing industry should exist in Australiacould not be left to
the vagaries of the market: there were some areas of economic production which
needed more proactive policies than protection through tariffs and subsidies or being
left to the dynamics of market forces. For the first three years public interest grants
were awarded on the recommendation to the Board of the Minister. No criteria for the
evaluation of public interest projects were issued until 1981. Projects were evaluated
according to an unofficial set of guidelines drawn up by an Interdepartmental Interim
IR&D Advisory Committee. The 1981 amendments to the legislation reformed the
Advisory Committee with the specific function of examining public interest research
grant proposals.^^
Ministerial direction issued 5 April 1977 and quoted in Australian Industrial Research and
Development Incentives Board, Annual Report 1980-81, p. 7.
Industrial Research and Development Incentives Act no. 85 of 1976.
John Ryan, 'Evaluation of Public Interest Industrial Research and Development Program', in
Evaluation of public support for industrial research and development, Bureau of Industry
Economics, AGPS, Canberra, 1986, pp. 39-54, p. 45.
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In 1981 the effectiveness of the AIRDIS scheme was reviewed in accordance
with the 1976 Act. The report of the evaluation process highlights the fact that
retrospective evaluations of effectiveness were not included as part of the normal
granting process. For example, in 1981 when 1173 commencement agreements were
in force, the Board authorised a 'one-off detailed analysis of only thirty agreements as
part of a submission to an lAC inquiry. This single analysis was used for the five-
year statutory evaluation.54
3.3 The introduction of socio-economic and management criteria
In 1983 the ALP government set criteria of allocation which were far more explicit and
detailed than previous criteria. The Board was instructed that:
... it is the Government's desire that emphasis be given to the timely support of
projects undertaken by companies which show sound entrepreneurial
management and regard themselves as servicing a global rather than an
Australian market.55
In so doing the Board was to use economic as well as technical and commercial
criteria and to consider their decisions in the light of the govemment's overall industry
policy objectives. In addition to employing criteria similar to previous ministerial
directions the government directed the Board to consider a wide range of socio
economic factors in their selection process:
• the likely benefits to accrue to other businesses and industries;
• the potential impact of knowledge gained and employment generation or
cost reduction;
• the extent to which prospective benefits from the project will accrue to
Australians and provide national returns beyond the company undertaking
the project;
• the level and quality of the industrial research and development, including
the use of expertise obtained under the contract;
• the commitment of the apphcant to the program;
• the reliance on foreign technology and the availability and cost of accessing
that technology.
• the capability of the applicant to see the project through to commercial
reahty;
• the commercial risk associatedwith the project.56
These criteria explicitly required the Board to assess applicants not only in terms
of the potential economic benefits of the application of the results of the subsidised
research but also to consider the broader social and economic ramifications of such
application and to assess whether these potential effects fitted stated government
policies in other policy arenas.
Ryan acknowledges that in defining program eriteria there is an inherent tension between the need
for flexibility and the need for accountability.
54 AIRDIB, Annual Report 1981-82, pp. iii-iv & 17.
55 AIRDIB, Annual Report 1983-84, p. 59.
56 Ibid., p. 60.
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Despite these ehanges the AIRDIS scheme was considered too inflexible to
accommodate the government's policy on re-stracturing Australian manufacturing
industry. The government instigated three reviews of the scheme which reported that
existing machinery was inadequate for the complexity of allocatory and evaluation
processes whichwerenowexpected of it. '^^
In 1986 new legislation established the GIRD scheme which has two major
components: discretionary grants and generic grants. At the same time a 150 per cent
tax concession on research and development was introduced. The evaluation of
applicants for the tax concession is conducted jointly between the IR&D Board and the
Tax Commissioner, and is coneemed with the legitimation of the activity claimed by
firms to be research and development.
For discretionary grants the Board, through delegated authority to the
Discretionary Grants Committee, must consider each application in the context of:'...
the Commonwealth government's industry development policy objectives, including
its specific wish to assist small, start-up companies wanting to enter the international
marketplace and companies involved in industry restructuring...Similarly, the
criteria for evaluation of applicants for generic grants explicitly require the Board to
consider aspects of the private sector managementof research and development which
would not formerly have been considered part of the responsibility of the Board. In
addition to the socio-economic objectives stated for the tax concession and
discretionary grants the Board should ensure that:
• the project fosters closer collaboration between research institutions,
including those in academe and industry;
• it gives priority to the project if it involves an area of technology with
respect to which the Minister has given a direction under section 20 of the
Act declaring it to be a priority area,
• it considers the extent of industry commitment to the project;
• it inquires into the degree of proposed dissemination of the results of the
projects;
• the quality of the research to be undertaken is such that there is a strong
probability that it will lead to important new discoveries, the solution of
technical problems or the introduction of innovative new techniques in
Australian industry;
• it is satisfied about the ability of the researcher to undertake the project and
achieve goals set out in a clearly defined project management plan; and
• the experience and record of the researcher in research and development in
the relevant area of technology is proven.59 [italics added]
The three were; an internal review by the Board which included a nation-wide survey on user
needs; an examination by Price Waterhouse on the effectiveness of the scheme in promoting
industrial research and development; and a report by the Bureau of Industry Economics on the
effectiveness of the public interest research program.
AIRDIB, Annual Report 1984-85, Parl. Paper no. 431 of 1985, p. iii.
Industry Research and Development Board, Annual Report 1986-87, Parl. Paper no. 74 of 1988,
p. 54.
Ibid., p. 56.
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The Board has adopted a 'corporate approach' to the process of evaluation
which it sees as essential in deciding where in the innovation cycle public money
should be used to fund private research and development-^® The approach was
developed by examining the experiences of firms using AIRDIS grants and asking
what the impediments to success were. The Board says that there are two types of
criteria which are essential for the effective use of such grants. Firstly, market-
oriented criteria ask two essential questions:
• does the company have strong customer relations in the business area
(particularly with leading edge customers)?
• is the company in a strong competitiveposition in this business?
Positive answers to these questions show that the applicant has a realistic view of the
market and customer requirements and has already acquired a considerable market
share or good access to the market. Secondly,project -oriented criteria require three
questions to be asked:
• is the project for an existing company business?
• does the company have research and development experience in this field?
• how substantial is the commercial innovation required?
Applicants who can answer these questions positively are judged by the Board
to have a good understanding of the relationship between research and development
activity and commercialisation. They are also more likely to be aware of the effect on
potential market success of the impact of input prices and competitors.The Board
now sees its role as one of fostering the transfer of knowledge from those companies
which are successful to those which are starting to use research as a means to
innovation. The Board sees the marketplace as the ultimate evaluator and the
government's role in the process should be to facilitate networking between
experienced and inexperienced firms, particularly in the area of setting up
commercialisation teams at an early stage in the identification of research which is
likely to yieldmarketable products and processes.^^
Industry Research and Development Board, Annual Report 1990-91, p. 13.
Australia, Joint Committee of Public k.cco\xnX.slnquiry into Public Sector Research and
Development, Submissions and Incorporated Documents, p. S1484.
62 Ibid., pp. S1486-87.
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3.4 Summary: evaluation in manufacturing industry research
These prioritisation, selection and evaluation processes are now considered part of
manufacturing science policy. The operationalisation of the processes involves
widening the range of expertise involved in the evaluation process andthe consequent
diminishing of scientific autonomy. The tax concession allows individual firms to
select the direction of subsidised research. Sir Frederick White's assertion of
scientists' unique capacity to decide the direction of research has been abandoned in
favourof a more market-led process. Through the criteriaapplied to discretionary and
generic grants governments can influence activities formerly regarded as outside the
research process. Thescope of activity labelled as 'science policy' has widened.
4. Rural Industry
Several factors mitigated againstevaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the
knowledge produced for use in rural production. These include the informal,
fragmented nature of agreements between theusers and producers ofknowledge in the
rural science policy community; thetraditional distaste ofscientists foraccountability;
and the unwillingness of governments to intervene in whatwas seen as an essentially
market relationship even though the majority of rural research funds came from the
public purse. It was not until the mid-1970s that government began to question the
amount of public money expended on rural research.^^ establishment of the
Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics and the Bureau of Rural
Resources, together with the increased accountability expected of the Department of
Primary Industry by theEraser govemment, and the techno-economistic values which
the Hawke government applied to rural research, have led to greater selectivity in
deciding the research to be undertaken; and also to the adoption of much wider
parameters for the cost/benefit analysis to which potential research projects are now
subjected.
4.1 Evaluation in 1965
The informal nature of agreements between rural producers, and scientists in the
various research organisations, follows, until the 1980s, the traditional pattern of
scientists' expectations of autonomy in the decision-making processes of
subgovernment. The lack of contractual obligations between producers' associations
and researchers allowed the dominant participant in the relationship to control the
direction of research. This seems to have varied between industries and through time.
It is noted in chapter 4 that wool growers proscribedresearch on artificial fibre/wool
blended textiles because of their insecurity about the growing use of synthetic fibres.
Their vision of the market was limited to pure wool textiles. Other analysts report that
63 The Industries Assistance Commission calculated that in 1975 $200m was spent on rural
research. This sum is almost twice the entire budget appropriations for CSIRO in that year.
Marsden et. al.. Returns on Australian Agricultural Research, p. 3.
scientists dominated the selection process with little thought about the economic or
financial implications of the application of theresearch results.64
The two-way production-research model which had been so successful in
Australian rural research was described by Moule of the Australian Wool Board in
1969. He noted that agricultural research in Australia should be seen very much as
industrial research in that results have to be produced in such a way that they can be
incorporated into farming practice. Similarly, researchers needed to be aware that
farmers are themselves a source of innovative ideas. The process can be seen as a set
of sequential yet interdependent stages:
1. operations research techniques are used to decide whether a given problem
is not simply a matter of misapplied technology;
2. researchers investigate the problem to see whether it can be resolved using
existing knowledge;
3. if no solution exists researchers work on producing basic research which
will lead to that particular solution, i.e., directed basic research;
4. the basic knowledge is then tested and, through operations research
techniques, becomes applied research which can be used in farm
management;
5. economic assesments are then made to ensure that the use of the new
techniques will result in increased production.
The same process is applicable in the case of new processes arising directly from
the laboratory or the farm which are not problem-based but which may increase
productivity.Moule says that this selective approach was developed in wool
research because the large capital reserves built up in the profitable 1950s began to be
depleted in the 1960s. This meant that: '...discriminating choices had to be made
against established priorities for the industry's need for science and technology'. The
supplyof funds to the envelope of resources had slowed to a steadystate pattern. The
problem for Australian farmers was that:
Institutionalized research for primary producers is conducted in an atmosphere
of stable, 'big business' and without the pressing compulsion to survive; its
results are meant to be used by 'small business' conducted in unstable
environments.66
Moule was concerned that scientific autonomy in large organisations such as CSIRO
and the universities allowed scientists to become isolated from the realities of the
markets in which the users of their research operated. If this scientific autonomy was
64David Morrison, 'Evaluating Research Benefits: TheWestern Australian Experience', Agricultural
Science, New Series vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 17-20, p. 17.
65 G.R. Moule, 'Research and theWoolgrower', Australian JournalofScience, vol. 32, no. 5, 1969,
pp. 176-183, p. 178.
66 Ibid., p. 182.
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compounded by lack of administrative accountability and foresight in selecting the
direetion in which research should proceed, then rural research would remain
narrowly focused and oriented to the solution of scientific problems rather than the
expansion of markets.
However, the use of such processes was not widespread. It was not until rural
economists began to analyse the costs and benefits of rural researeh that governments
began to appreciate or express eoncem about the lack of rigour that scientists had
applied to decision-making about the raral research they undertook. In 1975 the lAC
criticised the almost complete absence of evidence about the costs and benefits of
allocating funds to particular problems and areas of research, given the huge
government investment in rural research.^"^ A subsequent cost-benefit study of the
CSIRO Division of Entomology revealed that, in the large rural industries of sheep,
wheat and beef, every major scientific success, which required approximately six
person years of research effort, would double the benefits accruing to the Australian
community.The implication was that such economic insights should be built into
the processes of selecting and evaluatingprojeets for mral research.
As part of the economic rationalisation of public spending on rural research in
1981 Edwards and Fairbairn were commissioned by the short-lived Commonwealth
Council for Rural Research and Extension to develop and apply to rural produetion in
Australia a model for measuring the benefits accruing to the community. They
estimated that research which resulted in a 10 per cent reduction in production costs
would bring gains to Australia of between 70 and 90 per cent of total world gains if
the rest of the world's producers did not have access to the technology. If the research
results were available to overseas producers Australia's share of the gains would drop
to 10 per cent.These and other enquiries showed that, in order to be effeetive, rural
research needed to be aligned as much with future markets as with current problems
for the country to obtain the optimum benefit from public spending on mral research.
4.2 1990: co-ordination, corporatisation, and concentration
The Hawke government's policy of changing the priorities of the science policy
community in Australia meant that, from 1983, some raral researchers were expeeted
to manage with a restricted envelope of funding. The emphasis on producing value-
added exports in priority areas meant that researchers outside those areas were faced
with the prospect of justifying their share of the budget.'^ o The replacement of
conservative ideologies by techno-economistic expectations in raral science policy
67 Industries Assistance Commission, Financing Rural Research, p. 2.
68 Marsden et. al., Returns onAustralian Agricultural Research, p. 15.
69 Edwards &.Freebaim, Measuring a country's gainsfrom research, p. 12.
70 As Jones said in reply to a CSIRO entolmologist complaining about cuts to his research
program: 'Well, I must say that I'm sceptical that we're going to have a cotton-led recovery in
Australia.'
Jones, 'The 1984 Science and Technology Budget', p. 247.
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meant the introduction of evaluation processes at all levels of decision-making in the
rural science policy community.
The government's strategy for rural research involved, among other changes,
the establishment of a Primary Industries and Energy Research Council to co-ordinate
policy; the setting up of the Bureau of Rural Resources to analyse and evaluate
government expenditure onrural research; and the restmcturing of the Rural Research
Trust funds into Councils and Corporations. All these initiatives included a strong
commitment to the processes of selection and evaluation. The Minister for Primary
Industries and Energy, in 1990, identified process evaluation as described by the
OECD to be the method of choice for primary industry in Australia.'^ i Process
evaluation is concerned with assessing managerial effectiveness and efficiency in
achieving objectives. Performance indicators such as thepattem ofbudget allocations,
the speed of processing proposals and theeffectiveness of linkages between agencies
are assessed by such means as interviews, questionnaires and workshops involving
representatives ofproducers and customers/clients.'^ ^
At the macro-level, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics has conducted ex-post analyses of rural research projects which indicate
that 10 projects costing the Commonwealth government a total of $160 million had
yielded benefits of $2.5 billion to the Australia community, giving a benefit/cost ratio
of 16:1."^3 The Bureau is also helping research managers to develop ex-ante
evaluation frameworks which can be used to formalise many of the implicit, intuitive
judgements which need to be made in 'picking winners' when allocating user funds.
The variables which need to be built into the selection criteria are:
• the level and cost of resources to be committed to research, development
and evaluation of the new technology;
• the cost saving associatedwith the new technology in each industry;
• the intemational transferability of the technology;
• the probability of success;
• the expected life of the technology;
• the adoptionrate and ceilinglevel of adoption;
• the key economic parameters of the industries (elasticities, prices and
quantities); and
• the existence of keyextemal benefits orcosts tobe accounted for.'^ ^
The range of variables indicates the international, market-oriented context in
which projects areevaluated. Easeof intemational transferability reduces the gains to
Australian producers and should therefore be low. Technology with a long life
expectation increases the cost-saving advantage for Australian producers. The
^1 Kerin, Opening Addresses for SCA Workshop on Research Priorities, p. 4.
OECD, Evaluation ofResearch: a selection ofcurrent practices, OECD, Paris, 1987, pp. 38-40.
CSIRO pledges to help farmers', Australian, February 6 1992, p. 4.
Brian Johnston, 'Economic criteria and procedures for allocating resources to research', in Bureau
of Rural Resources, SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocation for Rural
R&D, pp. 26-34, p. 32.
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adoption rate quantifies the likelihoodof the new knowledge being used by Australian
producers. The incorporation of similar processes of evaluation into the variable of
the costs of research and development indicates the importance that key decision-
makers in the mral science policy sub-govemment attach to the process of evaluation.
At the meso-level the Bureau of Rural Resources has been given the role of
undertaking process evaluation within the rural science policy community. For
example, in 1988 and 1990 the Bureau organised workshops which examined the
organisation, funding, priorities and resource allocation of rural research and
development. Representatives of all sections of the rural science policy community
listened to a range of speakers from the Department of Finance, CSIRO, State
Departments of Agriculture, Rural Research and Development Corporations, the
universities and the ARC. They were then asked to consider how the system of
producing new knowledge for rural production in Australiacould be improved and to
vote on a series of questions about what needed to be changed and how this could be
achieved.'^5
All participants agreed on the success of the corporatisation of the Rural
Research Trust Funds in formulating research strategies at the micro-level of rural
industry interaction with the science system.'^ ^ Corporatisation has involved the
formalisation of the relationship between rural producers and researchers on a strictly
commercial basis. One rural research trust fund which made an early transition to
corporate status is the Australian Meat and Livestock Research and Development
Corporation (AMLRDC). The ExecutiveDirectortells of the transition from a passive
system of selection between submitted projects from scientists 'with a cause to
support', to an active, ex-ante selection system of three phases:
• examination of the factors affecting profitability for a five-year period,
including consumer, demographic, climatic, economic, political and
technological trends both in AustraUa and overseas;
• backward planning of each step with regard to the allocation of resources
using the World Bank system of feasibility studies which examines the
industry background, the core of the problem, the goal and steps to achieve
it, the best contractors to do the research work, the total cost and an
estimate of eventual benefits;
• tightly binding contracts with scientists to complete the projects on a fixed
price basis over 2 and 3-year terms.^^
Bureau of Rural Resources, Workshop on the Organisation and Funding ofRural Research,; and
Bureau of Rural Resources, SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocation for
Rural R&D.
Bureau of Rural Resources, SCA Workshop on Research Priorities and Resource Allocation for
Rural R&D, p. 98.
Ian McCausland, 'AMLRDC research priorities and resource allocation', in SCA Workshop on
Research Priorities and Resource Allocationfor Rural R&D, pp. 91-101, pp. 92-93.
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The AMLRDC has also conducted ex-post evaluations on six research projects
funded wholly or in part by the Corporation in order to identify successful factors
affecting levels and rates of return. It was found that all six programs had been
successful with the lowest benefit/cost ratio being 6:1 and the highest 74:1
However, it is not only the corporations which can benefit by such evaluations.
Staff at the Western Australia Department of Agriculture have found that when
researchers have participated in the process of applyingex-ante and ex-post evaluation
models to existing or proposed research projects, they were able to improve the
planning and execution of theirresearch.'^ ^
Corporatisation and concentration of decision-making about the allocation of
resources to rural research has occurred even at the level of potential rural industries.
The Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC) was
established in 1990 to foster innovation in those areas of agricultural production less
likely to attract private sector funding and to manage the industry levies of the 14
smaller Rural Research Councils. Each Council must comply with general
accountability requirements which include:
• the submission to the Minister of a strategic five year plan for research and
development in the industry;
• the submission to the Minister of annual research and development
programs;
• the evaluation of proposedprojects by criteriawhich fit research priorities;
• the publication of an annual report which evaluates performance against
strategic objectives;
• the presentation of the annual report by the Chairpersonof each Council to a
meeting representative of the industry served;
• the requirement that each of the above elements should be prepared by
extensive consultation with the industry.^o
The reward to the industry of such increased accountability is the autonomy and
flexibility resulting from the fact that the Councils will not be required to submit
individual research proposals or minor alterations to budgets for ministerial approval.
In addition to established Councils for such industries as chicken meat and
honeybees the Corporation allocates funds to such developing industries as essential
oils, goat fibres and wildflowers. The RIRDC has adopted a two-stage assessment
procedure for the allocation of funds to research projects. A two-page preliminary
application is assessed by the Corporation. Applicants who pass this stage are then
expected to submit detailed project descriptions in line with the Corporations
guidelines which require specific details of how the new knowledge is of relevance to
the industry, and of the expected financial gains from the application of consequent
^^ Greg Martin, 'Returns from research: meat and livestock. Agricultural Science, New Series, vol.
4, no. 2, March-April, 1991, pp. 21-24, p. 22.
Morrison, 'Evaluating Research Benefits, p. 19.
The legislation is ambiguous ahout whether or not individual Councils should report to the
Minister or to the Rural Industries Research and Development Council.
Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Annual Report 1990-91, pp. 3-4.
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new techniques. Researchers whose projects are selected are then required to sign
agreements which promise funding for the entire stipulated length of a project in return
for negotiated rights with regard to the management of intellectual property and of
resultant income. The agreements include provisions for the termination of the
agreement if satisfactory progress is notmaintained.^!
4.3.Summary: rural research evaluation
It is clear that the processes of evaluating research in the rural science policy
community has undergone considerable change since 1965. The dominant influence
of either scientists or producers has had to accommodate the increasing demands of
government for accountability for public research funds; and that research so funded
should be directed to improving Australia's competitiveness in the global economic
community. The traditional image of rural research as being the most efficient and
relevant of all sectors of research began to fade as economic cost/benefit analysis
revealed that only 9 per cent of such research was user-funded, and that forward
planning could double the gains to Australia from the application of rural research
results.
It was not until the election of a govemmentwith less interest in maintaining the
staus quo of rural producers than with pursuing techno-economic objectives involving
the direction of public research funds to the development of value-added production,
that radical changes were made to the processes of evaluation in rural research
decision-making. Theresult has been thatselection criteria arenow based not onlyon
the solution of rural research problems, but on the potential of proposed projects to
enlarge anddiversify export markets and value-added components in rural research.
By introducing these criteria, governments have forced producers and researchers to
place their activity in the wider context of Australia's global economic performance.
This has always been the case for the traditional export industries of beef, wheat and
wool but is now a requirement also for smaller developing industries which may not
previously have considered international markets but which must now do so in order
to recieve development funds.
Researchers must nowjustify theirexpenditure to councils and corporations that
are directly accountable not only to govemments and producers, but also increasingly
to private investors, for the money they allocate. Legally constituted, contractual
agreements place time and relevance constraints on the research undertaken.
Researchers may see this development as stifling their professional creativity but the
tighter processes of research evaluation ensure thatrural research funds return benefits
to the whole community and do not simply underwrite individual researchers'
intemational reputations.
81 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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Conclusion
Between 1965 and 1990 there were major changes in the way in which publicly
funded researchprojects were prioritised, selected andevaluatedaccording to techno-
economistic criteria. There is some evidence that similar processes were employed in
such areas as wool research in the 1960s but it was not until the late 1980s that
systematic prioritisation and evaluation were introduced into all the sectors of the
science system under examination here. The processes were introduced with least
resistance into the manufacturing and rural sectors in which research is inherently
market orientated. In the manufacturing sector the transition was from patterns of
selection by individual firms of projects at the product level, to industry-level
prioritisation by subgovemmental agencies composed of political, scientific and
commercial actors. A major initiative was the introduction of a non-prioritised tax
concession for private research and development. While this seems counter to the
argument of a government policy of increasing prioritisation, its introduction is in line
with the wider ideology of techno-economism in which governments intervene to
foster greater market orientation in research, and more awareness in industry of
research as a form of long-term investment.
In the rural sector the traditional selection processes of collective industrial
research were re-organised into corporations rather than the traditional trust funds.
The development of sophisticated mechanisms of research evaluation by rural
economists has systematised the process of selection formerly the prerogative of
scientists in varying relationships of dominance and dependency with producers.
In the higher education sector the processes of prioritisation, selection and
evluation were resisted by scientists who invoked the ethos of science to defend their
autonomy against the introduction of financial accountability mechanisms generally
considered normal in other areas of public activity. The same resistance was
expressed in CSIRO despite the statutory expectations of theOrganisation to serve the
needs of industry. It was the imposition of new rules (written into the 1986Act), new
resource requirements (in the formof externally generated funds) and ideas (including
the appointment of a ChiefExecutive withextensive commercial experience) by the
superstructural subgovemment which generated new relationships within CSIRO
science policy community. Similar inducements to change were imposed on the
higher education science subsystem.
The knowledge produced by the science system is the single most significant
outputof science pohcy. Thechange fromnationahstic-cultural to techno-economistic
objectives for the science systemnecessarily entails changes in the type of knowledge
produced and in the ways in which the knowledge is used. The final chapter in this
section looks at the way in which changes in resource allocation, structure and
evaluation processes have affected the type of knowledge produced by the science
system in Australia and the changinguses to which this knowledge is put.
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Chapter 8
Knowledge and its Application
1. The Concept of Knowledge in Science Policy
Scientific knowledge is a central issue in science policy. If the process of creating
knowledge by the scientific method is viewed as a cultural and social achievement then
the knowledge produced is intrinsically valued. Governments or private foundations
provide the economic and ethical resources for its production, and decisions about the
type of knowledge to be produced are largely internal to the science system. Such
knowledge (defence science apart) is not only a national but also an international
public good and can be used to achieve such social objectives as better health and a
cleanerenvironment. The publication of results in prestigous refereed journals is the
acknowledged form of competence in the international scientific community for this
type of research. The number of suchpapers published by a nation'sauthors becomes
a measureof national cultural achievement. Since 1972 science policy analysts in the
international attentive public have used suchmeasures as an indicator of the outputof
scientific activity.^
If on the other hand, the creation of scientific knowledge is seen as an aspectof
economic activity then the knowledge produced is intermediate to increased economic
production. In an ideal market situation, decisions about the typeof knowledge to be
produced would be negotiated between the users and producers of the knowledge.
The results of this research are usually regarded as the intellectual property of the
user/producer and are protected by an international system of patents, licences and
royalties. Patent activity is seen as a useful indicator of national innovative activity,
though it mustbe recognised thatnotallpatents arebasedon scientific knowledge and
that not all innovations are patented. In situations of market failure governments
intervene to fund the production of scientific knowledge perceived by theirofficials or
advisers as being of national economic importance. In this situation the opportunity
exists for private producers to influence governments' perceptions of the need to
subsidise research and development in the private sector.
This thesis shows that, in Australia, both State and Commonwealth
governments have traditionally intervened in the production of scientificknowledge
for nationalistic, social and techno-economic objectives by providing, wholly or in
part, the necessary resources. Despite this government involvement, scientists have
usually made the decisions about the type of knowledge to be produced. This has
resulted in an emphasis on basic science because the ability to produce this type of
knowledge is most highly valued in the scientific community. As governments
1 Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC), Measures of Science and
Innovation, ScienceandTechnology Policy Branch, Canberra, 1987, pp. 184-202.
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impose increased accountability on scientists there should be a demonstrable increase
in the production of applied science, as measured by patents and collaborative
agreements; and a decrease in the production of basic science, as measured by the
publication of scientific papers. Anexamination ofthetype of knowledge produced in
different sectors of science in Australia should reveal the extent to which scientific
knowledge has become part of national economic achievement rather than part of
national cultural achievement.
2. Indicators of National Scientific Output
There are two internationally recognised indicators of scientific output: bibliometric
analysis andpatents. In recent years Australian government agencies havealsoused
the 'know-how' payment to measure innovative activity. This indicator will also be
used here and is discussed later in the chapter. The following section explains the
terminology and use of bibliometrics and patents.
2.1 Bibliometrics
In 1967 Pritchard coined the term 'bibliometrics', defining it as: 'The application of
mathematics and statistical methods to books and other media of communication'.^
Bibliometrics has been used since 1972 as an international indicator of scientific
activity and involves counting the number of published research papers in a given
rangeofjournals, andthenumber of citations to those papers. There arelimitations to
the range of scientific knowledge measured in this way. Bibliometric indexes are
biased: firstly towards English language journals; secondly, towards journals
published in the USA; thirdly towards clinical medicine; fourthly, to traditional areas
of research rather than new ones; and fifthly, towards established rather than new
journals.3 Nevertheless, bibliometrics can be seen as a measure of the quality of
national scientific output in basic research.^
In Australia such indicators have been in general use only since 1987. Neither
the 1973 Project Score survey, nor the original 1978 ASTEC Report, used
bibliometric indicators. Since 1987 DITAC has used the Science Literature Indicators
Data Bank compiled by Computer Horizons Inc. (CHI) for the National Science
Foundation from the Science Citation Index (SCI).5 A familiar catchcry of Australian
scientists has become the statistic that, with only 0.2 per cent of the world's
population, Australia produces 2 per centof the world's publications as measured by
CHI. This figure has remained stable throughout the period from 1973 to 1986. By
far the largest proportionof papers is published by scientists in the USA with 36 per
2 Ibid.,p. 202.
2 Ibid., p. 185;
ASTEC, Profile ofAustralian Science, AGPS, 1989, p. 189.
4 Ibid.,p. 313.
This index monitors 3100 of the 25,000 scientific journals published world-wide on the basis that
84 per cent of all the internally significant scientific knowledge is publishedin 2000journals.
5
cent of the total. Traditionally, scientists from the UK have ranked second with 8-9
per cent, but in recent years Japan has been challenging that position.^ In terms of
scientific articles per 100,000 population Australia ranks fifth behind Sweden,
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. In terms of overall output
Australia ranked ninth in 1986."^
ASTEC has evaluated Australia's research outputs on the basis of the citation
and bibliometric analyses.^ The areas of strength are those in which Australia's share
of citations and papers are higher thanthe twoper cent average and the weaknesses in
areas below that level.9 The problem for governments is that these measures are of
significance to scientists for whomintemational status is ofparamount importance, but
are of little use in evaluating the effectiveness of scientificproduction at the national
level. As the authors of the ASTEC Report ask:
Is it better to concentrate Australian research in large areas which are dominated
by other countries, but which have substantial Australian publication activity
relative to our total activity or is it better to concentrate on smaller areas of
scientific interest in which we are the leading country? We have to ask if these
areas give a sufficiently comprehensive coverage of priority areas of science
which are necessary for Australia's future development.
7
As yet unpublished studies show that Japanese companies published an average of 21 per cent
morescientific papers in 1989 than they did in 1984. Some companies increased theiroutputhy
90 per cent. Hicks says that there are three main reasons for the increase. Firstly, Japanese
companies in some industries such as veterinary science andpharmaceuticals areunder a statutory
requirement to publish some of their results. Secondly, more basic science is being undertaken
by Japanese companies; and thirdly, the publishing rate has previously heen low because the
practice of life-time employment hasdiminished thecareer value of international puhlieation.
Dr Diane Hicks, 'Japanese Corporate Science', Seminar, Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex
University, 6 Decemher 1991 (unpublished).
DITAC, Australian Science and Innovation Impact Brief, p. 30.
^ In 1990 ASTEC and the Centre for Technical and Social Change at Wollongong University
jointly held a Forum to discuss the ASTEC Profile of Australian Science Reportpublished in
1989. The 463-page Report is a compilation of data on hasic science in Australia in terms of
human and financial resources expended and in terms of scientific output. Approximately sixty
per centof theReport is devoted to bihliometric and citation analyses of scientific disciplines in
Australia.
ASTEC, Profile ofAustralian Science, AGPS, 1989.
9 They are: strengths weaknesses
cardiovascular research preventative medicine
neuroscience community medicine
immunology mental health
fertility pharmacology
veterinary medicine microbiology
animal and plant physiology wholehody biochemistry
genetics economicgeology
nutrition soil research
virology waterresources research
astronomy mariculture
atmospheric research solid state physics
geology nuclearphysics
civil engineering parts of mathematics
fluid dynamics
mechanical engineering
Ibid., p.xi.
10 Ibid., p. 210.
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This raises the fundamental issue of why it should be necessary for Australian
scientists to compete in the international science status system. Apart from those
scientists in the highereducation science system whoarepursuing intemational careers
in basic science, the question arises of whether other scientists, particularly young
scientists who are not of world class standard, should be encouraged by their senior
colleagues to devote their productive creativity to achievement at this level. The
ASTEC authors themselves cite an OECD study which concludes that only five or ten
per centof scientists create 75-90 per cent of the significant advances in science.
The traditional rationale is somewhat of a credo for the science system and is stated
againin the introduction to ProfileofAustralian Science:
Since basicor longtermresearch hasbeenshown to have a measurable effecton
total factor productivity in private firms, a link can be drawn between basic
research and private R&D....Basic research conducted in Australia can also
improve the competitiveness of Australian firms.
ASTEC finds that the problemlies with the failure of Australian manufacturing
industry to exploit commercially thescientific knowledge created by thebasic science
system which is of international standing. According toASTEC it is notthe fault of
scientists if theychoose the status system of intemational science in preference to the
apphed science systemin Australia:
It is therefore understandable why so many basic researchers are decoupled
from the industrial system, and prefer to relate to the international science
community inpreference toassisting the economic development ofAustralia.i3
However, we can, by examining the publication record of other countries,
examine the extent to which citation and bibliometric analyses are indicators of national
economic well being. The data givenin Profile ofAustralianScience showthat such
economically successful countries as Japan and Germany publish only three times the
scientific papers published by Australian scientists, while scientists in theUKpublish
four times the number. Economically successful Switzerland and the Netherlands
publish fewer papers than Australia, even in the areas ofengineering and chemistry in
which those countries have giant transnational companies.
ASTEC's solution to the problem is to maintain the level of funding for basic
science and to increase funding for applied science. Funds for basic science, argues
the Council, should be allocated on a competitivebasis in order to identify those few
excellent scientists by whom the advances are generated. The general level of
'sophisticated' scientific skills in basic science needs to be maintained so that
Australian scientists can gain access to knowledge created overseas. Since this
11 Ibid.,p. 312.
12 Ibid., p. vii.
13 Ibid., p. xiii.
14 Ibid., p. 195.
knowledge is created increasingly in consortia of large companies, Australian
scientists will have to be in a position to trade skills for knowledge. Some basic
research will also need to be done: 'to fulfill our custodial duties for this part of the
world' (i.e., for nationalistic-cultural objectives). ASTEC advocates that the best
placefor both these types of basicresearch is in theuniversities wherescientific labour
is inexpensive and undirected,
Few voices in the international science policy community, and almost none in
Australia, are raised against these arguments.One who does question the
relationship between bibliometrics and economic activity is Kealey in the UK. He
argues that university science is the child of economic growth rather than its parent:
that it is a consumer good rather than a producer good. In particular he criticises the
use by Martinand Irvineof the Science Policy Research Unitof bibliometric indicators
in comparisons of national public funding for research and development To support
his argument he uses statistics which show an inverse relationship betweenthe rate of
scientificpublications and economic growth. He points out that this relationship has
not changed since Williams (see chapter 3, section 2.Lb) challenged its validity 40
years ago. '^^
2.2 Patents
A patent is defined as:
A government grant to an inventor, his heirs or assigns, for a stated period of
time, conferring upon him a monopoly of the exclusive right to make, use or
vend an invention or discovery.!^
The granting of patents in Australia became the responsibility of the Commonwealth
Government in 1904. Since then the Patents Act has been amended only twice, in
1952 and 1968, to expedite increases in applications.In 1980 Australia became a
signatory to the Patents Co-operation Treaty under which patent applications can be
filed simultaneously in several countries. In 1990 the Act was completely redrafted to
reflectchangesin the type of knowledge being createdand to allowfreer access to the
knowledge contained in patents. The redefinition of what constitutes an 'inventive
step' has made the granting of patents less likely and has brought the Australian
system into closer alignment with the European system. The new Act holds that prior
Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.
1^ Bourke and Butler have been following the UK debate and recently urged caution in using
bibliometrics as an indicator of overall decline in scientific activity in Australia.
Paul Bourke & Linda Butler, 'Australian Science: "Some Worries, Mate'", Campus Review,1%-2A
November, 1993, p. 9.
1^ 'Government funded academic science is a consumer good not a producer good: a comparative
reassessment of Britain's scientific and technological achievements since 1794 and a comment on
the bibliometry of B. Martin and J. Irvine', Scientometrics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1991, pp. 369-394, pp.
384-385.
1^ The Macquarie Dictionary, Macquarie Library Pty. Ltd., Sydney, 1981, q.v.'patent'.
19 Lamberton, Science, Technology and theAustralian Fxonnmy p. 6.
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knowledge of an invention publishedoutside the patent systemcan invalidate a patent
claim. Patent applications in Australia must now also be tested for inventive step
against internationally available knowledge.^o Researchers must therefore consider
patent activity before research results are disclosed to a 'third person'. This must
include applying for international patents rights aswell as patent rights in Austraha.^i
Patent recognition must now be sought in advance of recognition within the national
and intemational scientific communities.
Patent-awarding systems differ from country to country in the way in which
patents are applied for; the novelty requirements of what is considered to be new
knowledge, products or processes; the extent to which confidentiality must be
observed before patenting; and the length of time forwhich a patent canbe held.22
The actual granting (or 'sealing') of a patent is usually an indication that commercial
production of an innovation is about to takeplace. Foreign companies lodgepatents in
Australia in order to protect products and processes developed overseas. The use of
this new technical and scientific knowledge requires payments of licence fees and
royalties and these payments can also be used as an indicator of technological
dependence. These measures can be combined to give a picture of the changing
pattern of inventive activityin Australia between 1965 and 1990.
3. Higher Education
The output of the higher educationscience system consists of trained scientists and of
knowledge. The trained scientists enter other sectors of production, stay in academe
or pursue careers overseas. In addition, there have always been scientists who have
moved between the worlds of academe and private production, thereby increasing the
transfer of knowledge and skills.23 The majority of the knowledge produced has,
however, traditionally been regarded as a public good and published in scientific
journals of varying status in the international scientific system. Even knowledge
producedby arrangement with industry associations has generally been disseminated
20 The Industrial Property Advisory Committee noted in 1984 that the existing patent system had
social costs in terms of the monopolisation of innovative knowledge. The Act excludes biological
processes for the generation of human beings but McKenna considers that the Act did not go far
enough in terms of the definition of 'an invention' which retains much of the language of
manufacturing used in the original Statute of Monopolies of 1623.
Marshall McKenna, 'Patent Act 1990: Revision or Restatement?', Western Australian Law
Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 1991, pp. 383-390.
21 Errol Harwood, 'Protect, then Publish or Perish', Australian Physicist, vol. 27, no. 11,
November 1990, pp. 241-242.p. 242.
22 Ibid..
McKenna, 'Patent Act 1990: Revision or Restatement?', pp. 383 & 386.
23 Forexample, of thescientists interviewed for this thesis. Professor Arthur Birchworked for many
overseas pharmaceutical companies including ICI and Hoffman LaRoche; Professor Richard
Collins worked for AWA before taking a Cbair in Applied Physics at Sydney University; and
Professor Howard Worner was at Melbourne University before working for CRA, HHP and
others, then returning, at the age of 70 to a position at Wollongong University.
Professor Arthur Birch, Interview, 29.4.90.
Professor Richard Collins, 8.11.89.
Professor Howard Worner, 3.11.89.
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through public sector extension services. Although still predominant, this pattern of
knowledge production and application is changing as more higher education
institutions market, through specially createdcompanies, the knowledge producedby
their scientists.
The quantification of university research output is not well developed in
Australia. Analysis of SCI data and publieations is sporadic and there is always a lag
of up to five years between publication of scientific papers and publication of thedata
about scientific papers.24 This means that publication and citation data is of little use
as indicators of short-term trend, and therefore not actively pursued by decision-
makers in the science policy community. It is probably for thisreason that DITAC has
omitted such data from its latest series of science and technology indicators and
concentrates onhigher education research funding as the measure of 'performance'.25
Moremeaningful indicators of government objectives for higher education research are
the establishment of university research companies, and of Co-operative Research
Centres in which funding is contingent upon commercialisation.
3.1. Bibliometric analysis of basic research
The previous lack of interest in bibliometric studies is indicative of the absence of
expectations of accountability by thescience policy conununity of thehigher education
sector. Quantification of research output in the form of the allocation of human and
financial resources has traditionally (since Project Score in 1968) been considered an
adequate measure of performance. The most comprehensive setofAustralian datawas
published by ASTEC in 1989 using statistics supplied bythe Science Policy Research
Unit of the University of Sussex. The earliestdata in the set are from 1975.
The data indicate that Australia's share of world scientific publications barely
altered between 1975 and 1986 while the number of researchers in higher education
more than doubled during the period. Despite the time lag between research,
publication and analysis of publication, it appears that the downturn in scientists and
engineers in the early 1970s did notaffect the share ofpublications. Thedownturn in
1986 may be due to increasing publications from lapan and the rest of the world.26
The lack of statistics for later years highlights the inadequacy of bibliometrics as a
quantitative indicator in assessing theimmediate ouputs of research anddevelopment.
It is impossible to ascertain whether the downtum in 1984 has beenmaintained until
publication and citation measurements catch up with actual publication of papers.
Steve Sunter, CSIRO Australia Index, Personal Communication, 30.11.92
25 DITAC,Australian Scienceand InnovationResourcesBrief1992.
ASTEC and DITAC report different figures for 1984. The DITAC figures for 1984 (2.21) and
1986 are used here. The ASTEC figure for 1984 was 1.99.
Figure 8.1: The relationship between researchers in higher education
and Australia's share of world scientific publications
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3.2. The marketing of higher education research
A more immediate response to science policy is the increasing extent to which
universities are marketing research results. The commercialisation of university
research results began formally in 1959 when the University of New South Wales
established Unisearch to provide an interface between the University and public and
private industry. This form of interaction in the application of new knowledge
increased slowly. By 1970 there were still only two such companies; by 1980 there
were 9 and by 1990 there were at least 49 of which 31 offered private research and
development or intellectual property services.^^ The total number increased by 138
per cent between 1985 and 1990. Figure 8.2 illustrates the growth of those higher
education companies whose activity and/or revenue derive wholly or in part from the
commercial exploitation of intellectual property or research and development activity.
27 Attica, Directory 1991, Australian Tertiary Institutions Commercial Companies Association,
unpublished report, [confidential access only].
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Figure 8.2: The number of higher education research companies 1960-
1990
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The sudden increase at a time when the Government has been urging higher education
researchestablishments to co-operate more with industry and commercemust be seen
as a direct response to this aspect of science policy. Universities establish these
companies for various reasons but the mission statement of Uniseareh is probably
typical of many:
The objectives of Uniseareh are to:
- serve the wider community with the provision of an extensive range of
scientific, technological and professionals skills and resources of the
University, and to
- serve the University by increasing the utilisation of its skill and resource
base.
In pursuing these objectives Uniseareh promotes the University as an institution
of relevance to the community; and, at the same time, provides University staff
with a channel of contact into the activities and workings of the community
enabling their teaching and researchexpertise to be attuned to issues of current
importance.29
Steele and Lindley found that, among a sample of six university companies
which had been in existence for more than five years, the establishment of such
companies had the potential to create conflict among academic staffby introducing
rewards for non-academic behaviour into the university system. The conflict is
especially pronounced where professorial appointments are made, on the basis of
entrepreneurial skills, to people with a mediocre record of scholastic achievment.30
This conflict is a classic instance of the clash between scientific and political ideology.
28 Attica. Directory 1991, Australian Tertiary Institutions Commercial Companies Association,
Attica, unpublished report, [confidential access only],
29 Uniseareh, AnnualReport, 1990-1991, Uniseareh Limited, NSW, 1991, p. 4.
20 Steele & Lindley, 'Commercializing theUniversities', p. 182.
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The norms of communality conflict with the techno-economistic expectations of
subgovemment.
3.3. Commercialisation as a contingency in 1990
There are three programs within the higher education sector of science policy which
most clearly demonstrate the Hawke Government's intention to achieve the utilisation
of the results of research: the Co-operative Research Centres; the Industry section of
the Australian Postgraduate Research Awards; and the Senior Research Fellowships in
Industry. They are all funded on the premise of inducing application in private
economic production of the new knowledge, skills and training procedures generated
within the higher education system.
The CRC Program in particular is centred around the active involvement of users
of research in the operation of the Centres. Government funding of the Centres is
contingent upon the participating organisation providing 50 per cent of the
establishment and operational costs for each year of operation. Before funding is
granted formal agreements must be signed between each participant and the
Commonwealth Government, and between all participating organisations. These
agreements include detailed statements about how the results are to be utilised and how
issues of intellectual property, licensing and commerciahstion of research results are to
be managed. The Government has allowed a broad definition of 'research user'. The
participant organisation may be a private firm, a rural industry research and
development corporation or a public sector organisation.32 In fact, of the 52 CRCs
funded by 1993, only ten did not involve a participant from the private sector.^3
Summary: higher education
Since 1987 the Commonwealth Govemment has, by direct and indirect control over
research resources, intervened to change the pattem of interaction between researchers
in the higher education sector and potential users of the knowledge they produce. The
transition for scientists from the production of new knowledge as an international
public good, to active participation in its commercial dissemination and utilisation has
been a significant shift in the pattem of knowledge production and dissemination in the
Australian science system and has thereby caused conflict as commercial and
bureaucratic values of accountability and profitability have intraded upon academic
notions of autonomy and universalism.
31 The Australian Postgraduate Research Awards (Industry) provides funds for 60 candidates to
undergo part of their research within an industrial organisation. Participating firms must sponsor
each candidate to $10,000 or equivalent benefits. The Australian Research Fellow (Industry)
Program funds 20 researchers working in industry for twelve months.
ARC, Australian Research Council Awards 1990-91, pp. 21 & 23.
32 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Co-operative Research Centres Program: Round
Three Applications Guide, pp. 5,6, 12 & 17.
33 Scitech Technology Directory 1993, compiler, Jane Ford, Canberra, 1993, pp. 152-168.
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4. CSIRO
The function of CSIRO has always been to produce scientific research for use in
industry and the dissemination of research results has been a statutory obligation for
the Organisation. The changed wording of the Acts expresses the changing
expectations of governments in this regard. In theoriginal Actof 1920 the wording of
the relevant sub-section was :
(f) the establishment of a Bureau of Information for the collection and
dissemination of information relating to scientific and technical matters: and
(g) the collection and dissemination of information regarding industrial welfare
and questions relating to theimprovement ofindustrial conditions.34
In 1926 subsection (g) was omitted and the following paragraph was inserted in its
place:
.. .and also that of acting as a means of liaisonbetween the Commonwealth and
other countries in matters of scientific research.35
The norms of the science system were beginning to take over the original intention that
CSIR should produce scientific knowledgefor industrial application. The norms were
intensified in the 1949 Act which simply stated:
(g) thepublication ofscientific and technical reports and papers.36
Liaison with other countries merited its own section in this Act. In 1986 the primacy
of industrial co-operation over other functions was specifically emphasised:
7. Section 9 of the Principal Act is amended-
(a) by inserting after paragraph (b) the followingparagraphs:
(ba) to encourage or facilitate the applicationor utilisation of the results of
any other scientific research;
(bb) to carry out services, and make available facilities, in relation to
science;
.. .(c) by adding at the end the following sub-section
(2) The Organisation shall-
(a) treat the functions referred to in paragraphs (1) (a) and (b) as its
primary function; and
(b) treat the other functions referred to in sub-section (1) as its secondary
functions.37
The government was in this way writing into the new CSIRO legislation new rules
emphasising the way in which its reseachers should approach their results. Firstly
they should consider the industrial utility of the research undertaken, and only then
should they consider whether the results would be publishedand whether they should
connect their work with that done overseas.
34 Instituteof Science andIndustry Act ,no22 of 1920.
33 Science andIndustry Research Act ,no. 20of 1926.
36 Science and Industry Research Act, no. 13 of 1949.
37 Science andIndustry Research Legislation Amendment Actno. 121 of 19R6.
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4.1 Scientific publications 1965-1990
The combination of new rules about the knowledge produced, and new types of
funding arrangements, discussed in chapter five, seems to be changing the way in
which CSIRO scientists are approaching their work. Figure 8.3 shows the
relationship between the number of scientists in CSIRO; the papers they produce; the
allocation of funds by appropriation; and the total organisational expenditure for the
years 1965 to 1990 (in 1990$m). Therelationship between appropriation funding for
CSIRO and total expenditure is discussed in chapter fivewhere it is notedthat not all
of the funding growth comes fromtheprivate sector - much of this money comes from
other government agencies. The apparent sudden leap in the number of papers
published between 1965 and 1969 may be due to different data sources.38
Figure 8.3: the relationship between CSIRO funding, the number of
scientists and papers published.
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The figure shows a strong positive relationship between all four variables until 1980.
Funds, scientists and publications followed the samepattern of increaseand decrease.
From 1980 until 1986 the number of scientists remains more or less constant.39 After
38 Tbepublications data1968-90 areobtained from theCSIRO Australis Index butthe 1968 figures
appear to be incomplete andarenotused. The 1965 figure is obtained by counting the number of
papers listedin the 1965 Annual Report (at that time all publications were reported each year).
Expenditure andappropriations dataareobtained from each annual report from 1965 to 1990. The
funds are givenin units of a hundred thousand dollars in orderto allow the four variables to be
displayed on a compact graph.
39 The number of scientists employed by CSIRO is difficult to monitor accurately through time.
Only in 1992 did the CSIRO Australia Index begin to assemble the longitudinal data (Sunter,
the restructuring and new legislation of 1986the real valueof funds dropped as did the
number of papers published. However, the number of scientists increased. When
funds began to rise again in 1989 publications continued to fall. The 1991 figures are
included to account for the lag between performance of research and the publication of
results.40 Even allowing for lag it appears that the production of scientific papers by
CSIRO staff has fallen even though both the number of scientists and the available
funds have increased. In recent years as more research is undertaken in collaboration
with private firms, researchers have had to postponepublication for a negotiated time.
Consequently the lag between research and publication of results may widen in the
future. However, since 1986 there has certainly been an alteration to the traditional
pattem of publication."'^ '^
4.2 The application of research results, 1965
Measurement of the application of the results of research undertaken by CSIRO is
more difficult. The traditional indicator of the commercialisation of scientific and
technological ideas is the patent butthis is not a good indicator of activity in CSIRO.^^
By 1965 CSIRO had developed a policy that patents would only be sought on
inventions which seemed 'desirable in the public interest'.^3 The public interest
would be served only:
Personal Communication, 30.11.92). Consequently the figures given above are gleaned in
various forms from CSIRO Annual Reports. For 1965 and 1970 all the staff were listed in the
Annual Reports. The numbers for these years include divisional chiefs, assistant chiefs, senior
principalresearchofficers, principal research officers, scientific officers and experimental officers.
The figures do not include administrative staff, technical staff or librarians. For 1975 and 1980
exact figures were not given and Annual Reports simply stated a total number of personnel and
indicated that approximately one third of these were scientists. From 1979 charts in the Annual
Reports included the proportional distribution of professional staff throughout CSIRO but gave
no absolute numbers. The 1985-86 Annual Report gave absolute numbers for 1981 to 1986.
From 1986 onwards the numbers of professional staff are usually given in graphic form which is
difficult to read in numbers less than 100. Often the numbers are contradictory. For example the
1987-88 Report gives a precise number of 2489 professional staff engaged in research but the
1988-89 Report shows in graphic form that there were 3000 professional staff in CSIRO.
Until 1986 the number of papers published closely followed the level of funding. Since then the
level of publications has continued to fall even though the level of total expenditure has risen
again. Sunter estimated that the exact number of publications cannot be known for seven years.
Sunter, Personal Communication, 30.11.92.
41 This view is supported by Bourke and Butler in their interpretation of Australian bibliometric
statistics published in Science Watch, the journal of the American Institute of Scientific
Information in November 1993.
Bourke & Butler, Australian Science: "Some Worries, Mate'", p. 9.
42 In 1966Bncel andInglis noted:
Again, there has been only limited and tardy recognition of the fact that discoveries made in
government laboratories are unlikely to be put to practical use unless the government itself
establishes machinery for developing and patenting these discoveries.
Encel & A Inglis, 'Patents, Inventions and Economic Progress', p. 573.
43 J.p. Shelton, 'CSIRO Patents and Research for Industry', Australian Physicist, vol. 2, no. I.,
January 1965, pp. 3-6, p. 4.
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1. When there is a danger that others may obtain patents covering the
results of the Organization's research....
2. When it is desirable for the Organization to maintain an interest in the
quality and technical efficiency of production....
3. When it is likely that an inventionwill notbe developed and exploited
commercially unless covered by patent....
4. Where an invention may assist in maintaining or extending the use of
Australian products overseas....
5. Where substantial royalties may be earned, especially from industry
overseas.44
Shelton reports that the objective of the patent policy was to bring about the
widest possible use of research results within Australia by Australian manufacturers
and producers. Nominal royalties and licence payments ensured that these were
availableat the leastpossible cost to the domestic developer. The policy was different
for overseas manufacturers who wished to use CSIRO research results. In these cases
the maximnm royalties were charged. In 1965 CSIRO took out 32 patents in Australia
and overseas, 22 per cent of which were connected with the wool industry. The
patents resulted from research done in 15 ofthe 32 divisions ofCSIRO.'^ ^
White says that when suchpatents were taken outby CSIRO the Organisation
would then 'seek to interest appropriate firms in the discovery' and grant such firms
exclusive or non-exclusive licences. According to White careful administration of
patents did not result in total secrecy which would deny those results to other
developers. However, he alsosaidthat the mode of dissemination had to be different
in ruralindustry from thatin manufacturing industry because of the collective nature of
rural production. Research results in rural industry were disseminated through
research notes, newsletters, location reports, open days and State Government
agricultural extension services.46 In manufacturing production CSIRO interacted
much more on an individual basis with firms which wanted specific results. Shelton
bemoaned the fact that foreign firms were often the first and only developers to
expressan interestin commercial applications of CSIRO results:
Until Australian industry undertakes a significant proportion of its own
development work it will not be able to m^e fully effective use of CSIRO
research results which were it not for the problems of local development, might
have beenapplied to greater benefit in Austraha.''^ ^
Users of CSIRO research did not always agree with the Organisation's
administrators that researeh results were applicable. In the experience of one private
enterprise manager talking to scientists about thecommercial application of theirwork
required that researchers:
44 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
45 CSIRO Eighteenth Annual Report, pp. 108-109.
46 White, 'Administration of Scientific Reseach', p. 125.
47 Ibid., p. 6.
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...dig these fellows out of their scientific cocoon and awaken them to the fact
that there are other realitiesthan pounds of paper on a shelf.^s
Other research managers of significant Australian firms agreed with this view.
Lusby of IRH Industries and Whitton of ICI were both of the opinion that CSIRO
divisional chiefs had too much autonomy in the choice of research to be undertaken
and therefore chose projects which would yield results publishable in high-status
international journals.49 Ward of BHP said that continuous contact was necessary
with 'customers' for research and that it was therefore not surprising that researchers
who perceived that their role was confined to the laboratory would be frustrated at
industrialists' lack of interest in their results.50 Davies of AWA agreed that when
scientists eventually communicate with industry it is too late for effective input of
development needs.There seems to have been a gross lack of communication
between the senior scientists in CSIRO and their 'customers' in manufacturing
industry which did not occur in rural industry.
Here, once again in the history of science policy in Australia the policy analyst is
struck by the dichotomy between the relationships between researchers and rural
producers and researchers and non-mral producers. White's argument was that:
In agriculture there are a very large number of individual farmers and
pastoralists to whom it is important to convey new discoveries promptly....On
the industrial side the position is different, for here we are dealing with
individual firms. Each firm, depending on the nature of its activities and its
production, wishes information specific to its interests. It is for example, not of
much interest to a cement manufacturer to have news of scientific discoveries of
importance to the pulp andpaperindustry.52
One can speculate that pig farmers equally would not be very interested in wheat
production. The same environmental variables seem to have evoked different
responses in different sectors of the CSIRO subgovernment. In rural production
research results were widely broadcast and it was the responsibility of the levy-paying
producer to use the results productively. In non-rural industry the knowledge
produced by the researcherwas consideredto be the private property either of CSIRO
or the producer.
There would appear to be a closer fit between the norms of science about the
universality of knowledge and the nature of the relationship between govemment and
rural producers in Australia, than that between science and the non-rural industrial
sector. The reason arguably lies in the fact that, in the mid-1960s, govemment
intervention and sponsorship were much better developed in rural industry because of
Ibid., p.161, discussion on White's paper.
Lusby, 'Science Policy towards the Electronics Industry', p. 143.
Ward,'Science and Industry', p. 374.
^^ Davies, 'Federal Policy forIndustrial Research AndDevelopment in Australia', p. 425.
52 White, 'Administration of Scientific Reseach', pp. 124-125.
the political influence of the rural lobby. Rural techno-economism was legitimate but
non-rural techno-economism was not. The same opposition to intervention was
evident in mral industry when vested interests were threatened, as we saw in relation
to the prohibition of work on man-made fibres by the wool research association. At
that time too, whole divisions of CSIRO were more or less dependent on rural
research funding.53 Political ideology, scientific ideology and resource needs
coincided to produce a different pattem of knowledge dissemination for rural research
from manufacturing research.
4.3 The application of research results, 1990
The 1977IndependentInquiry into CSIROconsidered at some length the issues of the
dissemination of and commercialisation of research results and recommended that
responsibility for the development of results should he conferred onto individual
researchers, and that the responsibility for effective patenting, licensing and the
negotiation of joint ventures should be theresponsibility of the Organisation in general
and Divisions and Institutes in particular.34 In early 1985 the Organisation set up
Sirotech as an independent company to manage the technological transfer and
commercial assesment aspects of CSIRO research. In addition Sirotech would
canvass the research needs of industry.35
However, this initiative may have been too late because in 1985 ASTEC found:
"... that CSIRO may not have been sufficiently vigourous in pursuing the commercial
application of its work'.36 ASTEC acknowledged that there were many areas of
CSIRO research, such as climate changes and the formation of ore deposits, which
may not have patentable results even twenty years hence. Nevertheless, in order to
provide economic returns to society, it was essential that researchers should be
continuallyawareof which aspects of theirworkcouldbe commercialised. In order to
encourage this awareness, individual researchers and their Divisions should be
rewarded by being allowed to retain the royalties from such work. These measures
were endorsed by the then Minister for Science, Barry Jones, and between 1986 and
1989werebuilt into the re-stracturing of the Organisation.^^
33 For example, in 1965 the divisions of Animal Physiology, Protein Chemistry and Wool
Research were totally funded by contributions.
CSIRO Eighteenth Annual Report, pp. 208-213.
34 Australia, Independent Inquiry into CSIRO, pp. li-liii.
33 J.p. Wild, 'CSIRO and the ASTEC Review', Search, vol. 16, no. 5-6, June-July 1985, pp. 124-
126, p. 125.
36 ASTEC, Future Directionfor CSIRO, p. 33.
37 Mayo, Chief of theDivision of Animal Production, reports that thebonus and incentives scheme
was introduced aginst the wishes of researchers. Details of the scheme were sent to the divisions
for comment which was almost universally hostile. Nevertheless, the scheme was introduced in
its original form and consequently was resisted by the scientists who see it as counter to the
traditional understanding of collective credit for work accomplished. Much scientific work is the
result of input from a widely disparate set of researchers. The incentive sheme is based on a few
people taking credit for new knowledge.
Mayo, Interview, 7.11.89.
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By 1987 Sirotech had negotiated the establishment of three new companies
jointly with ICI, Du Font and the Australian Mineral Development Laboratories. The
company had arranged twenty collaborative agreements and advised on 200 more.
The number of patents filed almost tripled from 43 in 1983, to 73 in 1985 and 123 in
1986-87. The company also arranged for over 800 patent applications to lapse,
indicating the extent to which patent administration had been neglected by the
Organisation.58 However in 1992 it was announced that the company would be
abolished and its functions taken over by individual divisions as suggested in the
Birch Report in 1977.
Responsibility for knowledge application now resides in the divisions. Their
annual reports show that evidence of collaboration is now part of the reporting
process. For example, the Annual Reportof the Division of Geomechanics listed 102
collaborators in 1990. 56 of these were private companies.^^ The Division of
Polymers and Chemicals, which has a long history of collaboration with industry and
patenting of its research findings, published in its 1990 Annual Report a list of
confidential internal reports, adding in parenthesis that: 'This list is published solely to
indicate the extent of the Division's collaboration with industry'.The Divisions
have always included summaries of industry collaboration in their Annual Reports,
what has changed is the number of collaborations and their importance in divisional
funding and priorities.
Summary: CSIRO
The above changes in the pattern of the dissemination of new scientific knowledge did
not occur 'naturally' as scientists observed a sudden need to fulfill government and
industry's expectations. It required a deliberate governmental fracturing of the
patterns of interaction established by scientists to suit their ideological and resource
needs. Only when resource allocations were changed, when statutory obligations
were re-emphasised, and when new ideas about the disseminationof research results
were imposed on the Organisationdid scientistsbegin to orient their work to industry
as well as the international scientific community; and to manufacturing as well as rural
industry's needs.
5. Manufacturing Industry
There are several indicators which can be used to analyse the manufacturing sector in
terms of the scientific knowledge produced and its application. The level of business
expenditure on research and development (BERD), and the level of government
support of industrial research and development through grantsand tax concessions are
CSIRO Annual Report 1986-87, p. 41.
CSIRO Division of Geomechanics, Annual Report 1990-91, CSIRO, Canberra, 1991, p. 40.
CSIRO Division of Chemicals and Polymers, Annual Report 1990-91, CSIRO, Canberra, 1991,
p. 18.
direct measures of research activity which have been examined in chapter five and are
shown to have increased dramatically in the 1980s. The level of payments for know-
how and royalties, and the level of patent activity are other indirect measures of
inventiveness and these are examined here. Only 3 per cent of patent activity occurs in
the area of agriculture, and so patent statistics can largely be seen as a measurement of
manufacrnring activity.
Intuitively the causal pathway would seem to be that, as the level of BERD rises,
the level of patent activity should follow and that of payments for know-how should
decrease. However, the relationship is much more complex than this with such
factors as the availability of venture capital, the way in which technology is transferred
between overseas firms and their Australian subsidiaries, and the effects of
government policy on the importation of technology, intervening to change the direct
nature of the interaction. The relationship between expenditure on research and
development and patent activity should therefore be seen as a general rather than an
absolute indicator of inventive activity. Nevertheless patent activity continues to be
used as a measure of the effectiveness of expenditure on research and development.^^
5.3 Patterns of patent activity
In the mid-1960s patent statistics were beginning to be used as a direct indicator of the
effects of new products and processes on economic growth and as an indirect indicator
of the effectiveness of scientific research activity on the processes of economic
production. In 1966Encel and Inglis analysed patent activity in Australia and found
that, in common with most small economies, the level of domestic patent activity was
in decline and that of foreign patents lodged in Australia was increasing. For example,
in 1961 67 per cent of patent applications in Australia were from overseas compared
with 55 per cent in 1951.^2 Figure 8.4 shows the level of patent activity in the non-
rural and non-mining sectors between 1965 and 1990. The sharp rise between 1965
and 1972 is probably due to changes in the classification system.63 The data shows
that patent activity in Australia in 1990, although having doubled since 1981, has not
yet reached the level of 1973.
^1 DITAC have included patent activity as as a science and technology indicator in its Australian
Science and Innovation Resources Briefsince 1987.
Encel & Inglis, 'Patents, Inventions and Economic Progress', p. 578.
The Patents Office has only been issuing annual Activities Reports since 1974. World Intellectual
Property Organisation data for the previous years are supplied by the Patents Office but the
categories altered slightly in the late 1960s from the later IPG scheme.
Steven McMillan, Program Development Branch, Australian Patent, Trade Marks and Designs
Offices, Canberra, Personal Communication, 16.11.92.
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Figure 8.4: Patent activity in manufacturing production, 1965-1990
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Data source: Australian Patent, Trade Marks and Design Offices,Activities Reports 1974-1990;
Stephen McMillan, Program Development Branch, Australian Patent, Trade Marks and
Design Offices, Personal Communication, 16.11.92
As might be expected, most patent activity occurs in the private business sector.
Figure 8.5 illustrates the changing sectoral level of patent activity between 1977 and
1989.
Figure 8.5: A comparison of patents granted to sectors of industry
1977-1989
'^^"1 H patents granted to Commonwealth organisations
B patents granted to private organisations
77-79 82-85 87-89
Data source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Research and Experimental Development: All Sector
Summary 1977-79, Cat. No. 8112.0, 1985, Table 12, p. 9.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Research and Experimental Development: All Sector
Summary 1984-85, Cat. No. 8112.0, 1987, Table 25, p. 21.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Research and Experimental Development: All Sector
Summary 1988-89, Cat. No. 8112.0, 1990, Table 20, p. 17.
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The annual average level of patents granted to private sector enterprises increased by
49 per cent whereas the level granted to Conunonwealth Government organisations
rose by only 0.03 per cent. The increase was highest between 1982-85 and 1987-89
when the numberof patents granted to industry rose by 27 per cent.^^
However, since 1967 Commonwealth governments have subsidised
manufacturing research through the industrial research and development (IR&D)
schemes. Figures 8.6 and 8.7 illustrate the relationship between IR&D grants and
patent applications. The data consist of the annual number of patent applicants
domiciled in Australia (available only since 1974), the annual number of patents
sealed, and the levels of IR&D grants deflated to 1990 level.^5 All the data are
smoothed as three-year moving averages to clarify overall trend.
There is a ten-year lag between levels of IR&D grants and patent applications.
The high point in grant expenditure in 1972-73 is matched by a high point in patent
applications in 1982-83. Grant expenditure fell in real terms between 1976-82 and
applicationsfell in 1985. Since 1984the level of grant expenditure has fallen sharply
but the number of patent applications has remained fairly constant. This would seem
to indicate that the tax concession, introduced in 1986, has now superceded the IR&D
grant as the preferred form of funding inventive activity. In comparison the
relationship between the commercialistion of research is not so closely correlated. The
level of patents sealed dropped dramatically during the recession of the early 1980s but
continued to rise as the real level of IR&D grants fell after 1984.
The ABS collects patent data on a sectoral basis on an intermittent basis only as funding permits
Consequently the period of time for each set of data differs. The 1977-79 and 1987-89 data
represent two years of activity and the 1982-85 data represents three years of activity. To
compensate for this discrepancy the data for Table 8.5 has been averaged.
Derek Byars, ABS, Canberra, Personal Communication, 13.11.92.
Australian domicile does not necessarily indicate Australian ownership.
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Figure 8.6 & 8.7: the relationship between Australian patent
applications, IR&D grants and patents sealed, 1965-1990.
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Data source: Stephen McMillan, Australian Patent, Trade Marks and Designs Offices, Canberra,
Personal Communication, 16. 11. 92;
Australian Patent,TradeMarksand Designs Offices, Activities Report 1974-1990;
AIRDS Board, Annna/Report, 1967-1976;
AJRDIS Board, Annual Report, 1976-1985;
IR&D Board, AnwMo/Report, 1986-1991.
One aspect of patent activity which is increasingly cited as an indicator of
economic innovation by the privatebusiness sector is thenumber of overseaspatents
applied for by Australian firms. An increase in the level ofoverseas patents would
indicate that Australian firms are intending to export the products of innovative activity
rather than simply replacing imports.66 The OECD measures such patent activity as
numbers of extemal patent applications perunit ofGDP. Between 1981 and 1989 the
DITAC, Measures ofScience and Innovation, p. 212.
numberof externalpatentapplications from Australian residents rose from 2.7 to 6.1
per GDP unit, giving Australia the highest such growth rate inthe OECD.^"^
5.4 Changes in the sectoral distribution of patent activity
The areas of manufacturing representedin Figure 8.7 are the seven most consistently
active in terms of granted patents. The industrial research and development
expenditure illustrated consists of the estimated sum total ofresearch grants to industry
between 1976 and 1990, and is represented on the graph by the white bar.68 The
other bars represent annual patent activity.
Figure 8.7: The relationship between IR&D grants and patents in the
seven most active international patent classification areas, 1976-1990
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Data source: IR&D Board Annual Reports, 1976-1990.
Australian Patent, Trade Marks and Design Offices, Activities Reports 1974-1990.
The chemicals category is consistently the area in which the mostpatents are granted.
It covers such areas as dyes, ceramics, waste water treatment and the fermentation
industry which has traditionally been awarded the highestgrants within the category.
In real terms the peak funding years were 1980and 1987. The instruments category,
which has received the greatest grant allocation over the period, has a relatively low
67 DITAC,Australian Scienceand InnovationResourcesBrief 1992, p. 12.
68 The data does not include tax concessions. The data for grants between 1965 and 1976, and for
the research and development tax concession are classified according to the Australian Standard
Industry Classification (ASIC) scheme rather than the IPC scheme used for patents and
discretionary grants. Consequently, only the expenditure data on commencement, project and
discretionary grants is comparable with the patent data. The expenditure figures are totals of
amounts given in Annual Reports and therefore must be considered only as an estimate.
McMillan, Personal Communication, 16.11.92
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outcome in terms of patents. The peak grants for this area occurred in real terms in
1983 and 1984 and were awarded to the eomputer industry. Given the lag between
research and patents it may be that this area will show more patent aetivity in theearly
1990s. The 'separating and shaping' eategory is anaggregate of two categories whieh
inelude sueh industrial activity as physical and chemical processing of natural
substances and the working of materials into produets in plastics, metal and minerals.
The category produces a relatively high level of patents but receives a low level of
industrial research grants. In all areas except health andinstruments the highestlevels
ofpatent activity occurred from 1972 to 1976 andthen again from 1987.
Patent aetivity since 1986 has been static in the traditional manufacturing areas of
transport and engines and shows the greatest increase in the areas ofchemicals, health
and instruments which cover the 'new' industries of ceramics, biotechnology, and
computers.69 However, it is unlikely that any definite conclusion can bedrawn about
the relationship between government intervention and patent activity until the mid
1990s. The tax concession scheme will then have been in existenee for ten years and
the effects should be showing in patent statistics. It should then be possible to
compare the differential effects of grants and tacx concessions to assess the
effeetiveness of government priorities for manufacturing research in terms of
commercialisation.
5.5 Changes in technical know-how payments and receipts
Technical know-how is the specialised knowledge in the form of scientific, technical
or engineering expertise which is needed to produce a produet or implement a process.
Teehnieal know-how is acquired by transfer in kind, through the purchase of patent
licences or through royalty payments.'^ ^ The majority (89 pereent) of thisknowledge
is used in the manufacturing sector.Australia imports technical know-how to the
valueof $300million a year and exports a muehlowerlevelof knowledge. However,
the balanee of teehnieal know-how payments and receipts is changing. Table 8.1
shows thechanges between 1978 and 1989.'^ ^
Patent statistics are given only in the broad category levels used in the figure but industrial
research grant statistics are broken down into sub-categories.
ABS, Research and ExperimentalDevelopment: All Sector Summary 1989-90, Cat no. 8112.0,
AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p. 25.
DITAC, Measures ofScience and Innovation, 1987, p. 277.
Surveys of technical know-how payments and receipts areundertaken by theABS on a similar ad
hoc basis to patentdata surveys, i.e., when the Bureau is requested to do so andfunds are made
available. The first such survey was in 1978-79.
Table 8.1: Australia's changing balance of payments for technical
know-how, 1978-1979, in 1990 $m
Year Pavments Receipts
78-79 324 38.3
ratio 8.5 1
84-85 224.5 50.2
ratio 4.5 1
% change 31% 31%
88-89 3113 139
ratio 2,7 1
% change 68% 177%
Data source:ABS, Research and Experimental Development: AllSectorSummary, 1978-79, p. 9.
Research and Experimental Development: AllSectorSummary, 1984-85, p. 21.
Researchand Experimental Development: AllSectorSummary, 1988-89, p. 15.
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In 1978-79 payments outweighed receipts by 8.5 to I. In 1984-85 the payments
decreased by 31 per cent due either to less production or to the fact that production
relied less on overseas technical know-how, or a combination of both scenarios.
However, in thatyear receipts increased by 31 percentindicating thatmore Australian
technical know-how was being used in overseas production. The ratio of payments to
receipts in this year was 4.5:1. By 1988-89 technical know-how payments had
increased by 68 per cent but receipts increased by a massive 177 per cent which
reduced the payments to receiptsratio to 2.7:1.
These changes in the technical know-how balance of payments, taken with the
level of patent activity, the growth in the number of Australian innovations patented
overseas, and the sectoraldistribution of patent activity, as well as the increased level
of BERDdemonstrated in chapter five, indicate that the late 1980s hasbeen a time of
considerable inventive activity andiimovation in the non-rural sectorof production in
Australia. Because of the lag between research and development activity and the
commercialistion of products andprocesses it is as yet too early to determine exactly
howeffective the changes in science policy have beenbutthe indicators to datewould
seem to point to considerable increases in innovative activity in Australian
manufacturing industry.
Summary: manufacturing industry
Changing patterns in the the knowledge created for manufacturing industry by
research and development can be traced through patents and through know how
payments. These indicators show that there has been an increase in the amount of
knowledge patented in Australia and an decrease in the payments made by
manufacturers in Australia for the use of knowledge created overseas. These changes,
together with the increasing levels of BERD since 1983 indicate that manufacturing
industry in Australia is funding, and using in production, an increasing amount of
scientific knowedge.
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6. Rural Industry
Perhaps the greatest change has taken place inthe type ofknowledge produced and the
mode of its dissemination in rural research. In 1965 the knowledge produced by
research agencies for use in rural production was to a large extent considered by
governments, researchers and producers as a public good. The knowledge was
disseminated to national rural producers through government-funded extension
services. In 1990rural researchis increasingly seen as a private good. Between 1986
and 1990 the Commonwealth Govemment committed $14.5 million to joint venture
research inbiotechnology involving private companies.''^
6.1 Rural research knowledge and its application in 1965
In 1965 Commonwealth and State Governments subsidised both the production of
research for rural production and the extension services by which theknowledge was
disseminated to the producers. Of the research undertaken by CSIRO in 1965 and
paid for through budget appropriations, 38 per cent was for rural research. CSIRO
also had an Agricultural Liaison Unit which, through such means as technical
conferences, specialist committees, publications and personal contact, interacted with
producers to disseminate knowledge ofnew processes, and to help solve production
problems. Some knowledge was developed to the stage where it could be used
directly by extension officers and this was published inthe quarterly Rural Research in
CSIRO ortransmitted by direct interaction with State Departments ofAgriculture.74
In the universities at least 34 per cent of ARCS grants were for research
connected with rural production.'^ S jn addition the Commonwealth Govemment,
through Special Purpose Grants and Special Appropriations, contributed to such
programs as:
• dairy industryextension services;
• agricultural advisory services;
• tobacco industry extension services;
• cattle tick control and research;
• tuberculosis and brucellosis eradication.
Most of these services were also supplied through the extension programs of State
Departments ofAgriculture. In 1968-69, 72 per cent ofresearch expenditure funded
directly by the States was for agricultural science.'^ ^ Knowledge funded by all these
means was intended to keep farmers in touch with advances in research which affected
Annual Reports, 1986-1990.
^4 CSIRO EighteenthAnnual Report, pp. 106-107.
75 For these grants and for CSIRO funds it is difficult to separate disciplinary and divisional
resources into precise categories. Only research directly identified with rural production is
included herebut in many instances such research as cloud seeding in Atmospheric Physics, land
use degredation studies in Environmental Mechanics, insect venom attractants and repellants in
grants for Chemistry, are obviously for use in rural production .
ARGC, First Report, pp. 577-589.
CSIRO Eighteenth Annual Report, pp. 118-165.
76 Department of Science, Project SCORE, Report 2, Research and Development Expenditure by
State Governments, pp. 5 & 26.
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their special production needs of regional variations in such factors as soil fertility,
pests and diseases and plant variations.
This type of interaction suited both political and scientific ideologies. The
political influence of the National Country Party and the fact that many Liberal
pohticians were themselves rural producers meant that pohtical wUl matched influential
private interests.As Marsden notes:
Both politicians and research managers recognize and take into account the
beneficial consequences of research on the income of particular communities or
interest groups and, as already noted in relation to irrigation projects, where the
benefits are concentrated but the costs are spread over many individuals,
projects tend toreceive public funding more readily.'^ ^
Members of State and Commonwealth Parliaments could help their constituents
and themselves by establishing and then by protecting such services from detailed
analysis. The electoral consequences ofwithdrawing such services would helocalised
and so the services survived the more general cuts to rural subsidies of the Whitlam
Government. The collective, uncommercialised nature of the dissemination of
research results also conformed with scientists' notions of the communality and
disinterestedness. The statepaidtheir salaries and theproducers collectively benefited
from their work. The Australian community indirectly benefited through high export
commodity prices and lower production costs. It was not until economic recession
both lowered rural commodity prices and restricted the flow of resources to science
that the relationship came under scrutiny in the early 1980s. At the same time,
advances in biotechnology, or the manipulation of genetic material in life forms,
heralded the dawn of a new era in which governmental and private interests would
coincide in different ways in rural production.
6.2 Rural research in 1990: the biotechnology revolution
The revolution in biology was recentlydescribed in The Economistthus:
In the 1950s [thebiologists] found thatheredity was controlledby a simplecode
written in DNA. In the 1960s they cracked the eipher. In the 1970s they found
out how to insert new genes in the eodes of bacteria. In the 1980s they did so,
andbuilt an industry whosepromise of abundant drugs, new-fangled erops and
environment-cleansing bacteria may yetbe fulfilled in the 1990s.'^ 9
In 1965 the word 'biotechnology' did not appear in CSIRO's Annual Report (which
contained a list of all published papersj.^o By 1990 Professor Adrienne Clarke of the
77 The Minister for Education and Science in 1969 was Malcolm Eraser, a grazier from Victoria's
Western Districts.
78 Marsden et. al., Returns on Australian Agricultural Research, p. 15.
79 'Biology's heyday', The Economist, February 16 1991, Science Survey, pp. 6-7.
80 Biotechnology is 'the application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of
materials by biological agents to provide goods and services'. It includes such technologies as:
genetic engineering; cell manipulation and culture; fermentation technology and enzyme
technology.
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Special Research Centre for Plant Cell Biology at the University ofMelbourne was
inventing new plants using such techniques.^i Advances in biotechnology have far-
reaching implications for the production and dissemination ofnew knowledge inrural
production, and therefore for governments and scientists. CSIRO and university
laboratories in Australia have been at the forefront of the use of genetic manipulationin
rural production. Plants, animals, pests and fertilisers can be tailored to suit
producers' requirements. Because ofthe appropriability of the new knowledge inthe
form ofpatents, large firms involved inrural production are now much more involved
in the relationship between researchers and producers. Universities and CSIRO are
receiving private funding for research inbiotechnology, the results of which will not
flow directly to producers but will need to be purchased through products, patents,
licences androyalties on the use of intellectual property.
In terms of research output, fields of rural science form the sub-group Biology
II of the Computer Horizons Inc. database on scientific papers and citations. The
group includes agricultural, food, veterinary, dairy and animal sciences, entomology
and parasitology. This is the most internationally successful ofall fields ofscience in
Australia. As we have seen, scientific papers from Australia consistently form two per
centof the world's scientific papers. Forthe five areas in Biology II bothoutput and
citation percentages in 1975, 1980 and 1984 were consistently higher than two
percent. Agricultural and food science reached over four per cent each year, and
veterinary medicine was over six per cent for the period.Between 1981 and 1992
the two categories ofplant and animal sciences, and agricultural science comprised 20
per cent ofall Australian papers pubhshed and documented by the Institute ofScietific
Information in Philadelphia.
Successive governments have realised the potential of this research strength.
Biotechnology was identified in 1980 by the Senate Standing Committee on
Technological Change (the Myers Committee) as one of six generic technologies of
potential benefit in Australia. Initiatives by the Eraser Government such as the
convening of a symposium in 1981, the commissioning of an ASTBC report in 1982
and the National Biotechnology Workshop also in 1982, were continued by the
Hawke Government.84 Biotechnology was one of the first generic technologies
prioritised under the new GIRD scheme in 1986. Plant and animal biotechnological
research is the focus of threeSpecial Research Centres in universities. Of the 52 Co
operative Research Centres established in the first two rounds of funding 18 are
ASTEC, Biotechnology in Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 1982,p. 4,
®1 Adrienne Clark, 'New plants for old', The Uncertainty Principle, Robyn Williams (ed.), ABC
Enterprises, Sydney, 1989, pp. 205-217.
82 Entomology fell to 1.8% in 1980 but recovered with2.75% in 1984.
ASTEC, Profile of Australian Science, pp. 255-257.
83 Bourke & Butler, 'Australian Science: "Some Worries, Mate'", p. 9.
84 ASTEC, Setting Directionsfor Australian Research, p. 22.
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connected with rural research and include centres of biotechnological research for
agriculture. In 1990theproportion of papers published byCSIRO in plant and animal
biology was 51 per cent - thehighest everlevel.®^
The way in which this knowledge is being disseminated is in flux. There has
been what Dickson calls a 'structural shift' in interactions between governments,
private industry and researchers. The fact that most biotechnological research would
be classified as basic science has meant that large private companies are now interested
in sponsoring basic, as opposed to applied research in universities.^^ In Australia
much of this research would formerly have been disseminatedin applied form through
the publicly-funded extension services. So far the extension services remain, though
State Departments of Agriculture are cutting back on research laboratories as private
funding increases. The Chief Executive of CSIRO recently felt the need to reassure
farmers of continuing support in face of the shift to research into value-added
processes.
The reason is that firms see biotechnological advances and value-added
processes as research which canbe appropriated forprivate profit rather than collective
benefit. This fits a Commonwealth government science policy advocating more
external funding for public sector research agencies. The problem for rural producers
is the shortfall in available knowledge. Where this is produced by direct funding from
research councils and corporations there is little change in the application of results.
For example, the Wheat Research Council's Five Year Research and Development
Plan includes an ongoing assessment of the measures used to incorporate research
results into producers' practices.^^ The corporatisation of the researchcouncils means
that the producers themselves will have the opportunity of selling and licensing the
intellectual property which results from theresearch they fund.^^
The question of intellectual property in rural researchwas the subject of much
debate in the mid-1980s as the Commonwealth government was proposing the
introduction of plant variety rights. The subject arouses considerable passion and is
an ongoing issue for science policy-makers because the patentability of altered genes
changes the interactions of rural research.^O Proponents argue that the lack of
protection means that growers in Australia are denied theuse of new varieties because
Sunter, Personal Communication, 30.11.92
David Dickson, The New Politics ofScience, University of Chicago Press, USA, 1989, p. 77.
'CSIRO pledges to help farmers', p. 4.
Wheat Research Council, Annual Report 1988-89, Parl. Papers no. 34 of 1990, p. 3.
Peter Sheehan, 'Commercialising Science - the Government viewpoint', in Innovating Our Way
Out of the Rural Crisis, eds. C.D. Kimpton & L.W. Martinelli Royal Society of
Victoria/Australian Institute of Agricultural Science, 1987, pp. 59-65, p.65.
Paul Donnelly & Stuart Gray, 'What is the role of the Dairy Research and Development
Corporation in the Dairy Industry?', Agricultural Science, New Series, vol. 4, no. 3, May 1991,
pp. 39-41, p. 40.
Plant variety rights differ slightly from patents in that only the end product is protected and not
the product.
Anon, 'Plant variety rights in Australia', p. 291.
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the overseas owners would not benefit through royalties. Opponents argue that the
capacity to buy rights to new varieties would enable multi-national petro-chemical
companies to withold pest-resistant plants from the market or bind them into genetic
dependence on the manufacturers' produets.^i
In fact patenting does not 'lockaway' research information but requires the user
of the knowledge to pay the researcher or the holder of the patent for the right to use
the information. Such information is usually available six to twelve months after the
patent has been applied for.92 Since 1990 Australia has had a patent system similar to
most of those in Europe and Japan, and through which a provisional patent can be
issued at relatively low cost. This proves priority while researchers, owners and
investors assess the commerciability of the knowledge. Professor Adrienne Clark,
now Chair of CSIRO, believes that the research community in Australia is gradually
becoming used to theidea thattheir findings must be protected before they are aired at
conferences or in journals. Shesays thatwhenthe shiftto patenting beganboth patent
attorneys and scientists had trouble witheachother's perception's of priorities. Now
they, and the investing companies, are much more realistic about accommodating
everyone's interests into intellectual property agreements.93
6.3 Summary: rural research application
The trend in the application of rural research results from a system based on the
publicly-funded dissemination of knowledge to one based on the privatisation of
intellectual property is onewhich holds challenges for the science policy community.
The role of the Commonwealth and State governments is changing from one of being
the major source of funds to one of refereeing the process of knowledge transfer.
Governments now have a major responsibility to ensure that the Australiancommunity
gains maximum financial and social benefits from the knowledge produced by public
funds.
Havingcreateda climate in which private firms areencouraged to participate in
the research process, andin which researchers must seek intemational scientific status
through the marketplace as much as through scientific journals and conferences, the
role of governments is increasingly becoming one of facilitator of the process of
negotiation over intellectual property. Once more the rural science policy
subgovernment has taken the lead in the Australian science policy community by
enabling the members of the ruralscience subsystem to gainthe necessary knowledge
and skills to protect their interests. This is happening through workshops and
symposia where producers, financiers, patentattorneys andrural research corporation
managers can interact and exchange views and skills. Governments will also need to
91 RobertBell, 'The case against plant patenting', Search, vol. 16,no. 9-12, pp. 298-299, p. 298.
92 Robert Klupacs, 'The Power of thePatent', Today's Life Science, vol. 1, no. 3, September 1989,
pp. 14-16 & 19.
93 Adrienne Clark, 'New plants forold', p. 216.
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ensure that the licence and royalty agreements entered into by public research
institutions bring optimal, long-term benefits for the whole of the Australian
community. In this way the privatisation of rural research can benefit, rather than
disadvantage, mral producers in particular and the Australian taxpayerin general.
Conclusion
This final chapter on the outcomes of the transition in science policybetween 1965 and
1990 has demonstrated the way in which the knowledge produced in the science
system in Australia has changed as a result of the techno-economistic ideology of the
ALP governments since 1983.
In the higher education sector the knowledge produced is increasingly seen as
the intellectualproperty either of the scientist, the university, or the industrial partner
sponsoring research. Thedirect challenge to the normofdisinterestedness has created
conflict for those scientists who still seek to uphold the norms.
In CSIRO there was a traditional understanding that the knowledge produced by
the organisation was a public goodto be disseminated locally through interaction with
rural and manufacturing industry; and outsideAustraha throughthe pubhcation system
of the international scientific community. This has changed as govemment forced the
Organisation to align its research towards innovation andcommercialistation.
The manufacturing sector in Autralia, through foreign ownership, and trade
protection, hasnot perceived research and development asan integral partof economic
production. It has required considerable government intervention to change this
culture,but patent, know-how andBERDindicators show a markedchange towards a
more knowledge-based manufacturing sector.
Finally, and paradoxically the greatest changes in theproduction and application
of scientific knowledge in Australianeconomic production seem to be occurring in the
rural sector, where research and development has traditionally been funded
collectively, valued and systematically applied to production. The dynamic for change
has come equally from the enormously challenging field ofbiotechnology, and from a
government wishing to make Australian rural production less vulnerable to the
volatility of commodity prices. Rural research has always been at the forefront of
science policy in Australia. It is fitting that this sector should be demonstrating the
possible future role of govemment in its relationship with the scientific community -
that of ensuring that the Australian community reaps the full benefits of the public
funding of the creation of new scientific knowledge by acting as the facilitator of the
intellectual property trade.
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Conclusion
This study establishes that, between 1965 and 1990, there has been a radical shift in
the objectives ofscience policy in Australia, and the way in which governments have
sought to realise these objectives. These findings emerge from the above analysis of
the patterns ofchange in the formulation, articulation and implementation of science
policy. Such changes reflect the exercise of power, through control over rules,
resources and ideas, in the relationship betweengovemments and scientists; and the
way in which power is linked to the value systems which underlie interaction between
political and scientific actors. The study therefore links policy changes directly with
political and scientific ideology, and with the global economic imperatives which
challenge these ideologies and have also driven major policy changes in other areas of
policy such as the removal oftariff protection inmanufacturing industry.
The policy impact of the interaction between science and politics has received
scant attention in Australia and this study begins to address how conflicting or
complementary value systems affect the formulation, evaluation and implementation of
science policy. The policy community approach is the particular vehicle employed to
analyse the ways in which these values are articulated inthe interaction and expressed
as the exercise ofpower. Therefore this final chapter assesses the utility of the policy
community approach and the refinements to itwhich have developed in the course of
this analysis.
The chapter also reviews the changing patterns of interaction in the science
policy community, summarises the explanations ofchange, proposes a taxonomy of
science policy based on the relationship between government objectives for science
and the way in which they are achieved, and speculates on how the patterns identified
between 1965 and 1990 may extrapolate into the twenty first century.
1. The Policy Community Approach
The policy community approach used in this thesis follows the work ofPross (1986)
and Coleman and Skogstad (1990), and incorporates some of the suggestions made by
Atkinson and Coleman (1991) on how further studies would be able to clarify and
refine the approach. The approach is used here for several reasons Firstly, the
approach focuses on the actions and interactions of significant policy actors and
therefore fits well the realities of science policy as an area of government activity
which crosses many functional boundaries including rural, health andmanufacturing
research.
Secondly, the fact that the policy community approach also spans the divide
between public and private arenas of social activity is of particular use in the science
policy arena because the boundary between public and private research and
development in Australia has always been hazy. Using the approach in chapter four
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was very helpful in identifying and explaining, for example, the membership and
activities of the rural research trust fund advisorycommittees which, despite their title,
actually exercised considerable power in decision-making about the allocation of
resources in rural research.
Thirdly, the basic analytical distinction between two categories of: (1) the
subgovernment and (2) the attentive public, introduced by Pross, successfully
separates actors who actually make significant decisions from those who simply
influence such decisions. It is therefore a catalyst in recognising which actors are
excluded from routine decision-making. This is particularly useful in longitudinal
policy studies because themovement of individuals in and outof the subgovernment
identifies changing pattems of resource dependencies and ideas.
Fourthly, the approach cananalyse action inpolicy arenas thathave lowelectoral
impact and therefore are not usually widely debated in, oraffected bydecisions in the
more visible institutions of the political system. Science policy until the 1980s was
justsuch an arena inwhich the subgovernment and influential members of the attentive
public kept decision making very much within small networks of interaction.
Fifthly, the approach implicitly recognises the impact of significant actors
beyond national boundaries. This is ofparticular use inthe analysis of science policy
becauseof the closeintegration of domestic andinternational scientific communities.
For example, failure to recognise the importance of the OECD in spreading the
doctrine of techno-economism; or failure to recognise the capacity of governments to
use OECD endorsement as a means of legitimating pohcy change, would overlook an
important element in science policy-making. This aspect of policy communities is
discussed in greater detail below.
Sixthly, Pross's notion of pressure groups as the agents of change can explain
the rise andfall in the degree of influence exerted by these groups through time. This
concept allows the analyst to identify the role of such groups as the Australian
Academy of Science in the 1950s and 1960s, of AATSE in the late 1970s, and
FASTS,NSTAG and ASAin the 1980s. It alsoelucidates the demiseand reformation
of pressure groups in the science policy community as the importance of their ideas
and their policy salience wax and wane through time. An example of this
phenomenon is the incorporation ofFASTS into the Budget scrutiny process in 1985,
andits fall fromgrace in 1993 when it espoused an ideology in conflict with that of the
superstmctural subgovernment
Finally, Coleman and Skogstad's categorisation of different types of policy
network interaction has been particularly useful in disceming and identifying pattems
of interaction through timein the Australian science policy community. The traditional
pattems of interaction were generally clientele pluralist (see table4.2). This category
of network is one in which state interests are dependent on the skills, information and
commitment of weakly associated organised interests in the formulation and
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implementation of policy. Inchapter four the discussion ofthestructure of thescience
policy cormnunity in the 1960s demonstrates the way in which the science policy
subgovernment was very dependent on the participation of elite actors in the higher
education sector and CSIRO. In the manufacturing sector of science policy at this time
the networks were of the pressure pluralist type in which a few weakly associated
interest groups were engaged only in policy advocacy through the Australian Industry
Research Group. This contrasts with the situation in the rural research sector which
was strongly corporatist in nature. In this sector, producer interest groups and the
state combined in permanent agencies (the committees of therural research tmst funds)
which made decisions about the joint financing of research using common pooled
funds collected by the state on behalf of the producers.
By 1990 the rural research sector had been thoroughly corporatised as the
majority of the research trust funds are now research corporations with thecapacity to
raise funds in financial markets. The Hawke Government also corporatised decision-
making about CSIRO in a series of restructuring initiatives designed to re-orient the
country's largest research organisation towards the production of scientific knowledge
for use in economic production. The relationship between the subgovernment and
CSIRO is, strictly speaking, one of concertation because of the singular CSIRO
executive structure. However, the size and complexity of the Organisation, the
indirectnatureof the government's coercion, and the wayin which the subgovernment
was restructured to include commercial interests, favours the corporatist category as
themost adequate explanation ofcurrent relationships. Inthe manufacturing sector the
shift to corporatism has not occurred as organised interests remain weakly associated.
However, thepressure pluralist networks have changed tobecome clientele plurahst as
government has become dependent on businesses to allocate efficiently the
considerable financial resources foregone through the tax concession scheme.
The relationships within the higher education sector would appear to be
concertative. Here the relationship is a closed network in which an autonomous state
has created a single agency to allocate funds for research in the sector. At one stage in
the mid 1980s the relationship almost became state-directed but the fact that the
subgovernment always involved thehigher education research community in decision-
making about the restructuring; and that the significant actors in the restructuring
process (ASTEC, the ARGS Committee) were members of the existing
subgovemment means that the situation was notentirely oneof state-imposed change.
However, there are elements of a state-directed network in the way in which the
executive core has maintained control over the Co-operative Research Centres within
theDepartment of Prime Minister and Cabinet despite the promise to assign control to
an 'appropriate' agency once the scheme was established.
In all sectors there have been moves by subgovemment and the executive core to
include market interests and procedures in decision-making in science policy. The
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general shift in science policy interaction between 1965 and 1990 would therefore
seem to be from chentele pluralism to corporatistnetworks.
The actor-categorisation aspect of the policy community approach has been
further augmented in this thesis in order to expand the explanation of change. The
novel categories of international attentive public, and executive core are introduced in
order to distinguish, respectively; the influence on national science policy of
significant extra-national actors; and the capacity of significant actors in national
central agencies to veto action in a policy community of which they are not regular
members. In this way the thesis addresses two more of the conceptual 'challenges'
considered by Atkinson and Coleman tobenecessary for further development of the
approach. These are: theorising between communities and broader political
institutions; and integrating intemational arenas ofdecision-making into the approach.^
As mentioned above the category of international attentive public has been useful in
this analysis because ofthe close integration ofthe domestic and intemational scientific
communities. However, there are not many areas of modern government activity
which are immune to international influence, and the category would be of use in
analyses of other policy arenas.
Similarly, the notion ofthe executive core isofparticular utility in these days of
steady state resources and government by program management, particularly as the
control of financial resources is increasingly undertaken by departments of finance as
well as traditional Treasuries. Suchcentral agencies as the Department of Finance and
the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet play a considerable role in defining
overall budgets andsuggesting areas of possible cost-saving.
This thesis also introduces the category of superstructural subgovemment as a
logical extension of Pross's subgovemment. While this may seem to complicate an
approach whose major appeal lies in its simplicity and directness of applicability, it
helps to explain the increasingly centralised and complex structural changes that
occurred within the highly segmented science policy community. The science policy
community has shifted to a more stratified form. The most significant decisions about
the allocation of resources to the production of scientific knowledge are nowmadeby
specialised policy agencies in a superstructural subgovemment comprising both
scientists and non-scientists, according to prescribed techno-economic criteria of
relevance to economic production. Other policy agencies are still identifiable with the
sectoral subgovernments of science policy but the degree of autonomy they have
retained varies according to the perceptions in the superstractural subgovemment
about their centrahty to economic restmcturing.
A deficiency in the policy community approach, also noted by Atkinson and
Coleman, is that it lacks a perspective which will allow an explanation of the analysis
of the: '.. .relationships of powerand dependency that transcend andcolorindividual
Atkinson & Coleman, 'Policy networks, communities andproblems of governance', p. 163.
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transaction.'^ This thesis attempts to overcome thatproblem by incorporating into the
policy coimnunity approach Clegg's notions ofcontrol over structure, resources and
ideas. Here, the fundamental unit of analysis is the interaction which takes place
between significant actors in the policy arena. This interaction is structured into
networks of relationships which change through time and around issues. A policy
community may contain several such networks. The interaction which takes place
within the networks is motivated by the desire of significant actors to obtain or
maintain control of these vital factors. Such a concept of power is useful in explaining
why structures are established or not established in certain ways; in explaining the
differential distribution of resources; and in explaining why certain ideas remain
dormant and others germinate. The incorporation of this powerperspective into the
policy community approach allows the analyst to build up an understanding and
explanation of the complex interactions ofmodem, globalised policies by observing
and mapping the movement of actors, resources and ideas through geographical and
organisationalspace and through time.
In the science policy community the exercise of power is oriented around the
exchange of knowledge and resources, mainly ethical and financial. Chapter three
discusses the way in which scientists have reacted to new ideas and techniques
concerned with the organisation of research. It hasbeendifficult for many scientists
toseparate creativity, and political and financial accountability. However, the example
of the CSIRO Divisionof Wildlife and Etymology given in chapter seven shows that
creativity and accountability are notmutually incompatible. Chapter four shows how
new decision-making structures and programs evolve in response to these new ideas
with such concepts as research foresight borrowing heavily from policy process
theory. Chapter five traces changes in thepattern of allocation of public resources to
research activities and documents many instances in which a government with a
techno-economistic ideology about science imposes on researchers the need to
compete for public funding, and the need to consider the private sector as a source of
finance. The thesis shows that scientists' control over structures, resources and ideas
has diminished as the paradigm of scientists' autonomy has been superseded by the
paradigm of economic relevance.
The thesis thus links the exercise of power to the value systems and ideologies
of the actors. As Atkinson and Coleman suggest;'.. .there is no reason why networks
cannot also be distinguished in terms of ideologieal resources'.^ In this thesis the
notion of ideology is linkedto economic andpolitical change in explaining action in
thepolitical system and the science system. It was shown in chapter twohow various
political ideologies have shaped science policy in Australia, and how colonialism and
conservatism have gradually given way to techno-economism. Merton's concept of
^ Ibid., p. 161.
3 Ibid..
the ethos of science, contained in four principle norms guiding the behaviour of
scientists, is used to explain why scientific actors and political actors are so often in
conflict over science policy objectives. Scientists believe that autonomy is essential
for creativity. Political actors argue that research is simply another area of activity
funded from the public purse and therefore should be accountable to political norms.
In the 1980s the ideology of techno-economism proved more compelling in enforcing
such norms than previous conservative ideologybecauseof the inherent characteristic
belief in the legitimacy of governmentinterventionin social activity directed towards
national interests.
2. Changing Patterns of Interaction
Within the science policy community in Australia, patterns of control over rules,
resources and ideas have changed quite markedly in the 25-year period under
examination here. Overall there has been a shift away from control by elite individuals
or elite groups of scientists, interacting informally with significant actors in the
political system to maintain autonomous research organisations, towards a more
centralised and corporatised control of generalised research programs by mixed
committees of scientific and pohtical actors.
The thesis examines four separate subgovemments of science policy, each with
its attentive public, and identifies each as having developed distinct patterns of
interaction. The analysis shows that the decisionsmade in a particular science policy
subgovernment traditionally tended to be unco-ordinated with the other
subgovemments, and this has largely remained the casedespite the establishment of a
superstractural subgovernment consisting of overarching techno-pohtical agencies co
ordinating and controlling resources and ideas within each sector. The changing
patterns of interaction have produced different outcomes in each of the
subgovemments of the science policy community. These outcomes are summarised in
table 9.1.
In 1965 the higher education subgovernment consisted of a few senior
scientists, located in elite research organisations and universities, who were able, by
influence and veto, to control four key areas of action: ideas about the way the higher
education research system should be organised; the socialisation, indoctrination and
training of new scientists; the development of funding agencies; and the allocationof
funds from those agencies. Individualgrants programsproliferatedon an ad hoc basis
to suit scientists' disciplinary interests. Since then there has been a rationalisation in
which responsibility for most of the programs (excluding the NH&MRC)has been
relocated to a single agency covering a multiplicity of disciplines and operating under
increased ministerial control. The selection process has been made more competitive
by channelling recurrentresearch funds into competitive grants, and by opening up the
higher education research system to a wider range of institutions. Now research
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projects are increasingly selected and designed by teams of researchers often in
collaboration with industry and public sector researchorganisations.
Table 9.1: Changing patterns of interaction and their outcomes in
Australian science policy, 1965-90
Resources Restructuring Evaluation Knowledge and
its avvlication
Higher
Educ
ation
recurrent funds
+ special
research grants
X'
ARC
&
CRCs
individual researchers &
universities
4.
research teams &
Co-operative Research
Centres
peer-reviewed
excellence
i
mixed academic and
business committee
review
individual publications
& extension services
i
publications, patents
& research companies
selling intellectual
property
CSIRO
appropriations
+ 'contributions'
30% external
fund generation
discipline-based
divisions
i
industry aligned
institutes
individual researcher
& problem-centred
evaluation
i
organisational,
universal criteria based
selection
publications &
extension
services
publications, contracts
& collaborations
Secon
dary
AIRDS grants
'I
tax concession
& IR&D grants
firm-based
contracted
& sponsored
product level
X
industry level
imported taow-bow
indigenously produced
know-bow
Rural levies
i
levies &
venture capital
fijnds
i
corporations
scientists & producers
4
producer-market
communal extension
i
private intellectual
property
337
In 1965 CSIRO as a subgovernment dominated the Australian science policy
community through the influence of its scientists in the allocation of funds, in the
formulation of ideas about the way in which the production of scientific knowledge
should be organised and in theshaping of government objectives for the application of
research results. Although defence research had a larger budget, the scientists in
CSIRO had virtual autonomy over the selection, organisation and dissemination of
new scientific knowledge in the non-defence and non-medical sector. The CSIRO
Executive expected minimum political interference in the allocation of resources to
maintain the Organisation, and the idea of non-scientists being involved in the
management of research was an anathema. Even the leaders of the industries which
CSIRO was legally bound to support were regarded by scientists as incapable of
making strategic decisions about future industrial needs.
For CSIRO changing policy outcomes have resulted in a re-orientation of the
Organisation from ad hoc problem-solving for industry, and the pursuit of research
projectsbecauseof theirintrinsic scientific interest, to proactive selection of research
projects whichcanbe commercially exploited in Australia. The changes involve a re
alignment of the research divisions into institutes which closely parallel sectors of
industrial economic production; rationalisation of the Organisation's appropriation
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funds by restricting annual increases to those necessary to maintain real value; the
imposition by govemment of the requirement that thirty per cent of the Organisation's
total expenditure should be from external sources; andthe development of a standard
set of prioritisation criteria by which research proposals in all divisions must be
evaluated.
The changes in the manufacturing industry subgovemment have perhaps been
the most dramatic in terms of their impact on the amountof research undertaken. This
sector of economic production has traditionally laggedbehind the others in terms of
the level of investment in research and development. Innovation has been imported
rather than indigenously produced. In 1965 there was no direct govemment subsidy
to manufacturing industry research beyond the tax deductions normally allowed for
economic production. The system of tariffs on imported technology protected
manufacturers from the need to compete with technological innovation developed
overseas. The industry research and development incentives introduced in 1968
favoured large companies with existing research and development facilities. There
was no attemptto prioritise among areas of production or to evaluate the capacity of
the firm to carry the new knowledge through to viable commercial products and
processes.
By 1990 research anddevelopment as a percentage of production had increased
in all manufacturing industries but still lagged behind the OECD average except in
electronics and computing, non-electrical machinery and ferrous metals. The
incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in research and development had
broadened to include research into marketing and promotions. The grants system had
been developed to cover three main objectives: to encourage firms not formerly
undertaking research to do so; to encourage firms to collaborate in pre-product
research; and to foster co-operation between private firms and public sector research
organisations. In addition scientists in public research organisations were being
encouraged to involve potential developers in the early stages of their research. The
150percent tax concession was introduced in 1985-86 andwasa majorbreakthrough
in manufacturing science policybecause it was a formal recognition by govemmentof
the need for ongoing and flexible support for firms which may have to wait for ten
years before being able to appropriate the gains on their research and development
investment. One of the results has been a decreasing dependence on overseas
technical know-how and increased overseas payments for Australian technical know-
how.
In 1965 raral research activity had been collectivised for many years. Tmst
funds existed for the four major industries (wool; wheat; meat and dairy) as well as for
a few minor ones. The Commonwealth Government acted as agent for these rural
industries in four ways: using its tax powers to collect compulsory levies from
producers; adding public sector contributions; administering the tmst funds in which
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the research monies were held; and overseeing fund management. There was no
government direction about the use to which the funds were put. This was decided by
the members of advisory committees which managed the trust funds. Scientists and
producers were the most powerful members of the rural subgovernment and their
interests often clashed as they tried to manipulate resources and structures in order to
control the research undertaken. The majority of rural research was undertaken by
CSIRO and State department laboratories. The resultant knowledge was disseminated
through extension services provided by State Governments subsidised by specific
purpose and special appropriation funds from the Commonwealth Govemment.
By 1990 the trust funds had been corporatised to allow rural industries to raise
extra funds for research from private, non-producer sources. This has decreased both
producer and researcher control in favour of agribusiness interests. At the same time
appropriation funds for rural research in CSIRO, particularly for rural manufacturing,
were decreased. The result has been increasing privatisation of the results of rural
research formerly considered to be a public good.
Many of these changes occurred during the last eight years of the twenty-five
year period. The higher education research system remained fundamentally
unchanged until the termination of the binary system, and the establishment of the
ARC and the restructuring of research funds in 1987-88. The organisational and
funding changes to CSIRO which began tentatively in the early 1980s were completed
with statutory amendments and changed external financial expectations in 1986.
Similarly the incentives for manufacturing research and development were
foreshadowed in the sunset clauses of the AIRDIS scheme but the old system
remained in place until 1986. In 1985 the first of the rural research trust funds were
corporatised, and control of the minor funds was co-ordinated through the Rural
Industries Research Corporation.
However, the ideas for these developments were not entirely new. Many had
been brought to the attention of governments at regular intervals over the twenty-five
year period. For example, the income tax concession had been discussed in the early
1960s when a similar scheme had been introduced into Canada, and again at the end of
the 1970s when science policy began to come under increasing economic scrutiny.
Research centres involving co-operation between higher education, industry, and
public sector research organisations had explicitly been suggested by the Vernon
Report in 1965. The inclusion of industrial experience as part of the training of new
scientists has often been advocated as a way of broadening the relevance of basic
research conducted in universities and CSIRO. Likewise, the first OECD report on
science policy in Australia in 1974 recommended a wider definition of research and
development activity to be subsidised through the incentives scheme. Scientists
reporting on the dissemination of research findings in 1962 pointed out that the
intemational publication of research which could be commercially exploited is virtually
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a 'charitable donation to the rest of the world'. Nearly twenty years later the same
observation was made in a detailed analysis of ruralresearch by economists. In 1966
Encel and Inglis had suggested that the results of research conducted in government
laboratories wasunlikely to be patented or developed unless governments intervened
to ensure that it was done. In 1964, Boas, Chief of Tribophysics at CSIRO,
suggested that Parliament should have a science and teehnology committee, and
scientists should be employed at Cabinet level to ensure that the political systemwas
aware ofthe way inwhich the results ofreseareh could be used to benefit the nation.^
The question now needs tobe asked: why did the changes not oceur until the 1980s?
3. The reasons for change
This study argues that the causes for the implementation of science policy changes in
the 1980s rather than the 1960s or 1970s can be found in a eo-incidenee of fit among
threeevents: the electionof a Commonwealth government with a political ideology of
techno-eeonomism; a receptiveness in the subgovemment to the articulation of ideas
within theintemational attentive public about the rationahsation of science poliey; and
thedecreasing availability of public sector resources as commodity prices fell and the
technological balance of payments deteriorated. The election of a government, in
which the most significant actors in the scienee policy arena believed that the
restructuring of economic production should be science-based, meant that these aetors
were prepared to exereise power, in the form of their capacity to control rules,
resources and ideas, in order to achieve these techno-economistic outcomes.
Although Whitlam had expressed a similar ideology in the years leading up to
the election of an ALP Government in 1972, this policy rhetoric had not been
translated into action because Whitlam had used science policy as a device to expose
the incapacity of the Liberal-Country Party to address techno-economie issues of
industrial restructuring. He was not committed to effecting real change in the
produetion ofscientific knowledge inAustralia. The science portfolio was combined
with responsibility for the independence ofNew Guinea and given toa politician who
was much more interested in foreign affairs thanscience.^ Whitlam himself, having
spoken extensively on science poliey in Parliament between 1964 and 1972, barely
mentions science in his published account of his governments. This apathy allowed
influential scientists to retain control of the subgovernments and to resist innovation.
The postponement ofthe re-establishment ofa science poliey advisory committee, and
the 'capture' of theScience Task Force Report by academies advocating Polanyi-style
autonomy are examples of this resistance.^
Frasereventually established ASTEC but his conservative ideology delayed the
implementation of techno-economistic recommendations coming from the numerous
^ Boas, 'Science in Industry', p. 236.
^ Morrison, Interview, 1.11.89.
6 Whitlam, The Whitlam Years 1972-1975, Viking, Sydney, 1986.
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government inquiries into the science system throughout his terms of office. The
initial ASTEC Report; the Birch Report into CSIRO; the Industrial Assistance
Commission Inquiry into Rural Research; and the evaluation of theAIRDIS scheme all
documented the need for restructuring the publicly funded production of scientific
knowledge to fit the needs of the changingAustralian economy.
It was not until the election of the Hawke Government in 1983 that there was a
coincidence of commitment to techno-economism in the form of the appointment of
Barry Jones asMinister for Science, and thereceptiveness of significant actors in the
policy community to his vision of the way in which the science system should be
restructured after years of incrementalism. This commitment and receptiveness was
necessary in order to overcome the intransigence of those members of the
subgovemment and attentive public whose previous control of the system was under
threat. Jones' commitment to effecting change in the production of scientific
knowledge in Australia, coupled with his lack of a factional political base, alienated
him from both scientific and political actors and lead to his eventual demise as
minister, butmany scientists joined thepublic in bemoaning theloss to the ministry of
apolitician so dedicated to the restructuring ofAustralia's economic production.'^
Jones' restructuring rationale was based on the Australia's worsening terms of
trade. Theprices of commodities which composed themajority of Australia's exports
were falling. Between 1980 and 1983 the real value of sugar fell by 64 per cent; the
price ofwheat by 49 per cent; the price ofwool by 35 per cent; and the price ofcoal by
22 per cent.^ At the same time the pace of technological change through
computerisation was increasing the price of imported goods. The resulting
deterioration in the technological balance of payments, together with Australia's
broader structural economic problems, gave added impetus to Jones' arguments about
increasing the scientific and technical base of Australia's economic production. He
immediately enlarged the membership of subgovemmental agencies which controlled
the allocation of resources to research to include entrepreneurs and scientists with
experience in commercialising new, high technology processes and products. This
opened thegates to a radically corporatised science policy.
4. A Taxonomy of Science Policies
We can now compare this new type of science policy with otherpossibilities. Four
distinct types ofpolicy can be identified: elitist; nationalistic, corporatised; andmarket-
oriented. The taxonomy is based on the understanding that policy is a result of an
affinity between certain types of ideas, ideology and interaction.^ Table 9.2 specifies
the types. Two of the types - elitist and corporatised - have predominated in the
^ Phillip Adams, 'Australia cries: bring back Barry', Weekend Australian, 19-20 May, 1990, p. 2.
^ Foster and Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics, p. 286.
9 The types of interaction used are those articulated by Coleman and Skogstad tocategorise policy
networks. Their typology given in table 1.3 in chapter one.
Australian governments. The third, market pluralist, would be the choice of a
government committed to neo-classical theories of allocating public resources. A
fourth - nationalistic - occurs when governments or their agents assume total control
over the science system.
Table 9.2: A typology of science policies
IDEOLOGY IDEAS INTERACTION
POLICY TYPE
ELITIST CONSERVATIVE SCIENTIFIC
AUTONOMY
CLIENTELE-
PLURALIST
NATIONALISTIC SOCIALIST COLLECTIVISM CONCERTATIVE
CORPORATISED
TECHNO-
ECONOMISTIC
POLITICAL &
ECONOMIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
CORPORATIST
MARKET-
ORIENTED LIBERAL
ECONOMIC
RATIONALITY
PRESSURE
PLURALIST
Elitist science policy tends to emerge when conservative ideology encourages ideas of
scientific autonomy about the way publicly-funded research is organised, and in
decision-making about the overall objectives for the use of scientific knowledge.
Actors are allowed to participate in policy-making and clientele pluralist networks
prevail as govemment actors come to depend on the expertise, contacts and knowledge
of elite scientists to formulate and evaluate policy. Under conditions of scientific
autonomy there is minimal intervention or co-ordination by government of the
priorities or management of researchers.
By contrast, nationalistic science policy involves the control of all research
through a centralised political agency interacting through concertative networks with a
unified science system operating on collective principles of socialised welfare. The
science system becomes a national icon and the principal objectives for science are the
glorification and justification of the state. This is the type of science policy envisaged
in the works of Bemal discussed in chapter three. Science policies which exhibit the
characteristics of concertation are rare in liberal democracies because it is doubtful that
under such political systems scientists will be totally deprived of participation in
decision-making about the way scientific knowledge is produced and applied. Only in
wartime has such control been imposed on scientists. However, elements of
concertative science policy can be found in defence science where scientists, working
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under the control of the armed forces, operate in a science subsystem isolated from the
norms and values of the intemational as well as the national scientific community.
Corporatised science policies are developed by governments wishing to co
ordinate research on a national level towards the achievement of primarily economic
rather than cultural goals. Governments co-opt the leaders of economic and scientific
production to develop and implement sciencepolicy, They use political power in the
form of control over the rules, resources and ideas for science, to orient the production
of scientific knowledge towards economic objectives. Scientists are expected to select
and organise their work according to political and economic as well as scientific
criteria. Resources are therefore allocated by governments according to project
evaluations of relevance to economic needs. Groups participate in the processes of
prioritisation, selection and evaluation, but overall objectives are decided by
government.
Market oriented science policy means that governments allow market forces to
decide the allocation of resources to science. The objective is also broadly techno-
economistic, but governments' role is minimal and restricted to creating a productive
environment free of government-imposed constraints on the flow of capital, materials
and labour. Networks take a predominantly pressure pluralist form in which groups
approach government independently, and are assigned an advocacy role by
autonomous state actors. For those situations in which market failure occurs, for
example, the production of basic scientific knowledge, some government support may
be available through the university system or through government sponsorship of
research in private laboratories. Scientists organise the production of new knowledge,
which is commercialised either through the 'market pull' of the need to innovate or
reduce the costs of production; or through 'science push' by breakthroughs in
scientific knowledge being introduced to industry by researchers. Firms may join
industry associations which fund pre-development research on a collective basis.
The general pattern of change in science policy in Australia between 1965 and
1990 is a one of a shift from elitist to corporatised science policy. The elite scientists
of Menzies' era have been superseded by the science policy committees and councils
of the Hawke governments. The autonomy of CSIRO, and the industrial and
university granting schemes have been replaced by mechanisms of accountability,
albeit couched in the policy rhetoric of autonomy. Resources which had been
allocated to the research projects chosen by scientists must now be justified in techno-
economistic terms of relevance to economic production. Scientists in significant
In categorising this type of science policy the author decided to use the term corporatist to
designate the type of policy occurring when interaction is mainly of the corporatist type described
by Coleman and Skogstad. This is because the use of the term immediately conjures up concepts
of co-option, exclusion, mixed membership, and participant commitment to implementation
which are central to this type of policy.
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positions in peak organisations are co-opted into subgovernments as full-time policy
makers.
The change has been most marked in manufacturing research policy which, in
1965, was closest to the market model (given the constraints of tariffprotection on
innovation). In 1990 manufacturing science policy is effectively corporatised with
wide industry representation on the committees, councils andboards of management
which allocate resources to researchand development. Throughthe mechanism of the
grants schemes governments can direct resources towards research which will
restructureindustry. Through the mechanism of the tax concession govemments can
create the conditions which may encourage in Australian manufacturing the innovative
ethos which has been stifled by protectionist industry policies and the inertia of
conservative political ideology.
Market-oriented science policy has not yetbeen experienced in Australia. Such a
science policy would logically involve:
• the abolition of the Prime Minister's Science Council and all science policy
co-ordinating committees;
• the complete autonomy ofscientists in research organisations, including the
allocation of resources and the selection and management of research
projects;
• the complete privatisation of CSIRO and other public research
organisations;
• the abolition of the 150 per cent tax concession to deter the undertaking of
non-appropriable researchby business;
• the withdrawal of the government component from rural research
corporations;
• cessation of subsidy for extension services to rural and manufacturing
industry;
• payment by rural and manufacturing producers for environmental research;
• restriction of the support of science by govemment to the production of
basic science in universities;
• non-eligibility of applied research projects for govemment higher education
research grants;
• cessation of govemment subsidisation of collaboration between industry
and higher education;
• restriction of funds for research (including medical and defence) to that
which cannot be purchased for less cost overseas; which is not available
overseas; or which is required in order to adapt scientific knowledge
purchased overseas to Australian conditions. This research would be
undertaken on contract in private laboratories.
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The success of such a policy would rest upon three basic assumptions: firstly,
that scientists would produce research results in the form required by the market and
that scientists would actively promote their work to firms; secondly, that firms, rather
than importing new technology, would actively seek to use scientific knowledge
produced in Australia in order to innovate; and thirdly, that scientists and industrial
producers would reach an accommodation on the conflict between the ownership of
intellectual property and the publication of research results.
5. Future Policy Options
An evaluation of the effectiveness of science policy is not a central objective of this
thesis which instead concentrates on explaining how and why policy has changed.
However, having reached an understanding of the dynamics which underlie observed
changes, it is tempting to anticipate what further changes may occur.
At the end of 1990 there had been seven years of increasingly corporatised
science policy in Australia. Considerable government-induced structural change
throughout the science system, informed by ideas of techno-economism and combined
with new techniques for the prioritisation, selection and evaluation of research
activities have already produced some 'positive' outcomes in the forms of: an
improving technological balance of payments; greater investment by manufacturing
and other industries in research and development; a closer alignment of CSIRO to the
needs of economic producers; and, through the CRCs and other mechanisms, a similar
alignment of the higher education research system. Rural industry in particular stands
at the threshold of a revolution in production based on genetic engineering and other
advances in biotechnology which can be commercialised through rural research
corporations. The corporatist ethos fits an ALP ideology that legitimates government
intervention in the relationship between the science system and economic production.
With the re-election of the Keating govemment in 1993 it is likely that science policy
will at least remain corporatised in type, with, if anything, increasing prioritisation of
portfolio allocations to research by the superstructural Co-ordinating Committee on
Science and Technology.
It is difficult to judge how much a Liberal-National Party govemment would
have moved towards a market-oriented science policy. The science policy announced
just before the 1993 election is the most explicit of a series of vaguely-worded
statements which the Coalition has developed. The 1993 statement emphasised the
effects of tax restructuring in liberating private industry funds for investment in
innovation. That part of the policy is certainly market-oriented and free of govemment
intervention. However, it is unlikely, given the conflict that a corporatist science
policy provoked between the political and science systems, that the L-NP policy
rhetoric of allowing industry to lead the way in the prioritisation of research would in
fact be pohtically feasible.
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The implementation of such a model would create considerable conflict in the
science system and among private producers whose research and development
activities have previously been subsidised by government. It is likely that such a
policy would be short-lived and would rapidly revert to elitism as scientists and
industrial producers used political influence to allocate public resources to support
their activities in the name of national well being; or to corporatised science policy as
governments attempted to redress a worsening technological balance of payments as
industries reverted to old habits of importing technology once the carrot of government
subsidies was removed from science policy.
In addition the introduction of such a sciencepolicy in Australia would result in
the demise of basic research. There is verylittle tradition withinthe Australian science
system ofprivate sponsorship of basic research, There are no large philanthropic
foundations as there are in the USA; and, until recently, no tradition of business
interaction in university research as in Germany. The prolongation of the British
colonial ideology in universities hasmeant a highlevel of dependence on government
support. Under a market-oriented science policy, governments would only support
basicresearch in the higher education system for three purposes: to retain the services
of researchers of a sufficient calibre to train new scientists at a lower cost than could
be bought overseas; to maintain a pool of knowledge adequate to adapt and apply
scientific knowledge purchased outside Australia; and to meet the basic science
requirementsof industrialproducers.
Therefore it seems to be inevitable that there will be a continuation of
government support for the production of scientific knowledge for private as well as
public purposes. The most likely changes over the remaining years of the twentieth
century will be: theincorporation ofcontrol ofthe prioritisation ofmedical and defence
research into the superstructural subgovemment; and theexpansion of the concept of
research and development as anexport industry aswell asa form of aidto developing
countries.
The first development will increasingly be perceived by governments to be
necessary as medical research consumes an ever-increasing proportion of public
resources allocated to research without the wider spectrum of evaluative decision-
making based on economic as well as cultural criteria. The second development, that
of exporting the production of scientific knowledge developed in Australia, holds the
greatest potential economic benefits for Australia. The rationale would be to sell the
capacity to generate scientific knowledge as well as the knowledge itself. It would
involve leasing sections of major public research organisations to overseas customers
who wish to purchase the productive capacity of Australian scientists in a relatively
11 ABS datashows that, in 1989, only 11 %of all research anddevelopment expenditure on pureand
strategicbasic researchoriginatedfrom theprivatesector.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Research and Experimental Development: All Sector Summary
1989-90. Cat no. 8112.0, p. 5.
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low-cost environnient. This will be most pronounced in the areas of biotechnology,
rural, mining and environmental research, because ofthe expertise already available.
Likely customers would be small or newly industrialising countries which cannot
afford to establish research capacities in these areas. If scientists' creative capaeities
can bedirected in this way then, instead ofbeing the 'quarry ofAsia', Australia might
become the laboratory for the newly-developing countries ofthe Asia-Pacific region.
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